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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this study is the rights-based normative overlap of labour and administrative law in 
public employment. As the judiciary appeared to be unable to agree on a unified approach to 
the application of the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action to public 
employment, it was clear that the complexity and multi-dimensional character of the debate 
required analysis of existing approaches to the regulation of the public employment relationship. 
The following initial research question was formulated: To what extent does (and should) the 
constitutionalised rights to fair labour practices (s 23) and just administrative action (s 33) 
simultaneously find application in the regulation of public employment relationships? 
In answering this question, certain realities had to be acknowledged, the most important being 
that the debate in question jurisprudentially revealed itself to be a jurisdictional turf-war between 
the Labour and High Courts, rather than proper consideration of the relevant substantive 
arguments and underlying normative considerations. This called for an additional dimension to 
be added to the research question, namely consideration of the extent to which the ss 23 and 
33 rights are informed by variable and possibly different normative principles and whether these 
rights allow for cooperative regulation of public employment in accordance with the doctrine of 
interdependent fundamental rights. 
This became the primary focus of the study. In an attempt to simplify the debate, a deliberate 
decision was taken to limit the scope of the normative study to South Africa with its own historic 
influences, structures and constitutional considerations. The study shows that both labour and 
administrative law (as constitutionally informed) share concern for equity-based principles. This 
is evident from the flexible contextually informed perspectives of administrative law 
reasonableness in relation to labour law substantive fairness, as well as a shared concern for 
and approach to procedural fairness. Once simplified, and in the absence of any undue positive 
law complexity, the public employment relationship, at both a normative and theoretical level, 
furthermore shows no substantive status difference with private employment relationships. It is, 
however, accepted that there are job and sector-specific contextual differences. In the absence 
of substantive normative conflict between these branches of law and in the absence of a 
fundamental (as opposed to contextual) difference between public and private employment, 
there appears to be no reason to ignore the constitutional jurisprudential calls for hybridity, 
otherwise termed the doctrine of interdependence. The idea of normatively interdependent 
rights expresses the Constitution’s transformative vision (through the idea of flexible conceptual 
contextualism) and recognises that human rights may overlap. This also means that where such 
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overlap exists, rights should be interpreted and applied in a mutually supportive and cooperative 
manner that allows for the full protection and promotion of those rights. In giving expression to 
the interdependent normative framework of constitutional rights, these norms (absent any 
substantive rights-based conflict) should then be used by the judiciary as an interpretative tool 
to align specific labour law and general administrative law in the regulation of public 
employment relationships. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die fokus van hierdie studie is die regsgebaseerde normatiewe oorvleueling van arbeids- en 
administratiefreg in die openbare diensverhouding. Aangesien dit blyk dat die regsbank nie kon 
saamstem oor ‘n eenvormige benadering tot die toepassing van die regte op billike 
arbeidspraktyke en regverdige administratiewe optrede op die openbare diensverhouding nie, 
het die kompleksiteit en multi-dimensionele karakter van die debat dit genoodsaak om 
bestaande benaderings tot die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding te analiseer. In die 
lig hiervan is die volgende aanvanklike navorsingsvraag geformuleer: Tot watter mate vind die 
grondwetlik neergelegde regte tot billike arbeidspraktyke (a 23) en regmatige administratiewe 
optrede (a 33) gelykmatig toepassing in die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding en tot 
watter mate hoort die regte gelykmatig toepassing te vind? 
In antwoord op die vraag is sekere realiteite geïdentifiseer, waarvan die belangrikste is dat die 
debat in die regspraak grootliks neergekom het op ‘n jurisdiksionele magstryd tussen die 
Arbeids- en Hooggeregshowe, eerder as werklike oorweging van die relevante substantiewe 
argumente en onderliggende normatiewe oorwegings. Dit het die byvoeging van ’n verdere 
dimensie tot die navorsingsvraag genoodsaak, naamlik oorweging van die mate waartoe die aa 
23 en 33 regte deur buigsame en moontlik verskillende normatiewe beginsels beïnvloed word, 
en ook of hierdie regte ruimte laat vir mederegulering van die openbare diensverhouding in 
terme van die leerstuk van interafhanklikheid van fundamentele regte?  
Laasgenoemde het die primêre fokus van die studie geword. In ‘n poging om die debat te 
vereenvoudig, is doelbewus besluit om die strekking van die normatiewe studie te beperk tot 
Suid-Afrika, met eiesoortige historiese invloede, strukture en grondwetlike oorwegings. Soos die 
normatiewe studie ontvou het, wys die studie dat beide arbeids- en administratiefreg (soos 
grondwetlik beïnvloed) ‘n gemeenskaplike belang in billikheids-gebaseerde beginsels openbaar. 
Daar is ‘n versoenbaarheid tussen die kontekstueel beïnvloedbare en buigsame redelikheids-
perspetief van die administratiefreg, soos gesien in vergelyking met substantiewe billikheid in 
die arbeidsreg. Voorts heg beide die arbeids- en administratiefreg ‘n gemeenskaplike waarde 
aan, en volg beide ‘n gemeenskaplike benadering tot, prosedurele billikheid. Terselfdertyd, en 
in die afwesigheid van onnodige positiefregtelike kompleksiteit, blyk daar op beide ‘n 
normatiewe en teoretiese vlak geen substantiewe verskil in status tussen die openbare 
diensverhouding en die privaat diensverhouding te wees nie. Dit word egter aanvaar dat daar 
wel werk- en sektor-spesifieke kontekstuele verskille bestaan. In die afwesigheid van 
substantiewe normatiewe konflik tussen die twee vertakkinge van die reg en in die afwesigheid 
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van ‘n fundamentele (in vergelyking met kontekstuele) verskil tussen diensverhoudings in die 
openbare en privaatsektore, blyk daar geen rede te wees om die grondwetlike jurisprudensiële 
vereiste van hibriditeit, ook genoem die leerstuk van die interafhanklikheid van grondwetlike 
regte, te ignoreer nie. Die idee van normatiewe interafhanklike regte gee uitdrukking aan die 
Grondwet se visie van transformasie (via die idee van buigsame konsepsuele kontekstualisme) 
en erken dat menseregte soms oorvleuel. Dit beteken ook dat waar so ‘n oorvleueling bestaan, 
regte ïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word in ‘n wedersyds ondersteunende en samewerkende 
wyse wat voorsiening maak vir die volle beskerming en bevordering van daardie regte. 
Erkenning van die interafhanklike normatiewe raamwerk van grondwetlike regte hoort daartoe 
te lei dat die regsbank daardie norme (in die afwesigheid van regsgebaseerde konflik) as 
interpretasie-hulpmiddel gebruik om die spesifieke arbeidsreg met die algemene 
administratiefreg te versoen in die regulering van die openbare diensverhouding. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LABOUR 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Both labour and administrative law comprise of rules regulating legal relationships 
characterised by unequal power distribution: The employer holds managerial power 
over the employee, while the State holds public power over the citizen. Both regulate 
areas of interest to society in general. However, neither lends itself to precise definition. 
Attempts by authors to define these branches of law can best be labelled descriptions 
from a personal academic perspective or focus. 
Labour law can loosely be described as the body of rules designed to regulate the 
employment relationship through the application of the concept of fairness, of which the 
most explicit recognition is to be found in section 23(1) of the Constitution.1 In its purest 
sense, administrative law is seen as “a framework of normative principles of general 
application to administrative and executive bodies which guide them in their acts and 
decisions and provide the basis for their supervision”.2  
The application of administrative law to employment disputes has become a 
controversial topic over the past few years.3 Historically, administrative law principles 
                                            
1
 As a body of legal rules, Basson et al Essential Labour Law 2 describes labour law’s focus as the 
regulation of “relationships between employers and employees, between employers and trade unions, 
between employers’ organisations and trade unions, and relationships between the State, employers, 
employees, trade unions and employers’ organisations”. 
2
 Galligan Administrative procedures and administrative oversight: their role in promoting public service 
ethics Multi-country Seminar on Normative and Institutional Structures Supporting Public Service Ethics, 
Paris 5 November 1997 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/59/1850585.htm (2005/02/21). As a result, of 
the broad scope of administrative law, it influences a vast range of administrative areas, as well as an 
abundance of institutions and agencies of an administrative nature. See Hoexter New Constitutional and 
Administrative Law: Volume Two 4.   
3
 See PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC) at par 5. 
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were called upon to protect employees’ rights in areas where labour law in itself was not 
yet sufficiently developed to advance labour rights.4 Over time labour law incorporated 
administrative law notions of rationality and fair process.5 As labour law, in its earlier 
form, was primarily based on common law principles,6 legislation was eventually called 
upon to address the deficiencies of the common law. Although fairness was the catalyst 
for these developments, it was not specifically acknowledged as such until the specific 
integration of the concept of fair labour practices into the employment relationship by 
the Wiehahn Commission. Through these evolutionary steps, the focus of labour law on 
fairness gradually gained significance with the adoption of consequential regulatory 
legislation, promoting an employment-specific notion of fairness.7 The adoption of the 
interim and later final Constitution of South Africa altered the historical position 
fundamentally.8 Both the right to just administrative action (s 33),9 and the right to fair 
labour practices (s 23)10 are now enshrined in the Bill of Rights. As far as administrative 
action is concerned, PAJA11 gives legislative effect to s 33 of the Constitution, while, as 
far as labour practices are concerned, the LRA remains the most important piece of 
                                            
4
 See PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC) at par 11.  See also Editor 2004 
20(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
5
 See Editor 2004 20(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version); Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 
(11) BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
6
 See Grogan Workplace Law 1. 
7
 A very important development in the post-1995 era for labour legislation can be found in the inclusion of 
the Public Service under the scope of both the LRA and the BCEA. Section 213 of the LRA specifically 
provides that a person qualifies as a protected employee in term of the LRA if he or she works for the 
State. Consequently, the State is now regarded as an ‘employer’. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 
Volume One: Individual Labour Law 119; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 
14. 
8
 This ‘historical position’ refers to labour law’s common law basis, as left unaltered by the labour 
legislation put in place by the legislator. See also Editor 2004 20(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
9
 Section 33(1) holds that everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
10
 Section 23(1) proclaims that everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
11
 In Simelela v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) 
BLLR 1085 (LC) at par 40, the Labour Court acknowledged that the provisions of PAJA “reflect a 
codification of the principles of administrative law developed by our courts under the common law and the 
Constitution”. 
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legislation. PAJA regulates the conduct (administrative action)12 of organs of state.13 On 
the other hand, the LRA14 focuses on the regulation of employment relationships, 
whether private or public.15 Upholding the distinction between the regulation of State 
conduct as regulator in terms of PAJA and conduct of the State as employer in terms of 
the LRA proves problematic, as many employment decisions taken by the State can 
potentially be categorised as administrative action.16 It is therefore possible for labour 
law and administrative law rules to find application in the same circumstances. 
Recent experience17 serves as an example of the rights-based normative overlap 
between labour law and administrative law. The overlap primarily exists in regulation of 
the public employment relationship, as well as control over the activities of so-called 
labour tribunals, supposedly designed to deal speedily and efficiently with labour 
matters. The focus of this dissertation falls specifically on the overlap found in the 
context of public employment regulation. This overlap raises questions about the 
compatibility of the rights-based normative structure of labour and administrative law. 
                                            
12
 In terms of PAJA, an action will only qualify as an administrative action if it is “a decision of an 
administrative nature made under an empowering provision by an organ of state (or a private person 
when exercising a public power) that adversely affects rights that has direct external legal effect and that 
is not specifically excluded by the list of exclusions in subparas (aa) to (ii) of the definition of 
‘administrative action’”. See Currie and De Waal Bill Of Rights Handbook 501. Hoexter The New 
Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume Two 3 proclaims that “‘[a]dministrative action’ refers 
broadly to the conduct of the public administration”. 
13
 In terms of s 239 of the Constitution: “'organ of state' means- 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution-   
 (i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
 constitution; or  
 (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does 
 not include a court or a judicial officer”. 
14
 The LRA along with other labour legislation (the BCEA and the EEA) give effect to the constitutional 
right to fair labour practices. 
15
 See Editor 2004 20(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
16
 See Editor 2004 20(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
17
 See for example POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E), Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC), Nakin v MEC, Department of Education 
Cape Provinces 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). 
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2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
As articulated in MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose18 
by Froneman J, the determination of the relationship between labour and administrative 
law requires the following considerations: 
[W]hether the right to a procedurally fair and substantively rational decision 
should, in ... [a public] employment dispute, be viewed as an employment 
dispute or as dispute about the right to just administrative action, a question 
upon which there is not much clarity in our law at present.19  
The determination of the scope of the relationship between labour and administrative 
law requires consideration of the differences in origin and context in which the different 
dimensions of fairness as a norm developed. This, in turn, requires answers to two 
specific questions: firstly, whether administrative and labour law recognise fairness in a 
complementary fashion and, secondly, whether fairness so understood contemporarily 
and interdependently enriches constitutionally based labour law?20 For purposes of the 
current research, the following specific research question can be formulated: To what 
extent does the constitutionalisation of fair labour practices and just administrative 
action, as informed by variable normative principles, allow for a cooperative regulation 
of public employment in accordance with the doctrine of interdependent fundamental 
rights? 
3 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY   
In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security,21 the Constitutional Court recently handed 
down a judgment that appears to render the current research moot, not only because 
this study examines the legal relationship between labour and administrative law, but 
also because the issue was, on the face of it, finally dealt with by the Court.22 However, 
                                            
18
 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E). 
19
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 1. 
20
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
2. 
21
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). This judgment is discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. 
22
 Subsequent judgments fall outside the ambit of this study. 
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a closer evaluation of the issues underlying the research question and the impact of the 
study emphasises its necessity. 
Firstly, the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security23 
is open to criticism, due to legal and logical flaws in the reasoning of the court.24  
Secondly, the inherent conflict in the judgment has already led to reaction in the lower 
courts,25 illustrating that the case has not provided the sought after clarity, to the same 
degree - if not more - than was the case after Chirwa v Transnet Ltd.26 As it is a well 
known fact that the “State is the largest single employer”,27 clarity as to the proper 
regulatory scope of labour and administrative law in the public employment context 
remains crucial. 
Thirdly, although the scope of the research question may limit the focus of the research 
to public employment, it contributes to the understanding of the proper interpretative 
approach to constitutional rights at a wider level. The study evaluates the generally 
required approach to the relationship between constitutional rights.  
Fourthly, the study emphasises the fact that the judiciary has yet to properly and 
completely accept and adopt the supremacy of the Constitution. The study emphasises 
that the cause of this problem, namely the neglect of the judicial duty to promote and 
                                            
23
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
24
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
25
 See for example the recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality v Engineering Council of SA [2009] ZASCA 151 at paras 37 and 38 per Wallis AJA (giving a 
narrow reading to the Gcaba-judgment as a contextual finding of the absence of administrative action 
specific to Mr Gcaba’s dispute), and the Labour Court judgment, Setlhoane v Department of Education: 
North-West Province [2009] ZALC 119  at paras 15 – 18 per Molahlehi J (creating the impression that, 
regardless of the Constitutional Court’s recent ruling the Labour Court can still review employment 
decisions based on the principle of legality in terms of s 158(1)(h) of the LRA). A discussion of these 
cases however falls outside the time frame of the material considered in this study. 
26
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
27
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 35. The ILO provides the following data proof of the enormity of the 
State as employer: “[T]he statistics from more than 75 countries give a rough estimate of the public sector 
employment … as 435 million, of which 260 million workers were in public administration and the 
remaining 175 million in public corporations and enterprises.” See Public Service: Employment 1 
http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/dialogue/sector/sectors/pubserv/emp.htm (2008/10/31). 
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protect the spirit and purport of the Constitution, lies primarily with the Constitutional 
Court’s failure to act in terms of the normative approach it holds as yardstick for the 
lower courts. 
Finally, at a more philosophical level, the general importance of the study lies in the 
evaluation of the conflict between substance and form, and principle and practice that 
translates into the judiciary’s continuing problem to break with traditional formalistic 
thinking. Transformative constitutionalism requires, and in fact demands, such a judicial 
mind shift. 
4 SPECIFIC FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONTEXT 
The ILO recognises that the traditional distinction between the private and public sector, 
often upheld for political reasons, prevented uniform treatment of all employees 
regardless of sector.28 However, the contemporary dividing line between private and 
public employment is less precise and the fading distinction is the cause of a shift in 
political perspectives.29 In reaction, countries have acknowledged the need for 
                                            
28
 Within this context, the ILO describes the public service as follows: “The Public Service’ is understood 
here to cover not only public administration but also various services being provided in the public or 
general interest, whether they are delivered publicly or privately. Traditionally, such services have mainly 
been delivered publicly, but the private sector has increased its share in managing and delivering certain 
services against the backdrop of increased deregulation and reform of the public sector across the world.” 
See Public Service: Background – Sectoral Activities 1 http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/ 
dialogue/sector/sectors/pubserv.htm (2008/10/31).  
29
 Oluwu 1999 (37) J Modern Afr Stud 1 explains that the private and public sector are undeniably linked: 
“[A]n effective state is vital for the provision of the goods and services – and the rules and institutions – 
that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthier, happier lives. Without it, sustainable 
development, both economic and social is impossible.” The ILO therefore proclaims that the public 
service plays “a key role in the social and economic development of any country”. See Public Service: 
Background – Sectoral Activities 1. Staats 1988 (48) Publ Admin Rev 601 at 603 further explains that 
“[t]he private sector cannot be strong without able public servants to conduct trade negotiations, [and] 
develop accurate economic data”. Consequently, “[t]he notion that the public and private sectors are 
necessarily in conflict could not be more wrong, misleading, or unproductive” as Staats explains that “[a] 
strong, productive private sector is a cornerstone of a free economy and essential to maintenance of 
democratic institutions ... [as] government would not have the resources to carry out its mission” without 
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transformation of the public service.30 A shift away from the notion of the supreme 
power of the Crown or State, “towards democratic systems governed by the rule of 
law”31 is globally noticeable. Although the need for transformation is universally 
recognised, that does not imply standardised or identical transformation in all 
jurisdictions.  
The current debates centre around the questions of how far the State should 
and can introduce market-type mechanisms, involve private contractors, or 
privatise in order to ensure an effective and efficient provision of services in 
the public interest. There is no one-fit-all answer [to public employment 
transformation].32 
The historic influences, the structure33 and Constitutional provisions of every specific 
country must be taken into account when the transformation of the public service is 
evaluated from a country specific legal perspective.34 For this reason, a comparative 
country analysis will not be undertaken in this study. The focus falls on a South African 
specific contextual evaluation35 with reference to the constitutional relationship between 
                                                                                                                                            
it. Cf Schulz and Klemmer Employment Services http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ 
skills/empserv/publ/shulz.htm (2008/10/31).  
30
 See Hodges-Aberhard Comparative Study of contents of Civil Service Statutes 7 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/downloads/gllad/cs.pdf (2008/10/31).  
31
 Hodges-Aberhard Comparative Study of contents of Civil Service Statutes 6. 
32
 Public Service: Background – Sectoral Activities 1. Emphasis added. 
33
 Structure is an important distinguishing characteristic, as some countries have quasi-judicial tribunals 
that hear disciplinary matters, while others approach the courts directly. Hodges-Aberhard Comparative 
Study of contents of Civil Service Statutes 9 explains that, “[d]epending on the constitutional framework, 
some institutions must report to the Council of Ministers (for example, the State Administrative 
Commission in Bulgaria)”. Structure however does not merely imply legal structure, but also functional 
structure as the ILO notes that “[s]tructural adjustment is part of a process of global reform based on 
increased reliance on market forces and reduced role of the State in the economies”. See Public Service: 
Structural Adjustment and Efficiency 1 http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/dialogue/sector/ 
sectors/pubserv/struc.htm (2008/10/31). 
34
 See Hodges-Aberhard Comparative Study of contents of Civil Service Statutes 8. 
35
 Every country has its own plurality and diversity to take into consideration, along with its own historic 
and contemporary problems. See Longo Comparative Institutional Diagnosis of Civil Service Systems 2 
http://www.iadb.org/IDBDocs.cfm  (2008/10/31). The form and scope of public employment legislation 
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two rights not generally found in the structure of a traditional Bill of Rights. The right to 
just administrative action and fair labour practices carry specific historic meaning in the 
South African context, as does the judicial treatment of the overlap between labour and 
administrative law in the context of public employment.36 This state of affairs cannot 
contextually be associated with other countries. 
5 TERMINOLOGY IMPORTANT TO THE STUDY 
5 1 Contextualism and Formalism 
The rights and rules regulating the unequal power relationships with which labour and 
administrative law are concerned are based on core concepts. Conceptualism37 has 
always been part of the judiciary’s approach to resolving labour and administrative 
problems.38 
Prior to the Constitution, the judiciary embraced formalistic conceptualism. In placing 
the focus squarely on concepts as theoretically and academically developed, the 
judiciary during this period assumed “that the law applicable to a particular case can be 
discovered by simple syllogistic reasoning”39 in the absence of outside influences.40 
                                                                                                                                            
varies from country to country due to variables such as “rational … behaviour of political and socio-
economic actors … the institutional constraints and … changing economic and demographic context”, as 
Pennings 1999 (40) Int J Comp Socio 332 explains. Consequently, the Australian or United States 
specific transformation experience for example cannot be regarded as applicable in South Africa, merely 
because those countries have transformed their public employment perspective, as the contextual needs 
of every country’s employment needs differ. 
36
 Hodges-Aberhard Comparative Study of contents of Civil Service Statutes 11 appropriately 
emphasises that the legislative regulation of the public service of every country is “usually crafted around 
the provisions of a country’s basic law”, namely the Constitution. 
37
 Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 notes that conceptualism without context amounts to legal fiction. 
38
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 168.  
39
 David The Oxford Companion to Law 266 as referred to in Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 168. 
40
 Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 at 60 explains the reliance of formalists on conceptualism is based on three 
things: “First, legal concepts … [can] be identified through induction … Second, they [believe] … that 
more particular rules could then be derived ‘logically’ from the concepts induced from the caselaw. Third, 
they [believe] … that the result … [to] be a self-contained, internally consistent, systemized and 
rationalized law, rather like geometry, and therefore that, correct legal answers could be given to any 
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Formalists embrace conceptualism in the abstract “as a refuge from the inherent 
difficulty of most of the moral and social judgments”41 jurists are required to make.42 
Hoexter describes this as “a judicial tendency to rely on technical or mechanical 
reasoning instead of substantive principles and to prefer formal reasons to moral, 
political, economic or other social considerations”.43 Formalism, so understood, pre-
constitutionally allowed judges to manipulate legal concepts to fit their perspective.  
However, contextualised conceptualism counters such manipulation, as it 
acknowledges that “[w]hat is needed instead … is a concrete focus upon considerations 
of social advantage and disadvantage”44 in the context of every case. The juristic 
formalist will merely enquire: What does administrative justice or fair labour practices 
require? Hoexter explains that a legal question so formulated means “that hardly any 
effort … [goes] into the essential task of working out the appropriate content of 
lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness in particular cases”.45 In contrast, the juristic 
contextualist will formulate a contextual enquiry: What does administrative justice or fair 
labour practices require in the particular case? Within a contextual evaluation, the 
relevant concept(s) must achieve the status of a legal problem in itself, so as not to 
                                                                                                                                            
questions by reference to the logic of this system.” Admittedly, variations to this classical perspective of 
formalism have developed in the works of legal philosophers over the years. 
41
 Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 37. 
42
 Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 37. Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 at 59 – 60 explains that the classical 
perspective of formalism reveals conceptualism as autonomous conceptualism. This formalistic 
perspective denies the relative character of conceptual autonomy in that it disregards the relevance of 
contextual evaluation, in preference for the ‘logical’ abstract. At its most radical, formalism reveals “a 
nominalist belief that concepts do not have real world referents, or that real world referents are 
insufficiently identical to be captured by any concept”. A moderate perspective of formalism holds “that 
only narrow concepts drawn at lower levels of abstraction can be serviceable for formalist law”. For the 
purpose of the study, the definition of “formalism as autonomous conceptualism” is sufficient to contrast it 
with contextualism and to identify the fact that formalism views conceptualism in the abstract. 
43
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 168. 
44
 Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 at 61. 
45
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 169. Emphasis added. Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 36 
explains that such formalistic conceptualism “contributes more by way of obfuscation than enlightenment. 
Not infrequently it leads straight up a blind alley”. 
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become trapped in its own abstraction.46 With proper consideration of the context, 
judges “are engaged in willing the results they reach in the particular cases they 
decide”.47 
This contextually influenced approach is a consequence of constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism endorses the idea that the circumstances of every case will differ and 
accordingly that legal answer(s) may not always be black or white, but may reside 
somewhere in the grey area due the social, political and economic environment in which 
the question to which the concept(s) apply is formulated.48 Within the South African 
context, constitutionalism takes on a specific transformative character and requires a 
contextual application of the constitutional justice concepts: lawfulness, reasonableness 
and fairness.49 Law is not static.50 The undeniable presence of and worth found in 
flexible principles and contextual evaluation has brought about “important changes in 
juristic thought”.51  
The shift in perspective emphasises the importance of the realisation that “abstract 
formalist concepts should be replaced with context dependent sensitivity of social 
                                            
46
 See Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 37; NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at 
par 117 per Sachs J. 
47
 Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 at 60. Cf Botha 2003 (1) TSAR 20 at 21. 
48
 See Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35. 
49
 According to Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 150, one of the elements of transformative 
constitutionalism is the transformation of power relationships as it “connotes an enterprise of inducing 
large-scale social change” in both the public and private sphere. Seidman-Makgetla 2000 (17) Indicator 
SA 18 at 23 elucidates that “[l]abour inputs in shaping the transformation of the state are particularly 
important” in the realisation of social change, as citizens spend the majority of their lifetime within the 
workforce. Transformation in labour relations is necessary for social change, as “[l]abour relations must 
overcome a long legacy of bitterness and distrust”. 
50
 Michelman 1989 (27) Cornell L Rev 256 at 259 (with reference to Fiss 1986 (72) Cornell L Rev 1 at 15) 
elucidates that “law appears as generative of public values as it is dependent upon them”.  
51
 Pound 1936 (42) WVaLQL 81 at 90. Pound 1936 (42) WVaLQL 81 at 94 elaborates: “If co-operation [or 
interdependence] is not to be the whole idea, it is to be a large part of it. But I prefer to think that the 
recognition of co-operation and new emphasis upon it in all connection is a step towards some ideal 
involving organized human effort along with free spontaneous individual initiatives and I seem to see such 
an ideal in the ideal civilization.” For a general summary of these changes throughout different 
jurisdictions, see Pound 1936 (42) WVaLQL 81 at 90 – 94. 
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practice”.52 Social change cannot become a reality in the abstract of a formalistic yes/no 
answer to homogenous questions that do not take into consideration the change or 
transformed environment in which the questions call for evaluation.53 Unfortunately, 
jurists get trapped in the safety of tradition as is evident from the formalistic approach 
associated with what Klare describes as “South African jurisprudential conservatism”.54 
Traditional South African jurisprudential conservatism, while recognising that “legal 
practices are situated”,55 disregards the fact that circumstances change with the 
passage of time and that a clear rule that brought about a just result in a set of facts 50 
years ago may not bring with it similar justice in a contemporary legal milieu. This does 
not imply that South African jurists should not act with caution, but caution should “not 
connote any unwillingness to take bold steps or to rock the boat”.56 If caution brings 
about legal stagnation, constitutional transformation will suffer.57 
5 2 Doctrine of Interdependence 
The General Assembly of the United Nations is generally credited as the creator of the 
doctrine of the interdependence of human rights.58 In Resolution 41/117 of 4 December 
                                            
52
 Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 at 61, with reference to Llewellyn The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals 
127, elaborates on the reasoning of Llewellyn: “Law should be specific to situation types [for example 
public employment] … and should incorporate the norms of real people in the real world.” 
53
 A formalistic perspective of the Constitution encourage the judiciary to “confine itself to a technical 
construction” as merely another legal document, removed from “the social and political implications of” 
decisions based on the provisions of Constitution. See Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 36. See also 
Cox 2003 (36) ILR 57 with reference to Glimore The Ages of American Law 41 – 67. 
54
 Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 169. 
55
 Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 167. 
56
 Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 171.  
57
 See Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 171. In Bato Star (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 
(7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 35, O’Regan explained that “transformation can be achieved in a myriad of 
ways ... [as no] one simple formula for transformation” can be prescribed. 
58
 See Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 771. The doctrine can also be linked to the principle of 
universality, which allows for a margin of appreciation (and consequently an element of relative 
autonomy) in that it leaves room for interpretation in the application of human rights. See Türmen 
Contemporary Issues in Human Rights 3 http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/March-May1997 
(2008/10/15). 
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1986 the General Assembly gave recognition to the “indivisibility and interdependence 
of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights”.59 With reference to the UN 
understanding, Scott explains that the “term interdependence attempts to capture the 
idea that values seen as directly related to the full development of personhood cannot 
be protected or nurtured in isolation”.60 The doctrine of interdependence therefore 
attempts to realise the fact that rights should be rendered as effective as possible.61 
                                            
59
 This resolution emphasises that the traditionally separated first and second generation rights, can no 
longer be regarded as detached and finding application in isolation. The interdependence between first 
and second generation right are further supported by the Unity Resolution 421(V) and the Separation 
Resolution 543(VI) of the United Nations. Article 13 of the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran incorporates a 
similar understanding: “Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization 
of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.” See 
also art 1(b) of the GA Resolution 32/130; Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 867. 
60
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 779 – 783 explains that interdependence “may be understood 
as having two senses: organic and related interdependence”. Organic interdependence (referred to as 
direct permeability when given practical application) regards interdependent rights as “inseparable or 
indissoluble in the sense that one right (the core right) justifies the other (the derivative right)”. In other 
words, “[t]o protect right x will mean directly protecting right y”. See also Raz 1984 (93) Mind 194 at 197. 
Two types of organic rights have developed: logical or semantic entailments (such as identified in Golder 
Case (1975) 1 EHRR 524) and effectivist or foundational permeability. Scott holds that the logical kind of 
organic interdependence requires that the “derivative right must be a more specific form of the ... general 
core right” while the effectivist perspective argues that “[t]he goal is to render rights meaningful and non-
illusionary [as] ... [t]he relationship is justificatory in nature”. The main difference falls on “a different 
understanding of what form of necessity is required in order that one right be implied ... into another”. The 
second sense of interdependence (as opposed to organic interdependence) is found in related 
interdependence of what academics regard as neighbouring rights. Although this approach recognises 
that while rights are distinct, they are also regarded as mutually reinforcing and dependent, the emphasis 
falls on the relative autonomy of rights. Rights are regarded as equally important and complimentary, yet 
separate. When translated into practical application, this approach is referred to as indirect permeability 
when applied in practice. This perspective of mutually reinforcing rights is identifiable in the jurisprudence 
of the Constitution Court. 
61
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 810. Regardless of the sense of interdependence endorsed, 
one fact remains constant rights are hybrid in character and therefore undeniably interdependent. See 
Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 783. In the National Union of Belgium Police Case (1975) 1 
ECHR 578 at paras 59 and 60, the European Commission of Human Rights emphasised the hybrid 
nature of human rights. According to the Commission, this hybrid element is undeniably present in the 
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The doctrine of interdependence is not a perfect one-size-fits-all principle. It is not 
intended “to create the impression of relationships between rights as entities with some 
kind of objective existence that goes beyond intersubjective understandings”.62 The 
relationship of rights, as envisaged within the doctrine of interdependence, develops 
“not for the sake of rights but for the sake of persons”.63 As such, the idea of 
interdependence cannot be relied upon “to conceal an ideological split but [to reveal] an 
accurate reflection of the realities of the situation”.64 The relative autonomy of the rights 
involved come into play, as the one right determines the contextual boundaries in which 
the other can give expression to its individualism and vice versa.65 Furthermore, where 
two rights justifiably overlap, the normative principles informing the rights must be 
compatible for interdependence to be a functional reality. Within the area of overlap 
“‘cross-fertilization’ may help create a symbiotic relationship between the [rights or 
statutes] ... and may foster subtler, more sophisticated and more creative 
understandings of human rights and their interrelationships”.66 As a result, the judicial 
focus must move towards an emphasis on overlapping normative principles.67 Through 
                                                                                                                                            
relationship between “a traditional liberal right or civil liberty, and an economic right”. On the facts of the 
case (relating to a strike situation), the Commission consequently held that the existence of apparently 
separate first and second generation rights “[did] not exclude a construction to the effect that certain 
obligations with respect to trade union freedom may be incumbent upon the State, even in its capacity as 
an employer”. 
62
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 786. 
63
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 786. 
64
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 787. 
65
 The contemporary recognition of the fact that rights now carry the character of relative (in contrast to 
absolute) autonomy is a consequence of the fact that “[t]he Constitution also relativises the distinction 
between private law and public law”, as Botha 2003 (1) TSAR 20 at 21 explains. See also Fose v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) at par 57 per Ackerman J.  
66
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 849. Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising 
Administrative Justice 47 explain that for this creative purpose or advantage “[j]udges in the United States 
have used the due process clause to give content to a right to compensate for perceived shortcomings 
and deficiencies in the bill of rights”. 
67
 See Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 48. 
  
 
14 
all this, society’s interests in fundamental rights are given expression in the social 
meaning of the doctrine of interdependence.68 
5 3  The State as Regulator and Employer 
A reading of s 239 of the Constitution reveals that one is dealing with an organ of state 
as soon as one considers the rights and responsibilities of the employer in the public 
employment context.69 The incorporation of the State as employer within the scope of 
labour legislation post-constitutionally is a political strategy.70 It creates the fictional 
image of the State to be of ‘ordinary’ character.71 Two elements render “the State 
fundamentally different from the individual ... [namely] coercive resources and duties of 
governance”.72 As regulator, the State “is required to act in the public interest”;73 “to 
                                            
68
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 786 explains: “From the vintage point of the underside of 
history, the intimate relationship between all human rights has a potential grounding in social experience 
and a relevant meaning that may be far ahead of understandings generated in less oppressive 
conditions”. 
69
 In MEC for Transport KwaZulu-Natal v Jele 2004 (12) BLLR 1238 (LAC), the Labour Appeal Court 
considered s 239, along with the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994, and concluded that employees of an 
organ of state are employees of the State, as the State is a single employer. See Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 35 – 36. In Botha v Department Education, Arts, Culture and Sport, Northern Province [1999] 
ZALC 110, the Labour Court referred with approval to the judgment  in SAAPAWU v Premier (Eastern 
Cape) 1997 (9) BLLR 1226 (LC) at 1232 in which Landman J stated: “Various references are made in the 
Constitution, 1996, to an organ of State. It would seem to be clear that the founding parties of the 
Constitution envisaged a broad conception of the State to include not only the State as it is traditionally 
known but also to include other functionaries or institutions ... exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of legislation.” The State will therefore not be describable as such without the 
presence of public power. The scope of s 239 was also considered by the Constitutional Court in 
Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 833 (CC). 
70
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 488 elaborates: “Politically, the goal is to protect the individual 
from overarching State power, to reconcile … conflict between the individual sovereignty of each citizen 
… with the reality of an institutional and coercive State … [It] combines the liberal idea of maximizing 
liberty with the objective of attaining a fair outcome in legal contest between individual and State.” A fair 
outcome between employer and employee is what labour law covets in a legal contest, and administrative 
law desires a similar result in a legal contest between citizens and the State. Therefore, this political 
move should be acceptable to both labour and administrative law. 
71
 See O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 488. 
72
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 490.   
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ensure the presence of justice in the community”;74 to “exercise its powers in the 
interest of the common good”;75 and to “always have due regard for the quality of its 
actions”.76 It is difficult to argue that these considerations can be disregarded by the 
State when it acts as employer. However, where the State is bound as if it were an 
individual, it also carries a “duty to abide by and obey the law in all its parts, and enjoys 
no ... immunity”.77  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reality is that the State as employer exercises managerial power,78 which is linked 
to public power in the context of public employment. From this perspective, labour law 
regulates the exercise of managerial power by the State, while administrative law 
focuses on the exercise of public power. As illustrated, labour law and administrative 
law rights collectively keep the State, when contextually required, in line with the ideals 
of constitutional justice.79  
                                                                                                                                            
73
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 491. 
74
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 492. 
75
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 492. 
76
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 492. 
77
 O’Byrne 1991 (14) Dalhousie LJ 487 at 490. Footnotes omitted. 
78
 Within the public sector context (as is the case in the private sector) Seidman-Makgetla 2000 (17) 
Indicator SA 18 at 19 explains that managerial power comes down to the following: “Within broad national 
standards, departmental managers have considerable discretion about work organization, the working 
environment and employment.” 
79
 The Constitution (specifically s 8(1)) also binds an organ of state acting as agent of the State as 
employer to protect and promote the rights in the Bill of Rights in terms of s 8(1). Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 96 explains the impact of this provision: “This means that all organs of state must 
Illustration 1: Control of State exercised decisions 
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6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
In the chapters to follow, the evaluation of the relationship between labour and 
administrative law in the context of public employment is divided into three sections or 
focus areas, to emphasise the distinct aspects that underlie proper consideration of the 
research question.  
The first part of the study introduces and describes the three main areas of influence 
traditionally drawn into the public employment debate, namely labour law (Chapter 
Two), administrative law (Chapter Three), and the character of the public service 
(Chapter Four).  Chapters Two and Three look into the development of the normative 
basis of labour and administrative law. In this exercise, the broad concept of fairness 
(both substantive and procedural) is identified as the core concept of labour law, while it 
is illustrated that administrative law relies on three conceptual pillars, namely 
lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. The theoretical basis dealt with in 
the first section is completed with the evaluation, in Chapter Four, of the traditional 
assumptions underlying the apparent difference between public and private 
employment, which leads to the conclusion that in reality the difference is contextual 
rather than fundamental. Collectively, these chapters illustrate that public employment 
does not require a substantively distinct regulatory approach as traditionally assumed.  
The second part of the study sets out to prove the functional potential of a substantively 
similar regulatory approach to public and private employment relationships, while taking 
into account the impact of contextual considerations on the understanding and 
application of the underlying and unifying normative principles of labour and 
administrative law. The normative interaction between substantive fairness and 
reasonableness is evaluated in Chapter Five, leading to a finding that the underlying 
rationale of both concepts allows for easy cooperation between the constitutional rights 
to fair labour practices and just administrative action. Both labour and administrative law 
acknowledge that, at a substantive level, the context informs the content of the 
                                                                                                                                            
protect, promote and fulfil the rights protected by the Bill of Rights, including the right[s] to just 
administrative action [and fair labour practices]. Where any person is of the view that any of the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights have been infringed by an organ of state … that person may approach a 
competent court for relief.” 
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applicable regulatory concept. While this realisation is recent and largely constitutionally 
informed, the similarities in procedural fairness addressed in Chapter Six illustrate a 
long tradition of cross-fertilization between labour and administrative law. Chapters Five 
and Six together illustrate the existence of normative overlap between labour and 
administrative law through a shared recognition of the duty to act fairly. This normative 
overlap is a crucial element for the practical application of the constitutionally endorsed 
doctrine of interdependence, as explained in Chapter Seven. This core constitutional 
principle is ‘supported’ by two additional constitutional principles, namely flexibility and 
specificity. Flexibility addresses the pre-constitutional problem of formalism in that it 
allows for the context of every case to inform the content of the applicable rule and 
ultimately the outcome. Specificity acknowledges the necessity of specific rules to be 
recognised and applied in relation to the corresponding specific branch of law. If 
specificity is understood as relative in nature, the principle of flexibility can cooperate 
with it, provided that the pre-contextualised specific rules associated with different 
branches of law and which grant a measure of legal certainty are not set in stone and 
are variable to the extent that justice in every case requires. Specificity can accordingly 
only truly function as a constitutional principle if understood as subject to the 
interdependent spirit and purport of the Constitution. Absolute specificity is merely 
formalism under a different name, allowing specific rules to trump interdependent 
application of fundamental rights. A cooperative approach requires flexibility to direct 
the content, degree and impact of a rule in the context of every case.  
The third part of the study illustrates how the idea of absolute specificity-as-formalism 
(masquerading as a constitutionally endorsed principle) has contributed to the confusion 
and uncertainty in the judicial debate about the relationship between labour and 
administrative law. It shows that absolute specificity, translating into formalistic 
separatism has, in fact, taken the focus away from substantive considerations and 
transformed it into a jurisdictional debate subject to interpretative manipulation of the 
‘intent’ of the legislature and drafters of the Constitution. The theoretical focus of the 
first section and the normative interdependent focus of the second section are 
accordingly balanced with a critical evaluation of the judicial approach to normative 
interdependence in the context of public employment. While Chapter Eight emphasises 
the absence of a unified approach in focusing on initial judicial developments, Chapter 
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Nine reveals the reason for this judicial flaw through an analysis of the recent 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The logic 
underlying the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeal is the standard by which the 
Constitutional Court’s recent attempt at fulfilling its constitutional duty is measured and 
found wanting. The persuasive value of the constitutional jurisprudence is brought into 
question in Chapter Nine. In conclusion, Chapter Ten emphasises that the endorsement 
of a constitutional relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action has been hindered by an operational divide between the principled 
conceptual theoretical basis, and the judicial experience in the (mis)application of that 
theoretical basis. In conclusion of the study as a whole, Chapter Ten ultimately takes 
the first steps towards the development of “an appropriate analytical methodology”80 to 
a value-based interdependent understanding of fundamental rights in the public 
employment context. 
                                            
80
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT, GOAL AND FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF LABOUR LAW IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the broader context of the evaluation of the relationship between labour and 
administrative law, the goal of this chapter is to identify the essential, core and 
(perhaps) idiosyncratic values of contemporary labour law that underlie the s 23 
constitutional right to fair labour practices.81 This progressive and unique constitutional 
right informs the contemporary legislative and judicial attempts to develop a coherent 
labour law system.82 
The labour law analysis in this chapter allows for comparison between these values and 
the core values of administrative law.83 Ultimately, the identification of these 
characteristics supports the proper evaluation of the compatibility, if any, of these two 
branches of law. In part 2, this chapter explores labour law’s multi-faceted and reactive 
nature through an analysis of its development as influenced by social, economic and 
political variables and places this development within the new constitutional milieu. Part 
3 will illustrate that labour law, as constitutionally informed, has undergone a paradigm 
shift away from separatism towards the idea(l) of equitable uniformity,84 primarily 
                                            
81
 See Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 18–8(1); Currie and De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 499; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 212; 
NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 33 per Ngcobo J. 
82
 See NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 16 per Ngcobo J. 
83
 Chapter Three focuses on the identification of the characteristics of administrative law. 
84
 The idea of separatism has infiltrated labour law at various stages of its development and has revealed 
itself in various forms. Initially separatism informed the structure of the labour system in drawing a 
regulatory distinction between white and African workers. Later this idea of separate regulatory structures 
translated into the idea that the perceived difference between private and public employment 
relationships called for separate and distinct regulation. Equal access to labour fairness was initially 
sought by African workers and later pursued by public sector employees. Equitable uniformity is therefore 
regarded as the philosophical and practical antidote to the negative effects and limitations associated with 
a separatistic approach to the regulation of labour relations. Unfortunately, the idea of separatism has 
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through the introduction of s 23 of the Constitution. Part 4 provides further examples 
(with reference to dispute resolution and remedies) of how the equity-based approach 
has translated into practice. Ultimately, the discussion will illustrate that labour law, as it 
developed, shunned the shackles of separatism, compartmentalism and formalistic 
conceptualism, through its pursuit of a unified system that embraces fairness and social 
justice.  
2 DEVELOPMENT: KEY MOMENTS 
2 1 The Master-Servant Relationship, Industrialisation and Separatism 
Initially, the focus of the South African economy fell on the paternalistic and 
individualistic nature of the master-servant relationship.85 The common law’s 
inadequacy in regulating disputes between masters and servants resulted in the 
introduction of the first labour legislation.86 As a result, the common law regulated the 
master-servant relationship, subject only to the Masters and Servants Acts aimed at 
protecting “illiterate workers from employer abuse”.87 
                                                                                                                                            
been revived by those jurists who wish to confine the application of the constitutional rights to fair labour 
practices (s 23) and just administrative action (s 33) to the separate legal spheres of labour and 
administrative law respectively. The idea of separatism will be explored throughout Chapters Two, Four 
and Eight. 
85
 See Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 3.1. 
86
 During this time, legislation aimed at regulating the contract of employment made the breach thereof a 
criminal offence. In theory, people of all races fell within the reach of these laws, but the courts 
interpreted it to regulate only unskilled workers. Masters and Servants Acts remained in force until after 
the establishment of the Union. The following are pre-Union territory examples of master-servant 
legislation: Masters and Servants Act 15 of 1856 (C); Masters, Servants and Apprentices Ordinance 2 of 
1850 (N); Masters and Servants Law 13 of 1880 (T); Masters and Servants Ordinance 7 of 1904 (O). 
Section 51 of the Second General Law Amendment Act 94 of 1974 later repealed the Master and 
Servants Acts. See Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa 773. See also Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law: Volume One 7; Chronology of Apartheid Legislation http://www.stanford.edu/class/ 
history48q/Documents/EMBARGO/1chap13.htm (20/03/2006);  
87
 Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 32.  
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The industrial revolution was the next developmental milestone, as it brought with it the 
awareness that work encompasses “more than a means of survival”.88 Although 
academics and historians have debated whether this era is characterised by “the 
restricted piecemeal nature of the process of industrialization”,89 or a gradual change 
better described as an evolution rather than a revolution, it is objectively undeniable that 
it signified change at an industrial, social, economic and intellectual level.90 
Labour law initially merely reflected the developments brought about by the industrial 
(r)evolution, without attempting to control or anticipate the transition.91 As a result, De 
Foucauld describes the (r)evolution of labour law as “[a] disorderly reflection of social 
change”.92 The second industrial revolution in the 19th and 20th century eventually 
inspired the creation of “contemporary labour law ... [as] the outcome of a gradual 
process of construction, concomitant with that of productive organization itself, within 
national boundaries”.93  
As the interests of society evolved, labour law in the South African context was required 
to adopt a broader perspective. Accordingly, labour law revealed a developmental 
tendency to strengthen “statutory requirements and collective contractual relations at 
the expense of rights and obligations created by individual employment relationships”.94 
This development was the result of labour law’s reaction to societal demands for job 
security in a time of economic and political uncertainty.95 
                                            
88
 De Foucauld 1996 (135) Int LR 675 
89
 Hoppit 1990 (43) Econ Hist Rev 173 at 174. 
90
 Hoppit 1990 (43) Econ Hist Rev 173 at 174 and 188 best describes this (r)evolution “as a transition, 
involving interconnected changes and continuities, in which whole tenor, direction, and possibilities of 
economic life were transformed”. Emphasis added. 
91
 See De Foucauld 1996 (135) Int LR 675 – 676, who further points out that labour law is regarded as 
the descendent of the industrial revolution.   
92
 De Foucauld 1996 (135) Int LR 675. 
93
 Morin 2005 (144) Int LR 5. For a discussion of the historic phases of the industrial revolution, see 
Industrial Revolution http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9042370 (2008/10/18); Rothman The Evolution 
of Labour Law and Significance of Workchoices. Paper delivered at the 15th Annual Law Conference: 
Workplace Research Centre and Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney, 10 August 2006. 
94
 Jenks and Schregle Labour Law.  
95
 See De Foucauld 1996 (135) International Labour Review 675 at 676. 
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However, the development of South Africa’s labour law was tempered by Government’s 
laissez faire approach in the early 1900s, as government supported industrial leaders 
and “intervened as little as possible”.96 In the absence of regulatory mechanisms for 
workplace conflict, strike action followed.97 In turn, this resulted in the first form of 
separatism, as legislation such as the Mines and Works Act 12 of 191198 introduced the 
concept of job reservation.  
The First and Second World War placed further pressure on the development of labour 
law. During that time, the collective exercise of power and inequality in the workplace 
were clearly present. African mine workers countered the recognition of white trade 
unions by means of strike action.99 In response, Government in 1920 tightened pass 
laws, which in turn led to massive strike action by African workers.100 This tension 
ultimately culminated in the 1922 Rand Revolt,101 to which Government responded with 
force.102 However, it became evident that force could not make up for the lack of a 
unified regulatory structure for the workforce. 
                                            
96
 Bendix The Basics 29. 
97
 See Bendix The Basics 29, Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 3.6. 
98
 With this Act, Government reserved 32 types of jobs for white workers only. See Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law: Volume One 8. Bendix The Basics 29 explains that this development was a government 
reaction to the dominant European employee groups present in the mining industry, as they brought with 
them “trade unionism … [with the] intent [of] … protecting their interests”. 
99
 The strike action was aimed at the improvement of employment conditions. See Bendix The Basics 30. 
100
 See Bendix The Basics 30. 
101
 The Rand Revolt was a violent uprising of white miners during the reign of an unstable white minority 
government that contested democracy and feared revolt by the African population. See Basson et al 
Essential Labour Law: Volume One 8; Bendix The Basics 30; Chanock Legal culture, state making and 
colonialism, Lecture presented at the Post-Graduate Research Seminar, Stellenbosch University, 4 
August 2006; Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 3.6. 
102
 Bendix The Basics 30 notes that “[o]ne hundred and fifty-three mineworkers were killed and five 
hundred wounded [with a further] … [f]ive thousand … arrested and four hanged for treason”. The author 
explains that the hard-handed approach to trade union and employee demands led to the downfall of the 
Smuts Government in 1922. 
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Government realised that its laissez faire approach was ineffective and adopted the 
Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924,103 aimed at the prevention of industrial unrest by 
means of collective bargaining.104 The Act also enforced separatism through job 
reservation by excluding all “‘pass-bearing natives’ from the definition of an 
employee”.105 The 1924 Act was the predecessor of the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 
1956 (later renamed the Labour Relations Act). The 1956 LRA set out “to control black 
workers to an even greater extent”106 and further expanded on the separatistic 
approach in only providing for a system for white worker trade union representation.107 
The growing struggle against workforce inequality in the form of “pressures of black 
unionism”108 and “renewed pressure for change both from within and outside South 
Africa”,109 forced Government to call upon the thirteen-member Wiehahn Commission 
to investigate the state of labour legislation. This was a defining moment in the 
development of South African labour law.110 
                                            
103
 See Bendix The Basics 30. The promulgation of the first Industrial Conciliation Act by the Pact 
Government (a coalition of the Labour Party and the Afrikaner National Party) was a direct consequence 
of the 1922 strikes. The Act created a statutory industrial council system along with a system for the 
(compulsory) registration of unions, employer’s organisations and industrial councils. Even though the Act 
did not directly exclude African employees from its scope, it did so indirectly (through the wording of 
definition of “employees”) with the effect that African workers from the Transvaal and Natal were 
excluded. Those African employers working in the other provinces were so few in number that they 
feared that they would be overpowered. As a result, they did not feel welcome within the statutory union 
system and did not make use of this right to associate. In reality, African unions existed from as early as 
1917, although the Botha Commission Report UG 62/1951 claimed the date to be 1918. See Bendix The 
Basics 31; Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 3.6. This 1924 Act was also the predecessor of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 (later renamed the Labour Relations Act). See Basson et al Essential Labour 
Law: Volume One 8. 
104
 Bargaining bodies (called Industrial Councils) were put in place. See Bendix The Basics 31.  
105
 Bendix The Basics 31. 
106
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 9. 
107
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 9 explain that another system was created “for black 
workers in terms of the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act”. 
108
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 9. 
109
 Bendix The Basics 40. 
110
 See Jones 1985 (6) MDE 217. 
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2 2 The Introduction of the Concept of Fair Labour Practices 
By the time of the Wiehahn Commission, South Africa’s labour law system was not 
systematised.111 In its report, the Wiehahn Commission recommended “that South 
Africa should seek to align its labour and industrial relations law and practices to the 
fullest possible extent with international labour conventions, recommendations and 
other international instruments”.112 The Commission also identified that there has to be 
minimum interference by the State in the private affairs between employers and 
employees, and that they should manage their own affairs.113 The opinion was held that 
the State should not dominate the labour market with its own political interest.114 
                                            
111
 This opinion is advocated by Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 1 and further endorsed by 
the mandate of the Wiehahn Commission, namely to recommend necessary changes for a more effective 
and sound labour system. Legislation under consideration included the four basic labour acts: the 
Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956, the Wage Act 5 of 1957, the Shop and Offices Act 75 of 1964 and 
the Factory, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 of 1941. See De Kock 1980 (1) ILJ 26 at 29; Luckhardt 
and Wall Working for Freedom: Black trade union development in SA throughout the 1970s. 
112
 Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 278 fn 66.  
113
 See Wiehanh Aantekeninge par 4.41. This recommendation must be viewed from the perspective of 
the State’s role as regulator. 
114
 This recommendation focussed on the State’s abuse of labour regulation to further its own political 
agenda and power in its capacity as regulator. Within this context, the Wiehahn Commission saw a 
functional opportunity for a tripartite structure. The Commission based its idea of tripartism on the ideal of 
a situation where all role-players in labour relations, namely employers, employees and government, 
could deal directly with one another (or their representatives), to discuss problems and injustices and so 
strive towards the formation of a labour system representative of “all interests for the advancement of 
social justice”. The characteristics of this structure can be described as open negotiations, decision-
making of a democratic nature and the backing of collective interests. In other words, as Poolman 
Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 18 explains, the trilateral relation between the three role-players 
“implies collaborative relations between the social partners in sharing the broad objective of promoting 
and preserving harmonious relations in the work environment and the country as a whole”. In theory, 
tripartism is aimed at transforming the unequal employment actors (workers, employers and government) 
into equal social partners and empowered them to effectively tackle and address important policy issues. 
See Mandela 1994 (15) ILJ 732 – 734, Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 7, Wiehanh 
Aantekeninge par 4.41.1. 
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These recommendations dramatically changed the design of South African labour law, 
as they were based on an equity-based understanding of labour law.115 The legislature 
responded by introducing the idea of (un)fair labour practices, which brought with it the 
flexible concept of fairness.116 
The creation of the Industrial Court was a consequence of the fairness-inspired reform 
of labour law. In terms of the amended 1956 LRA, the Industrial Court was granted 
jurisdiction to determine what constituted an unfair labour practice within the scope 
created by a very wide definition.117 The concept of (un)fair labour practices was fleshed 
out in the judgments of the Industrial Court.118 The decisions of the court were based on 
considerations of equity and fair play, taking into account the manner in which an event 
took place, the reason underlying conduct and the effect conduct would have on good 
industrial relations.119 The Industrial Court, in exercising its equity jurisdiction, 
                                            
115
 The Commission’s recommendations extended freedom of association to all persons by rejecting the 
idea of job reservation. This change was reflected in the Labour Relations Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
See Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 9, Bendix The Basics 40, Lee 1983 (82) African 
Affairs 461, Van Eck 2005 Obiter 549 at 553. Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 280 notes that the changes 
following the Wiehahn Commission were the result of the “convergence of politics, sociology, economics 
and law” in labour relations. See also Jones 1985 (6) MDE 217 at 224. 
116
 See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 1. Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 293 declares that this 
“concept ‘unfair labour practices’ [was] … designed to promote collective bargaining … subject to … 
orderly and acceptable employment practices … [while also] positively … entitling the individual 
employee to claim, as a right, protection against unfair dismissal”. See Chapters Five and Six for a 
discussion of the meaning and impact of the concept of fairness within the context of both labour and 
administrative law from a substantive and procedural perspective. 
117
 Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 207 holds that an unfair labour practice 
was therefore “any labour practice which in the opinion of the industrial court is an unfair labour practice”. 
The result being that “[e]very case … potentially creates new laws and guidelines of fairness and 
contributes towards the establishment of a ‘labour code’ – by judicial precedent developing a body of 
case law of fair employment guidelines”. See Jones 1985 (6) MDE 217 at 223. 
118
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 501. 
119
 The ‘manner’ links to the procedural perspective, while ‘reason’ and ‘effect’ considerations link to the 
substantive perspective. See Jones 1985 (6) MDE 217 at 223. Van Eck 2005 Obiter 549 at 554 notes that 
the Industrial Court, through this process, redirected labour law towards recognition of the following: “(i) 
employees with their inferior status are in need of special protection; (ii) the law of contract (and the 
common law) is not suited to regulate the employment relationship without the creation of a floor of rights 
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developed a set of legal rules regulating the substantive and procedural components of 
fair labour practices in line with international standards.120 By 1982, considerations 
underlying substance fairness crystallised in case law121 in accordance with the 
understanding that the concept of unfair labour practices should be “read in terms of an 
effect approach”.122   
Grogan explains that the adoption of the concept of unfair labour practices also 
changed the perspective that ordinary employees could not claim a right to be heard 
prior to dismissal, because the Industrial Court’s insistence on procedural fairness in 
case of dismissal was also based on “considerations of equity and fairness”.123 Through 
this step, principles of natural justice gained the status of an intrinsic component of the 
concept of fair labour practices.124 
One blemish on the ‘new’ equity approach was the exclusion of the public sector from 
the ambit of the 1956 LRA and the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. As such, the 
Wiehahn Commission’s recommendation to regulate the employment relationship of all 
employers and employees through the same relevant legislation was not given full 
effect. 
                                                                                                                                            
for workers; (iii) the common law is largely ignorant as to the rights to freedom of association and the right 
to strike”. 
120
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 502; Takirambudde 1995 (39) JAL 39 at 52. 
121
 See Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 290 – 291.  
122
 The Industrial Court in UAMAWU v Fodens (SA) 1983 (4) ILJ 213 (IC) at 227 confirmed the necessity 
of “a flexible approach to industrial relations”. See also NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd 
1985 (6) ILJ 369 (IC) at 377; Cameron 1986 (7) ILJ 183 at 191.  
123
 Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186 at 193. See Nchanaleng v Director of Education (Transvaal) 1954 (1) 
SA 432 (T); Van Coller v Administrator, Transvaal 1960 (1) SA 110 (T); Grundling v Beyers 1967 (2) SA 
131 (W). 
124
 Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 292 explains that the application of the Industrial Court’s equity-based 
jurisdiction furthermore clarified that substantive and procedural fairness are based on the underlying 
assumption that “an employee has a legally protected right to his job”. Consequently, “substantive and 
procedural rules are applicable even if the contract of employment has been lawfully terminated”. 
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2 3 The Impact of Natural Justice on Public Employment 
Although the Wiehahn Commission’s equity-based recommendations led to the 
amendment of the 1956 LRA, the Act specifically excluded public sector employees 
from the equity jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and its pursuit of substantive and 
procedural fairness in labour relations.125 As a result, public sector employees relied on 
the principles of natural justice126 (as already developed within the procedural fairness 
structure of administrative law)127 as an alternative means to protect their interests.128 
This provided impetus for the heightened application of natural justice so understood, 
as a matter of principle and logic.129 
In Langeni v Minister of Health & Welfare,130 the court reasoned that “the public 
character of the employee was alone enough to bring [public employment decisions] … 
within the compass of administrative law”,131 regardless of the employment contract.132 
                                            
125
 Public servants, found themselves regulated by the Public Service Act 111 of 1984. This forced 
sectoral separatism is the root of the current day classification problem of the public sector as 
administrative or labour law regulated. See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 244, Pretorius and Pitman 
1990 Acta Juridica 133. 
126
 Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607 at 638 describes this form of justice: “Natural justice is entirely a creation 
of the common law. In its vigour and especially in its new-found vitality, as clothed in the duty to act fairly, 
it is little short of a miracle of judicial creativity.” 
127
 It must be noted that natural justice is not an incident of administrative law, but a development of 
common law. Administrative law, like other areas of the law, is merely a vehicle for its application. See 
Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 603 points out 
that “[t]he disciplinary element of an administrative action has been singled out primarily for purposes of 
extending the scope of the audi principle beyond the restrictions imposed by the ‘prior-‘rights’ doctrine 
and the equally stultifying principle that audi never applies in a ‘contractual context’”.  
128
 Ganz 1967 (30) MLR 288 explains that, although the principles of natural justice historically “evolved 
in respect of relationships” other than between employer and employee, its logic undeniably finds 
application to employment relationships. 
129
 This perspective is evident in the judgments of Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) 
and Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A), as discussed by Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237. 
130
 1998 (9) ILJ 389 (W) at 396 – 397. 
131
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 241. See also Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) 
at 29. 
132
 In the Zenzile-judgment, the court clearly condemned “the view that the requirements of natural justice 
can never apply to a contractual relationship”. See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 242. 
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The judiciary could revert to such reasoning, as the rules of natural justice are flexible in 
nature and susceptible to such interpretation “in circumstances of extreme urgency”.133 
Natural justice was a good fit to grant public servants a sense of procedural fairness, as 
the State could not contract out “of the obligation to observe the rules of natural 
justice”.134 
In response, the State adopted the view that “the decision to dismiss does not affect the 
employee’s legal rights … [as there is] no legal entitlement to remain in employment 
beyond the expiration of [the] … notice period … [if] duly given”.135 The judiciary 
reacted by interpreting natural justice to embrace the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 
In Administrator Transvaal v Traub,136 it was explained that “a person’s right to a 
hearing no longer [was depended] … on proof that a legal right [had] … been 
infringed”.137 With this approach, the judicial focus in considering the “question whether 
a public official is bound to adhere to the rules of natural justice”138 shifted to fairness 
considerations in contrast to proof of “actual or potential infringement”139 of a legal 
right.140 In a certain (limited) sense, the Traub-decision was the public sector’s 
equivalent of the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations. Both the Appellate Division 
and the Commission embraced the concept of fairness. Consequently, as declared by 
Grogan, “[t]here is no magic to the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
institutions”141 in the pursuit of fairness.142 
                                            
133
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 244. See also Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) 
at 40. 
134
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237. See for example, Staatsdiensliga van Suid-Afrika v Minister van 
Waterwese 1990 (2) SA 440 (NK); Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A); Administrator, 
Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A). See also Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 588 at 599 – 600. 
135
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 242. 
136
 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186 at 192 explained that “[t]he court in Traub made it 
clear that it did not see fairness in the context of principles of natural justice of legitimate expectation as 
exclusively linked to the actions of public organs.” See Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 
(A) at 761. 
137
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 242. 
138
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 601. 
139
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 601. 
140
 See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 601. 
141
 Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186 at 188. 
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2 4 Constitutionally Reformed Labour Law 
2 4 1  Recognition of the Right to Fair Labour Practices 
Building on the fairness (r)evolution, labour law gained (public law) momentum with the 
coming into force of the interim and final Constitutions.143 The Constitution paved the 
way for greater respect for labour rights within the general scope of human rights to 
prevent unjustified limitation and differentiation in the labour market.144 
A Bill of Rights is traditionally aimed at the regulation of “legislation and public power, 
[and] not the conduct [or managerial power] of employers”.145 The right to fair labour 
practices has therefore been described as a progressive,146 but also “an odd right to 
include in a Bill of Rights”.147 This unique constitutional right, born from a specific 
political climate, was “inserted in the Interim Constitution as part of the package of 
provisions to secure the support of the public service for the new constitutional 
dispensation”.148 The inclusion of a specific labour relations provision also “envisages 
the development of a coherent system of law that is shaped by the Constitution”.149  
                                                                                                                                            
142
 This is in line with the opinion of Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607. 
143
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 10.  
144
 Section 27 of the interim Constitution was replaced by s 23 of the Constitution. Any limitation of labour 
rights will only be regarded as constitutional if the limitation complies with the requirements in the general 
limitation clause, s 36 of the Constitution. 
145
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 501 – 502. 
146
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 499. 
147
 Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 212. In NEHAWU v UCT 2003 
(2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 33, Ngcobo J emphasised the unique character of the right to fair labour 
practices. See Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 18–8(1). 
148
 Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 212. Cooper 2005 (26) Comp 
Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 200 also emphasises the inclusion of the right to fair labour 
practices as a political compromise: “[A] demand by public sector employees for access to the unfair 
labor practice law on dismissal developed under the 1956 Labour Relations Act (LRA) as a means of 
protecting their jobs during the transition to a new political dispensation.” In the constitutional 
dispensation this concern led to the embedding of this right in Constitutional principle XXVII and its 
subsequent appearance as a fundamental right in both the interim and final Constitution.” See also 
Constitutional principle XXVII; Chaskalson et al CLOSA 30–15. 
149
 NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 16 per Ngcobo J. Emphasis added. 
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Although this specific objective underlies the inclusion of the right in the Bill of Rights, it 
attracts a degree of uncertainty. Section 23(1) of the Constitution is described as open-
ended150 and “incapable of precise definition”.151 This characteristic is intentional and 
not a mere drafting flaw.152 The uncertainty is balanced through “the equitable and 
unbiased protection of both employers and employees”.153 Consequently, the apparent 
vagueness of s 23 protects the flexibility of the concept of fair labour practices.154 This 
approach aims at countering formalistic application of the right, by allowing the concept 
to be adaptable to the factual situation and the specific interests at play in every 
individual employment relationship.155 
The protection of the contextual application of the right to fair labour practices is 
necessary, as the interests of an employer and employee differ in focus. Employer-
interests are “underpinned by the right to the economic development of their enterprises 
through enhanced production and efficiency”,156 while employee-interests are informed 
by “the principle of social justice in the workplace”.157 Even though s 23(1) attempts to 
balance employment interests through the promotion and protection of fair labour 
practices, it “does not identify where the balance between these interests should be 
                                            
150
 See Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law 18–8(1).  
151
 NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 33. 
152
 See Cohen 2004 (20) SAJHR 482. 
153
 Cohen 2004 (20) SAJHR 482 at 483. 
154
 Within the ambit of this flexible concept lie other variable components, such as fairness and 
reasonableness, requiring more than mere lawfulness. 
155
 Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 200 – 201 points out that in interpreting 
the right to fair labour practices a creative approach must be adopted in determining its content and 
scope, but that the Constitution also provides pointers through its values, language, context, historical 
origin, along with consideration of foreign and international law. See Chapters Seven and Nine for 
examples of how the idea of interdependence (or connexity as it is referred to in international law) reveals 
itself as a constitutional pointer in the relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action. 
156
 Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 212. The State (in conformity with the 
Constitution) requires the public administration to function efficiently. 
157
 Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 212. The promotion of social justice is 
included in the aim of the LRA. 
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struck in any situation”.158 Consequently, the right to fair labour practices should be 
generously interpreted.159 As a minimum, it is safe to say that s 23(1) entitles the right-
holder160 “to fair treatment within the context of fair labour relations”.161  
2 4 2  Legislative overhaul in response to the Constitution 
A consequence of this flexible approach was the enactment of a new LRA. A 
constitutional facelift of the 1956 LRA (which excluded public sector employees from its 
protective ambit) would not suffice.162  
Post-constitutional labour legislation primarily gives effect to the fundamental right to fair 
labour practices as enshrined in s 23(1).163 Accordingly, the principal labour statutes, 
namely the LRA, the BCEA and the EEA must be regarded as a legislative package of s 
23(1) sub-rights:164 the rights to fair terms and conditions, fair differentiation in contrast 
to discrimination, fair negotiations, fair disciplinary action and fair dismissal. Of this 
package, the LRA is the primary legislative instrument that gives effect to s 23(1) and 
the underlying normative values of the Constitution.165 It was enacted with a specific 
focus: the regulation of labour relations between employees and employers.166 
                                            
158
 Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 213. 
159
 See Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 204. 
160
 The right-holder is also referred to as the beneficiary. 
161
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 499. This minimum can be derived from a consideration 
of the content of the concept of unfair labour practices as phrased in the 1991 amendment of the 1956 
LRA, as this was the definition available to the drafters of the Constitution at the time of its enactment. 
See Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 301 – 302. 
162
 See Natal Die Casting Co (Pty) Ltd v President, Industrial Court and Others 1987 (8) ILJ 245 (D) at 
253 – 254 per Kriek J; Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 10. 
163
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 9. 
164
 The BCEA and the EEA are regarded as complementary to the LRA, as the EEA and the BCEA also 
give effect to constitutional rights relevant to the employment context. However, for the purposes of the 
dissertation, the focus will fall on the LRA as it specifically includes the State as employer within its ambit 
and aims to give effect to s 23(1) in an attempt to grant public servants access to the concept of fair 
labour practices. See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 502; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination 
and Unfair Labour Practices 9; Grogan Workplace Law 6.  
165
 Klare 1997 (18) ILJ 588 notes that the LRA is “one of the most democratic, participatory, inclusive, and 
accessible labour statutes in the world … resolving several critical labour rights issues at the 
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Hepple explains that the success of the LRA is dependent on “social consensus, social 
need, an open … legal culture”.167 A misinterpretation of this functional purpose of 
labour law will render it less effective in achieving its goals.168 To prevent such a 
misinterpretation, s 1 of the LRA unequivocally states that it is “[t]he purpose of the Act 
… to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace by … [giving] effect to and regulat[ing] the 
fundamental rights conferred … in the Constitution”.169  
This focus of the LRA brings a human rights element170 into a labour law system that 
has generally focused on rights-based171 and goal-based172 justification.173 As a result, 
                                                                                                                                            
constitutional level”. The LRA’s simplified regulation of collective labour law is proof of this. See Basson 
et al Essential Labour Law 228.  
166
 See Cohen 2004 (20) SAJHR 482 at 485. In NEWU v CCMA 2004 (2) BLLR 165 (LC) at 169,  
Landman J explained that, although the LRA is inclusive in nature, it does not look “to regulate 
exhaustively the entire concept of fair labour practices as contemplated in the Constitution”,166 as labour 
law is “too wide to be contemplated by a single statute”. Accordingly, it is in theory possible for PAJA to 
find application alongside the LRA where the latter falls short of the protection granted by the former. 
Both these pieces of legislation have to be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution and should 
therefore not be in conflict with one another as the interdependent constitutional rights in ss 23 and 33 
are both protected in the Bill of Rights. In NEWU v CCMA 2004 (2) BLLR 165 (LC) at 169, Landman J 
further opined that where a labour practice falls short of the regulation by conventional statutes (such as 
the LRA and PAJA), reliance can be placed on s 23 of the Constitution. Such an approach would also 
allow the influence of s 33 constitutional considerations, as ss 23 and 33 are interrelated. See Chapter 
Seven, part 2 2 for a discussion on the doctrine of interdependence.  
167
 Hepple 1999 (20) ILJ 9 at 12. 
168
 See Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 21. 
169
 See also Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 61. 
170
 See Olivier Reshaping private and public employment in South Africa: The impact of the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights, Paper delivered at the Public Law Conference, Stellenbosch University – Alexander 
von Humboldt Foundation, 8 – 10 September 2005. 
171
 Collins Justice in Dismissal 82 states that labour law’s rights-based justification is rooted in “the 
common law of wrongful dismissal by suggesting that employees forfeit their rights to their jobs when they 
commit serious breaches of their contracts of employment”. This has to be distinguished from the rights-
based approach recognised under South Africa’s constitutional approach. 
172
 Collins Justice in Dismissal 90 identifies two forms of goal-based justification: “A narrow form identifies 
the relevant goal as that of the employer’s interest in the productive efficiency of each member of the 
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every aspect of an employment relationship is infused with the constitutional promise of 
fair labour practices and its application cannot be ousted without justification that is 
reasonable “in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.174 Landman J, in NEWU v CCMA,175 noted that even the value of dignity is 
protected by the legislatively regulated concept of unfair labour practices, as “an 
expression of the consciousness of modern society of the value for the rights, welfare, 
security and dignity of the individual and groups”.176 This understanding of unfair labour 
practices as socially unjustified practices, which can occur in both an individual or 
collective context,177 is reflected in the fact that the LRA’s regulatory focus falls on both 
individual and collective labour law.178 Apart from giving both a collective and individual 
labour law understanding to the right to fair labour practices, the equity-based LRA also 
draws a distinction between unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices.179 
                                                                                                                                            
workforce. A broad form envisages the goal as the interest of the firm, which encompasses, as well as 
the efficient use of labour, such matters as product market success, reputation, and customer loyalty.” 
173
 See Collins Justice in Dismissal 82 – 90. 
174
 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
175
 NEWU v CCMA 2004 (2) BLLR 165 (LC). 
176
 NEWU v CCMA 2004 (2) BLLR 165 (LC) at 167, quoting Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 
11. This once again emphasises the personal element of labour law. See Re Wilson and Medical 
Services Commission of British Columbia (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 171 (BCCA). See also Chaskalson et al 
CLOSA 30–19 fn 4. 
177
 See Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 294. 
178
 See Botha and Mischke 1997 (41) JAL 134 at 139; Brassey The New Labour Law 149; Cassim 1984 
(5) ILJ 275 at 293; Chaskalson et al CLOSA 30–30; Grogan Workplace Law 315; Van der Merwe 1988 
(9) ILJ 749 at 754. 
179
 The LRA understanding of and approach to unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices will inform the 
labour dimension of the comparative discussion in Chapters Five and Six. The s 23 constitutional right to 
fair labour practices, the basis of the LRA, implies that an employee has a fundamental right to not be 
unfairly dismissed. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 94. Basson et al Essential Labour Law 77 
explain that the 1956 LRA lacked a specific definition of an unfair dismissal. A decision or conduct was 
merely viewed as “unfair if it met the general criteria of an unfair labour practice, as defined”. Under the 
constitutionally influenced scheme, s 186(1) of the LRA specifically defines a dismissal, while s 188 
requires a dismissal to be both substantively and procedurally fair. The inclusion of separate provisions in 
the LRA dealing with unfair dismissal does not render the regulation of the s 186(2) LRA defined ‘unfair 
labour practice’ (any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee) 
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2 4 3 Constitutional Impact on the Common Law  
The Constitution replaces the common law as the basis of South Africa’s legal system. 
This does not imply that pre-constitutional common law jurisprudence is of no 
contemporary value. It must merely in terms of s 39(2) be allowed to adapt to the spirit, 
purport and object of the Constitution.180 The judiciary has a duty to develop the 
common law in such a manner.181 However, in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security,182 the Constitutional Court made it clear that the s 39(2) development of 
common law concepts does not merely call for the evaluation of its consistency in terms 
of the written provisions of the Bill of Rights, but also the normative value system that 
underlie the provisions of the Constitution.183 When so adapted, the common law can 
inform the broad provisions of the Constitution.184 
The common law of employment has not been unaffected by the Constitution and its s 
39(2) directive.185 Traditionally, even though the “contract of employment has always 
                                                                                                                                            
redundant. Therefore, the focus is again placed on the relationship’s character and consequently the 
mutual interests at play. A ‘labour practice’ can only arise in the context of an employment relationship 
that in turn can be divided, as Basson et al Essential Labour Law 184 explain, into three stages: “the 
beginning (when the employee is an applicant for employment), a middle (as long as the relationship 
continues) and an end (dismissal, resignation or retirement)”. 
180
 See NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1999 (3) BCLR 280 (C) at 288 – 289; Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) at par 54; S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) at par 31. 
See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 69 fn 152. 
181
 See Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 23. 
182
 2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC). 
183
 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) at par 54. In casu, the 
Constitutional Court declared that the concept of “reasonableness on which the legal convictions of the 
community are based is now to be found in the Constitution and not in some vague notion of public 
sentiment or opinion”. In Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) 
at par 35, Froneman J emphasised that “the fundamental constitutional values of human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms underlie ... the direct and 
indirect development of the common law contract of employment under either sections 8 or 39(2) of the 
Constitution, in whatever court this might happen”. 
184 It is the nature of a Constitution (and specifically a Bill of Rights) to rely on broad provisions, to allow 
for its application in a diverse set of circumstances and to prevent it from becoming dated.  
185
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
25 per Froneman J. 
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imposed mutual obligations of confidence and trust between employer and 
employee”,186 the concept of fairness was “virtually unknown to the common law of 
employment”.187 However, in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt,188 Nugent AJA for the 
majority noted that “it might be that an implied right not to be unfairly dismissed was 
imported into the common-law employment relationship by ... section 23(1) of the 
present Constitution ... even before the 1995 Act was enacted”.189 The judiciary has 
taken to read the Fedlife-judgment as authority for the proposition that “irrespective of 
whether a right is claimed under the common law or legislation it must be consistent 
with the overarching authority of the Constitution”.190 In line with this perspective, 
Cameron J in Murray v Minister of Defence191 declared that the common law of 
employment (developed to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights) 
“must be held to impose on all employers a duty of fair dealing at all times with their 
employees – even those that the LRA does not cover”.192 Thus, the Constitution 
imposes on the common law of employment “a continuing obligation of fairness towards 
the employee on ... the employer when he makes decisions affecting the employee in 
his work”.193 This constitutionally informed fairness dimension of common law realises 
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 Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA) at par 5 per Cameron J. 
187
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 9. The common law placed reliance on 
the principle of legality as understood within the contract of employment, as associated with the concept 
of unlawfulness. The legislative recognition of the concept of fair labour practices introduced an equity 
focus. The Constitution now embraces a broader concept of legality as associated with the rule of law. 
See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 1 and 6. 
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 2001 (12) BLLR 1301 (SCA). 
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 Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 (12) BLLR 1301 (SCA) at par 13. Emphasis added. 
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 Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 26. The enactment of legislation 
giving effect to the provisions of the Bill of Rights spurs on constitutional development of the common law. 
See Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 36 per 
Froneman J. 
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 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA). 
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 Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA). Emphasis added. 
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 WL Ochse Webb and Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen 1997 (18) ILJ 361 (LAC) at par 366 per 
Froneman J as referred to by Cameron J in Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA) at 
par 11. 
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the obligation of fairness at “both a formal procedural and substantive dimension”,194 as 
it is “encapsulated in the constitutional right to fair treatment in the workplace”.195 
In the recent judgment of SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie,196 a judgment 
difficult to fault for its reasoning, Wallis AJA highlighted certain limitations on the duty to 
develop the common law in the employment context (as reflected in the Murray-
judgment). Wallis AJA explained (with reference to Mohlaka v Minister of Finance),197 
that the judiciary should only act on the obligation (as reflected in ss 8(3), 39(2) and 173 
of the Constitution) if necessary.198 As a result, the common law should only be 
developed in the employment context to the extent that labour legislation fails to give 
effect to the constitutionally endorsed labour rights.199 It was held that development of 
the common law to reflect rights and remedies related to unfair dismissals and unfair 
labour practices as already protected in the LRA would endorse “attempt[s] to 
circumvent rights and to obtain, by reference to, but not in reliance upon, the provisions 
of the LRA an advantage that it does not confer”.200  
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 Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA) at par 11. Footnotes omitted. 
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 Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA) at par 11. Footnotes omitted. 
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 2010 (5) BLLR 488 (SCA). 
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 2009 (4) BLLR 348 (LC). 
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 See SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 (5) BLLR 488 (SCA) at paras 36 and 43. Wallis 
AJA explained that cases (such as Boxer Superstores Mthata v Mbenya 2007 (8) BLLR 693 (SCA) and 
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statements made in Boxer Superstores Mthata v Mbenya 2007 (8) BLLR 693 (SCA) at par 6, Old Mutual 
Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 (8) BLLR 699 (SCA) at paras 4 – 7, and Transman (Pty) Ltd v 
Dick 2009 (7) BLLR 629 (SCA) at 13 and 30 that can be read as taking the argument (regarding the 
impact of the harmonisation of the constitutionally and common law endorsed fair treatment on 
employment relationships) further than development where necessary in the absence of statutory 
regulation of the constitutional right to fair labour practice, was clearly obiter. 
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 See SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 (5) BLLR 488 (SCA) at par 36; s 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution. 
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 See SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 (5) BLLR 488 (SCA) at par 56. According to Wallis 
AJA attempts of this nature “occasioned the recent jurisdictional debate in cases such as” Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC), Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA), and 
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3  LABOUR LAW TODAY 
3 1  The Purpose of Labour Law 
Labour law seeks to regulate a specific type of relationship to which no other field of law 
can claim possession: the employment relationship.201 In seeking to regulate 
employment relationships, labour law reflects the perspective of Klare that law, as 
power, “reflects the key underlying relationship of … domination”.202 
Labour law, objectively viewed, is sui generis in nature. The somewhat haphazard 
development of labour law,203 a story of action and reaction, supports this 
perspective.204 Power imbalances and conflicts of interest were the constant catalysts 
for legislative attempts to uphold fairness and equality in labour relations. This equity-
based progression was a constant response to political, economic and social 
circumstances and borrowed principles and rules from other areas of the law205 to 
create a unique employment-based power balance system. 
                                                                                                                                            
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). See Chapter Eight and Chapter 
Nine. Cf Du Toit 2008 (125) SALJ 95 AT 96 – 97. 
201
 The predetermined employment relationship basis translates into regulation through contextualisation 
of the relevant principles at de facto level of application. See Chapter Five, part 1. 
202
 Klare 1997 (18) ILJ 588 at 591. 
203
 See part 2. 
204
 The realisation that labour law deals with the rights, duties and interests of various role-players and 
the State’s pivotal involvement in the employee-employer relationship gave rise to the development of the 
concept of tripartism. Within this system, the three role players – the State, the employer and employee 
(or their respective organisations and representatives) – each have a function and a role to fulfil in the 
industrial relationship. A tripartite approach is recognised in labour systems throughout the world. The 
involvement of the State in the employment relationship is aimed at evening out the factual and 
contextual weaker position of the employee (in contrast to that of the employer), seeing that the 
philosophy of humanisation, partnership and the industrial relationship doctrine of the 20th century strive 
for the achievement of greater equality between the tripartite partners (which now includes the State). 
See Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 2.15. For a discussion of the idea of tripartism and its place in the public 
employment relationship see Chapter Four, part 3 2 3.  
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 Examples of these are the law of contract, administrative law and criminal law. 
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The borrowing of principles has encouraged some academics to label labour law a 
mere by-product or specific form of contract law.206 In truth, labour law overlaps with a 
range of private and public law considerations.207 Employment relationships merely 
commence with the aid of contractual considerations and obtain effect through the 
acknowledgement of certain (public law) rights208 and counteracting obligations.209 
Given the vast array of legal influences, South African labour law has a hybrid 
character. It may place reliance on principles associated with specific rights and other 
areas of law, but these borrowed principles are informed by the specific employment 
context in which it finds application.210 Labour law is an example of the practical 
success of the idea of hybridity or interdependence as, in essence, it focuses on sui 
generis labour law, but emphasises the inherent flexibility of its character.211 
Contemporary South African labour law gives expression to this hybrid character in its 
desire to address power imbalances in a constitutionally coherent manner.212 
The individual employment relationship is the primary focus of the power struggle labour 
law seeks to regulate.213 The acknowledgment of a collective element of labour law is a 
counteraction to the domination-subordination relationship present in individual 
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 See Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 267. Labour law cannot function as a mere by-product of contract 
law, as the latter does not possess the ability to adapt the employment relationship to social and political 
effects in labour relations. 
207
 See Hahlo and Kahn The South African Legal System 126. 
208
 These rights are referred to as the six democratic labour rights: the right to work, the right to associate, 
the right to bargain collectively, the rights to withhold labour, the right to protection and the right to 
develop. See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 11; Van der Merwe 1988 (9) ILJ 749; 
Wiehahn Aantekeninge paras 2.1, 2.3 and 4.128. 
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 See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 2. 
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 See Hepple 1999 (20) ILJ 9. See Chapter Five, part 1. 
211
 See Cameron 1986 (7) ILJ 183 at 185; NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd 1985 (6) ILJ 
396 (IC). 
212
 The idea of hybridity resembles the constitutionally endorsed doctrine of interdependence and the 
international law equivalent of connexity. See Chapters Seven and Nine. 
213
 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 1 recognises that regulatory power of labour law resides mainly in 
its focus on the individual employment relationships. An unequal power relationship, akin to that of an 
employer and employee, can be found in administrative law relationships due to the coercive or 
command element present in both. See Chapter Three. 
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employment relationships.214 In short, labour law is the sum of a real or fictitious belief 
in an equality-based relationship between the individual and collective employment 
powers at play.215 In light of this view, Kahn-Freund proclaims that labour law should be 
seen in this regulatory context, regardless of the label that has been prescribed to it.216 
In identifying the function of labour law, one should stay true to the power struggle at 
play.217 This emphasis is crucial, as power is the “pervasive presence within the 
employment relationship that ultimately distinguishes employment from … ordinary 
commercial [contractual relationships] … and explains why the employer has a duty to 
act fairly”218 within the scope of contemporary labour law.219 As such, the individual and 
collective aim of labour law is to establish and protect the idea of fairness through 
equalisation of labour power.220 
3 2  The Relationship 
3 2 1 Misunderstood Contractual Perspective 
The employment relationship, at its most simplistic, has been described as a contractual 
relationship.221 Merely “attaching a label [whether it be contract or administrative, 
private or public] does not affect the substance of the matter”.222  
Labour law focuses on a specific relationship between people that “arises out of mutual 
need”.223 An employment relationship continues and is reciprocal in character, 
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 See Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 1.  
215
 See Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 1. Within the context of the employment relationship the 
presence of equality is mostly fictitious, as such a relationship is mainly characterised by “domination and 
subordination”. See Weddernburn et al Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund 83. 
216
 See Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 3. Ganz 1967 (30) MLR 288 at 292 explains that “merely 
attaching a label to the relationship … does not affect the substance of the matter”. 
217
 See Arthurs 1996 (46) Univ Toronto LJ 1 at 44 – 45. 
218
 Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 195. 
219
 See Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 3. 
220
 See Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 4. See also Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 
in the Constitution 216 – 217. 
221
 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 180. 
222
 Ganz 1967 (30) MLR 288 at 292. 
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 Bendix The Basics 11. 
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rendering it more than a mere contractual arrangement.224 It is a status relationship, as 
it is influenced by imperative norms.225 Reliance cannot merely be placed on pure 
contractual principles.226 The employment context necessitates “an open admission of a 
status of employment”227 to allow labour law to evolve in reaction to the practical 
demands of labour practices.228 This status lends itself to be governed by principles 
found in public law.229 
3 2 2 Conflict Component 
Conflict, arising from both substantive230 and procedural231 matters, is a constant 
element in an employment relationship.232 The conflict element is countered by the 
mutual need for co-operation.233 Employment relationships move between these two 
extremes, constantly adjusting to align with the social, economic and political conditions 
of the time, in search of balance.234 The nature of the needs235 or interests at play in an 
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 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 32 – 44; Grogan Workplace Law 49. This feature is not found 
in an administrative law relationship. Cf Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40 at 50. 
225
 Fairness is such a normative imperative. The fact that cases such as NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 
154 (CC) and Transport Fleet Maintenance (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 2004 (25) ILJ 104 (LAC) distinguish 
between rights and obligations arising from an employment contract or from an employment relationship 
is evidence of the fact that the relationship carries a different status than mere contract. See Brassey 
1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 180. 
226
 See the following discussion on the deficiencies of the principle of freedom of contract in the regulation 
of labour law. 
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 Rideout 1966 (19) CLP 112. 
228
 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 180; Rideout 1966 (19) CLP 112. 
229
 The power element present in employment relationships places the focus on public law principles 
rather than principles of contract law. This ‘cross-fertilization’ again hints at labour law’s hybrid character. 
See Collins 1986 15 ILJ (UK) 1 at 10 – 13. See also Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 180. 
230
 Substantive matters are those dealing with wages and basic conditions of employment. See Bendix 
The Basics 12. 
231
 Procedural matters emanate from the employer’s approach to decisions, be it disciplinary or other. 
See Bendix The Basics 12. 
232
 Bendix The Basics 12 explains that these conflict areas influence each other, as “[c]onflict that centres 
on substantive issues spill over into procedural issues”. 
233
 See Bendix The Basics 18. 
234
 See Wiehahn Aantekeninge paras 2.2 and 2.4; Wright Labour Law 1. 
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employment relationship determines whether the balance can be best regulated at 
individual or collective level.  
A conceptual distinction between the, albeit overlapping, individual and collective 
dimensions of the employment relationship has developed.236 Such a distinction is 
justified, because the individual dimension raises concerns about workplace justice, 
while the collective dimension focuses on respect for, and the promotion and protection 
of, the interest of all concerned groups.237 However, both focus on the employment 
relationship and both ultimately have the same goal, namely to balance the unequal 
power at play in pursuit of fair labour practices. 
3 2 3 Dimensions of the Unequal Power Relationship 
The status of employment has a personal element, as it focuses on the relationship 
between employer and employee.238 This does not imply an equal relationship, as “the 
relation between an employer and an isolated employee is typically a relation between a 
bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power”.239 A more evolved view of the 
employment relationship also recognises the influence of trade unions, employers’ 
organizations and the State (as regulator) as role players with an interest in the 
regulation of employment relationships.240 The employment relationship therefore has 
an individual241 and collective242 dimension. 
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 If the nature of the ‘need’ determines the method of regulation, then an employment related need 
inevitably involves some form of employment regulation. 
236
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 225; Grogan Workplace Law 315. 
237
 See Grogan Workplace Law 315. 
238
 See Wright Labour Law 1. Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 198 notes that  “[e]mployment is more 
than simply an exchange of hard cash for hard work; it is a relationship in which feelings of trust, 
confidence and good will play an important part”. These ‘feelings’ emphasise the personal dimension to 
the employment relationship. 
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 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 18. See also Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc 
LJ 40 at 50. 
240
 According to Wright Labour Law 1, labour law consequently “deals with the relationship of 
employer/employee/collective organisations/State”. 
241
 Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 1 explain that “‘individual’ labour law is 
concerned with the relationship between individual employer and individual employee … [and] is founded 
on the common-law contract of employment, but its content is determined largely by statute and collective 
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3 2 3 1 Individual Dimension 
The common law view that voluntary and consensual parties to a contract bind 
themselves equally, is a misleading notion.243 Left unrestrained, the principle of freedom 
of contract ignores the stronger bargaining power of the employer,244 and allows for the 
presence of domination and subordination in the conclusion of the contract of 
employment.245 It has to be said, that certain residual terms are found in the common 
law of contract, namely “the duty to be respectful, to work in a competent manner, and 
to act in good faith”.246 These terms create the impression that the employee’s interests 
are protected, even though the employer has the power to prescribe the ‘consensual’ 
terms of the agreement. In practice, this only strengthens the employer’s position, due 
to the broad phrasing of these residual terms,247 as the common law preserves the 
employer’s “right to dismiss the employee simply by giving the required notice”.248 This 
perspective emphasises lawfulness instead of fairness.249 Legislation as a component 
of contemporary labour law attempts to restore balance and promote fairness in the 
                                                                                                                                            
bargaining”. Labour law balances the interests of the concerned parties to achieve industrial justice. See 
Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 1 fn 4. 
242
 Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 1 note that collective labour law “is applied 
to the relationship between employer and organized labour [and] … [i]ts content is determined primarily 
by statute and collective bargaining”. In this context, the judiciary aims to protect collective bargaining 
power as a method of dispute resolution. See Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 
1 fn 4. 
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 See Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 276; Grogan Workplace Law 10; Tiopazi v Bulwayo Municipality 1923 
AD 317; Pretoria City Council v Minister of Labour 1974 TPD 238. 
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 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 181; Collins 1986 (15) ILJ (UK) 1 at 10; Strydom 1999 (11) SA 
Merc LJ 311.  
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 See Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 311 at 312. 
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 Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 311 at 312. See also Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 186. 
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 Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 311 at 312 notes that the residual terms enhance the employer’s 
prerogative, as it allows for a broad interpretation of the duties.  
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 Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 311 at 312. See also Pretorius and Pitman 1990 Acta Juridica 133 at 
134; Kubheka v Imextra (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 484 (W) at 488.  
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individual employment relationship through equalisation of power, by limiting the 
exploitation of employees and to promote job security.250  
Contemporary labour law’s individualistic approach to labour relations forms the basis of 
the idea(l) of equal partnership between employers and employees.251 It is an attempt to 
promote fair employment practices so that the interests of both parties attract equal 
consideration. In practice, this equalisation is not easily realised, as the employer is the 
one with the capital and associated power to regulate the employee’s employment. 
Without the regulatory assistance of labour law to restrain common law deficiencies, the 
employee is exposed to exploitation, abuse and endangerment in the workplace,252 
regardless of society’s ideals of equitable uniformity. 
3 2 3 2 Collective Dimension 
Individual employment, from an unrestrained common law perspective, does not give 
recognition to the individual employee’s existence “alongside many others with the 
same employer”.253 The common law does not consider the collective dimension of 
labour relations.254 
Legislative regulation provides for collective bargaining to balance the unequal power 
relationship between employer and employee through the joint action of employees as 
represented by trade unions.255 This labour law development assists with this task by 
providing certain facilitating rights, such as freedom of association and the right to 
strike.256 
Collective labour law, like individual labour law, focuses on employment relationships. 
There is an undeniable link (even overlap) between individual and collective labour 
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 See Grogan Workplace Law 5; Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 311 at 313. 
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 See Wiehahn Aantekeninge par 2.14. 
252
 All of these aspects contributed to the development of collective labour law, where one voice is 
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 Pretorius and Pitman 1990 Acta Juridica 133 at 135. 
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 See Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 25. 
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law,257 as collective labour law may be described as an indirect mechanism to ensure a 
fair(er) outcome at individual level. Collective bargaining forms the functional 
component of labour law,258 focussing on matters of mutual interest instead of disputes 
of right.259 This collective ‘mutual interest’ goal is a contemporary labour law method of 
addressing the deficiencies of individual labour law.260 
3 3 Managerial Prerogative261 
Subordinates will question the basis for the authority to which they are subject and the 
reasonableness of the manner in which it is exercised.262 Employees therefore question 
the employer’s managerial prerogative, as it “constitutes the most characteristic 
expression of the employer’s power”.263 Employers fervently rely on managerial 
prerogative when regulating their workplace standards and refusing to bargain with 
trade unions on work related issues.264 
In similar fashion to the concept of fairness, the term managerial prerogative evades 
legislative or common law definition.265 Strydom explains that the word prerogative in 
itself “denotes a right or a privilege which belongs to a particular institution, group or 
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 See Grogan Workplace Law 315. 
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 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 230 elaborate: “A central theme of collective labour law is that 
collective bargaining is the preferred method of establishing and changing terms and conditions of 
employment as well as the resolution of interest disputes.”  
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 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 228; Grogan Workplace Law 339. 
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 See Bendix The Basics 16, 27 and 39. 
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 See Chamberlain 1963 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 184 at 185. 
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 See Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40. 
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 Although employers and trade unions regard the meaning of the term managerial prerogative as 
obvious in practice, the nature and the scope of the term is at issue when the interests of the parties in 
the employment relationship are at odds and require legislative regulation and judicial intervention. See 
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person”.266 An employment related prerogative “is usually taken to refer to the ‘right to 
manage’ an organisation”.267 The employer’s decisions can fall into one of two 
categories: Human resource related organisational decisions and economic or business 
based decisions.268 
With regard to economic or business type decisions, for example investment decisions, 
an employer can act unilaterally in exercising unqualified managerial prerogative.269 
Human resource related decisions (reflecting the manner in which the employer utilises 
the employees) can therefore be linked to the controversy surrounding the exercise of 
managerial prerogative. The fact that employees are at the impact centre of the 
exercise of managerial power (in relation to the first type of decision) calls the manner in 
which the power is exercised to be scrutinised. It is this type of decision, which makes it 
difficult to identify the acceptable scope of the employer’s managerial prerogative.270 
It is obvious that agreement on every employment decision by all parties to the 
employment relationship is improbable, if not impossible.271 As there is an overlap 
between employment terms and conditions and work practices, regardless of the 
theoretical distinction made above, confusion often results in disputes over the scope of 
managerial prerogative.272 While the employer can change work practices unilaterally, 
any changes to employment terms and conditions must be negotiated with employees 
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 Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40 at 41. Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 5 explains that the purpose of 
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 Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40 at 42. See also Collins 1986 (15) ILJ (UK) 1; Jordaan 1991 (11) ILJ 
1; Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practices 91. 
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 See Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40 at 42. Cf George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1996 
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 According to the judgment in BTR Dunlop Ltd v NUMSA (2) 1989 (10) ILJ 701 (IC) at 705, “[t]here 
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relationship”. See UWC and UWCUWU 1992 (13) ILJ 699 (ARB) at 705 per Bozalek A. 
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 See SACWU obo Mhlongo and Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd 2002 (23) ILJ 2134 (CCMA) at 2138. 
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(or their union representatives) and be agreed upon by all parties to the employment 
relationship.273  
The employer cannot merely rely on managerial prerogative “to make the employee 
submissible to instructions of whatever kind management might choose to impose”.274 
The employer, while having the right to manage, is confined to exercising that right 
within the scope of the terms and conditions of the employment contract, whilst 
observing the general legal rules that govern employment relationships.275 The scope of 
managerial prerogative must be determined with consideration of two factors: the right 
to work276 and the right to trade.277 The two factors stand in conflict with one another.278 
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It is the task of the judiciary to balance the underlying interests to determine the scope 
of managerial prerogative.279  
Initially the employer’s managerial prerogative was judicially regarded as fairly wide and 
unfettered at times, as the common law traditionally favoured the employer.280 The 
traditional common law unfettered managerial prerogative of the employer is proof of 
the unequal power in the employment relationship.281 Legislative and constitutional 
recognition of the principle of fairness now limits the employer’s common law 
managerial prerogative.282 Considerations of fairness and reasonableness restrict 
managerial prerogative at a substantive level by informing the concept of unfair labour 
practices, as it is wide enough to embrace issues ranging from promotions, demotions 
and suspensions to dismissals on the ground of conduct, capacity and operational 
requirements.283 The legislative recognition and jurisprudential development of unfair 
labour practices does not annul the employer’s right to discipline and dismiss.284 It 
merely restricts managerial prerogative in an attempt to eliminate the arbitrary element 
in the unequal bargaining relationship.285 
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Anderman Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers’ Rights 62 (as quoted in Strydom (LLD 
1997 UNISA) 65), the employer’s common law prerogative to discipline “is carefully preserved in the 
employee’s duty to obey as an implied fundamental term of the contract”. 
282
 See Strydom (LLD 1997 UNISA) 75 and 80. See also R v Canqan 1965 (3) SA 360 (E) at 367 – 368. 
Strydom (LLD 1997 UNISA) 90 notes that the managerial prerogative of the employer is still recognised, 
but now tempered by the fact that the employer’s “instructions must not only be lawful but also fair or 
reasonable”. Emphasis added. 
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 See George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1996 (8) BLLR 985 (IC) at 997 – 998. 
284
 See Strydom (LLD 1997 UNISA) 103. 
285
 See Strydom (LLD 1997 UNISA) 103 and 108. In Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and 
SACCAWU 1990 (11) ILJ 1357 at 1365 (ARB), it was recognised that even though an employer “has the 
prerogative to manage the business … [and] has a decisive say over the conduct of the enterprise” this 
prerogative is now limited by considerations of lawfulness, fairness and reasonableness, as is evident in 
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The limitation that the constitutionally entrenched right to fair labour practices places on 
an employer’s managerial prerogative, requires that employers act in a fair manner 
when taking commercial decisions that potentially affect the rights of employees. 
Deference for managerial prerogative, viewed through a value-added constitutional 
prism, has the effect that judicial interference with an employer’s decision is warranted if 
the relevant decision was reached in the absence of fairness.286 In the past, the 
judiciary has acknowledged that the employer’s employment decisions call for respect 
unless bad faith or improper motives underlie the decision under review.287 The fact that 
the judiciary generally approaches interference with the managerial discretion of 
employers with an element of respect, by no means implies that the judiciary’s default 
position is one of submission to the view of the employer unless otherwise 
persuaded.288 
It does not constitute an undue disregard for an employer’s prerogative if the judiciary 
evaluates the reasons for employment decisions in terms of the idea of rational 
                                                                                                                                            
the rationale behind the legislative limitations imposed on the managerial prerogative of employers. See 
also Brassey et al The New Labour Law at 74; Strydom (LLD 1997 UNISA) 111; Checkers SA Ltd (South 
Hills Warehouse) and SACCAWU 1990 (11) ILJ 1357 at 1364 (ARB); NAWU v Atlantis Diesel Engines 
(Pty) Ltd 1992 (13) ILJ 405 (IC) at 408. 
286
 See Van Jaarsveld 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 355 at 358. The Labour Appeal Court in WL Ochse Webb & 
Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen 1996 (8) BLLR 985 (IC) confirmed this approach. See also the discussion 
of the impact of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 
(12) BLLR 1097 (CC) in Chapter Five, part 4 3. 
287
 In George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1996 (8) BLLR 985 (IC) at 996 – 997, Landman P 
explained that as far as it is associated with the commercial activities of the business, managerial 
prerogative requires judicial recognition of the employer’s capacity to recruit, appoint and promote 
employees in accordance with his or her opinion of the business requirements. Cf Arries v CCMA 2006 
(11) BLLR 1062 (LC) at par 16; Administration Western Cape (Department of Health and Social Services) 
v Bikwani 2002 (23) ILJ 761 (LC) at paras 29 – 32. 
288
 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 177 and 178, 
Ngcobo J stated (albeit it in the context of dismissal) that it is essential to recognise that a discretion lies 
with the employer. The law requires the employer (in similar fashion as the administrative law decision-
maker) to apply his or her mind in formulating an adverse employment decisions. The fact that the 
employer has a discretion does not obligate the judiciary to surrender to the employer’s perspective. An 
employer’s perspective of fairness will unquestionably favour his or her interests primarily. 
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justifiability.289 The Labour Appeal Court has looked to administrative law for guidance 
in determining how the reasons must be ascertained.290 Simplified, a rational decision is 
one that passes the test of both factual and legal causation.291 Consequently, both 
administrative and labour law approach the idea of deference as respect in a similar 
way. Both call for the facts of the dispute and the interests that require balancing to 
dictate the required degree of respect. The test for deference can be summarised as 
follows: a decision warrants interference as far as the discretion of the decision-maker 
was not properly and reasonably exercised as required by the circumstances of the 
case.292 
3 4 External Influences: Political, Social and Economic  
Labour law reflects customs, standards, and norms293 in the regulation of the 
employment relationship.294 These customs, standards, and norms change as society 
changes.295 Society’s multitude of employment relationships forms the basis of 
economic activity.296 The realities that social and economic considerations bring to an 
employment relationship are further linked to political considerations, as “[s]ociety and 
politics revolve around the economy”.297 Because of its hybrid nature, labour law is 
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 See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO 2001 (22) ILJ 1603 (LAC) at 1613 and 1617; Coca-
Cola Bottling East London v CCMA 2003 (2) BLLR 159 (LC) at 163; Basson v Provincial Commissioner 
(Eastern Cape), Department of Correctional Services 2003 (4) BLLR 341 (LC) at 356; Benjamin v UCT 
2003 (12) BLLR 1209 (LC) at 1223 – 1224; Arries v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1062 (LC) at paras 43 and 44 
(with reference to Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC)). Cf Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte Application of the President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 
241 (CC) at par 90. 
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 See County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 1999 (20) ILJ 1201 (LAC) at 1712. 
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as respect. Cf Department of Justice v CCMA 2001 (11) BLLR 1229 (LC) at par 25. See Chapter Three, 
part 3 6 2 and Chapter Five, part 2 1 3. 
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 See Arries v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1062 (LC) at par 16. 
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294
 See Bendix The Basics 47. 
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 See Bendix The Basics 47. 
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 See Bendix The Basics 2. 
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 See Bendix The Basics 21; Strydom 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 40 at 50; Vettori (LLD UP 2005) 23. 
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accustomed to function within a polycentric setting and is susceptible to regular and 
dynamic transformation.298 Its metamorphic character is comparable to that of a living 
being adapting to its elements by way of evolution.299 Its susceptibility to change reveals 
an element of flexibility that ensures that labour principles do not become archaic or 
unsuitable because of a change in political, social and economic circumstances.300 
Due to its regular political, social and economic transformation, contemporary labour 
law balances the interest of various role players and provides “the normative framework 
for the existence and operation of all the institutions of the labour market”.301 Labour law 
therefore has optimal impact when unified and equally applicable to employment 
disputes in every sphere of business – be it private or public.302 Equal applicability of 
labour law and access to its regulatory framework does not automatically imply that 
there is only one standard mould for a proper employment relationship. Labour law’s 
flexible character is supported by variable core concepts, such as fairness, that ensure 
its adaptability to the needs of every employment relationship as required by the context 
of every dispute. 
3 5 Contemporary Core Concepts 
The flexible essence of contemporary labour law is encapsulated in s 23(1) of the 
Constitution, the right to fair labour practices. As such, labour law – whether contractual 
or legislative in nature – is built upon two core concepts – ‘labour practices’ and 
‘fairness’. 
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 See Grogan Workplace Law 1. 
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 Due to this character, it functions well within the current South African constitutional dispensation as 
the Constitution (much like the European Convention on Human Rights 1950) can be regarded as a 
“living instrument”. See Limbach 2001 (64) MLR 1. 
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 See Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 18-2; Rideout Rideout’s Principles 
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3 5 1 Labour Practices 
The concept ‘labour practices’ evades precise definition, but is confined to the scope of 
the employment relationship.303 The Constitutional Court has frequently emphasised 
that the law must strive for fair results through the balancing of the interests and rights 
of the parties involved in a dispute.304 Recognition of the impact of the employment 
relationship and the balance of matters of mutual interest brings within the ambit of the 
constitutional labour practices a wide range of labour issues.305 The equity 
jurisprudence of the Industrial Court is of great interpretative assistance in determining 
the scope and application of the term labour practices within the context of s 23.306  
It has been argued that s 23(1), in dealing specifically with the right to fair labour 
practices, should focus exclusively on individual matters, as the remaining subsections 
of section 23 focus on collective labour rights.307 Commentators have however 
emphasised the limitation of such an approach, as it “would exclude from the realm of 
the fair labour practice right those collective practices which cannot find a home under 
the collective labour rights”.308 
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 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 504. 
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 See NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 40 per Ngcobo J. See also Avril Elizabeth 
Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA 2006 (9) BLLR 833 (LC) where the Labour Court indicated 
that, in the context of s 23, the judicial protection of the right not to be unfairly dismissed calls for the 
recognition of the tension between the respective interests of employers and employees. 
305
 This approach reminds of the equity jurisprudence of the Industrial Court whereby the balancing of 
employment interests for the realisation of labour peace brought within the scope of labour practices both 
individual and collective matters. See Cooper 2005 (26) Comp Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 206 
– 208. 
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 See Chaskalson et al CLOSA 30–17. The Industrial Court found unfairness to relate to the following 
labour practices: dismissal in the absence of a fair reason and procedure; selective dismissal; failure to 
reemploy as per agreement; failure to renew a contract regardless of reasonable expectation; 
discrimination; dismissal of strikers involved in a lawful strike; refusal to bargain; bargaining in bad faith; 
unfair bargaining strategies; victimization for trade union involvement. See Cooper 2005 (26) Comp 
Labour Law and Pol’y Journal 199 at 208. 
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 See Chaskalson et al CLOSA 30–18.  
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3 5 2 Fairness 
Jurisprudence pre-dating the Constitution confirmed that lawful conduct does not 
necessarily amount to fair conduct.309 Although the Constitutional Court has confirmed 
that “the inquiry into fairness is not novel”,310 the concept has gained fundamental 
recognition. Consequently, labour practices can only be regarded as fair, from a s 23 
constitutional perspective if both lawful and reasonable.311 
Fairness is a core element in the employment relationship, as “no meaningful 
relationship can result from arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable applications of 
statutory authority”.312 
Although it is a relatively uncomplicated exercise to identify (un)fairness after the judicial 
fact, the general scope of the concept of fairness evades jurists. Fairness is understood 
in terms of synonyms: “‘equitable’, ‘equity’, ‘unbiased’, ‘reasonable’, ‘impartial’, 
‘balanced’, ‘just’, ‘honest, ‘free from irregularities’, ‘according to the rules’, ‘equality’”.313 
From the vast array of synonyms, it is clear that the only thing that is certain is that 
fairness is a vague and variable concept. 
                                                                                                                                            
Chaskalson et al CLOSA 30–21. Cf Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (1987) 38 DLR 
(4th) 161 per Dickson CJ.  
309
 See NEWU v CCMA 2003 (24) ILJ 2335 (LC); Basson et al Essential Labour Law 75. 
310
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 63 per Navsa AJ. See 
also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 503.  
311
 See the discussion to follow with regard to the link between fairness and reasonableness. See also 
Chapter Three, parts 2 3 2 and 3 6 2. 
312
 Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 827. The same argument holds true in the context of 
administrative law relationships. 
313
 Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 42. The identification of equality as a synonym of 
fairness is of great importance, as equality is both a right and a value in the Constitution. Equality before 
the (labour) law is what public employees negotiated for and theoretically obtained with the constitutional 
inclusion of s 23 (the right to fair labour practices). Poolman’s reference to reasonableness as a synonym 
for fairness reminds of the reasoning of Sachs J in the Sidumo-case, namely that a fair decision also 
qualifies as a reasonable decision and vice versa.  
  
 
53 
The concept of fairness has revolutionised the modern perspective of labour law with its 
transformative impact on contemporary labour law,314 as the Constitution prevents 
fairness from becoming just a word on paper.315 Its inherent contextual flexibility has 
however also attracted criticism as creating uncertainty in a legal system that aims to 
promote legal certainty.316 The vagueness associated with the concept of fairness does 
not automatically translate to judicial uncertainty, as a general duty to act fairly can be 
deduced and sufficiently identified from the synonyms of ‘fairness’.317 Even though the 
concept is broad and elastic in nature, it also acknowledges the rules of natural 
justice.318 
In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd,319 Navsa AJ confirmed that the concept of 
fairness is not absolute, as it “affords a range of possible responses”.320 The possibility 
exists that there can be more than one fair response in any given context.321 The 
context in which a decision is made determines the standard of fairness required.322 
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 Modern administrative law has not been left untouched by the concept of fairness. See Mullan 1982 
(27) McGill LJ 250 at 273; Ridge v Baldwin [1963] 2 All ER 66; Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) 
SA 731 (A). See also Chapter Three, parts 2 2 and 3 6. 
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 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 12; Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional 
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 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 34 per Navsa AJ. For 
similar reasoning, see also Hutchinson 2001 (22) ILJ 2223 at 2224; Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 
822; NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (6) BLLR 697 (A) at 706; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
(Rustenburg Section) v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1021 (SCA) per Cameron JA. 
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 See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 43; Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 822. 
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The concept of fairness, and the duties associated therewith, cannot be described as 
static.323  
The constitutional concept of fairness seeks to create equilibrium between employer, 
employee and the public in the context of labour relations,324 and incorporates two 
dimensions: substantive fairness (fairness of impact or goal) and procedural fairness 
(fairness in action).325 The assessment of fairness in the constitutionalised labour 
context calls for the consideration of the circumstances of every case.326 It is not strictly 
a question of law, but also calls for a moral or value judgment.327 This approach 
“necessarily involves a degree of subjective judgment”.328 It must however not be 
understood as the unfettered exercise of the adjudicator’s personal perspective, as 
fairness is “a combination of findings of fact and opinions”.329 
It is evident that fairness (in the context of labour practices) is the core concept on 
which balance in the employment relationship depends.330 Section 23(1) of the 
Constitution introduces “an implied duty on both the employer and the employee to act 
fairly”331 that tempers the uncompromising terms of employment contracts and 
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 See Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 824. 
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 See Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 18–13, Cohen 2004 (20) SAJHR 
482. 
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 See Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies 
of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 at par 1. Poolman Principles of Unfair 
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328
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 503. 
329
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 63 per Navsa AJ. See 
Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 503; Council of Mining Unions v Chamber of Mines of SA 
1985 (6) ILJ 293 (IC) at 295. 
330
 Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 42 identifies it as more than a mere requirement, but 
rather an obligation in labour relations. 
331
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 57. 
  
 
55 
supplements employment terms and conditions.332 The fairness element of s 23(1) is 
therefore not solely determined from the perspective of the employee.333 
3 5 3 Fairness and Reasonableness 
Fairness is sometimes perceived as a standard that finds expression through 
considerations of reasonableness in the circumstances of a case.334 In terms of this 
view, fairness requires proportionality as associated with the concept of reasonableness 
in administrative law.335 In the determination of reasonableness, Poolman has identified 
three stages: 
(a) whether the [decision-maker] in labour relations, after reasonable careful  
investigation has adequate factual grounds on which to base his views; 
(b) whether [the decision-maker] in labour relations adopted a reasonable 
procedure in his investigation; and 
(c) whether the decision and the consequential conduct was reasonable in 
the circumstances.336 
The first aspect shows that an element of rationality is required, as the factual grounds 
must support the decision emanating from the labour practice. The second 
consideration encompasses a procedural aspect. The last consideration reveals an 
element of proportionality, as the decision (and pursuant conduct) must amount to a 
reasonable response. Poole explains that the principle of proportionality prescribes that 
there has to be a fair balance between the action taken (the decision) and the right 
affected in the factual circumstances of the case.337 In the pursuit of substantial justice, 
Poolman argues that “[e]quity [or fairness] incorporates those rules of reasonableness 
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in the particular circumstances to avoid or minimize hardship and injustice … [as the] 
moral standards of society require the application of equitable principles according to 
changed societal norms of justice”.338 Sossin therefore explains that the evaluation of a 
decision’s reasonableness calls for consideration whether the decision “can be justified 
normatively on grounds of fairness, consistency and coherence”.339  
What this illustrates (as will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters), is that 
there is a close link between fairness (the core value of labour law) and reasonableness 
(one of the core values of administrative law). In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mine 
Ltd,340 Sachs J was sensitive to this reality in stating that “it is difficult to see how a 
reasonable commissioner can act unfairly, or a fair commissioner can function 
unreasonably”.341 
4 FURTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF THE FAIRNESS PRINCIPLE 
As has already been illustrated, fairness considerations have influenced the 
development of the common law and the legislative approach to the regulation of labour 
practices. Two further examples of the impact of fairness considerations in the 
regulatory structure of labour law are dispute resolution and remedies. 
4 1 Dispute Resolution 
The constitutionally informed LRA supports a specialised, labour specific, approach to 
dispute resolution. Employees who have been unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair 
labour practices have access to two specialised forums, namely the CCMA and the 
Labour Court.342 
                                            
338
 Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 48. One can simplify this statement by reasoning that 
fairness gives a de facto contextual content to the de jure reasonableness requirement. See Chapter 
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 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mine Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 145. 
342
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 555 qualifies this position: “If a 
recognition agreement or contract of employment provides that disputes concerning the termination of 
employment must be referred for private arbitration, the employee cannot utilize the statutory forums.” 
  
 
57 
Arbitration by the CCMA calls for a re-hearing of a dispute by a commissioner, a neutral 
third party, who is at liberty to “deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with a 
minimum of legal formalities”.343 Although the LRA endorses the speedy resolution of 
disputes, it does not allow commissioners to ignore the principles of natural justice 
during the arbitration proceedings.344 In terms of s 138 of the LRA, a commissioner 
must determine the substantive and procedural fairness of a disputed dismissal or 
labour practice, by determining whether the reason presented for the action taken 
against the employee holds true in the facts and circumstances of the specific case.345 If 
the decision is fair, with regard to both reason and procedure, interference by the 
commissioner is unwarranted.346 
A CCMA arbitration award may only be questioned by means of review on the specific 
grounds mentioned in s 145. In respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction of the 
CCMA, the court’s involvement is limited to “an exercise of secondary decision-
making”.347 The standard of review is that of a reasonable decision-maker.348 The 
Labour Court relies on the principle of rationality to review the reasoning and conclusion 
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of a commissioner.349 In essence, the court reviews the commissioner’s logic.350 In 
addition to this review mandate, ss 191(5)(b) and 191(6) of the LRA also provide for the 
adjudication of specific types of dismissal disputes by the Labour Court in the first 
instance as “a court of law and equity established in terms of section 151 of the LRA”.351 
4 2 Remedies 
In line with the fairness-perspective of s 23, remedies in the employment context should 
fit the equitable principles legislatively and judicially developed specifically for the 
workplace.352 Ultimately, the aim is to grant speedy and effective relief.353 Sections 193 
and 194 of the LRA, building on the ‘justice and equity’ discretion of the Industrial Court, 
guide the Labour Court and the CCMA in identifying possible fair remedies, such as 
reinstatement, re-employment or compensation, when it fits the circumstances of an 
unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice.354 
5 CONCLUSION 
The employment relationship, as the regulatory focus of labour law, amounts to a power 
relationship based on command and subordination. Labour law is aimed at countering 
“the inequality of bargaining power ... inherent in the employment relationship”,355 a 
relationship of dependency, mutual need and conflicting interests. Labour law is multi-
                                            
349
 See De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 (21) ILJ 1051 (LAC) at par 27 per Conradie JA. 
350
 See Grogan 2006 22(6) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
(Rustenburg Section) v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1021 (SCA) at par 34, Cameron JA explained that the 
reasoning of a commissioner would not be logical if he or she relied on a bad reason which “cannot 
provide a rational connection to a sustainable outcome.” In considering the commissioner’s logic, it is not 
the task of the court to weigh good reasons against bad reasons. 
351
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 340. In Gibb v Nedcor Ltd 1997 (12) BLLR 1580 (LC), Jali AJ 
argued that reference to the term adjudication in these sections of the LRA calls for a distinction from the 
review required by s 145, regardless of the fact that adjudication is not defined in the Act. 
352
 See Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 300; Grogan Workplace Law 5. 
353
 Conciliation and mediation are important concepts in labour law. Adjudication is seen as a last resort. 
The remedy granted by the court must be effective if previous negotiations between the parties 
themselves have failed to resolve the employment issue. See Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186. 
354
 See Grogan Workplace Law 129 – 134. 
355
 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 201 – 202; Klare 1988 (38) Cath UL Rev 28. 
  
 
59 
faceted and reactive in nature, responding to social, economic and political variables.356 
Labour law is also of public interest, as it has been used, but also abused, as “a 
principal tool of state policy”.357 Constitutionally informed, labour law has undergone a 
paradigm shift towards equality for all employees in labour law through the concept of 
fair labour practices.358  
In developing its core concept of fairness, labour law has embraced proven principles of 
law (as developed in other legal branches) to meet the needs of the employment 
relationship,359 while avoiding fragmentation. Consequently, labour law allows for 
overlap with other legal fields, as will be illustrated in the chapters to follow, “[b]ecause 
the employment relation is central to so many theories of social relations”.360  
Accordingly, calls for the compartmentalisation of labour law requires cautious and 
critical evaluation,361 as confirmed by Froneman J in Nakin v MEC, Department of 
Education, Eastern Cape Province,362 as the values of the Constitution inform all law.363 
To accommodate constitutional harmony (or hybridity) reliance on other rights are called 
for to inform labour rights when the context of a dispute so requires.364 The idea of 
hybridity, so understood, empowers labour law to give expression to its own hybrid 
character in the regulation of employment relationships.  
The unavoidable influence of the Constitution (through its values and rights) on the 
system of labour law can have progressive effects, as Chapter Ten will ultimately 
                                            
356
 This is evident from South Africa’s labour history. Arthurs 1996 (46) Univ Toronto LJ 1 at 4 
emphasises that there is “a close affinity ... between the state and labour law … in the light of the rapid 
and ramifying social, economic, political … developments [which] are transforming the state, the 
character of employment, and consequently, labour law”. 
357
 Takirambudde 1995 (39) JAL 39 at 41. 
358
 See Takirambudde 1995 (39) JAL 39 at 41. 
359
 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 202. 
360
 Arthurs 1996 (46) Univ Toronto LJ 1 at 32. 
361
 For such a critical (but cautious) evaluation, see Chapters Eight and Nine. 
362
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). 
363
 See MEC, Department of Road and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
17 per Froneman J. 
364
 See MEC, Department of Road and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
18 per Froneman J. 
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illustrate by embracing the idea that the Constitution “may gradually alter the character 
and behaviour perhaps even the identities, of the actors in the labour law field”.365 This 
‘alteration’ is already evident in the inclusion of public servants in our labour system and 
the two-fold classification (employer or regulator) of the State in the context of labour 
law. A discussion of the proper understanding of the public service is therefore called 
for and is the focus of Chapter Four. Before such a contextual discussion can be 
attempted, it is necessary to give due consideration to administrative law’s 
development, goal and fundamental tenets in South Africa, as has been attempted from 
a labour perspective in this chapter. Such an evaluation will allow for a balanced and 
constitutionally endorsed evaluation of the relationship between labour and 
administrative law in the regulation of the public employment. The labour law exercise in 
this chapter will therefore be repeated in Chapter Three from an administrative law 
perspective. 
                                            
365
 Arthurs 1996 (46) Univ Toronto LJ 1 at 40. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT, GOAL AND FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter falls on administrative law and the principles associated with it, 
disconnected from other external legal influences. It is aimed at the identification of the 
normative characteristics that inform administrative law, as the basis for a comparison 
with the normative basis of labour law. Along with Chapter Two, this chapter provides 
the yardstick against which to measure the compatibility of labour and administrative 
law in the context of public employment.  
This chapter will show that the key developments in administrative law culminated in  
s 33(1) of the Constitution.366 Section 33(1) advances administrative law367 in its 
                                            
366
 In the constitutional milieu, the concept administrative action (in its widest meaning) refers to conduct 
of the administration when public power is exercised. The term administrative action has obtained a 
complex meaning, as the right to just administrative action and the applicability of PAJA is confined by the 
ambit of such action. The categorisation of action as administrative action is a threshold requirement. 
Section 33 illustrates a move away from the categorisation of types of administrative action, but not from 
the required presence of administrative action. Under PAJA, that determination has a narrower focus, as 
s 1 describes administrative action as any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by an organ of 
state, when exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution, or exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation. The enactment of PAJA has not 
inspired the legal community to great praise for its potential. The basis  	
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producing “a misguided idea of deference” due to the narrow description of the concept. In establishing 
the ambit of public power (and therefore also administrative action), the court in President of the RSA v 
SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143 stated that the determination of whether action taken amounts to 
the implementation of legislative or the formulation of policy primarily requires consideration of the nature 
of the power. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 111; Hoexter Administrative Law 6; Hoexter in 
Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 29; Klaaren 2006 Acta Juridica 370 at 378; 
Gamevest (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Northern Province and Mpumalanga 2002 
(12) BCLR 1260 (SCA) at par 12 per Olivier JA; Fetsha v Member of the Executive Council responsible 
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promotion of administrative justice, to the extent that the latter is not protected 
elsewhere in the Constitution,368 and gives expression to the basic principles or 
conceptual trilogy of administrative justice: lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.369 
Section 33 must not be restrictively construed as a mere codification of common law 
rules that inform it,370 as the Constitution may call for the development of these 
principles.371 
As part of an array of specialised rights in the Bill of Rights, s 33 “has far less work to do 
than … if it were the only right in Chapter 2 of the Constitution”.372 The fact that s 33 is 
one of a collection of rights,373 supports the Constitutional Court’s perspective that all 
fundamental human rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights are mutually supportive and 
                                                                                                                                            
for Education (Eastern Cape) [2006] 3 All SA 542 (Ck) at par 10. Cf Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro 
Inspection Services CC (Western Cape) 2001 (10) BCLR 1026 (SCA) at par 16 per Streicher JA. 
367
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 128; Govender in Corder and 
Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 47. 
368
 See Rautenbach General Provisions of the South African Bill of Rights 63. See also Devenish, 
Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 128. 
369
 See Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 47. 
370
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 203. Cf President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
at par 136; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 
687 (CC) at par 22; Fetsha v Member of the Executive Council responsible for Education (Eastern Cape) 
[2006] 3 All SA 542 (Ck) at par 9. 
371
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at paras 28 – 42; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 202. 
372
 Hoexter in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 28. This statement calls for 
reflection on the pre-constitutional (uncharacteristic) role of administrative law in the protection of human 
rights in a repressive legal milieu. See Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative 
Justice 49; Rikhoto v East Rand Administration Board 1983 (3) SA 595 (A); Hurley v Minister of Law and 
Order 1985 (4) SA 709 (D); Mathebe v Regering van die RSA 1988 (3) SA 667 (A); Hira v Booysen 1992 
(4) SA 69 (A). 
373
 Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 48 explains that s 33 forms 
“part of a cluster of rights that include those stipulated in ss 32 and 34”. See also Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 201. Cf Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 16; Hoexter 
Administrative Law 138; Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 45.  
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interdependent.374 Section 33 must be viewed within the holistic context of the 
Constitution and its underlying values.375 The constitutionalisation of specific 
fundamental rights creates a broader scale of judicial review than previously allowed.376 
The goal of this chapter is to trace the development of administrative law, albeit 
somewhat in isolation. It serves as a basis for the analysis of the conceptual trilogy that 
allows for the contextual co-operation between the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action. To enable a proper understanding of the scope of these concepts, 
their relation to the principles of natural justice and initial development will first be traced 
(part 2). The identification of the key developmental moments will be followed by a 
discussion of the purpose of administrative law (part 3 1) and the type of relationship it 
seeks to regulate (part 3 2). This opens the door to a proper understanding of the 
contextual considerations (parts 3 3 and 3 4) that influence the functioning of the 
conceptual trilogy, namely, procedural fairness (part 3 5 1), reasonableness (part 3 5 2) 
and lawfulness (part 3 5 3). Finally, it will be considered how the proposed promotion 
and protection of the trilogy in terms of the right to just administrative action translates 
into remedies in practice. 
                                            
374
 See Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at par 23. See also NCGLE v 
Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at paras 15 – 32 (per Ackerman J) and par 112 (per 
O’Regan J); Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
(6) BCLR 569 (CC) at paras 41 and 102 – 104; Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 153. 
375
 The interpretation of s 33 must take account of its relationship with other provisions entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights, as well as s 1 and the general provisions in Chapter 10 of the Constitution, with due regard 
to the principles of accountability, responsiveness and transparency. See Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 
286, 289 and 290; Craig Administrative Law 3. 
376
 See Hoexter in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 28. Hoexter comments that 
the categorisation of review as either constitutional or administrative is not of great importance, as the 
Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte application of the 
President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 30 held that “[t]here is only one system of law … 
shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law”. 
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2 KEY MOMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
Early administrative law was not well recognised as a field of law in South Africa.377 Its 
narrowly construed traditional pillars were the ultra vires rule and the principles of 
natural justice. It was later recognised that a restrictive perspective does not serve the 
ends of justice, resulting in the development of the broader concepts of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness. 
2 1 The Traditional Pillars of Administrative Law 
2 1 1 Ultra Vires 
The English doctrine of ultra vires has a limited meaning:378 no administrative body, 
organ or authority may exceed its objective powers.379 This understanding allowed the 
judiciary to overlook considerations of procedural fairness and reasonableness.380 As a 
result, the doctrine allowed formalism to creep into the judicial review of administrative 
action and gave a narrow meaning to the principle of legality.381 
As a component of the rule of law (s 1 of the Constitution), the principle of legality has a 
broader meaning, requiring that public power must be exercised in good faith.382 The 
Constitutional Court has embraced the broader principle of legality as the grundnorm of 
                                            
377
 The fact that only a few descriptive pages in the 1935 comprehensive constitutional law contribution of  
Kennedy and Schlosberg, The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution, focuses on 
administrative law is evidence of this. The reason for administrative law’s slow development is historically 
rooted. See Beinart 1948 (11) THRHR 204 – 205; Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 23 at 24 – 25. 
378
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 204. 
379
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 204. 
380
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 205 explain that South African judiciary followed the English 
“with the result that the requirement of lawfulness or legality was often confined to compliance with 
provisions of the enabling or empowering statute”. 
381
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 205; Hoexter Administrative Law 110, 116 and 117 with 
reference to Baxter Administrative Law 301. Cf Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 219. 
382
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 56; Hoexter Administrative Law 117. 
  
 
65 
administrative law, as it is enshrined in the supreme Constitution, and has distanced 
itself from the doctrine of ultra vires.383  
2 1 2 Natural Justice 
The idea of procedural fairness was introduced through the narrow scope of the 
principles of natural justice,384 as a minimum standard of fairness385 by means of two 
general rules:386 audi alteram partem387 and nemo iudex in sua causa.388 The judiciary 
jealously guarded this approach and stifled the development of a general duty to act 
fairly, as it was reasoned that the value of procedural fairness “would be lessened 
rather than increased if it were applied outside its proper limits”,389 as associated with 
the rules of natural justice. 
2 2 Procedural Fairness 
The development of the principle of fairness, following the trend set by the 
groundbreaking English decision of Ridge v Baldwin,390 was a triumph for law generally 
                                            
383
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 198; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 22. 
384
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 169. See also De Ville Judicial Review 218; Devenish, 
Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 129; Hoexter Administrative Law 351. Cf Sachs v 
Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11 at 38 per Stratford JA; R v Nqwevela 1954 (1) SA 123 (A) at 131 per 
Centlivres CJ; Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom 1988 (4) SA 645 (A) at 662 per Corbett JA. 
385
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51. 
386
 In giving content to these rules, courts considered the presence or absence of fair play. See Currie 
and Klaaren Benchbook 89. 
387
 A person affected by a decision should be granted the opportunity to state his/her side, preferably 
before any decision is taken. See Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 89. 
388
 The person making a decision affecting another person must be, and be perceived to be, impartial. 
See Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 89. 
389
 Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief [1958] 2 All SA 58 (A) at 59. See Hoexter 2004 (4) 
Macquarie LJ 165 at 169; Hoexter Administrative Law 352. See also Wiechers as referred to in Burns and 
Beukes Administrative Law 51. 
390
 [1964] AC 40. Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 364 fn 40 notes that Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 
brought about the “rebirth” of the principle of fairness. 
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and administrative law specifically.391 With the judicial acceptance of the general 
principle of fairness, minimum standards were identified to guide decision-makers.392 
2 2 1 The Duty to Act Fairly 
The creation of the duty to act fairly is attributed to English law, and viewed as an 
elaboration of the rules of natural justice.393 In In re HK (An Infant),394 Lord Parker 
declared the rules of natural justice to fall within the ambit of the collective duty to act 
fairly.395 This general approach to fairness brought about a judicial understanding that 
the duty to act fairly requires case-by-case contextualisation of the already recognised 
principles of natural justice.396 The seminal South African decision of Administrator, 
                                            
391
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360. 
392
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360. Asimow 1996 (44) American J Comp L 393 at 398 explains that 
procedural fairness “safeguards an individual’s dignitary interests” in that decision-makers are compelled 
to consider the side of the affected individual. In the current context, fairness allows for the review of the 
legality and not the merits of a decision. Within the ambit of administrative law, fairness is therefore 
primarily viewed as a procedural framework. It must however be noted that Wade Administrative Law 340 
regards no decision as ever being completely unreviewable. See also Roncarelli v Duplessis [1958] SCR 
121 at 142 and Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 361. 
393
 The acknowledgment of the right to be heard has led to courts inferring a variety of procedural rights, 
for example the right to be informed of an impending (potentially adverse) decision. See Sossin 2002 (27) 
Queen’s LJ 809 at 824. In Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 27, Jafta AJ 
explained that it is the negative impact of decisions affecting the rights and legitimate interests of 
individuals that form the basis of such rights. The evolvement of the general duty to act fairly is also 
evident in the development of labour law. It formed the basis of the acknowledgment of the concept of fair 
labour practices by the Wiehahn Commission. See Chapter Two, part 2 2. 
394
 [1967] 2 QB 617. 
395
 Apart from the fact that the person presiding over a procedure must be uninvolved and that all affected 
individuals must be granted an opportunity to state their side of the case (as per the rules of natural 
justice), the basic requirements of fairness also call for the affected person to be informed of the reasons 
on which the decision is based. As a procedural concept, the right to reasons is traditionally part of the 
concept of fairness as emphasised by Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 364 – 365. 
396
 See R v Liverpool Corporation, Ex Parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 
589; Baxter Administrative Law 538 – 540; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51; Evans 1973 (36) 
MLR 93 at 94; Hawke and Parpworth Introduction to Administrative Law 164; Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s 
LJ 809 at 824. Baxter Administrative Law 538 – 540 prefers to view the general duty to act fairly within a 
procedural sense. See Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 48. Cf Van Huyssteen v Minister for Environmental 
Affair 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C) in which the court followed this approach. 
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Transvaal v Traub397 embraced this general idea of fairness in calling for the application 
of administrative law principles of justice in the public employment context. The 
developmental importance of the recognition of the duty to act fairly lies in the fact that it 
offers “an escape from the conceptual mess”,398 which initially limited the fairness 
requirement to only certain kinds of administrative actions.399  
In short, the duty to act fairly is flexible rather than static.400 Its general content is 
dependent “on the importance of the interest affected by the decision and not on 
whether that interest belongs to some list on the ‘rights’ side of a rights/privilege 
distinction”.401 So viewed, this general duty calls for decisions made in good faith.402  
2 2 2 Legitimate Expectation403 
Traditionally an affected person with an expectation short of a right could not call on the 
protection of natural justice.404 The concept of legitimate expectation first appeared on 
                                            
397
 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). This case concerned the denied appointment of hospital residents. 
398
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 171. 
399
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 171. 
400
 For example, a written hearing may be sufficient in one set of circumstances, while the variable 
concept of fairness may require an oral hearing in another context. See Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 
at 824. 
401
 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193 at 194. See the discussion on the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation at part 2 2 2. 
402
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 366. 
403
 It is acknowledged that there is an ongoing academic debate with regard to the recognition and 
development of the principle of substantive legitimate expectation in South African jurisprudence. 
However, O’Regan J in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) 
BCLR 846 (CC) at par 306 explained that “[o]ur courts have expressly refrained from determining the 
question whether a legitimate expectation might give rise to a substantive benefit, although English courts 
have developed a doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation”. Brand JA also recently in Duncan v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [2010] 2 All SA 472 (SCA) at par 14 pronounced (with 
reference to Campbell 2003 (120) SALJ 292 and Quinot 2004 (19) SAPL 543) that the time has not yet 
come for South African “courts to cut the Gordian knot” as far as the issue surrounding substantive 
legitimate expectation is concerned. For this reason, the discussion of legitimate expectation within the 
ambit of this study will be confined to the traditional procedural perspective. 
404
 In Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 34, Jafta AJ explained that prior to 
the acceptance of the doctrine of legitimate expectation the common law confined the application of audi 
alteram partem “to cases where an administrative decision affected pre-existing rights of the party 
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the legal scene in Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs,405 where Lord Denning 
MR reasoned that the focus should fall on whether it would be fair to deprive a person 
who has a right, interest or legitimate expectation from the opportunity to be heard.406 In 
the South African context, a paradigm shift came with the Traub-judgment, when the 
Appellate Division introduced the doctrine of legitimate expectation.407 The introduction 
of the doctrine, because of the recognition of the duty to act fairly, brought about a less 
rigid judicial approach,408 20 years after the English decision of Ridge v Baldwin409 
rejected the sterile distinction between rights and privileges.410 The importance of this 
development lies in the recognition of legality as the overreaching principle that brings 
together the two paradigms of rights and interest or expectations.411 
                                                                                                                                            
challenging the validity of the decision on the basis that it was denied a hearing”. The result being that 
applicants that wished to acquire rights, but did not yet possess existing rights, were not entitled to 
procedural fairness. This approach went hand in hand with the administrative law associated deprivation 
theory, in terms of which the courts reasoned that the benefit of fairness only befell people whose rights 
were eradicated or surrendered because of an official action. See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 
169 – 170; Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief [1958] 2 All SA 58 (A). 
405
 1969 (2) Ch 149 (CA). 
406
 See Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs 1969 (2) Ch 149 (CA) at 170. 
407
 See Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) at 761. Cf Walele v City of Cape Town 
2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 27. The doctrine of legitimate expectation (as linked to procedural 
fairness) strikes a reasonable equilibrium between the need to safeguard individuals against unfair 
decisions and the promotion of judicial deference for administrative decisions. See SA Veterinary Council 
v Szymanski 2003 (4) BCLR 378 (SCA) for the legitimate expectation requirements. See also 
Hauptfleisch v Caledon Divisional Council 1963 (4) SA 53 (C) at 59; Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng 
Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346; Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the 
Association of Governing Bodies of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) at 
par 34; NDPP v Phillips 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) at par 28. 
408
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 171. 
409
 [1964] AC 40.  
410
 See Evans 1973 (36) MLR 93 at 97. 
411
 See Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193 at 194. 
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2 2 3 Broadening the Scope of Procedural Fairness 
The concept of fairness is now a constitutional principle. No matter how it is clothed,412 
the principle of fairness remains omnipresent. In the context of s 33, fairness has a 
procedural rather than a substantive character.413 It aims to grant people who stand to 
be adversely affected by an administrative action the opportunity to state their case 
before the action or decision is taken.414 This gives the administrator the advantage of 
having all the relevant facts upon which to base his or her decisions.415 Within the ambit 
of s 33, the concept of procedural fairness forms an important “component of the rights-
based approach to administrative law”.416  
The right to procedurally fair administrative action not only involves the application of 
the rules of natural justice, but also includes principles and procedures that are right, 
just and fair, as dictated by every individual case.417 It amounts to more than an 
interpretative presumption.418 Although no fixed content can be prescribed to the 
principle of procedural fairness, the importance of adherence to it and its promotion is 
irrefutable.419 
                                            
412
 It could be within the scope of s 23 (fair labour practices) or s 33 (procedurally fair administrative 
action). 
413
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 52. 
414
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 52. 
415
 In Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO 2000 (11) BCLR 1235 (CC) at par 24, 
Goldstone J elaborated as to the constitutional rationale of fairness. See Chapter Six, part 2 for a 
discussion of the foundational design of procedural fairness. 
416
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 69. The same understanding holds true for ss 3 and 4 of PAJA. 
Section 3 of PAJA deals with individual procedural fairness, while s 4 gives effect to s 33 of the 
Constitution by means of collective procedural fairness. 
417
 See Jenkins v Government of the RSA [1996] 1 All SA 659 (Tk); Maharaj v Chairman of the Liquor 
Board [1996] 2 All SA 185 (N); Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 27–4. 
418
 In terms of s 36 of the Constitution (the general limitation clause) the rights in s 33 can only be limited 
if reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom. 
419
 In Fetsha v MEC for Education (Eastern Cape) [2006] 3 All SA 542 (Ck) at par 30, the court stated that 
s 33 “does not limit the application of procedural fairness only to administrative action that affects rights or 
legitimate expectations [as] … [i]t rather appears to include the broader notion of a duty to act fairly 
without laying down rigid rules as to the range of situations to which procedural fairness would apply”. 
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2 3 Reasonableness 
Reasonableness, as a requirement for just administrative action, has a turbulent past 
and a controversial interpretative present, because it has a reputation for being difficult 
to prove.420 
2 3 1 Common Law 
Traditionally, reasonableness falls within the broader scope of the principle of legality.421 
Initially it was not well received due to judicial fears that it would blur the lines between 
review and appeal.422 This resulted in an incoherent common law approach to and a 
narrow judicial perspective of the concept of reasonableness.423  
Not merely any degree of unreasonableness was regarded as solely sufficient to render 
a decision deficient.424 Only unreasonableness of a gross nature was considered 
reviewable.425 This narrow perspective was referred to as ‘symptomatic 
                                                                                                                                            
The court qualified that s 3 of “PAJA reintroduces the limitation of the right to procedural fairness to 
administrative action that affects rights or legitimate expectations”. Hoexter Administrative Law 358 
described the formulation of procedural fairness in s 3(1) as noteworthy for two reasons: “On the one 
hand, it is more generous than s 1 of the Act in that it recognises legitimate expectations as a trigger in 
addition to rights. On the other, it is less generous in requiring that rights or legitimate expectations be 
affected materially as well as adversely.” Section 1 of PAJA qualifies the concept of administrative action 
as referred to in s 33. Section 3 refers to that same concept in a different context, which controversially 
includes legitimate expectations. In Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 30, 
Jafta AJ argued that Parliament “must have been aware of the judicial decisions applied to the audi 
principle in its original and expanded forms, incorporating the doctrine of legitimate expectation” when it 
enacted PAJA. In Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 35, Jafta AJ therefore 
noted that the application of the definition in s 1 to the interpretation of s 3 “will lead to absurdity”. Jafta AJ 
was willing to read s 3 as excluding the s 1 definition. 
420
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 366. 
421
 See Wiechers Administratiefreg 178. 
422
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 160 at 170. 
423
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 210. 
424
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 130. 
425
 For example, gross unreasonableness was reviewable if it related to mala fides or ulterior motive, as 
something besides standard unreasonableness could also be inferred from it. See Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 210 and 485; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 121; 
  
 
71 
unreasonableness’, as associated with the English law Wednesbury-principle.426 In 
terms of this principle, the required reviewable standard of unreasonableness must be 
“[s]o outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible 
person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at 
it”.427 This traditional approach has been labelled to stringent.428 This perspective is 
reflected in the court’s rejection of the symptomatic approach in Standard Bank of 
Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO,429 moving it closer to the constitutional 
perspective of reasonableness.430 
2 3 2  The Constitutional Extension of Reasonableness 
In the constitutional context, reasonableness has been transformed into a primary 
adjudicative tool, in answer to the desire for simplicity following the common law 
confusion.431 The inclusion of reasonableness as a requirement for just administrative 
                                                                                                                                            
Administrator, Transvaal and the First Investment (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1971 (1) SA 56 
(A) at 80; Maharaj v Chairman of the Liquor Board [1996] 2 All SA 185 (N) at 189 and 193. 
426
 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 as referred to 
in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. The ‘symptomatic 
unreasonableness’ approach was evident in South African cases, such as Union Government (Minister of 
Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Limited 1928 AD 220 at 237. See 
Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 130; Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 160 
at 170.   
Cf De Ville Judicial Review 13, 196 and 209. 
427
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 at 951. For criticism 
of the Wednesbury-approach see De Ville Judicial Review 211. See also Brind v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720 at 738; R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International 
Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 129 at 157. 
428
 See the critical perspectives of Baxter Administrative Law 458, 489 – 490 and Wiechers 
Administratiefreg 237 – 254. See also Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 211 and 392; Hoexter 
Administrative Law 302. Cf Union Government v Union Steel 1928 AD 220.  
429
 1995 (3) SA 74 (B) at 96. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 395. 
430
 Case specific considerations are noticeable in the proportionality approach as a means of evaluating 
reasonable administrative action. As such, the social, economic, historical and political aspects of every 
case come into consideration. Cf De Ville Judicial Review 211 – 212. See part 2 3 2 2. 
431
 See Fredman 2006 Publ Law 498 at 514; Hoexter Administrative Law 303. 
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action in s 33(1) alters the narrow common law approach.432 As a result, two elements 
of reasonableness (rationality and proportionality) have evolved. 
2 3 2 1 Rationality 
The requirement that decisions must be rational is rooted in the rule of law, which 
dictates that the exercise of public power must not be arbitrary in nature.433 Rationality 
forms the minimum requirement for the exercise of all public power,434 even where the 
nature of the decision taken by an organ of state falls outside the ambit of an 
administrative action.435 Rationality in this context is informed by the principle of 
legality;436 it requires a rational connection between the designed purpose of the power 
and the exercise of that power.437 
The s 24(d) interim Constitution reference to justifiability in relation to reasons given 
was interpreted as rationality,438 “which is the first element of reasonableness”.439 
                                            
432
 This new perspective is reflected in ss 6(2)(f)(ii) and 6(2)(h) of PAJA. 
433
 For such arbitrary decisions to be avoided, Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 383 note the 
necessity of a rational link in a decision between the power and the purpose for which it is exercised. For 
reference to the link between rationality and the rule of law, see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 90 and Dawood v 
Minster of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) at par 47. 
434
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 383; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 85. Cf De Ville Judicial Review 
200. 
435
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 383. 
436
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 323. 
437
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 323. As stated, rationality is not solely a test for reasonable 
administrative action. Reasonableness is not only exclusively a concept calling for consideration in 
administrative law, but is also an important consideration in other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Within a 
culture of justification, rationality retains its position as a principle of the rule of law. See S v Makwanyane 
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at par 156 per Ackerman J; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 85; De Ville Judicial Review 
200. 
438
 Hoexter Administrative Law 303 – 304 explains that the wording of s 24(d) rendered the doctrine of 
symptomatic unreasonableness redundant. See Asimow 1996 (44) American J Comp L 393 at 396 fn 15; 
Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 211, 384 and 396; De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 
Handbook 473; Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 160 at 172; Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31 at 40; Roman 
v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C); Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC); 
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During this interim period, reasonableness was read into the requirement of just 
administrative action through the general limitation clause,440 requiring that any 
limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. Within the context of s 33, rationality has also been judicially 
identified as a standard of review.441 
A decision is generally viewed as rational if supported by the evidence and information 
available to the administrator, along with the reasons provided for it.442 In addition, a 
rational decision objectively furthers the purpose for which the power (in terms of which 
it was taken) was granted.443 
Rationality, although not specifically defined,444 has also been included in the content of 
PAJA.445 In terms of s 6(2)(f)(ii) administrative action is reviewable if it is not rationally 
connected to the purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering 
provision, the information before the administrator, or the reasons given for it by the 
                                                                                                                                            
Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk). Cf Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 
1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC) at par 32 per Froneman DJP. 
439
 Hoexter Administrative Law 303. Consequently, even though reasonableness was not expressly 
referred to in the interim Constitution, its effects were still profound. 
440
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 212. 
441
 See Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 108. Cf Hoexter 
Administrative Law 304. It has also been argued that reasonable administrative action requires a 
functionary to make rationally justifiable decisions. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 85. Cf Ampofo v 
Member of the Executive Council for Education, Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation, Northern Province 
[2002] 1 All SA 226 (T) at par 55. 
442
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 307. 
443
 This approach was adopted by the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 
(11) BLLR 1093 (LAC) at par 37. See Hoexter Administrative Law 307. 
444
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 387. 
445
 In the application of s 6(2)(f)(ii), the Supreme Court of Appeal has referred to the Carephone-approach 
with approval. See Hoexter Administrative Law 308; Trinity Broadcasting (Ciskei) v Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa 2004 (3) SA 346 (SCA) at par 21; Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1021 (SCA) at par 25. 
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administrator.446 These considerations have been described as a four-pronged 
rationality test.447  
Regardless of its express legislative recognition, rationality as a standard against which 
to evaluate the reasonableness of an administrative action is but one consideration. 
While rationality is the minimum requirement for reasonableness, s 33(1) calls for 
something more in a reasonableness analysis. If rationality is to be regarded as a 
threshold consideration for reasonableness, then other considerations naturally follow. 
2 3 2 2 Proportionality 
Although the majority in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape448 
read s 24(1) of the interim Constitution as merely requiring rationality,449 the minority 
reasoned that “[j]ustifiability … must demand something more substantial and 
persuasive than mere rational connection” as the principle of legality requires that “[a]ll 
exercises of public power have to have a rational basis”.450 Subsequent cases point to 
the fact that rationality is merely the first aspect of reasonable administrative action.451 
In addition to rationality, proportionality has been identified as the second component to 
reasonableness in terms of s 33(1).452  
                                            
446
 Although s 6(2)(f)(ii) is describable as “a thorough and searching ground of review”, Hoexter 
Administrative Law 308 – 309 explains that this is not particularly alarming as it honours the identified 
common law grounds of review: ulterior purpose, failure to apply the mind and arbitrariness. 
447
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 387; De Ville Judicial Review 200. Cf Harksen v Lane NO 
1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at paras 43 – 54; S v Lawrence 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) at par 19. 
448
 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
449
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at paras 41 
– 46. 
450
 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 164. 
451
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 307. In Khosa and Mahlaule v Minister for Social Development 2004 
(6) BCLR 569 (CC) at par 67, the Constitutional Court clearly stated that constitutional reasonableness 
stretched further than rational review. See Fredman 2006 Public Law 498 at 514; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 43 per O’Regan J; Minister of 
Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 108 per Chaskalson CJ. 
452
 The fact that it is referred to as a second element by no means implies that it is to be regarded as a 
lesser element than rationality. See Hoexter Administrative Law 309. 
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In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service,453 Lord Diplock 
predicted that proportionality, as a basis for administrative review, would develop in 
English law and other jurisdictions.454 True to this prediction, elements of the principle of 
proportionality now form part of South African administrative law.455 Due to uncertainty 
about the limits of the principle of proportionality, its status, in contrast to rationality, 
remains contentious.456  
The proportionality analysis reveals a bolder character than the traditional 
reasonableness test.457 Hoexter (with reference to S v Manamela)458 defines 
proportionality as “the notion that one ought not to use a sledgehammer to crack a 
nut”.459 It maintains equilibrium between the unfavourable and favourable impact of an 
action with the aim of encouraging administrators “to consider both the need for the 
action and the possible use of less drastic or oppressive means to accomplish the 
desired end”.460 Proportionality allows for a balance that is realistically maintainable by 
                                            
453
 [1984] 3 All ER 935. 
454
 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 at 950. 
455
 Roman v Williams NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C) at 1276 was the first case in which administrative law 
was held to require reasonable administrative action of a proportional nature. Cf Ngqumba v 
Staatspresident 1988 (4) SA 224 (A) at 252 and 256. In Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks SA 
(Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 637, Sachs J confirmed the significance of proportionality within 
the reasonableness enquiry. See De Ville Judicial Review 207; Hoexter Administrative Law 309. 
456
 See De Ville Judicial Review 203; Hoexter Administrative Law 309 – 310. 
457
 See Jowell 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 18. Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31 argues that the increase of 
judicial support for the principle of proportionality indicates the “move from a ‘culture of authority’ to a 
‘culture of justification’”. For examples of similar judicial reasoning see Eastern Metropolitan Substructure 
v Peter Klein Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 661 (W) at par 36; Bel Porto v Premier, Western Cape 
2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) at par 166; Schoonbee v MEC for Education, Mpumalanga 2002 (4) SA 877 (T) at 
885; Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement 2002 (5) SA 567 (Tk) at paras 14 – 15; Minister of Health 
v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 637. 
458
 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at par 34. 
459
 Hoexter Administrative Law 309. Cf R v Goldsmith [1983] 1 WLR 151 at 155; Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 408. De Ville Judicial Review 203 and Plasket (PhD 2002 Rhodes) are fervent 
supporters of proportionality. See Hoexter Administrative Law 311. 
460
 Hoexter Administrative Law 309 with reference to Hoexter in Klaaren A Delicate Balance: The Place of 
the Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy 61 at 64. 
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the reasonable decision-maker. In short, a proportionality analysis balances 
constitutional interests.461  
The proportionality of an administrative action is evaluated with due regard to 
considerations of balance,462 necessity463 and suitability.464 This formula is not 
specifically identifiable in PAJA,465 but it has been argued that s 6(2)(h)466 indirectly 
includes proportionality considerations,467 as it calls for something more than mere 
rationality.468 Burns and Beukes explain that “the requirement of proportionality between 
                                            
461
 See Du Plessis and Penfold 2005 ASSAL 27 at 69. 
462
 De Ville Judicial Review 203 determines the balance consideration by enquiring whether “the 
measures (even though it may be suitable and necessary) [do] not place an excessive burden on the 
individual which is disproportionate in relation to the public interest at stake?” In S v Makwanyane 1995 
(6) BCLR 665 (CC) the Constitutional Court referred to the principle of proportionality as “the balancing of 
different interests”. Cf Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 416. 
463
 With regard to necessity, De Ville Judicial Review 203 evaluates the necessity of a measure by asking 
whether “no lesser form of interference with the rights of a person was possible in order to achieve the 
desired aim (such alternative measures being equally effective to the measure taken)”. Cf Jowell 2006 
Acta Juridica 13 at 18. 
464
 According to De Ville Judicial Review 310 one must consider whether “the measure in question [was] 
suitable or effective to achieve the desired aim”. Cf Hoexter Administrative Law 310. 
465
 The Act does not make express mention of proportionality within the context of reasonableness 
review. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 416; Hoexter Administrative Law 311.  
466
 The section allows for a court or tribunal to judicially review administrative action if “the exercise of the 
power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provisions, in pursuance of which 
the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power or performed the function”.  
467
 Section 6(2)(h) allows for review of unreasonableness as a separate ground of review from that of 
rationality found in s 6(2)(f)(ii). See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 675; Hoexter 
Administrative Law 312 considers the possibility of such an interpretation. De Ville Judicial Review 209 
points out that s 6(2)(i) possibly serves a similar purpose, as the section refers to the review of “otherwise 
unconstitutional or unlawful” administrative action. 
468
 The wording of the section unfortunately reminds of the traditional Wednesbury–approach. See part 2 
3 1; Currie and De Waal Bill of RIghts Handbook 675. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 44, O’Regan J criticised the 
Wednedsbury-test for unreasonableness. Hoexter Administrative Law 312 explains that s 33(1) “killed the 
doctrine of symptomatic unreasonableness stone dead” by allowing direct reliance on lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair administrative action. See also Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 403. 
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the means and the ends should include an examination of the reasonableness of the 
decision itself and it is in this regard that the two principles overlap”.469 The legislative 
omission of express mention of the proportionality principle by no means denies the 
crucial role of the proportionality enquiry, as “its role in controlling the exercise of 
administrative action cannot be understated”.470 This is evident from the judgment in 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,471 where O’Regan J 
reasoned that a reasonableness evaluation calls for consideration of the nature of 
competing interests in an unequal power relationship, as well as the impact that a 
decision of the power bearer may have on the interests of a vulnerable individual or 
group.472  
2 4 Lawfulness 
As a common law principle, lawfulness is traditionally associated with the doctrine of 
ultra vires.473 This English law doctrine requires that organs of state not exceed their 
objective power.474 Unlawful administrative action occurs when an administrator acts 
beyond the framework of his or her empowering provision.475 As such, lawfulness is a 
formal test that does not necessitate the consideration of reasonableness or procedural 
fairness. In the past, this common law approach was applied inconsistently throughout 
                                            
469
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 416. See also Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 408; 
Hoexter Administrative Law 411. Cf Baxter Administrative Law 528. 
470
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 416. 
471
 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC). 
472
 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 45. 
The inclusion of considerations of this nature in the reasonableness evaluation clearly requires a balance 
of interests that is in conformity with the proportionality perspective of De Ville Judicial Review 203 – 310. 
473
 See part 2 1 1; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 50; Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law and Justice 129. 
474
 Lawful administrative action must conform to the provisions of empowering statutes and all common 
law rules. See Wiechers and Baxter as referred to in Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 205. Burns 
and Beukes Administrative Law 205 fn 30 hold that this approach to lawfulness reminds of the narrow 
approach of ultra vires, also termed procedural ultra vires. Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 48 supports the 
narrow perspective, while De Ville 1995 (11) SAJHR 264 prefers the broader approach. 
475
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 205. 
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South African jurisprudence, to the exclusion of the other trilogy principles.476 This 
makes the constitutional protection of the principles all the more significant.477 
2 5 Legality 
The Constitutional Court has placed reliance on the constitutionally endorsed rule of law 
to curtail the abuse of power.478 Generally, the scope of the rule of law is considered to 
be broad.479 At a minimum, it requires adherence to the principle of legality.480  
Constitutional Court decisions reveal a fondness for the principle of legality.481 In recent 
decisions, where administrative actions were found to be absent, but public power was 
nevertheless at play, the court looked to the principle of legality for guidance.482 
                                            
476
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 50. 
477
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 50. The inclusion of lawfulness in the Constitution has 
brought forth various opinions as to its interpretation. Hoexter Administrative Law 225 declares that “the 
requirement of lawfulness in relation to administrative action … seem to coincide completely with the 
content of the constitutional principle of legality”. Considering the relationship between lawfulness and 
legality in the control of public power Hoexter Administrative Law 251 explains that, regardless of whether 
reliance is placed on the principle of legality or the ordinary administrative law rules, an administrator is 
not allowed to act outside the scope of his or her power or misconstrue that power. Cf President of the 
RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 148. In the context of lawfulness, Hoexter Administrative Law 
226 explains that “it seems there is nothing to choose between the grounds in the PAJA and those 
implied by the principle of legality … [but] constitutional logic dictates that where possible, resort should 
be had to a detailed statute such as the PAJA before relying on a broad constitutional principle”. 
478
 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte application of the President of 
the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 85. Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31 at 32 describes this as an 
incident of the “culture of justification”. Cf Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 285. 
479
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 14. 
480
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at paras 56 – 59; Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: 
Volume One 77; Hoexter Administrative Law 13. 
481
 Hoexter Administrative Law 321 explains that the appeal of legality is “the great contrast between it 
and the PAJA ... Where the Act applies only to ‘administrative action’, a concept it defines very narrowly, 
the principle of legality applies to every exercise of public power; and where the PAJA contains specific, 
detailed rules, the beauty of the principle of legality is its generality”. 
482
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC); President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
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Consequently, if s 33 cannot find direct application, the exercise of public power does 
not stand free from lawfulness and reasonableness review,483 because the principle of 
legality has been developed as a constitutional conceptual safety net.484 As such, it falls 
within the broader scope of the rule of law, but should be regarded as a principle 
separate from the administrative justice clause.485  
As part of the rule of law, the principle of legality conveys the notion that “the exercise of 
public power is only legitimate where it is lawful”.486 Furthermore, the ideas underlying 
legality gain legitimacy as products “of an interplay of purposive orientation between the 
citizens”487 and the state.488 Two elements support the implicit constitutional principle of 
legality:489 public power must be exercised in good faith, and an organ of state must not 
misconstrue its power.490 These constraints have been found to be implicitly present 
throughout the Constitution, and not limited to the administrative justice clause.491 
Legality, as a constitutional constraint on the exercise of public power, incorporates 
“objective rationality” as a “minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise of 
all public power”,492 so incorporating an element of reasonableness.493 
                                                                                                                                            
Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC); Hoexter 2004 (4) 
Macquarie LJ 165 at 181. 
483
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 58. 
484
 In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 59, it was found that the principle of legality is “implicit in the constitution”. 
485
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 181. 
486
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 56. Cf Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 181. This idea is shared by 
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193 at 196. 
487
 Fuller The Morality of Law 204. 
488
 See Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 262. 
489
 See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 181. 
490
 See President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 148. 
491
 See President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 148.  
492
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 
241 (CC) at par 90. See also Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 182. 
493
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 321 and 323. 
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The Constitutional Court has been quick to rely on the specific content or “rich 
possibilities of the Rule of Law as a foundational value of our constitutional order”.494 
Consequently, the principle of legality “may be used to inform and supplement the 
written law and the written Constitution itself”.495 As such, the flexible constitutional 
principle of legality has the potential of acting “as a residual repository of fundamental 
norms about how public power ought to be used”.496 
Reliance on the broader constitutional principle of legality requires the judicial 
evaluation of conflicting interests in “a creative and innovative capacity to craft new 
remedies and to contribute to the evolution”497 of rights based jurisprudence.498 This 
constitutional function of legality provides “a way of overcoming the all-or-nothing 
results that are dictated by the use of threshold concepts”.499 
                                            
494
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 182. Footnotes omitted. 
495
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 183. 
496
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 183. It is undeniable that lawfulness can be brought within the 
scope of legality. See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 59. The Constitutional Court has however refrained from 
interpreting the principle of legality to cover procedural fairness or proportionality. See Masetlha v 
President of the RSA 2008 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 78. Cf the minority judgment of Sachs J in Minister of 
Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 637. Plasket (PhD Rhodes 2002) 
164 however argues that the s 33 requirement of a right to reasons is the only element still separating the 
principle of legality from just administrative action. Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 183 – 184 
points out that full reasonableness can be included within the principle of legality if the exercise of public 
power “can be said to be irrational or a misconstruction of one’s power not to give due regard to 
proportionality”. See also Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 321; Hoexter Administrative Law 323. With 
regard to procedural fairness, Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 184 declares, with reference to Raz 
1977 (93) LQR 195 at 201, that the rule of law “lists the observance of natural justice as one of the most 
important principles implied in the doctrine”. 
497
 Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 17. 
498
 It is also an indirect manner by which the Constitutional Court recognises the trap of conceptualism in 
the threshold requirement of administrative action in the broad s 33 of the Constitution and the more 
stringent PAJA. 
499
 Hoexter 2004 (4) Macqaurie LJ 165 at 184. 
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3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TODAY 
3 1 The Purpose 
Administrative law has an active component in its definition, namely law in motion,500 
which results in two dimensions: empower and constrain.501 These dimensions translate 
into the primary and secondary purposes of administrative law: the first attempts to 
legally limit power in an attempt to protect citizens from the State, while the second 
aims to compel public authorities to perform their duties.502 In short, the focus falls on 
both power and duty as “the negative as well as the positive side of 
maladministration”.503 This focus gives administrative law a relative autonomous 
identity504 as a “body of general principles which govern the exercise of powers and 
duties by public authorities”.505 
                                            
500
 Maitland Constitutional History of England 533 (while regarding administrative law as generically part 
of constitutional law) draws a distinction between structure and function (within the constitutional context). 
Holland Jurisprudence 374 works with a similar distinction of constitutional law “at rest” and “in motion”. 
Both authors place the major part of administrative law within the latter of their two dividing principles, i.e. 
as the law relating to function. Maitland and Holland proclaim these limiting distinctions necessary for 
reasons of convenience. 
501
 See Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 3. Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 4 – 5 affirms Currie and 
Klaaren’s dual perspective. 
502
 See Jayakumar Administrative Law 1; Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 par 2, Paper delivered at the Legal Resource Centre 
seminar on the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, 23 October 2001; Wiechers 
Administratiefreg 1. 
503
 Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 5. Jowell 2006 Acta Juridica 13 comments that the positive duty 
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See also Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 12. 
504
 Grant Administrative Law Through the Cases 1 correctly qualifies this general statement by adding 
that constitutional law plays an important role in developing the principles of this unique administrative 
law. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) 
BCLR 241 (CC) at par 45. Cf Transnet Ltd v Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) BCLR 176 (SCA) at par 
34; Fetsha v Member of the Executive Council responsible for Education (Eastern Cape) [2006] 3 All SA 
542 (Ck) at par 12. 
505
 Jayakumar Administrative Law 1. Cf Beinart 1948 (11) THRHR 204 at 207. 
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Public interest promotes the aim of administrative justice and informs this two-pronged 
approach.506 General public functions are regarded “as those functions aimed at the 
public interest”.507 It is the public interest element that gives the power exercised by 
public functionaries a public character.508 The weight ascribed to the public interest in 
any given situation must be evaluated.509 In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,510 Langa CJ stated 
that the facts of every case must be scrutinised for the presence or absence of 
strengthening factors within such an evaluation.511 Strengthening factors are “intimately 
linked to the impact a decision has on the public”.512  
                                            
506
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 84. Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 82 note that “[p]olitically it is necessary to distinguish between the 
state interest and public interest. It is submitted that the latter has a wider impact than the former”. See 
also Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 10; Quinot (LLD US 2007) 207 – 
208. 
507
 Quinot (LLD US 2007) 207. See Baxter Administrative Law 90; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 
191; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 74 fn 64. In POPCRU v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 56, Plasket J explained that every action of an organ 
of state must be exercised in the public interest. See Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 203. 
508
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 53. In Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 191, Langa CJ commented that the POPCRU-facts pointed to 
the “‘pre-eminence of the public interest’ in the proper administration of prisons”. See also Bullock NO v 
Provincial Govt, North West Province [2004] 2 All SA 249 (SCA).  
509
 This fact was illustrated by the minority judgment of Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 
97 (CC) at paras 186 – 194. 
510
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
511
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 191. 
512
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 193. The absence of strengthening factors 
cannot be guaranteed in public employment disputes. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at 
par 194, Langa CJ emphasised that his “reasoning does not entail that dismissals of public employees 
will never constitute ‘administrative action’ under PAJA”. The requirements for an administrative action 
may for example be present where “the person in question is dismissed in terms of a specific legislative 
provision, or where the dismissal is likely to impact seriously and directly on the public by virtue of the 
manner in which it is carried out or by virtue of the class of public employee dismissed”. 
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Public function513 and public interest are not mere synonyms, as “[t]he most 
fundamental difference lies in the fact that under the criterion of public interest the focus 
is more on the (abstract) interest the public has in the action, whereas under public 
function the focus is rather on the object or subject matter of such action”.514 The 
distinction is however not absolute.515 Public power is at play where the public interest 
is paramount.516 A unified understanding of and approach to public power however 
eludes the judiciary.517  
                                            
513
 De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 167 – 168 explain that a body or organ of state performs 
a public function when “it seeks [with the necessary authority] to achieve some collective benefit for the 
public or a section of the public … [when it] intervene[s] or participate[s] in social or economic affairs in 
the public interest … [and when it] regulate[s] commercial and professional activities to ensure 
compliance with proper standards”. See Hoexter Administrative Law 3. 
514
 Quinot (LLD US 2007) 207.  
515
 See Baxter Administrative Law 100. Public function can translate into public interest, as the State is 
called upon to always act in the public interest. Quinot (LLD US 2007) 207 therefore concludes that 
“these two ideas may simply be two different ways of looking at the same criterion”. See also Boulle, 
Harris and Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law 300; Quinot (LLD US 2007) 203. 
516
 See Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v JSE 1983 (3) SA 344 (W) at 364 – 365 per Goldstone J. 
517
 In Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional Services 
2006 (10) BLLR 960 (LC) at par 59, Freund AJ found that when the “respondent exercised his power to 
transfer, he exercised a public power or performed a public function … conferred by statute on a public 
official which is required to be exercised in the public interest … [and is] manifestly a ‘public power’”. 
However, in Hlope v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (3) BLLR 297 (LC) at par 12, Van Niekerk AJ 
(in agreement with Murphy AJ in SAPU v National Commissioner of the Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 
(LC)) held that it “does not necessarily follow that because the power to suspend or transfer is sourced in 
legislation, it axiomatically follows that the power or function concerned is a public one … [as] disciplinary 
or operational transfers and suspensions are employment or labour-related matters, not administrative 
acts”. In dealing with a labour dispute regarding correctional officers, Plasket J in POPCRU v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 53 argued that it is not through the vastness of the 
public interest group that public power is brought into play, but rather the fact that in such “instances … 
public power … has been vested in a public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public 
interest, and not in his or her own private interest or at his or her own whim”. 
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3 2 The Relationship 
The essence of administrative law is one of relationship, albeit a limited one,518 as it 
“includes the entire range of actions by government with respect to the citizen or by the 
citizen with respect to the government, except those matters dealt with by the criminal 
law and those left to private civil litigation”.519 In determining the scope and nature of 
this legal relationship,520 it is important to identify the (sometimes combined) rules and 
principles regulating this complex relationship.521 
A specific relationship to which the State finds itself party may involve both 
administrative action and labour practices due to the procedural and substantive 
                                            
518
 In giving effect to its purpose, administrative law is designed to regulate the relationship between 
society and the State. See Chongwe 1989 (15) Commw L Bull 623; Haysom and Plasket 1988 (4) SAJHR 
303 at 307; McAuslan 1978 (9) Cambrian LR 40; Makhasa v Minister of Law and Order, Lebowa 
Government 1988 (3) SA 701 (A) at 723. 
519
 Friendly 1974 (3) Md Bar J 6. See also Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 7. Cf Beinart 1948 (11) THRHR 231. 
520
 A legal relationship implies the participation of two legal subjects (whose relationship originates from 
agreement or some other legal consequence) and is regulated by law. See Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 65. General administrative law recognises this relationship at de 
jure level, without linking it to a specific predetermined de facto type of relationship/context. 
521
 The complexity flows from the fact that the State can find itself party to more than one type of 
relationship simultaneously. See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 173; Devenish, Govender 
and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 66; Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 9, 20 and 13. Burns 
and Beukes Administrative Law 16 – 17 point out that administrative law was traditionally identified as 
public in nature and contrasted to private action associated with contractual agreements, while the 
employment relationship (due to contractual creation) was regarded as private in nature. The Constitution 
has watered down the public/private divide. Legal purists/traditionalists justify separate regulation on the 
hypothesis that a private law relationship is equal in nature, while a public law relationship is in essence 
unequal. This hypothesis has been disproved in practice. Few relationships exist that are truly equal, as 
is evident in the private law relationship between parent and child. Baxter Administrative Law 62 
predicted this development as a result of the public regulation of private activities and privatisation of 
public services. Cf John Wilkinson and Partners (Pty) Ltd v Berea Nursing Home (Pty) Ltd 1966 (1) SA 
791 (N); Basson t/a Repcomm Community Repeater Services v Post Master-General 1994 (3) SA 224 
(SE); Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 65; Wiechers Administratiefreg 47 
and 48. 
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characteristics within the multi-faceted relationship.522 Baxter mentions three 
prerequisites for determining the presence of administrative law characteristics in the 
relationship: 
(1) the organ of state acts from a position of authority;523 
(2) the organ of state exercises its power in advancement of public interest;524 and 
(3) the organ of state gives expression to an empowering act.525 
Wiechers regards the requirement of “owerheidsgesag”526 as the decisive factor. This 
factor cannot be regarded as decisive, as every relationship has its own specific context 
in which it stands to be considered.527 Authority however remains an important indicator 
due to a power hierarchy being a typical feature of an administrative relationship,528 as 
“the administrative organ takes the greater or stronger position, in relation to either a 
subject or another administrative organ, as a result of its state power”.529 It is the norm 
that an organ of state finds itself party to a power relationship, because it is clothed with 
                                            
522
 Quinot (LLD US 2007) 123 fn 2 explains that “[t]o classify the state action as administrative action 
does not mean that it is not also contractual in nature, it is simply not purely contractual, ie purely private 
law regulated”. 
523
 See Baxter Administrative Law 351. An organ of state, as party to an administrative relationship, is not 
“simply free to employ its powers as it pleases”. Wiechers Administratiefreg 48 describes it as follows: 
“The ... decisive characteristic of an administrative law relationship is that the organ of state that stands in 
the relationship is clothed with public power and has made use of this authority or has the capacity to 
make use of this authority.” (Own translation) Cf Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 100; Devenish, 
Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 66. 
524
 See Baxter Administrative Law 351. Cf Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 66. 
525
 See Baxter Administrative Law 351. Cf Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 66. 
526
 The term “owerheidsgesag” translates to state authority or public power. See Wiechers 
Administratiefreg 51 – 52. 
527
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 100. 
528
 See Wiechers Administratiefreg 58. 
529
 Wiechers Administratiefreg 3. (Own translation) See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 100. Cf 
Hoexter The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume Two 2.  
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public power530 to be exercised in the public interest.531 The subordinate position of the 
citizen does however not imply that “the individual is totally stripped of rights, privileges 
and freedoms when entering into an administrative-law relationship, or that the 
administrator may infringe upon these rights, unless specifically empowered to do 
so”.532  
It is the interaction between the authority exercising public power and the subordinate 
that administrative law seeks to regulate in an attempt to prevent an insidious impact on 
the lives of individuals.533 Administrative law attempts to achieve this through a set of 
(court developed) common law principles.534 These common law principles535 have a 
                                            
530
 It is important to note that an administrative action is a specific form of public power and not merely 
equitable thereto. In President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143, the Constitutional 
Court explained that a series of considerations determine under which public form the nature of the power 
should fall: “The source of the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So too is the 
nature of the power, its subject matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it 
is related on the one hand to policy matters, which are not administrative, and on the other to the 
implementation of legislation, which is.” Accordingly, when determining whether a specific exercise of 
public power qualifies as an administrative action, “the subject matter of a power is … relevant to 
determine whether the exercise of the power constitutes administrative action for the purposes of section 
33”. The court warned that this exercise would require the drawing of difficult boundaries, in determining 
which form of public power should fall within the constitutional purpose of s 33. Due to the inherent 
uncertainty accompanying such an evaluation, this must “be done on a case by case basis”. Cases such 
as President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), while acknowledging the existence of different 
forms of public power, also emphasise that a definition of public power remains elusive. It has however 
been noted that public power is not equatable to the political power of government. See Beinart 1948 (11) 
THRHR 208; Wiechers Administratiefreg 3. Cf Simelela v MEC for Education, Province of the Eastern 
Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 1085 (LC) at par 39. A consideration as to the meaning of public power remains 
unavoidable, as Beinart 1948 (11) THRHR 208 at 215 points out that “[t]he nature of the issue will often 
depend on the nature of the power granted to the administrator”. 
531
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 100; Hawke Introduction to Administrative Law 103; 
Wiechers Administratiefreg 47 and 67. 
532
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 102. 
533
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 7; Kennedy and Schlosberg of 
the South African Constitution 407. 
534
 Chongwe 1989 (15) Commw L Bull 620 at 623 explains that “[a]dministrative law is … largely a judge-
made response to the evolution of a state bureaucracy”. See Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law and Justice 8. 
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quadruple aim, in seeking “to promote the effective use of administrative power, to 
protect individuals and organizations from its misuse, to preserve a balance of fairness 
between public authorities and those with whom they interact, and to ensure the 
maintenance of the public interest”.536 In fulfilling its aim to protect citizens against the 
abuse of public power, administrative law both empowers and constrains, thereby 
balancing the rights and interests of individuals against the public interest.537 The 
ultimate objective of this equalisation is the promotion and protection of constitutional 
justice to preserve a balance of fairness.538 
3 3 The Context in which the Relationship is Regulated 
In giving effect to its regulatory aim, administrative law has a general and specific or 
particular approach.539 Particular “administrative law deals with the rules and principles 
that have developed in specific and specialised areas of administration, such as social 
welfare”,540 while “[g]eneral administrative law ... expounds the rules and principles 
common to all or most kinds of administrative action”.541 General and specific 
                                                                                                                                            
535
 The Constitution usurps the common law principles reconcilable with the spirit, values and rights 
enshrined therein. See s 39 of the Constitution; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re 
Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC). 
536
 Baxter Administrative Law 3. See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 9. 
537
 See Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 5. According to Hoexter Administrative Law 42 this focus of 
administrative law is a necessary component as the presence of power implies “a measure of discretion 
or choice”, which can potentially be abused if left unrestrained. Cf Harlow and Rawlings Law and 
Administration. 
538
 See Hoexter in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 27. Cf Baxter 
Administrative Law 3. 
539
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 7. 
540
 Hoexter Administrative Law 7. Cf Baxter Administrative Law 2; Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law and Justice 8. Particular/specific administrative law contextualises rules and principles 
at de facto level. 
541
 Hoexter Administrative Law 7. Cf Baxter Administrative Law 2; Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law and Justice 8. General administrative law contextualises rules and principles at de 
jure level. 
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administrative law are symbiotic in nature, as the former creates the framework that 
facilitates the latter.542  
General administrative law “describes the powers … of the administration and the way 
in which those powers may be exercised and are controlled”.543 It acts as a safety net 
where there are gaps in the specific regulation. This is possible as the inherent ideas 
and principles of general administrative law are ever-present in the specific realm.544 
However, it is a well-accepted rule of interpretation that, in the case of conflict, the 
specific should trump the general. In the case of general and specific administrative law 
instruments, this is true in theory. In practice, such conflict is avoided by the fact that 
general administrative law provides the “underlying principles and jurisprudence”545 and 
“permeates virtually every facet of the legal system”.546  
In giving effect to s 33, PAJA (as an example of general administrative law) prescribes a 
framework of general principles and rules applicable to all administrative action, as well 
as the remedies available when these are disregarded.547 All administrative decision-
making must occur within this framework, which “prescribes how the administrative 
powers … must be applied within a specific sphere of administrative law”.548 In turn, 
labour law has been identified as an example of such a specific sphere of administrative 
law connected to this general framework, if the circumstances so justify.549  
                                            
542
 See Chapter Five, part 1; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 9; Hoexter 
Administrative Law 7. Cf Cane Administrative Law 18. 
543
 Hoexter Administrative Law 8 with reference to Baxter Administrative Law 5. Farina 2004 (19) SAPL 
489 at 490 explains that general administrative law is “the regulation of regulation”. Cf Hoexter 
Administrative Law 8. Cf Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 4. 
544
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 9. 
545
 Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 8. 
546
 Baxter Administrative Law 2. Cf Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 8. 
547
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 4. 
548
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 4. Emphasis added. 
549
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 5 elucidates: “This branch of law regulates the organisational 
rights of employees and trade unions and also makes provision for the resolution of labour disputes 
through statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The basic principles of administrative law and 
just administrative action apply to this field of law, albeit in a less formal manner. Specific administrative-
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Within the context of the values and rights of the Constitution, it must be understood 
that specific developments (with regard to fairness) function within the broader general 
principles of administrative law in a manner that is reconcilable with both s 23 (fair 
labour practices) and s 33 (fair administrative action). Consequently, a general 
administrative law relationship can stand in (constitutional) relation to a specific 
employment relationship. 
3 4 External Influences: From Political to Moral  
In unison with labour law, administrative law is susceptible to change as its 
development speaks of external influences.550 Administrative law is influenced by 
political ideas of the State.551 The basic principles of administrative law evolve in 
accordance with the idea of democracy embraced by the system that dominates it.552 
Every shift in the South African concept of government and democracy (initially 
characterised by ideas of parliamentary sovereignty, segregation and apartheid, now 
influenced by the Constitution)553 is reflected in the development of administrative 
law.554 In reaction to external influences, administrative law has “not only become 
increasingly sophisticated but has more specifically seen an expansion of judicial 
control over the administrative process”.555 The paradigm shift from parliamentary 
sovereignty (along with the associated formalistic conceptualism)556 to constitutional 
                                                                                                                                            
law principles, such as the principle of fairness, have acquired their own content and meaning in the 
sphere of labour law.” 
550
 See Chapter Two, part 3 4. De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 12 point out that this 
characteristic of administrative law is evident in the fact that administrative common law folded under 
parliamentary pressure and failed to protect individuals and groups from governmental assault. See 
Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279. 
551
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 8. 
552
 See Corder 1998 (12) SAJHR 38 at 40. 
553
 Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31 at 32 associates such vigorous state control of administrative law with a 
culture of authority created by the state’s apartheid doctrine. See also Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 280. 
554
 See Corder 1998 (12) SAJHR 38 at 40. 
555
 Barrie 1991 (1) TSAR 169. 
556
 Cf Hoexter 2004 (4) Macqaurie LJ 165 at 167. English administrative law, from which the formalistic 
conceptual perspective originated, adopted a flexible approach to administrative law in Ridge v Baldwin 
[1964] AC 40 (CA), while South African administrative law long still ignored this altered perspective. 
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democracy reflects “a right-based conception of public law, which is openly and 
unashamedly concerned with the imposition of certain standards of legality”.557 This 
rights-based approach is generally associated with Dworkin’s concept of law as 
integrity,558 which attempts to accommodate the problematic moral dimension of the law 
by holding that “propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from principles of 
justice, fairness and procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice”.559 A certain legal notion is viewed as 
the best approach if it can be justified by the community’s concept of justice, fairness 
and procedural due process as now informed by the Constitution and (more specifically) 
the Bill of Rights. In South Africa’s democracy, the Constitution is a bridge from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification with this rights oriented approach.560 In a 
culture of justification, it is of immense importance “that the Constitution is founded on 
                                            
557
 Craig as quoted in Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 41. The core rights of this type of democracy (that 
inform the effective functioning of the State) are openness of action, involvement in decision-making, 
validation for decisions made and accountable administrative action. Plasket Administrative Action: The 
Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 par 12 holds that the main aim of a 
rights-based approach of public law is to circumvent the abuse of power. See s 1(d) of the Constitution; 
Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 42 – 43; Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 23; De Ville Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 10; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 6.  
558
 In Dworkin’s own words, “law as integrity accepts law and legal rights wholeheartedly … [as] [i]t 
supposes that law’s constraints benefit society not just by providing predictability or procedural fairness, 
or in some other instrumental way, but by securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes their 
community more genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the political power it does”. 
See Dworkin Law’s Empire 95 – 96; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 6.   
559
 Dworkin Law’s Empire 225. Dworkin’s theory distinguishes principles from legal rules, as he holds the 
former to have a moral content, as moral considerations determine the existence of a legal principle. See 
The Nature of Law http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laphil-nature/ (11/07/2006). Cf Devenish, Govender 
and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 6. 
560
 This metaphor is best associated with Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31 at 32, as the author refers to this 
“culture of justification” as “a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which 
the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, 
not the fear inspired by the force at its command”. Cf Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 283; Shabalala v 
Attorney-General, Transvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) at 740. According to Stacey 2007 (22) SAPL 79 at 87 
the “basic principle of Mureinik’s ‘culture of justification’ is that all decisions claiming the backing of 
democratic authority are legitimate only if they have been shown to be justifiable”. See Davis 2006 Acta 
Juridica 23 at 30; Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 304. 
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the rule of law and directly enforceable values of constitutional supremacy”.561 In the 
event of inconsistency, constitutional supremacy entails that the constitutional 
provisions trump government action of any legal or political nature.562 Within this 
framework, the rule of law is of utmost importance as it acts as a check563 on the 
exercise of all power.564 Over the years, the rule of law evolved into elements of efficacy 
of the law,565 stability,566 supremacy of legal authority567 and impartial justice.568 The 
evolved rule of law is incorporated into the s 1(d) value of the Constitution.569 
3 5 The Current Conceptual Trilogy Underlying Administrative Law 
3 5 1 Procedural Fairness 
3 5 1 1 Variable Nature 
Throughout the development of the concept of fairness, society’s focus shifted away 
from historic exclusion, differentiation, indignity and stereotypes.570 The duty of fairness, 
within the context of constitutional values, cannot simply be equated to the rules of 
                                            
561
 Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 at par 5. 
562
 See Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 21.  
563
 The term is here used in the context of checks and balances. 
564
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 14; Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 320 – 321. 
565
 Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 14 note that an effective 
administrative law system exhibits “fair dealing and good administration”. 
566
 Vague laws have been held to be inconsistent with the constitutional understanding of the rule of law. 
See SA Liquor Traders Association v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board 2006 (8) BCLR 901 (CC). 
567
 Constitutionally understood, the rule of law requires every decision to be taken in accordance with the 
law, of which the Constitution is supreme. See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 14. 
568
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) at par 56 fn 52; Magidimisi NO v The Premier of the Eastern Cape Case Number 
2180/04 (unreported) at par 18 per Froneman J. 
569
 See Fallon 1997 (97) Colum LR 1 at 8 – 9. The s 33 constitutional right to just administrative action 
breaths fresh air into the development of administrative law. See Hoexter 2004 (4) Macqaurie LJ 165 at 
172. 
570
 See Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BLLR 1181 (CC) at paras 26 and 27. 
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natural justice.571 No precise description can be ascribed to fairness, due to its flexible 
nature.572 This variable character allows specific situations to dictate the content of the 
norm.573 It calls for what is “essentially an intuitive judgment”.574 Ultimately, the question 
comes down to what procedural fairness requires in the circumstances of every specific 
case.575 Constitutionally informed, its adaptable nature has earned fairness “a 
comprehensive, principled, operational and elegant new legal figure”.576  
A context-sensitive approach will call upon courts to balance relevant considerations577 
in the interest of fairness and ultimately justice.578 Furthermore, the “flexibility of the duty 
to act fairly and the requirement of procedural fairness as protected in the Constitution 
… have made it possible to impose this obligation in a wider range of cases”579 than 
traditionally brought within the ambit of administrative review. 
                                            
571
 This does not imply that natural justice does not form part of constitutional fairness. See Corder 1998 
(14) SAJHR 38 at 48; Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 88 fn 1. Cf De Ville Judicial Review 24. 
572
 Fairness is but one flexible principles of the administrative justice trilogy; reasonableness also has a 
variable character. See Hoexter Administrative Law 328.  
573
 See Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Other Appeals [1993] 3 All ER 92, 
referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Chairman: Board On Tariffs And Trade v 
Brenco Incorporated 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) at par 13. See NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 
1517 (CC) at par 126; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BLLR 1181 (CC) at par 27. De Ville 
Judicial Review 221 and 249 holds that the application and content of the principle of procedural fairness 
are interlinked in its evaluation. 
574
 Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1993] 3 All ER 92 at 106. See Currie and 
Klaaren Benchbook 89. 
575
 See De Ville Judicial Review 247. 
576
 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 640 per Sachs J. 
See also Premier, Province of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing 
Bodies of State Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 at par 39. 
577
 See De Ville Judicial Review 247. 
578
 See De Ville Judicial Review 249.  
579
 De Ville Judicial Review 224. 
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3 5 1 2 The Substantive Dimension of Fairness 
The developed general duty to act fairly and consequential constitutional fairness 
standard embrace more substance than mere procedural rules.580 The recognition of a 
general standard of fairness appears to blur the traditional distinction between 
substantive and procedural fairness.581 This perspective is linked to the argument that 
procedural fairness (along with reasonableness) calls for a degree of contextual 
variability when considering what is required of administrative authorities.582 
The idea of substance incorporates a degree of ambiguity.583 Courts are functionally 
hesitant to intervene in issues that can be labelled substantive in nature.584 In the 
context of administrative law, courts rather view procedure as their sphere of 
                                            
580
 Natural justice is not the sum total of its primary traditional rules. See Wiechers as referred to in Burns 
and Beukes Administrative Law 51. 
581
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 214 elaborate as to the underlying purpose of the distinction: 
“The importance of the distinction between procedural and substantive fairness is that where 
administrative action is challenged on the basis of procedural unfairness or irregularity, a reviewing court 
examines procedural issues only … Where substantive unfairness is alleged, the reviewing court must 
determine whether the decision was substantively fair or reasonable, in the light of issues such as 
general interest, government policy, the effect on the individual …” 
582
 See Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 48; Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 368 – 369; Malan 2007 (22) 
SALJ 61 at 73; s 3(2) of PAJA. Cf Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 60; Cf Wiseman v Borneman [1969] 3 All 
ER 275 at 277. 
583
 See Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ of Toronto LJ 193 at 195. It also has to be said that 
the term ‘substantive’ may have different meanings: outcome of a decision; who defines procedural 
fairness; form and content of procedural fairness; justification requirement of procedural fairness; political 
justification for procedural fairness. Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ of Toronto LJ 193 at 195 
– 196 explains that several of these meanings “pertain to process, [therefore] it might seem that the 
distinction between process and substance is illusory; what we have is substance all the way down”. The 
authors however hold “that the distinction is not likely to disappear, since ... it does at least have the 
function of demarcating domains”. Still, the use of the distinction must be “sensitive to the demands of the 
principle of legality” as it is the “basis of the appropriate [constitutional] conception of judicial review”. 
584
 See Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ of Toronto LJ 193 at 195. 
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influence.585 The judiciary must however guard against the identification of a formalistic 
set list of procedural rules required in every set of circumstances.586  
The flexible nature of fairness may be seen as the catalyst for the argument that 
administrative law should consider fairness in general (and not just procedural fairness) 
in the promotion of administrative justice.587 An unrestrained understanding of the 
logical link between administrative action and traditional procedural fairness justifies the 
recognition of the substantive dimension of fairness.588 A distinction is not denied, but 
the weight the distinction carries in developed administrative law is questioned.589 
Read in line with the perspective of Chaskalson CJ in Bel Porto School Governing Body 
v Premier of the Province, Western Cape,590 s 33(1) of the Constitution clearly 
maintains a substantive/procedural distinction.591 If this were not so, s 33(1) would have 
referred to fair administrative action without a procedural qualification.592 Chaskalson CJ 
pointed out that a judicial disregard of the distinction would amount to a disregard of the 
doctrine of separation of powers.593 
                                            
585
 See Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ of Toronto LJ 193 at 195 – 196.  
586
 This would restrict the value of fairness and allow courts to assume that fairness is only procedural in 
nature. The pre-constitutional formalistic conceptual approach in the sphere of administrative law created 
such an approach. The courts considered procedural fairness as contextually removed from substantive 
fairness, creating the idea that substantive questions could not arise legitimately in an administrative law 
relationship. See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 364. 
587
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 343. 
588
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 343; Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 369. 
589
 According to Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 369 – 379 the argument is supported by the fact that the 
administrative law distinction between rights and interests have retained analytical appeal, while losing its 
practical significance after Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 60. 
590
 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
591
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 343. 
592
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier of the Province, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 
(CC) at par 84. The court based its reasoning on that of Corbett CJ in Du Preez v Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) at 231, namely that it is the manner and not the merit of 
a decision that must be considered within the administrative law duty to act fairly. 
593
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier of the Province, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 
(CC) at par 88. Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 344, however still suggest that the constitutional 
requirement of reasonableness, now explicitly referred to in s 33(1), “if given a broad interpretation, could 
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Although s 33(1) clearly emphasises the procedural element of fairness, the 
Constitution is not confined to s 33 in determining the scope of a fairness evaluation. 
The minority (Sachs and Mokgoro JJ) in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, 
Western Cape594 argued that the constitutional perspective of fairness is broader than 
traditional common law rules associated with natural justice.595 Constitutional fairness 
incorporates two dimensions:596 substantive fairness597 and procedural fairness.598 The 
distinction is however not clear-cut.599 The minority acknowledged the traditional 
separation of substantive and procedural fairness, but viewed such 
compartmentalisation as a complex process.600 It was argued that this separation might 
be difficult to maintain, as the two dimensions “may to some extent become 
intertwined”.601 With due regard to the constitutional milieu, the minority noted that “[i]t is 
necessary to determine the circumstances in which a court, looking at a scheme that as 
a whole passes the test of constitutional fairness, can and should detach a detail which, 
                                                                                                                                            
still constitute authority for the premise that all administrative action must be procedurally and 
substantively fair and just”. Cf Re Scott and Rent Review Commission (1977) 81 DLR (3rd) 530 (NSCA) at 
533 – 535 per MacKeigan CJNS; Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 368. 
594
 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
595
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. 
It must be noted, as stated by Corder in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 
27–15, that “[t]he difference in approach taken in the Bel Porto case may well turn less on the principle 
and rather more on the facts of the case as presented to the court”. 
596
 Sachs and Mokgoro JJ drew this distinction in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western 
Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. 
597
 Substantive fairness focuses on the effect or impact of an action or decision. 
598
 Procedural fairness is concerned with the manner in which a decision is taken. 
599
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. 
600
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. 
601
 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. The 
interdependent relationship between substantive and procedural fairness may be another consequence 
of the interdependence of fundamental rights and values. Some rights, such as labour and socio-
economic rights, clearly have a substantive element, while due process rights such as just administrative 
action are procedural in nature. It is more than probable that one set of circumstances can infringe 
constitutional fairness on both a substantive and procedural level. 
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viewed on its own would be constitutionally unfair”.602 This approach prevents a fairness 
enquiry from becoming a sham in which formal procedure is painstakingly observed, 
while substantive questions are cunningly evaded.603 Dyzenhaus therefore argues that 
“the value of fairness is not purely formal”,604 as was the perception under a culture of 
authority.605 Within a culture of justification, the value of fairness is of a substantive 
nature.606 
3 5 2 Reasonableness 
3 5 2 1 Substantive Proportionality 
Judicial caution in the evaluation of proportionality is based on the possible overreach it 
could bring to a reasonableness enquiry. The idea that proportionality brings a 
substantive element to reasonableness resides in the fact that rationality review does 
not link reasonableness to the merits of the action.607 Opposition to the recognition of a 
substantive element of reasonableness is primarily based on two arguments.608 The 
one being the fear that the judiciary may regard themselves as super-administrators 
entitled to impose “their own ideas on the administration”,609 the other that the 
boundaries between appeal and review may become uncertain.610 
                                            
602
 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 153. 
Emphasis added. 
603
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 365. 
604
 Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 262. 
605
 See Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 262. 
606
 See Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 262. 
607
 In Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 661, Sachs J explained 
that proportionality “will always be a matter of context, impact and degree and ultimately a question of 
balance”. As such, it incorporates within its range the substantive perspective of judicial review. See 
Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 48 – 49; Radio Pretoria (geregistreer ooreenkomstig artikel 21 van die 
Maatskappywet van SA van 1973 soos gewysig) v Voorsitter van die Onafhanklike Kommunikasie-
owerheid van SA [2006] 1 All SA 143 (T). Cf De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 at par 130 per 
Mokgoro J. 
608
 See Burns LAWSA Vol 1 at par 142. 
609
 Burns LAWSA Vol 1 at par 142. 
610
 Hoexter Administrative Law 106 notes that in some cases it may be impossible “to separate the merits 
from the rest of the matter, since a court cannot effectively judge the legality of the decision without 
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In Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape,611 the minority of the 
court (in the context of interim Constitution’s s 24 justifiability) declared an element of 
substantive review to be present, as it “requires more than a mere rational connection 
between the reasons and the decision”.612 Mokgoro and Sachs JJ reasoned that 
rationality alone is insufficient, as public power generally must be exercised in a rational 
manner, as it is required by the principle of legality generally and lawfulness 
specifically.613 In the majority judgment, Chaskalson CJ held that justifiability merely 
requires a rational decision.614 This view must be checked with the evaluation of 
reasonableness (as a concept encompassing more than mere justifiability) within the 
scope of s 33 by the same judge. In Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd,615 
Chaskalson CJ stated that the express s 33 inclusion of reasonableness allows “for a 
more intensive scrutiny of administrative decisions”.616 
                                                                                                                                            
considering its merits as well”. See Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA 2006 
(11) BLLR 1021 (SCA) at par 31 per Cameron JA. 
611
 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
612
 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 164. See 
Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 384. 
613
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 164. 
In the context of labour law, the substantive element of review (due to the requirement of both substantive 
and procedural fairness) was never denied as in the administrative law context. Froneman J’s 
understanding of justifiability in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC) (as required in 
the interim Constitution provision for just administrative action) as something calling for a value judgment 
is proof that the Constitution and the relation between different rights crossing the private/public divide 
has brought about development in the area of judicial review. 
614
 See Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 89. 
See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 675; Pillay 2005 (122) SALJ 419 at 427. Cf Bel Porto 
School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 128. 
615
 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
616
 This argument is based on the fact that s 33 of the Constitution no longer necessitates jurists to 
validate justifiability as importing reasonableness. See Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 
(1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 108. Cf Hoexter Administrative Law 306; Bel Porto School Governing Body v 
Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 46; Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 
(6) BCLR 569 (CC) at par 67. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC) at paras 45 and 49, O’Regan J acknowledged that reasonableness review incorporates a 
substantive element. In casu, O’Regan J considered the reasonable equilibrium approach. This approach 
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The recognition of reasonableness, if properly construed, does not carry administrative 
law judicial scrutiny over to the area of appeal.617 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines,618 Navsa AJ stated that substantive rationality as applied by the Labour Appeal 
Court has been likened “to administrative law concepts such as reasonableness”.619 In 
respecting the distinction between appeal and review, the subjective element of 
reasonableness calls for recognition of the fact that review has two sides: substantive 
and procedural.620 Although substantive review “is review on the ground of the 
substantive content of the decision”,621 it does not allow a court to abuse the limits of 
such review to substitute a reasonable decision of a public body with its own 
substantive decision.622 This development is acceptable as the justification for 
substantive review is not merely based on the pragmatic application of the principle of 
fairness623 (as relating to reasonableness), but rooted in constitutional values and 
                                                                                                                                            
requires an acceptable decision to strike an equilibrium “between a range of competing interests or 
considerations”. Proportionality requires the means to meet the ends. It entails that the administrative 
action must be the least intrusive means to realise the ends sought to be achieved by the action. Cf 
Asimow 1996 (44) American J Comp L 393 at 408 – 409; Jowell 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 17 – 18; 
Mureinik 1994 (10) SAJHR 31. 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
		
 	

	 		  	     ! " 	   	
	
 
 	     
    
	#Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC) at par 36; 
Hoexter Administrative Law 107 and 318. 
617
 Reasonableness and fairness stand in close conceptual proximity. See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 
at 367 – 368; Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 at 67; CUPE Local 963 
v New Brunswick Liquor Employees (1979) 26 NR 341 at 351 per Diplock J. 
618
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
619
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 39.  
620
 Forsyth Judicial Review and the Constitution 332 describes judicial review as a spectrum with both a 
procedural and substantive end. 
621
 Forsyth Judicial Review and the Constitution 332. 
622
 See Forsyth Judicial Review and the Constitution 332. 
623
 Corder in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 27–18 takes the position that 
the requirement of reasonable administrative action illustrates a constitutional demand for “a degree of 
review of the substance of the decision, as the requirement of lawfulness and procedural fairness must 
surely cover all the formal and procedural aspects of the matter”.  
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principles.624 Thomas emphasises that a Bill of Rights is “first and foremost an effects-
oriented document”.625 Recognition of substantive judicial review is not irreconcilable 
with transformative constitutionalism.626 The starting point of an analysis should be “the 
consequence of the practices, not simply the motivation”.627 A denial of reasonableness 
as more than mere rationality and something different from lawfulness and procedural 
fairness, will rekindle the pre-constitutional formalistic administrative law review 
perspective, “leaving the individual helpless and unprotected in the face of sweeping 
administrative powers”.628 
3 5 2 2 Variable Nature 
The variable nature of reasonableness has contributed to it being described as an 
elusive concept.629 The mere fact that various tests for reasonableness have developed 
is evidence of its variable nature, a characteristic it shares with the concept of 
fairness.630 
In Olitzky Property Holdings v State Tender Board,631 Cameron JA admitted general 
considerations of reasonableness to be a value-judgment “based on considerations of 
morality and policy, and taking into account its assessment of the legal convictions of 
the community and now also taking account of the norms, values and principles 
                                            
624
 See Forsyth Judicial Review and the Constitution 335; Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 
2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 616 per Sachs J. Cf Thomas Canada and the United States: Differences 
that Count 309. 
625
 Thomas Canada and the United States: Differences that Count 309. 
626
 See Chapter One for a reference to the theoretical meaning of this phrase, as developed by Klare 
1998 (14) SAJHR 146. 
627
 Thomas Canada and the United States: Differences that Count 309. Emphasis added. Footnotes 
omitted. 
628
 Burns LAWSA Vol 1 at par 142. 
629
 Although a positive transformative tool, not all academics and jurists are equally excited by the 
variable nature of reasonableness residing in the proportionality test as discussed. Corder and Van der 
Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 47; See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 366. 
630
 See Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 47. The connection between fairness 
and reasonableness is not limited to their variable nature. Both demand something more than lawfulness, 
as a decision that appears lawful may not necessarily be fair or reasonable. 
631
 2001 (8) BCLR 779 (SCA). 
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contained in the Constitution”.632 The context in which reasonableness is evaluated 
determines the method of consideration.633 As guidance to the contextual application of 
the principle, O’Regan J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism634 identified certain factors, namely, “[t]he nature of the decision, 
the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the 
decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision 
on the lives and well-being of those affected”.635 This flexible test for reasonableness 
calls for a balance between rationality and proportionality.636 One can describe the 
consideration of these factors (and their relation to the tests) as functioning on a 
judicially adjustable curve.637 This allows for reasonableness to be applied in a flexible 
manner (which allows for expression of the public interest)638 as dictated by the 
circumstances or context of the case.639 This perspective undeniably renders 
reasonableness review contextual in application.640 The variability of reasonableness 
review is found in its reliance on degrees of rationality and proportionality as prescribed 
                                            
632
 Olitzky Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (8) BCLR 779 (SCA) at par 11. This perspective 
of reasonableness has its roots in the landmark case of S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 655 (CC), 
where the Constitutional Court made it clear that there is no fixed yardstick for the determination of 
reasonableness in every situation. 
633
 See Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) par 145. Cf Hoexter 
Administrative Law 201. 
634
 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). 
635
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
at par 45. See also Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 212. 
636
 This reasonableness equilibrium is referred to by Jowell 2006 Acta Juridica 13 at 18 in his evaluation 
of O’Regan J’s judgment in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). It takes into consideration the crucial requirements and positive contributions of 
both these tests. 
637
 Craig Administrative Law 552 understands the reasonableness perspective to call for “irrationality and 
proportionality … [to] be applied with differing degrees of rigour or intensity”. See Hoexter Administrative 
Law 315 fn 137. 
638
 See De Ville Judicial Review 130. 
639
 See Hoexter Administrative Action 315. The factors do however assist in offering “some frame of 
reference for reasonableness, which is otherwise a rather colourless concept” as they “confirm the 
inherent variability of reasonableness and offer a new basis for its operation”. 
640
 See De Ville Judicial Review 130. 
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by the circumstance, be it purely administrative or a combination of labour and 
administrative considerations.641 The intensity and degree of the principles of rationality 
and proportionality as applied, differs depending on the circumstances of the case.642 
Such a case-by-case analysis undeniably calls for value judgments at some level, and 
as incorporated into (substantive) judicial review, allows some deliberation of the 
merits.643 
3 5 3 Lawfulness 
The principle of lawfulness has the potential to “be interpreted widely to include 
compliance with the Constitution, with enabling legislation and with the rules of the 
common law”.644 Viewed broadly, lawfulness can be seen as “an umbrella concept”,645 
incorporating the concepts of procedural fairness and reasonableness within its general 
ambit.646 So viewed, s 33 lawfulness is equated to the broader constitutional value of 
legality. This understanding of lawfulness is not supported by the Constitution.647 PAJA 
also reveals the trilogy as separate but supporting principles.648 Lawfulness must rather 
                                            
641
 See Craig Administrative Law 552. Cf Hoexter Administrative Law 315 fn 137. 
642
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 315 fn 137. 
643
 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC) par 36. 
644
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51. 
645
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51. 
646
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 204 note that it is a reoccurring argument that lawfulness 
functions as an umbrella concept that includes the requirements of reasonableness and procedural 
fairness within its ambit. Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51 explain that such reasoning would 
render the inclusion of procedural fairness and reasonableness in s 33 unnecessary. 
647
 The position lawfulness holds within the scope of s 33 is of great importance. It is worded as a 
principle collaborating with the principles of procedural fairness and reasonableness to ensure the 
promotion of just administrative action. These concepts were regarded important enough to necessitate 
separate protection in the context of s 33. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51. Cf TWK 
Agriculture Ltd v Competition Commission [2007] JOL 20764 (CAC) at par 21. 
648
 This reasoning is supported by s 6 of PAJA that articulates separate grounds of review by means of 
subsections. Specific parts of s 6 grant courts the power to review administrative action where an 
administrator acts unlawfully: ss (6)(2)(a)(i), (6)(2)(a)(ii), (6)(2)(f)(i) and (6)(2)(i). These sections grant 
legislative recognition to lawfulness as a form of narrow ultra vires. Cf Burns and Beukes Administrative 
Law 205; TWK Agriculture Ltd v Competition Commission [2007] JOL 20764 (CAC) at par 21. Unlike the 
concept of procedural fairness, PAJA does not contain a section specifically titled ‘lawfulness’. However,  
s 6 of PAJA includes the common law principles of administrative legality and therefore lawfulness as 
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be viewed as the persona legality takes on when it finds contextual application, as the 
source of the exercise of lawful administrative action is rooted in the principle of 
legality.649 The fact that lawfulness must be viewed as context specific also gives it a 
variable character, albeit to a lesser extent than that associated with fairness and 
reasonableness.650 One is rather dealing with lawfulness as administrative legality in 
contrast to constitutional legality.651 As administrative legality, lawfulness forms an 
important part of the rights-based philosophy of administrate law.652 
                                                                                                                                            
grounds for judicial review. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51 and 89; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 30. 
649
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 50. This argument reminds of the comments made by 
Wiechers with regard to the relationship between legality and the doctrine of ultra vires. Wiechers 
Administrative Law 178 declares the doctrine of ultra vires to fall within the broader ambit of the principle 
of legality. Cf De Ville Judicial Review 8 fn 67. 
650
 Hoexter Administrative Law 201 explains that the variability of lawfulness resides in the fact that 
“courts apply different degrees of rigour in different circumstances to the question whether a statutory 
formality has been complied with”. 
651
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 51. The courts have used the terms lawfulness and legality 
interchangeably. Cf Vorster v Department of Economical Development, Environment & Tourism: Limpopo 
Provincial Government [2006] JOL 17461 (T) at par 17 per Fabricius AJ. The trick is in determining the 
contextually prescribed considerations, which will point to either administrative legality or constitutional 
legality. The fact that context can assist in the distinction is clearly identifiable in the judgment of Lord 
Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 at 951. 
652
 In administrative law, lawfulness forms an important component of the rule of law. See Burns and 
Beukes Administrative Law 69. 
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4 REMEDIES653 
Remedies available under common law review of administrative action were mainly 
limited to interdicts and declaratory orders. These remedies were generally all subject to 
the discretion of the court.654 
In the constitutional milieu, South Africa embraces “a broad approach to justiciability 
[as] … [o]ur courts consider every exercise of public power that infringes or threatens 
fundamental rights to be justiciable”.655 This constitutional spirit places an indispensable 
duty on the courts to afford appropriate relief, meeting the requirements of both justice 
and equity.656 This remedial approach is found in s 8 of PAJA. Plasket credits it with the 
positive result of freeing the court from conservative constraints.657 Courts are now 
empowered to grant remedies that are just and equitable in the context of PAJA. The 
fact that courts are authorised to grant remedies that are just and equitable are of great 
importance. It is a principle of law that every remedy must carry the potential of 
effectiveness.658 PAJA therefore prevents review from being potentially toothless.659 
                                            
653
 In terms of the principle of avoidance (as confirmed with specific reference to PAJA by Chaskalson CJ 
in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 437 and reiterated by Van der 
Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77 at 99) reliance should not be placed directly on a constitutional right if there is 
legislation in place giving effect to that right. The same argument holds true for constutitutional remedies 
in general and specialised remedies contained in legislation enacted to promote and protect a specific 
constitutionally entrenched right. For this reason, the discussion in part 4 of Chapter Three will only focus 
on remedies within the ambit of PAJA. A similar argument can be made in the case of labour legislation 
based remedies (see Chapter Two, part 4 2) in light of the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in SANDU v 
Minister of Defence 2007 (8) BCLR 863 (CC) at par 52. 
654
 See Baxter Administrative Law 678; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 505. 
655
 Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 at par 29.1.  
656
 See Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 at par 29.3. 
657
 See Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 at par 29.3. 
658
 See Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 365. 
659
 De Ville Judicial Review 135 explains the scope of this remedial power: “Section 8 of Paja ... gives the 
court a wide discretion in granting relief. Whereas in some instances it would be appropriate to declare 
invalid (or set aside) a decision where effect was not given to a legitimate expectation, in others it would 
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The objective of just administrative action (understood as a component of the 
constitutional task to promote and protect fundamental rights interdependently) justifies 
such discretionary contextual remedies.660 The combination of the infringed 
fundamental rights and the case-specific circumstances in which such infringement 
occurs guide the judiciary in determining the appropriate remedy.661 
5 CONCLUSION 
Chapter Three (although isolated within the theme of the study) serves to illustrate that 
administrative law relies on a system of rules and variable principles to effectively 
control the exercise of public power and balance the interplay between empowerment 
and accountability within administrative law relationships.662 Within this purpose, three 
facets can be identified. Firstly, administrative law recognises the disparity in the 
relationship between the State and citizens.663 Secondly, its regulatory rationale calls for 
the application of both substantive and procedural rules to address this disparity, which 
can be present in both public and private law contexts.664 Thirdly, these rules must be 
                                                                                                                                            
indeed be appropriate to issue a declaratory order or mandamus to the effect that a certain decision has 
to be taken. These are not ... the only possible remedies. Compensation might sometimes be an 
appropriate remedy, or an order that the public authority take account of the legitimate expectation of the 
party affected in taking a decision.” Cf Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 365 for a discussion as to the 
general relation between review and remedy. 
660
 See McKinney v University of Guelph (1990) 76 DLR (4th) 545 (SCC). 
661
 Cf Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) per Ackermann J; De Ville Judicial 
Review 356 – 357. 
662
 See Plasket (PhD Rhodes 2002) 2. Cf Chaskalson 1989 (5) SAJHR 293 at 298; De Smith, Woolf and 
Jowell Judicial Review 5. 
663
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 5. 
664
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 5. Viewed in isolation, the set of rules administrative 
law contributes to the equalisation of the relationship between the State and citizen (whether it be purely 
administrative or also of an employment nature) are mainly procedural in nature. Although basically 
procedural in nature, the constitutionally informed application of its conceptual basis has brought 
administrative law closer to substantive considerations. 
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justified in terms of the constitutional principles that regulate the exercise of public 
power.665  
These facets crystallised throughout the development of administrative law, following a 
different developmental path to that of labour law. As evident from a reading of Chapter 
Two and Three, the dogmatic development of administrative law was influenced by the 
judiciary’s pre-constitutional attempts to restrain the abuse of public power,666 while the 
flexible development of labour law was pragmatically brought about through legislative 
intervention.667 The method of development may be different, but the underlying 
conceptual norms are complementary, as Chapters Five and Six will illustrate. The 
perspective is supported by the fact that in no area of law the objective of justice is 
more evident than in the constitutional relationship between administrative and labour 
law: Both aim to establish a just society and attempt to bridge the gap between law and 
justice in a broader political, social and economic milieu.668 The interrelated objectives 
embrace the concept of fairness (the basis of social justice) as the underlying principle 
of both the ss 23 and 33 idea of constitutional justice. 
Building on this understanding, Chapters Five and Six will consider the co-operative 
character of administrative law, as procedural rules function in conjunction with 
substantive rules supplied by other areas of law, such as labour law.669 The variable 
trilogy (lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness) acts as the legal means by 
                                            
665
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 14. Administrative law, as informed by the 
Constitution, now has a transformative character. See Chaskalson 1989 (5) SAJHR 293 at 295 and 299. 
666
 The historic development of administrative law carries the fingerprints of formalistic conceptualism. It 
placed an all-or-nothing condition on the protection of justice and constrained the variable nature of the 
trilogy of principles. See Hoexter 2004 (2) Macquarie LJ 165 at 168. 
667
 See Chapter Two, parts 2 2 and 2 4, 
668
 These interrelated objectives align with the preamble of the Constitution. See Chaskalson 1989 (5) 
SAJHR 293 at 298.  
669
 The substantive rules trigger the context in which the power-imbalance relationship functions. This 
disparity arises because all administrative actions of the State at some level interfere with property, trade 
or labour, at least to some extent. See Beinart 1948 (11) THRHR 214 at 223. Evans 1973 (36) MLR 93 
explains that administrative law inspires a judicial “willingness to extend … [its] principles … in novel 
ways in order to remedy an injustice”. See for example R v Liverpool Corporation, Ex Parte Liverpool Taxi 
Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 589 per Lord Denning. 
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which unjust formalistic results are opposed.670 The variable nature of these concepts 
empowers the judiciary to take context-informed constitutional value judgments.671 
When the variable nature of the basic principles (uncontroversial in isolation) find 
contextual expression, the ‘contamination’ of these principles through labour law 
considerations, causes judicial confusion and enhances formalistic reasoning as 
Chapters Eight and Nine reveals.672 Judicial recognition and application of the doctrine 
of interdependence (the description of which is found in Chapter Seven) reveals the 
potential to resolve formalistic thinking, as it recognises the normative interrelation 
between fundamental rights, such as the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action. 
                                            
670
 The administrative justice clause and PAJA rely strongly on conceptualism, which can undermine 
variability if formalistically construed. Section 33 and PAJA place no inherent restriction on the flexible 
nature of the principles of justice, but introduces administrative action as a threshold requirement: s 33 
broadly regards it as the operational link, while PAJA provides a checklist approach to the identification of 
the presence or absence of administrative action. Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 at 168, 172 and 
184 explains that the threshold approach unfortunately allows courts to write in formalistic code or 
“legalistic shorthand”. 
671
 This perspective addresses traditional formalistic symptoms. See Hoexter The New Constitutional and 
Administrative Law: Volume Two 112. Cf De Ville Judicial Review 67; Evans 1973 (36) MLR 93 at 99; R v 
Liverpool Corporation, Ex Parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 All ER 589 per Lord 
Denning. The judiciary must view the following question as primarily calling for its attention: What does 
constitutional justice call for in the specific circumstances? Answering this question is not an option, but a 
legal directive. Merely limiting the question to administrative or labour justice would be an incorrect 
assumption that constitutional justice can be compartmentalised into the different fundamental rights. 
672
 Jurisprudence unfortunately fails to clearly illustrate that the s 33 of the Constitution and PAJA related 
requirement of administrative action should be read as an impact threshold. This is in conformity with the 
variable principles of fairness (both substantive and procedural) and reasonableness as impact emerges 
as an important consideration in determining infringement of constitutional rights. This shift in perspective 
is necessary, as the requirement of an administrative action threshold is undeniably a requirement for a 
specific form of public power. The exercise of any specific public power is subject to all the contextually 
relevant provisions of the Constitution, as well as all the general constitutional values, principles and 
requirements. See De Ville Judicial Review 25, 67 and 68. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the consideration of the fundamental principles of labour and administrative 
law in Chapters Two and Three, this chapter introduces the public employment 
relationship as a relationship that has revealed itself as the prime catalyst for the 
fundamental (re)consideration of the relationship between administrative and labour 
law.  
The point of departure of this chapter is twofold. First, one has to recognise that there 
are different approaches to the regulation of public sector employment.673 For example, 
some fifty years ago, Plewman declared that “the true legal relationship between the 
Crown, as employer, and the statutory servant, is one which is sui generis, and is 
comparable only in very general terms to the common law relationship of master and 
servant”.674 More recently, in his minority judgment in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,675 Langa 
CJ (in summarising the view of majority) stated that “there is no reason to afford public 
employees greater protection than private employees”.676 In at least one instance, the 
suggestion has even been made that public employment operates in a sphere of law of 
its own, as evidenced by the development of a distinctive doctrine applicable to public 
employment.677  
Secondly, despite the express legislative choice to regulate public employment in labour 
relations terms similar to private employment, a general (and somewhat controversial) 
presumption seems to persist: public and private employment relationships remain 
fundamentally different, must be distinguished in principle and, accordingly, must be 
                                            
673
 The existence of the debate is already proof of the importance of the legal regulation of public 
employment relationships. See Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1614. 
674
 Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70 at 85. 
675
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
676
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 171. 
677
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 refers to the “[e]merging doctrine”. 
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regulated separately.678 The counterargument is that there is no fundamental difference 
between private and public employment relationships.679 This is not to deny that 
differences may exist, but rather to illustrate that the identifiable differences that do exist 
do not originate from the nature of the public or private employment relationships. The 
differences that do exist are of a job- or sector-specific character. The hypothesis of this 
chapter is that there is no substantial difference between the nature of the employment 
relationship found in either the private or public sector. The differences that do exist are 
contextual, as the differences are linked to either the nature of the job or sector, and not 
the relationship. These contextual differences alone are not substantial enough to 
support a presumption of difference and compartmentalised legal regulation of private 
or public sector employment relationships. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the presumption of a fundamental 
difference between private and public employment and, in the bigger picture, to set the 
scene for a proper evaluation of the interaction between labour and administrative law 
in regulating public employment in the chapters to follow.680 The evaluation of this 
presumption of difference will be done in two ways. Firstly, part 2 will focus on the way 
in which public employment - and the legal regulation thereof – developed. Accordingly, 
consideration will be given to the early development of public employment and its 
regulation in England, the reception and development of these principles in early South 
African jurisprudence and its ultimate translation into legislation. Secondly, part 3 will 
                                            
678
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200 fn 4 provides an early example of this approach by 
stating that “public employment cannot be compared in any fundamental way to private employment” and 
by pointing out that “it becomes clear that the employment relationship must be rationalized in a context 
of public, not private, law”. More recently, it has been declared that “[t]he complexity of the 
interrelationship among … [the] sources of law underscores the importance of a unified treatment of the 
law of public employment as a distinct body of doctrine”. See Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1617. 
Emphasis added. 
679
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200 fn 4.  
680
 While it is true that in jurisdictions throughout the world, public employment is regulated separately in 
addition to generally applicable labour laws regulating the private sector, the aim of this chapter is to 
compare (at a conceptual level rather than a positivistic level) the nature of the employment relationships 
found in either the public or private sector. It is therefore not denied, from a positivistic perspective, that 
South African legislation (for example the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994) indeed creates a regulatory 
distinction. 
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consider the extent to which public sector employment remains unique in modern 
society in general and the current South African dispensation in particular. 
Consideration will be given to contemporary arguments relied upon in attempts to justify 
a distinction between the regulation of public and private employment. These 
arguments will be divided into three groups – those based on the supposed nature of 
the relationship in question (part 3 1), and those based on the sector-specific contextual 
differences between private and public employment (part 3 2), and also with specific 
consideration of those based on the apparent necessity to differentiate between the 
collective labour rights granted to public and private employees respectively (part 3 3). 
In anticipation of the discussion to follow, this chapter will show that neither a historical 
perspective on the development of the regulation of public employment, nor any of the 
arguments still used today, justify a fundamental differentiation in the regulation of  
private and public employment. In fact, the fundamental similarity of the two types of 
employment already justifies uniform regulation of employment (whether public or 
private) by means of labour legislation such as the LRA. However, this chapter will also 
show that there are contextual differences between private and public employment. 
These differences at least call for flexibility in the application of norms in such a way 
that contextual differences are properly reflected in the regulation of the substantially 
similar public and private employment relationships.681 
2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
2 1 English Law Influence 
The English common law has had an immense influence on the development and the 
regulation of the (statutory) employment relationship between the Crown (or State) and 
                                            
681
 Looking ahead to the discussion in Chapter Five and further, it may already be stated that it is in a 
combination of the existence of contextual differences between private and public employment and the 
requirement of flexibility that administrative law becomes important and where the answer to the proper 
interaction between labour and administrative law in the regulation of the public employment relationship 
is to be found. 
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its public servants.682 As far as South Africa is concerned, “English law was 
incorporated and viewed as applicable to the relationship between the Crown and its 
servants, in so far as that law was part of the rights of sovereignty or government”.683 
Originally, public employees were seen as servants of the highest authority in all affairs 
and the source of all law and justice, namely the Crown.684 It fell within the ambit of the 
Crown’s ancient right and privilege to appoint public servants, stipulate their 
employment conditions and decide on their remuneration.685 This was a form of at will 
employment, as public servants held office purely at the pleasure of the Crown.686 As a 
result, the Crown had the absolute discretion to dismiss a servant when it so wished.687 
This traditional approach to the public service reveals that the relationship between the 
Crown and its public servants was not intended to be contractual in form or statutorily 
regulated. Blackstone conveys this message by dealing with the public service as part 
of the law of property.688 In fact, public offices were considered a form of property and 
                                            
682
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 47 notes: “The Roman-Dutch law authorities do not give much assistance 
on the question of legal relationship between the government and members of the armed forces.” 
683
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 51. See also Union Government v Whittaker 1916 AD 194 per Innes CJ; 
Binda v Colonial Government 1950 (3) SA 151 (A) per De Villiers CJ. 
684
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70. 
685
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70. 
686
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70. Mandelbrote 1936 (53) SALJ 426 at 428 explains that this 
prerogative of the Crown is linked to the aphorism that “the King can do no wrong”.  
687
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70; Fletcher v Nott (1938) 60 CLR 55 at 77 per Dixon J. In Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister of the Civil Services [1984] All ER 935 at 950, Lord Diplock identified the 
rationale underlying this common law prerogative: “[T]he theory [is] that those by whom the administration 
of the realm is carried on do so as personal servants of the monarch who can dismiss them at will, 
because the King can do no wrong”. In a contemporary context, Gleeson J in Jarratt v Commissioner of 
Police for New South Wales (2006) 225 CLR 130 at paras 7 and 10, held that the application of the 
common law service at pleasure rule to public employment “is difficult to reconcile with modern 
conceptions of government and accountability”, as the rules were “established long before modern 
developments in the law relating to natural justice”. The United Kingdom discredited the rule in Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] All ER 935 and M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 
377. 
688
 The idea of public offices as the property of public servants is based on a 19th century United Kingdom 
practice. In Marks v The Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549, it was explained: “The notion of an office 
as a form of property in which a man can have an estate is foreign to present-day ideas. But it is ... the 
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therefore hereditable.689 As property, offices were also purchasable “unless the grant 
from the Crown specified otherwise, or unless the office was a position of trust, or one 
calling for services of a personal nature or was granted to an individual because of the 
confidence reposed in him, in which case the office was usually for life”.690 Historically, 
commissions in the armed forces were commonly bartered as commodities.691 Crown-
favourites were also rewarded with public offices as gifts.692 Personal work performance 
was seldom regarded a requirement, as public servants employed their own personal 
servants693 (with no connection to the Crown)694 to perform the necessary public office 
tasks in return for a small portion of the office holder’s remuneration.695 The result was a 
“system of holding offices, based as it was on property, far from making tenure of office 
precarious, made most officials virtually irremovable”.696 The early English public 
service can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
key to an understanding of the legal meanings of resigning an office and of holding an office at pleasure.” 
See Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales (2006) 225 CLR 130 at par 64 per McHugh J, 
Gummow J and Hayne J; Beinart 1955 BSALR 21. 
689
 See Marks v The Commonwealth (1964) 111 CLR 549 at 586 per Windeyer J; Coutts v The 
Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91 at 99 and 120; Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South 
Wales (2006) 225 CLR 130 at par 65 per McHugh J, Gummow J and Hayne J; Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 
23.  
690
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 23. 
691
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 23 fn 18, in quoting Logan, elaborates: “The reports of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries abound in cases dealing with the sale of offices and the traffic in the emoluments 
attached thereto, cases which involve offices ranging from the captaincy of an East Indiaman to the post 
of surveyor of the baggage of the port of London. The diarist, Samuel Pepys, had to buy off a competitor 
who made a claim for his post in the Admiralty.” 
692
 See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 23. 
693
 They were the responsibility of the person who employed them. This was a typical master-servant 
relationship, with no responsibility accruing to the government (Crown). See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 
23. 
694
 This reminds of the current day trend of privatisation and outsourcing of State functions. 
695
 See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 23. 
696
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 23. 
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A speech on economic reform delivered by Burke (a British statesman and political 
writer) in 1780, as well as the recommendations of several commissions, altered the 
earlier property perspective.697 This shift eventually led “to the prohibition of the sale of 
offices, the abolition of fees and perquisites attaching to offices and of sinecures, and 
the substitution therefore of salaries voted by Parliament”.698 Although these changes 
moved public offices out of the realm of property and into that of contract,699 this step 
was not well received by all.700 The English judiciary took an extreme route and labelled 
                                            
697
 Collins Justice in Dismissal 11 explains: “The underlying reason for the rejection of ownership of jobs 
by all types of economic systems consists in an appeal to general welfare considerations … [which] 
include reference to the wealth, happiness, and satisfaction of preferences of all the members of a 
society … [In addition to the fact that it would harm] productive efficiency, ownership of jobs would create 
friction in the labour market, by preventing reductions in the workforce to meet declining demands and by 
discouraging workers from seeking new jobs …” 
698
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 24. 
699
 See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 24. 
700
 Freedland 2005 Publ Law 224 at 226 – 227 identifies the rationale for the introduction of public 
employment contracts as being twofold. First, it removes the lack of clarity regarding terms and conditions 
of employment. Secondly, it places the public servants more or less on par with their private sector 
counterparts. With regard to this attempt at equalisation Freedland explains that the “latter notion of 
‘putting them more on a par with their counterparts in other walks of life’ has to do with identifying the 
employment relationship as a commercial armslength market relationship, importing no special privileges 
or ‘jobs for life’”. In a somewhat ironic fashion, and with regard to the administrative law arguments of the 
‘purists’, Freedland emphasises that these equalisation notions are regarded as “contributing to the broad 
goals of promoting greater ‘transparency, accountability and openness’”. This merger of “general law and 
practice of contracts of employment on the one hand and, on the other hand, the traditional particularities 
of the civil service employment relationship” is not without its obscurities. These obscurities are however 
Illustration 2: Early English Public Service 
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the relationship between the Crown and its servants as a legal category incomparable 
with any known enforceable legal relationship.701 Nonetheless, it was identified as a 
relationship.  
Beinart refers to this approach as a “levelling-out process”, whereby everyone, from the 
public officials’ servants to the highest servants (i.e. Ministers) was subject to the rules 
applicable to all Crown servants.702 With this step, public office gained its appropriate 
meaning as “service to the public”, seeing that it was no longer seen as something to be 
acquired for private gain.703 In the context of this evolvement of the English public office, 
Beinart identifies two main judicial trends of 19th century jurisprudence: 
One, which became generally accepted, was to regard all government offices 
to be at the pleasure of the Crown, only its basis being disputed; in how far 
could it be said to be founded on public policy and according to what extent 
could this rule be varied? The other far more contentious, was to the effect 
that there were no legally enforceable rights as between the subject and the 
Crown in matters of service.704  
Beinart describes these trends as “products of the transitional stages, and not the final 
stages of the evolution”705 as the “effects of social change on the law is always gradual; 
                                                                                                                                            
mainly rooted in “an unresolved set of issues about the prerogative nature of Crown employment” which 
has not survived constitutionalisation in South Africa. 
701
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 24 elucidates: “The effect that these vast reforms in the nature of public 
office had on the common law is nowhere specifically indicated. It is clear that the movement was away 
from property – indeed this notion was soon discarded – but the exact direction of the movement is not 
clear. It was heading towards contract, no doubt, but there is a period of wavering, noticeable in judicial 
decisions starting with the latter half of the nineteenth century. Many judges, finding themselves free from 
the trammels of property, went, it seems, over to the other extreme, to a sort of legal Alsatia in which the 
relation between the Crown and its servants could not be fitted into any legal category or, at least, into no 
enforceable legal relationship.” 
702
 See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 24. 
703
 See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 25. 
704
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 25. Emphasis added. 
705
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 25. 
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indeed the law usually lags behind the actual facts”.706 The pursuit of “a stable public 
service, free of political manoeuvring”707 is a product of social variables. 
Initially there was a distinction between supreme political708 and subordinate non-
political709 servants of the Crown,710 with only the latter technically and legally holding 
office at the pleasure of the Crown.711 This position was altered when all public servants 
where subjected to the same rules and regulations.712 
2 2 The Initial South African Response 
In cases such as Malcolm v Commissioner of Railways,713 Sheard v Attorney-
General,714 Marshall v Union Government,715 and Sachs v Dönges, NO,716 the South 
                                            
706
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 25. 
707
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 25. 
708
 Referring to cabinet ministers. 
709
 Referring to the permanent members of the public service. 
710
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70. 
711
 In practice, the permanent members of the public service were considered to have a right to remain in 
undisturbed ‘possession’ of their positions, as they discharged their functions in a proper manner. See 
Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70 at 71. 
712
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 22 states that “all persons from the Prime Minister down to the casual 
sweeper of government offices are more or less on the same legal footing … [as the] legal relationship 
that results is always between the employee and the Crown and not between the employee and the 
person who appointed him – they are all alike public servants of the Crown”. 
713
 1904 TS 947. The court relied on the rule that the Crown can dismiss a servant at pleasure. See 
Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 54. 
714
 1908 TS 1077. Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 54 fn 61 explains that Wessels J reasoned that “in terms of 
his commission the Governor had no authority to bind his successors not to dismiss Crown servants. This 
implied that express authority from the Crown to appoint on terms other than pleasure would have been 
binding, as decided in [the English case of Terrell v Secretary of State the Colonies [1953] 2 All ER 490]”. 
715
 1917 TPD 371. De Villiers JP relied on the English case of Dunn v The Queen [1896] 1 QB 116 
(controversial in itself) to hold that a civil servant only had a moral, and not a legal, right to an increase in 
pay. Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 55 explains that “[i]n effect, this [was]… a decision that a Crown servant’s 
pay [could] … be reduced at pleasure, and no contrary agreement by the Crown would avail him”. 
716
 1950 (2) SA 265 (A). Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 55 – 56 explains that the judges of the Appellate 
Division, in casu, were divided as to the scope of the English rule of dismissibility at pleasure: “Van den 
Heever, J.A. took the extreme view that the rule … is an attribute of the Prerogative … [and] Centlivres, 
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African judiciary showed preference for English precedent.717 Consequently, a great 
deal of public employment law “has its origin in the patronage of the Crown”.718 
However, legal roots grow along with society. In South Africa, this brought about a 
contractual and a statutory element to public employment.  
Ever since the recognition of public sector employment as an area in need of regulation, 
South African courts have been at odds as to the role of the contractual element in that 
employment relationship. What is clear is that the idea that public employment should 
predominantly be regarded as statutorily regulated dominated pre-constitutional South 
African jurisprudence.719  
Plewman explains that the traditional public employment relationship appears to mirror 
the contractual relationship of master and servant, but the rights and obligations of the 
parties are governed primarily by statute.720 In contrasting this perspective with early 
                                                                                                                                            
J.A. … was of the opinion that the rule to dismiss at pleasure was part of the wider principle that the 
Crown cannot fetter its future executive action and, therefore, an express contractual term to the contrary 
cannot oust the Crown’s right to terminate at pleasure.” They based their judgments on the doctrine of 
executive necessity, which originated from an once-off (widely criticised) judicial comment in 
Rederiaktiekbolaget “Amphirite” v King [1921] 3 KB 500 per Rowlatt J, “to the effect that the employment 
of public servants is an illustration on a lesser scale of the principle that the government cannot by 
contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the state”. See Beinart 
1955 BSALR 21 at 39. Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa 185 also comment, with reference to 
Union Government v Schierhout 1922 AD 179 and Nicol NO v Lawrie 1950 (3) SA 151 (A): “If there were 
(as is now doubted by many), an inability of the Crown in England by contract to fetter this right [to 
dismiss at will], will that rule abstain in South Africa? Certainly if a statute so authorises, dismissibility at 
pleasure can be contractually excluded. Otherwise, if the rule is really a governmental prerogative matter, 
the English law should apply, but if merely a question of public policy, the Roman-Dutch law, favouring 
enforceability of the contract (except with military servants). The trend is favouring the second view, 
which it is believed is the correct one.” 
717
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 55 explains that the English precedent was followed by South African 
courts in cases regarding non-military servants of the Crown. 
718
 Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70. 
719
 In Lavoipierre v Union Government 1925 TPD 47 at 59, Stratford J stated (albeit obiter) that, “[u]nder 
the Public Service Act, 1912, the Minister does not make contracts; he makes appointments and 
promotions; and until the public servant actually assumes the duties of the office he is directed to fill, 
there seems nothing to prevent the Minister from changing his mind with impunity”. 
720
 See Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70.  
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private sector master and servant law, the dissimilarity between the two spheres of 
employment becomes evident, as the State traditionally avoided interference in the 
private employment relationship, while it regulated public employment with intricate and 
numerous statutes.721 This is evident from the development of South African labour law 
in accordance with the political, social and economic variables of the time.722 As social 
demand shifted in response to the political and economic atmosphere in South Africa, 
so too did the labour focus of the State. As a result, the State opted to regulate the 
rights and obligations of the parties to the employment relationship by means of 
legislation (in contrast to the idea of relying on contractual freedom).723 Early 
comparison reveals legislation outweighing contract in the public sector with the 
opposite position prevailing in the private sector.724  
In Evans v Public Service Commission and Minister of Justice,725 Bristowe J stated that 
a “public servant is bound solely by statutes”.726 According to the court, public 
employees only possessed rights statutorily bestowed upon them.727 However, in 
                                            
721
 The State relied on legislation to address public employment issues every time a new problem or 
situation had to be regulated or suppressed. 
722
 See Chapter Two, part 3 4. 
723
 One of the justifications advanced for the increase in legislative intervention was the struggle for 
procedural rights: “[T]he procedural rights afforded public employees turn largely on the legislature’s 
willingness to grant civil servants the protection of tenure.” The idea of protection of tenure implied a 
system that protected “public employees against dismissals without cause”. See Anon 1984 (97) HLR 
1611 at 1616 – 1617. 
724
 This early comparison created the impression that public servants were better protected than private 
employees were, as the latter were left to the mercy of the employer in the absence of statutory 
protection. However, this initial position changed when the principle of fairness, the equity jurisdiction of 
the Industrial Court, and the principles of collective labour law were recognised. Public sector employees 
were denied this protection from abuse of power by the State as employer, until the advent of a 
constitutional democracy. 
725
 1920 TPD 118. 
726
 Evans v Public Service Commission and Minister of Justice 1920 TPD 118 at 125. 
727
 Public servants were denied any rights not found to exist on the proper interpretation of the statutes. 
See Evans v Public Service Commission and Minister of Justice 1920 TPD 118 at 125. 
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Schierhout v Minister of Justice728 Innes CJ did not view the distinction between public 
and private sector employment as clear-cut:  
Broadly speaking … [the public servant] contracts at his appointment that he 
will serve the state in accordance with the statutes and the statutory 
regulations from time to time operative. These laws regulate in great detail 
the conditions and terms of his service. Once upon the fixed establishment 
he retains his position until he is duly removed or superannuated. He 
occupies his position midway between that of a Crown employee subjected 
to dismissal at pleasure and that of an ordinary servant whose period of 
service depends upon the terms of his contract.729 
In Bramdaw v Union Government,730 Matthews J further held that the “Crown contracts 
that it will perform its statutory obligations, i.e. that it will pay a servant his statutory 
emoluments for the services he renders, will not withhold those emoluments except so 
far as the statute permits and will not remove him from office except as provided by 
statute”.731 In supporting the views of Innes CJ and Matthews J, Beinart puts forward 
the perspective that “the legal relationship between the Crown and the employees is … 
a contract and where the Act is silent on a particular point, the common law applies … 
[as all] the statutes do is to exclude certain common law terms either expressly or by 
necessary implication”.732  
Plewman, however, emphasises the ever-present element of public power and explains 
that people are “generally appointed to the public service by virtue of powers conferred 
by statute on the [State], in its executive capacity”.733 Although this may be true, 
statutory regulation present in the exercise of public power has whittled down the 
principle of dismissal at pleasure.734  
                                            
728
 1926 AD 99 at 108. 
729
 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 at 108. 
730
 1913 NPD 57. 
731
 Bramdaw v Union Government 1913 NPD 57 at 73. 
732
 Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 63. 
733
 Plewman 1955 (72) SALJ 70 at 71. See also Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 23. 
734
 As a result, certain grounds of dismissal have developed through legislation. See Plewman 1955 (72) 
SALJ 70 at 71. 
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This analysis shows that the early South African approach to public employment 
reached the stage where it was accepted that public employment has both a statutory 
and contractual element.735 
2 3 Legislative Intervention 
Modern day public servants find their employment regulated by means of detailed 
legislation providing, for example, grounds for their dismissal, as well as the procedures 
to be followed for fair implementation of decisions by the State (or organs of state) as 
employer.736 Such a legislative framework is a necessity for the balancing of 
employment interests.737 However, a labour relations framework was not always 
provided for public employees. South Africa’s apartheid legacy is the primary reason for 
this neglect, especially in the context of collective bargaining.738  
Traditionally, the regulatory legislative framework, functioning to the exclusion of public 
employees, supported the presumption of substantial difference between private and 
public employment. Prior to 1993, the South African legal system did not provide a 
labour relations framework for the public service with the result that public servants “had 
no labour rights, no right to organise into trade unions or to bargain collectively”.739 
                                            
735
 The development in the private employment relationship also reached the stage where the contractual 
element was supplemented with statutory regulation. See Chapter Two, parts 2 1 and 2 2.  
736
 In the past, there has been uncertainty as to whom the actual “employer” in the public service is when 
it comes to employment disputes, seeing as government is divided into many institutions and organs. In 
analogy to the view that the Crown is the employer of its servants, the State is in reality the employer of 
those people working in the public service. In MEC for Transport: KwaZulu- Natal v Jele 2004 (12) BLLR 
1238 (LAC), it was held that the State and not a specific government department should be seen as the 
employer in cases where disputes arise between public servants and their departments. See Grogan 
Workplace Law 28; Grogan 1990 (11) ILJ 655. 
737
 See Chapter Two, part 2 4 2 for a discussion of the role of legislation in addressing the deficiencies of 
the traditional common law approach to the employment relationship. 
738
 Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 2 
http://www.pscbc.org.za (2008/07/09) explains that the previous administration fragmented the public 
service. 
739
 Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 2. 
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The 1956 LRA, which governed the private sector, specifically excluded the public 
service from the restricted rights contained therein.740 The effect of this was that public 
servants could not complain of their working conditions or unfair and unreasonable 
treatment using the 1956 LRA created mechanisms or even rely on collective 
bargaining techniques.741 Public employment relationships were therefore restricted at 
both an individual and collective level.742 The legal consequence of such restrictions 
                                            
740
 The exclusion was contained in s 2(2) of the 1956 LRA. See Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Service 3 http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/ServicesProducts/presentations/17th/ 
TembekaNgcukaitobi.doc (2008/06/13). The labour rights found in the 1956 LRA were of a restricted 
nature, as the State initially saw the employment relationship as a matter to be primarily regulated by the 
parties involved, and later saw labour legislation as a manner of restraining economic pressure 
threatening the State. See the discussion in Chapter Two, part 2 1. A vast array of statutes regulating 
public employment were put in place during the time of the Union: the Public Service Act 27 of 1923 (it 
established the Public Service Commission that acted as an advisory board in all matters relating to the 
public service, but its decisions could be overruled by the Governor-General), the Government Service 
Pension Act 32 of 1936 and the Railways and Harbours Service Act 28 of 1912. Although public servants 
were not granted the labour rights extended to their private sector counterparts, s 14 of the 1923 Public 
Service Act provided that their salaries could not be reduced, while s 17 regulated transfer and s 18 
retirement. Furthermore, s 20 of the 1923 Public Servants Act listed seventeen types of misconduct and 
provided that public servants be duly charged, granted the right to be heard by a person appointed by the 
Public Service Commission, allowed an appeal to the Commission and if found guilty either be 
discharged from service, have his salary reduced or subjected to a lesser penalty legislatively prescribed. 
Section 96 did imply that the Crown could be sued in a court of law if it did not observe the provisions and 
procedures of the 1923 Public Servants Act. There was nevertheless a limitation, as the Act restricted 
public servants to the remedies therein provided. The State for example legislatively determined the 
tribunal of its choice. The public service was later regulated in terms of the Public Service Act 111 of 
1984, along with the Public Service Staff Code. See Beinart 1955 BSALR 21 at 59 – 61; Plewman 1955 
(72) SALJ 70 at 73; Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15. Grogan Workplace Law 9 comments that, in terms of these 
regulations, “[e]mployment disputes in the public sector were therefore dealt with by the civil courts as 
issues of contract or administrative law”. 
741
 See Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 3. 
742
 Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 640 explain that it is a historical tendency in 
most jurisdictions to distinguish the public sector from the private by means of legislative exclusion. The 
authors however note that, apart from the legislative exclusion, the courts “contributed to the creation of a 
specific regime for the civil service”. See also Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 
643. In South Africa’s pre-constitutional era, both these legislative and judicial limitations where present in 
the regulation of disputes relating to public employment. 
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was that “[e]mployment disputes in the public sector were ... dealt with … according to 
the principles of the law of contract or administrative law”.743 Emery and Giauque 
describes this legislative and judicial position as a form of negative differentiation, as it 
resembles characteristics of a “situation essentially marked by a type of confusion of 
references and developing paradoxes”.744 
A legislative attempt was made to bridge the regulatory gap with the promulgation of the 
1993 PSLRA. With this step, the regulation of public and private employment 
relationships was rendered “broadly similar”.745 The result was a substantially similar 
but still separate system of employment regulation.746 This step brought into question 
the relevance of the presumption of substantial difference.747 Although the 1993 PSLRA 
                                            
743
 Grogan Workplace Law 10. Harlow 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 280 comments that the 
“common law world used the dominant ‘control’ theory of law to add a substantial legal dimension to 
public administration’s traditional managerial basis”. Harlow explains that the theory in “administrative law 
that best represents this ideal-type is a ‘command-and-control’ theory which … is usually highly 
procedural in character”. In the American context it is referred to as ‘due process’, the English system 
knows it as ‘natural justice’, while the French refer to the ‘rights of defence’”. See also Harlow 2005 (71) 
Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 281 – 282. 
744
 Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 640. 
745
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15. 
746
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 also emphasises that the Act enforced legislative distinction. It created “an 
entirely different system of regulation than that for the private sector”. This Act functioned against an 
administrative law background. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 24 further explains that the difference 
between the former LRA and public service legislation arose out of different processes and negotiations, 
rather than employment characteristics and arguments based on efficiency and expediency. 
747
 The 1993 PSLRA not only granted labour rights and protection against unfair labour practices in the 
public sector, but also established the Public Service Bargaining Council (Central Chamber) at national 
level and Departmental and Provincial Bargaining Councils. A similar system was contained in legislation 
regulating the education and police services. The Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993 
established the Education Labour Relations Council, while the South African Police Labour Regulations 
passed in 1995 (after labour unrest in the police and prison departments) led to the establishment of the 
National Negotiating Forum. Both these Acts have been repealed by the LRA. Bargaining forums of this 
nature focussed on dispute prevention and resolution, as well as the “[r]egulation of settlement of matters 
of mutual interest through negotiations”. In terms of s 35 of the LRA, the establishment of the Public 
Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council serves as a compulsory framework for social dialogue, at 
central level, in the Public Service. The objectives of the Council falls mainly on the enhancement of 
labour peace, promotion of sound employment relationships, negotiation of agreements to balance 
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maintained sectoral separation, it did specifically provide labour rights to public 
employees for the first time.748 In doing so, the 1993 PSLRA also defined what 
constituted unfair labour practices in a public employment relationship. This was the first 
legislative step in granting public employees access to the equity jurisprudence 
developed in the private sector in response to the Wiehahn recommendations.749  
The 1994 PSLRA replaced the 1993 Act750 and brought public employment within the 
context of the LRA.751 The 1994 Act was repealed by the LRA.752 The LRA (along with 
the BCEA) now grants recognition and protection to public servants through the 
inclusion of the State in the definition of ‘employer’.753 Dispute resolution mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                            
mutual interest, dispute resolution and conclusion, supervision and enforcement of collective agreements. 
It is important to note that these objectives are reconcilable with the broad aim of the LRA. The LRA 
therefore draws a contextually informed distinction between private and public sector bargaining councils. 
Bargaining councils in the private sector are the product of a voluntary process, while the creation of 
public sector bargaining councils is mandatory. See Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the 
South African Public Service 2 – 6. See part 3 for a discussion of contextual considerations. 
748
 See Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 2. 
749
 This also indicated a paradigm shift in the application of administrative law in the public employment 
context. Grogan Workplace Law 10 explains that, in extending the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, this 
Act and the Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993 gave public servants “access to the Industrial 
and Labour Appeal Court, as well as the freedom to strike”. 
750
 The 1994 PSLRA also replaced the Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993. 
751
 See Gorgan Workplace Law 10. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 23 comments on the position prior to the 
LRA: “Whether one’s view of administrative law is that it should control government power and protect 
individual rights, or that it should ensure accountability and foster participation, the power that the state 
exerts in the relationship with its employees, at times as an instrument of public policy and with potentially 
devastating effects on their lives, is an appropriate subject for administrative law control”. Consequently, 
any labour relations framework should have regard of this reality in regulating public employment 
relationships. See also Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 22. 
752
 The LRA also repealed the Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993 and the South African Police 
Service Labour Relations Regulations of 1995. 
753
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 119. In giving effect to the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices, the labour legislation drafters recognised that the previous sectoral separation was not 
conducive to constitutional transformation and social justice. Recognition is therefore given to the fact that 
certain considerations within the context of public employment require specific consideration. See part 3. 
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created by the LRA are now extended to the public service.754 The LRA created a new 
labour relations framework for the public sector that substantially associates it with the 
private sector.  
The LRA provides for the current unified system of labour relations as a response to the 
constitutional imperative that labour rights are applicable to all sectors, without 
unjustified distinction.755 If not supporting, unification at least shows acceptance of the 
argument that there are more substantial similarities that underlie public and private 
employment relationships in the modern day understanding of labour law, than there 
are differences.756 
                                            
754
 Additional sources of protection, namely the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994, the Employment of 
Educators Act 76 of 1998 and the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 were introduced. These 
enactments, along with specific regulations and collective agreements functioning within the general 
context of the labour relations framework, also regulate public employment relationships and are 
responses to the Constitution. However, as is evident from a reading of supplementary legislation, the 
LRA remains the primary piece of labour legislation. Although the long title of the Employment of 
Educator’s Act 76 of 1998 proclaims that it provides for the employment of educators by the State and 
regulates the conditions of service, discipline, retirement and discharge of educators, its provisions are 
generally subject to the LRA, as section 11(1) of the Educator’s Act states: “The employer may, having 
due regard to the applicable provisions of the Labour Relations Act, discharge the educator”. The Public 
Service Act 103(P) of 1994 similarly states (in s 17(1)(a)) that the power to discharge “shall be exercised 
with due observance of the applicable provisions of the Labour Relations Act”. The Public Service 
Amendment Act 30 of 2007 (operational with the exception of certain sections) identifies as one of its 
aims the alignment of the grounds of dismissal found in the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994 “with the 
grounds of dismissal recognised by the Labour Relations Act”. Furthermore, the South African Police 
Service Act 68 of 1995 (in s 1) stipulates that a strike by the police force “means a strike within the 
meaning of the Labour Relations Act”. 
755
 Any limitation of a constitutional right, labour or other, must be legally reasonable and justifiable in 
terms of s 36 of the Constitution to be acceptable within the context of an open and democratic society. 
756
 In terms of s 197(1) of the Constitution, the public service “must function, and be structured in terms of 
national legislation”. The LRA qualifies as national legislation. Nothing in s 197(1) therefore points to a 
constitutional imperative to differentiate between the labour regulation of public and private employment 
based on the nature of the respective employment relationships. The Constitution merely recognises that 
a framework is necessary to recognise and regulate public service practices. With s 197, the Constitution 
acknowledges the need for a structure in which the required values and principles can take sector-
specific contextual form. 
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It has to be said that academic and judicial attempts to cling to the presumption of 
difference has allowed some technical difficulties to emerge as obstacles to the 
transformation of constitutionally informed labour law. Huluman, with reference to Adair 
and Albertyn, explain that “the extension of modern labour legislation to the public 
service caused tension between the archaic, prescriptive and inflexible labour legislative 
framework and the LRA’s emphasis on equity and self-regulation”.757  
In summary, it can be said that the nature of public employment and its concomitant 
regulation initially showed marked differences to private employment. However, public 
employment and its regulation evolved through the stage of being seen as a 
combination of contract and statute to the point of express legislative recognition of the 
similarity between private and public employment. 
3 THE PRESUMPTION OF DIFFERENCE 
Given the development of the public employment relationship and its regulation as 
described in part 2, it is not surprising that it has been said that public employment “has 
not been the subject of unifying treatment”.758 The traditional approach, which relies on 
the public/private divide, “rests on historical accident rather than any point of 
principle”.759 As such, historical developments in this area have left no “systematic 
approach”760 for the proper understanding and interpretation of the rights now 
guaranteed in ss 23 and 33 of the Constitution, nor of subordinate legislation applicable 
to public employment.  
Some commentators accept that contracts form the basis of the creation of employment 
relationships in general, but only play a limited role due to the nature of the relationship, 
and generally accept that there is “no general distinction between State and private 
employment”.761 This perspective, which is in favour of a unified approach, is based on 
                                            
757
 Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 4. See also Adair and 
Albertyn 1999 (24) ILJ 813. 
758
 Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1614. 
759
 Fredman and Morris State as Employer 268. 
760
 Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1614. 
761
 Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142. See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265; Chapter Two, part 3 2. 
Carty 1991 Publ Law 145 similarly notes that “[l]abour lawyers … have not traditionally drawn any 
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the argument that the nature of public and private employment relationships is 
substantially similar. However, the traditional presumption of difference (supported with 
arguments of the substantially different job- or sector-specific contextual realities) 
continues to find juristic favour. 
The discussion to follow is based on the understanding that the general nature of an 
employment relationship is common to both the private and public sector and forms the 
basis of the similarity that justifies the constitutionally informed unified labour law 
approach.762 In contrast, the job- or sector-specific considerations create the context in 
which an employment relationship functions. It is not the nature of the employment 
relationship, but the nature of the job or sector that is different. In general, the 
Constitution and labour legislation has identified the need to protect the parties to an 
employment relationship generally characterised by unequal power. To do so, reliance 
is placed on equity-based principles to balance the interests of the parties to an 
employment relationship. This understanding is common to all sectors and jobs. This is 
the basis on which s 23 of the Constitution and the LRA find application and forms the 
basis of the contemporary declaration of substantial similarity. The difference-element 
comes into play when considering the interests that require balancing. The job- or 
sector-specific context of a specific employment relationship under scrutiny will 
determine the content of those interests, as well as the degree to which the equity-
based principles will find application. The context in which an employment relationship 
functions cannot be predetermined with precise certainty, as it would lead to over-
                                                                                                                                            
distinction between state and private employers”. According to Leigh and Lustigarten 1991 (54) MLR 613 
at 636 the earlier English perspective unfortunately primarily influenced the South African approach, as 
the public service is regarded as “serving a Parliamentary executive”. This approach brought about great 
injustice and led to the idea that the public service is in need of more regulation than their private sector 
counter parts in order to prevent abuse. With regard to the modern day English approach, Fredman and 
Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152 – 153 argue that there are certain characteristics relating to the 
State as employer that cannot be ignored “despite the rhetoric of ‘value for money’, ‘efficiency’ and 
‘market discipline’, as the State functions differently than “its private sector counterparts”. 
762
 See Chapter Two, part 3 2 for a discussion of the nature of an employment relationship. 
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regulation and absolute formalism that undermines the flexible character of the 
constitutionally recognised principle of fair labour practices.763 
It is therefore necessary to scrutinise the arguments on which the separatistic views are 
based. For purposes of the discussion, these arguments will be divided into three 
groups. In the first instance (part 3 1), those arguments based on the supposed unique 
nature of the public employment relationship will be evaluated. Particular consideration 
will be given to whether public employment qualifies as a special status relationship 
(part 3 1 1), as well as the question whether the power struggle inherent in employment 
relationships justifies a different approach to public employment (part 3 1 2). In the 
second instance, those arguments based on the supposed job- or sector-specific 
contextual differences between private and public employment will be evaluated (part 3 
2). In evaluating the substantial weight to be granted to contextual differences, specific 
attention will be paid to the difference in resources (as it relates to profit aspirations and 
public interest), public perception and tripartism. Thirdly, in the absence of substantial 
difference of the public and private employment relationship, the argument that 
collective labour law does not find equal application in public and private sector 
employment will be questioned (part 3 3). 
In summary, this exercise will ultimately illustrate that, although contextual differences 
between employment relationships are present, all employment relationships (whether 
public or private) are substantially similar in nature. No employment-based dispute 
(even if restricted to the private sector) is exactly the same and differing job- or sector-
specific contexts prevent the precise replication of the protection and promotion of 
individual and collective labour rights.764  
                                            
763
 To say that the unique context or circumstances in which public or private employment relationships 
respectively function justifies separate and distinctive legislative regulation is akin to arguing that the 
unique circumstances in which the employment relationship of a waiter or a bricklayer and their 
respective employers function justifies distinct legislative regulation, because the waiter deals directly with 
the public, while the bricklayer works in an environment with a higher risk of job-related injury. 
764
 This does not undermine the idea of equality, as equality (as constitutionally endorsed) does not 
require absolute sameness in treatment. 
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3 1 Nature of the Employment Relationship 
3 1 1 Status Relationship 
An argument that has featured strongly in support of the presumed difference between 
public and private employment is that public employment carries a special legal status, 
which, in turn, calls for a separate theory of law and regulation.765 Blair, based on the 
labour relations reality of the 1950s, declares that public employment qualifies for such 
a distinction as it meets the three essential legal conditions for a special legal status 
relationship.766 Viewed against the contemporary understanding of South African labour 
law, Blair’s findings can be challenged through a re-evaluation of these conditions.  
The first of Blair’s requirements for a special status legal relationship is a “significant 
degree of public or social interest in the existence of the condition”.767 It is undeniable 
that there is public interest in public employment - the general public has an interest in 
effective public services and the public has a special concern when labour related 
problems in public employment have the potential to affect their daily lives.768 
Nevertheless, is the presence of such interest substantial or fundamental enough in 
itself to counter the substantive similarities between public and private sector 
employment relationships? It is doubtful whether this argument in the current day 
justifies an approach that endorses the presumption of difference between public and 
private employment. To focus solely on the public element is to sever the head from the 
body. Public employment undoubtedly is a public relationship,769 but it is nevertheless 
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 See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265. 
766
 See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265. In the 1950s context in which Blair argues for distinct regulation to grant 
private and public sector employees similar protection, public servants were prevented from striking, 
exercising their political rights and could be dismissed without notice or just cause. In contrast, private 
sector employees’ liberties were protected in that they had to be given due notice prior to dismissal and 
just cause had to be shown. Cf Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 645. 
767
 Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 266.  
768
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30. It must be noted that employment 
problems, regardless of sector, remain labour related problems. The context of the problem is merely 
different and must be evaluated by means of an application of flexible labour principles within the context 
at hand. 
769
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 201. 
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an employment relationship.770 The general essence of the employment component 
cannot be ignored simply because it coexists with the public component in one singular 
legal relationship. As already stated, the general employment relationship itself has 
been identified as a status relationship.771 Furthermore, general employment 
relationships arguably also fall within this social condition, as employment itself is of 
immense social significance.772  
Blair declares the second requirement for a special status legal relationship to be legal 
relevance in a substantial and general manner, in contrast to “restrictions of a specific 
nature” that “affect legal conditions only in a limited manner”.773 To bestow on public 
employees a legal status that justifies distinction from general employment, the 
restrictions placed on public employees by the State as employer must be materially 
different from that found in private employment.774 At present, it cannot be said that the 
general legal capacity of public employees is sufficiently restricted or elevated to meet 
this requirement, as the power associated with the prerogative to employ/dismiss at will 
no longer clings to the State as it traditionally did to the Crown.775 Absent this 
prerogative, this argument cannot sufficiently support a presumption of difference. 
The third (and most significant) condition Blair holds forth as granting a unique legal 
status to public employment lies in its nature, as the status of public employees is 
conferred and withdrawn by means of State intervention.776 Uncertainty as to the role of 
contract and statute in the stipulation of the terms of public employment has contributed 
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 As Harlow 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 291 comments, the “law is not, as public administrators 
often see it, a static phenomenon nor is it necessarily an instrument for status”. 
771
 See Chapter Two, part 3 2. 
772
 Cf NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC); Transport Fleet Maintenance (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 2004 
(25) ILJ 104 (LAC). 
773
 An example of such a substantial legal restriction is found in the limited legal capacity of mentally 
impaired persons. Another example is the limited economic/legal capacity of a person who is declared 
bankrupt. See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 266 and 268.  
774
 See Brassey 1993 (9) SAJHR 177 at 180. 
775
 If this question were discussed 50 years ago, the answer would have been different, because 
substantial legal limitations were put on public servants. See the discussion in part 2. Cf Blair 1958 (21) 
MLR 265 at 266. 
776
 See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 266. 
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to contemporary support for Blair’s third condition. However, this argument is 
superficial, as it does not consider the function performed by the State within the public 
employment relationship. The State acts as employer, albeit with public power. Arbitrary 
conduct is no longer the norm in public employment.777 In reality, the public employment 
relationship is as voluntary in nature as that of the private sector: legislation prescribes 
the terms of public employment contracts, while the terms of private employment, 
although in theory open to negotiation, is prescribed by the employer in a take-it-or-
leave-it fashion.778 From a contemporary perspective, this third condition is as 
unconvincing as the first two presented in support of the special legal relationship in 
support of the fundamental difference contention. 
If the traditional conditions identified by Blair are accepted without regard to the 
transformative nature of the South African legal system, public employment may 
artificially be declared a legal relationship calling for specific regulation of its own. 
Ironically, Blair, while supporting the recognition of public employment as a unique legal 
status, simultaneously propagates that public servants must be granted “the same 
rights vis-à-vis the State employer as are available to”779 private employees against 
their employers. Viewed against the current legal landscape, Blair’s reliance on the 
three conditions to support his unique status argument is inherently contradictory780 and 
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 The traditional position that public servants held office at pleasure changed substantially when the 
traditional Crown-servant relationship was ‘legalised’ with legislative limitations placed on prerogative 
powers. Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 268 argues that the fact that legislative prescriptions are 
consequently involved in the creation and conclusion of public employment relationships brings with it a 
legal nature that implies State intervention to some degree. This argument loses sight of the fact that any 
employment relationship has a legal nature to it. 
778
 In the private sector, it is the private employer that prescribes the terms and conditions open for the 
employee’s acceptance per his or her choice, while in the public sector it is state-intervention of a 
particular kind, that of the legislature, that dictates the terms on which an employee can accept or reject 
the offer of employment. Although a non-party prescribes the terms and conditions in the public sector, 
the employee remains in a similar position as his private sector counterpart who only in theory has 
individual negotiation power. Both public and private sector employees are at an equal power 
disadvantage. 
779
 Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 275. 
780
 If a unique status is identified, that requires acknowledgment of unique interests that cannot be linked 
to rights and obligations identified within the context of the private sector, it would not be a legally ‘just’ fit.  
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refutes the presumption of difference. The traditional declaration781 that there is nothing 
essentially illogical in claiming a separate status782 for public employees may still ring 
true to some, but is out of step with the contemporary nature of employment in general. 
It is not surprising that Emery and Giauque, for example, regard the proclaimed 
difference between public and private employment as a myth that “emerged from the 
administrative apparatus itself, rather than from the status of civil servant[s]”.783 
3 1 2 Power Struggle and Employment Needs 
In McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford,784 Holmes J stated that a public servant accepts 
employment on the terms offered to him or her.785 The unequal power inherent in 
employment implies that both the private and public employee have only their services 
to offer, in contrast to the vast and intimidating resources of the private or public 
employer.786 The individual employee stands alone, with the only alternative being the 
refusal of employment.787 
In reality, this power differential and the needs of the parties to both private and public 
employment relationships are substantially comparable. The State as employer requires 
faithful performance,788 managerial freedom789 and continuity of service.790 In turn, 
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 As based on the principles identified by Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 268. 
782
 See Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265 at 268. 
783
 Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 645. Within the context of “administrative 
apparatus” reasoning, the difference in status is based on the negative thoughts associated with a 
bureaucratic system. See Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 643. 
784
 1892 (155) Mass 216. 
785
 See McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford 1892 (155) Mass 216 at 221. 
786
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. 
787
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 16 explains: “In this 
regard the public employee is in a similar (un)equal negotiating position as the private employee. An 
employment relationship, regardless of its public or private sector backdrop, remains one of 
subordination. This is evident when considering the needs and resources of both parties to the public 
employment relationship.” The differing needs and resources give rise to the subordinate element of 
public employment similar to that of private employment. 
788
 The State requires of its employees to fulfil their tasks in “a trustworthy and honest” manner. See 
Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 198. 
789
 This allows the State to determine “what positions are needed, how many are wanted, and what their” 
duties entail. See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 198. 
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public employees require reasonable working conditions and minimum levels of 
security.791 The needs of public sector parties to the employment relationship are not 
fundamentally irreconcilable with their private sector counterparts.792 These needs in 
fact illustrate that the power struggle in the public sector resembles that referred to by 
Kahn-Freund in the context of private employment.793 Dotson therefore holds that a 
review of the needs of the State or private employers and the public or private 
employees are comparable in “that each has serious and pressing requirements ... 
[and] their respective resources in relation to their needs are vastly unequal”.794 The 
reality of a comparable unequal position illustrates that both private and public 
employees are limited (in the context of their individual employment relationships) to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.795  
3 2 Contextual Reality 
Throughout the years, several differences have been identified between the private and 
public employment sectors,796 some of which have been classified as substantial with 
reference to considerations such as resources, profit aspirations, the public interest, 
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 Continuity of service is an important need of the State as employer as “it must be able to maintain 
certain functions without interruption” as is required by the public interest it serves. See Dotson 1956 (16) 
Publ Admin Rev 197 at 198. 
791
 Examples of such minimum security would be medical aid and pension fund contributions. See Dotson 
1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. 
792
 This is emphasised by Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199: “In short, the freedoms of 
enterprise which we have found essential to employee welfare in private endeavour are no less a 
necessity in public employment, and for equally cogent reasons.” Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 
at 200 fn 4 further explains that the identification of similar employee concerns is a necessary exercise 
“relevant to the rationalisation of public employment at a certain stage”, but this does not imply that the 
characteristics of all employment relationships (whether private or public) are similar. For instance, public 
employment has an additional public character. See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 201. 
793
 The inherent (subordinate) character of an employment relationship is emphasised in the academic 
work of Kahn-Freund. See Chapter Two, part 3 2. 
794
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200. 
795
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200 holds that the State’s great economic capacity allows it 
to stipulate the terms and conditions of employment due to its comprehensive and flexible resources. See 
part 3 2 1 for a consideration of the contextual impact of resources. 
796
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 32. 
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tripartism and collective bargaining. These differences are contextual variables at best, 
as they are linked to the character of the sector or job and not the nature of the 
employment relationship. These differences merely inform the application of the equity-
based principles and rules regulating employment relationships, while the existence of 
the employment relationship triggers the application of these principles and rules. The 
mere existence of a sector or job character difference is not enough to justify a 
fundamentally different regulatory approach. Mere sector-specific contextual differences 
cannot function as catalyst for the implementation of a different labour regulatory 
system in the public and private sector. To illustrate this point, it is necessary to 
evaluate the public sector-specific arguments that are presented as apparent 
justification for separate regulation based on a presumption of difference between 
public and private employment. 
3 2 1 Resources, Profit Aspirations and the Public Interest 
Resources797 are a recurring theme in the difference-debate. In reality, there are 
differences in employer-resources. Those endorsing the presumption of difference in 
favour of a separate legal theory for public employment, identify the disparity between 
the resources available to the State as employer and private employers as a key 
factor.798 
It is generally acknowledged that the private sector has a profit aspiration.799 This aim 
ultimately plays a role in employment decisions. If profit is the aim, then the market is 
the ultimate determinant in business-based employment decisions.800 Supply and 
demand within the market determines the profit margin, which, in turn, determines the 
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 The fairly broad term ‘resources’ is used in legal literature as relating to public employment, but can 
also be understood in a more restrictive sense as bargaining power. 
798
 See Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. 
799
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 32. 
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 Heintzman and Marson 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 549 at 551 explain the link between society and 
the market: “Both theory and practice in the private sector have already identified a link between 
employee satisfaction and customer satisfaction, on the one hand, and between customer satisfaction 
and the bottom line, on the other. The combination of these two relationships yield a causal chain in 
which an improvement in employee attitudes and behaviours leads to an improvement in customer 
attitudes and behaviours, which leads in turn to an increase in growth and profit.” 
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number of employees appointed and maintained by a private employer.801 Wages for 
private employees are privately funded.802 In contrast, profit is not the motive for 
decisions relating to the provision of services by organs of state.803  
Following this reasoning, the argument has developed that “the attitude of the employee 
vis-à-vis the employer”804 is different between the two spheres. Smith and McLaughlin 
explain:  
The private employee is conscious of the profit motive underlying his 
employer’s activities, and of the fact that this affects the process of decision 
making concerning employee wages and other emoluments. The employee 
tends to think he is competing with the management and the owners of the 
enterprise in the division of its fruits. The public employee, on the other hand, 
enters this type of employment realizing that he serves the public interest, 
not a profit motive.805  
                                            
801
 Competition within the industry has an influence on such business decisions. While business 
considerations may be the reason for appointments, those considerations do not in itself characterise the 
nature of the employment relationship. Although Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 
at 32 point out that the services provided by the public sector (in contrast to that found in the private 
sector) have little or no competition, the position is not as clear-cut in the contemporary context. The 
State, for instance, has competitors in more than one area of service to the public, for example in 
transport and medical services. 
802
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 32 – 33 identify that decisions of this nature 
in the private industry “are based upon the financial positions of the employer”. 
803
 Heintzman and Marson 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 549 at 552 explain that, in contrast to a profit 
based bottom line in the private sector, “citizen trust and confidence is, in many ways, the bottom line for 
the public sector, or as reasonable proxy for it”. The public sector bottom line is however not “easily 
measurable, because it involves competing and even contradictory notions of the public good”. 
Heintzman and Marson 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 549 at 552 elaborate: “Like everything else in the 
public domain, the bottom line for government is contestable, and involves conflict, contradictions, 
paradoxes and trade-offs between competing public goods. That is what democratic governance and 
policies are all about.” 
804
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. 
805
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. 
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The authors elaborate on this reasoning, by stating that the sense of obligation of public 
employees makes them “less ‘competitive’ than private employees”.806 Smith and 
McLaughlin however recognise that this (wage informed) argument identifies at best a 
theoretical difference in that it is “more hypothetical than real”.807 
It cannot be denied that the State has “unique resources”.808 The State’s predominant 
source of revenue is taxes809 and its predominant focus is on service to the public (and 
not profit and production). Due to the State’s unique resources, budget considerations 
come into play when employment decisions regarding available positions and salaries 
are made.810 Stewart accordingly argues that the “traditional relationship between 
capital and labour is absent in the public sector”.811 The argument follows that, unlike 
private employers, the State as employer does not feel the burden of market 
constraints.812 This argument points to the fact that the State does not function as “just 
another industry”.813 
                                            
806
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. 
807
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33 – 34. What remains real is the shared 
reality of an unequal power relationship in both the private and public employment sector. 
808
 Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. In addition to financial resources, Frant 1993 (37) 
American J Pol Sc 990 at 995 points out that the State, in “[c]ontrol over hiring and firing … officials [has] 
access to a large pool of labor … and public funds with which to reward supporters”. Dotson 1956 (16) 
Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199 confirms that the State has unique resources at its disposal. 
809
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17 explains that “this prescribes a minimal role for the profit motive”. 
Although there has emerged a trend to privatise public services, it “has not substantially altered the 
source of revenue”. 
810
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33 emphasise that the use of public funds 
inevitably render the State answerable to the public. In contrast, “private enterprise … derives its funds 
from private sources” which renders its managers answerable primarily to its owners. See Smith and 
McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 32. 
811
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 16 links this argument to the reasoning that managerial power in the public 
service is found within a hierarchy of power and not in the ownership of capital. 
812
 See Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. 
813
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. Frant 1993 (37) American J Pol Sc 990 points out that “[m]ost people 
believe that the public sector is more ‘bureaucratic’ than the private sector, meaning that there are more 
internal rules constraining employees’ behaviour”. 
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Although the State may not feel the burden of market constraints, this does not imply 
the absence of constraints on the State as party to an employment relationship.814 In 
contrast to market constraints, the State is subject to political and macro-economic 
constraints.815 The potential residing in the State to “override commercial considerations 
in favour of political goals”816 within the framework of industrial relations817 has caused 
some concern.818 Frant further endorses the presumption of difference in holding that 
the structure of the public service is different, in that it “creates unique incentives for 
executives to abuse their appointing authority”.819 The incentives and abuse however do 
not translate to a substantial difference, as private sector employers also tempt captains 
of industry with large monetary incentives that bring with it power. With power comes 
                                            
814
 See Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. 
815
 See Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. The fact that the modern State has exclusive 
power to decide issues of national security (as Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 20 emphasises) is hardly 
constraint enough to render it protected from comprehensive and uniform labour regulation, which 
primarily focuses on the balancing of interests and power in an employment relationship. Labour law 
requires balancing of interests and power, but does not define those interests and power. Labour law 
rather leaves it to the contextual (job- or sector-specific) considerations of every case to determine the 
content of the relevant interests and power. 
816
 Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 20 points out that the 
State has the power to call on the military “to quell industrial action, remove strikers from state premises 
and to take over the functions and duties of the strikers”. An example of such action can be found in the 
1990 and 2007 strikes at public hospitals. In 1990, the hospital workers at ten day-clinics and fifteen 
provincial hospitals in the Cape Peninsula partook in a strike. The State called upon the military to assist 
with the crisis this caused for the functioning of the hospitals. See Anon, Die Burger 10 March 1990 and 
Anon, Die Burger 2 May 1990. During the 2007 strike at public hospitals, the State called on 2600 military 
members to assist with the crisis at hospitals with the provision of medical care, the cooking of meals for 
patients as well as cleaning. The State also called upon the military to protect the public against the 
striking hospital workers. See Keppler, Die Burger 9 June 2007 and Merton, Die Burger 11 June 2007. 
817
 This bureaucratic character of the State as employer is not restricted to the public sector, as the effect 
thereof is also felt in the private sector. See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 16. 
818
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 21 points out that courts are reluctant to interfere in revenue decisions, as 
“it is their role to intervene to control the use or abuse of public power”. The author identifies this as an 
area in which administrative law controls and remedies can assist in the regulation of the public 
employment relationship, if the abuse of resources unknown to the private sector affects employment 
rights. 
819
 Frant 1993 (37) American J Pol Sc 990 at 995. 
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the potential for abuse, regardless of whether that power is exercised in the public or 
private domain. Arguably, only the degree of potential abuse differs. Abuse in the public 
service has a potentially greater (public) impact than the purely internal business impact 
in the case of a private organisation. Although abuse of power, resources and structure 
may be valid concerns, its job- or sector-specific character is inappropriate as basis for 
the separate legal regulation of public and private employment.820  
Although the State functions as an employer, it must be admitted that the contrasting 
“milieux in which employee relations problems arise”821 inevitably find expression in the 
rationale for employment decisions in different sectors. The rationale for employment 
decisions by the State as employer to a certain degree differs from that found in the 
private sector.822 Stewart explains that “[p]ublic sector employment decisions are 
subject to social, political and ideological factors, not purely the market, and the public 
interest should be at the centre of the decision makers’ considerations”.823 It can also be 
said that the “criteria for determination of wages and working conditions and the 
limitations upon these determinations, as between private and public employment, 
obviously differ at least in [some] instances”.824 In the private sector, the “area within 
                                            
820
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 16 correctly observes that a public employment “relationship is far too 
complex to be able to rely simply on the capital-labour dichotomy to explain it”. 
821
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. 
822
 See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. 
823
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. Although public employment decisions are subject to such variables as 
social and political factors, the private sector is not unaffected by these variables. See Chapter Two, part 
3 4. With regard to the political element present in private employment Du Toit 2007 (28) ILJ 1405 
explains that “power built up in the bargaining arena enables trade unions also to engage with broader 
issues and exert political pressure”. However, it is only the impact or influence of these factors that 
differs. Substantial similarity cannot be denied based on the different contextual degrees of the identified 
factors. In the context of private employment, social and political factors influence the economic or market 
related rationale underlying employment decisions. In the context of public employment, the influence of 
social and political factors (both to an extent linked to economic variables) find expression in the public 
interest rationale, which, in turn, influence public (power) based employment decisions. See further the 
perspectives of Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. 
824
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus 
& Lab R Rev 30 at 32 also emphasise that private employer wages are sourced from private funds. 
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which decisions are made is bounded by overriding economic realities”.825 The fact that 
the State acts according to budget rather than market interest is linked to the rationale 
for employment decisions taken in the public sector.826 However, while profit and 
economic considerations are not the primary rationale for decisions relating to the 
servants that perform public services,827 the modern democratic State “include[s] a 
more market-driven public service”828 that supports the lack of fundamental difference. 
Considerations of a resource-nature therefore fail to pass as substantial enough to 
override the substantial similarities between public and private employment 
relationships. 
In attempts to magnify the perception of profit aspiration difference between public and 
private employment, the interests vested in the provision of public and private sector 
services have been identified as a key distinction. Interests differ from person to person, 
workplace to workplace and sector to sector. Due to the profit incentive found in private 
employment, the interests of the employees are clearly economic in nature. In contrast, 
legal writings regarding public employment (limited as it may be) have identified public 
policy as a vital interest in that sphere.829 As such, public employment requires a special 
virtue in its vocation830 founded on an apparently special moral level.831 However, this is 
nothing more than a sector-specific contextual consideration, as it cannot be ignored 
that public employees are also citizens affected by the conduct of the State.832 Although 
public servants act with the public interest in mind, they are also citizens with an interest 
in exercising their legally recognised rights.833  
                                            
825
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 33. However, the State as employer is not 
left unaffected by economic realities, as these realities affect social and political considerations that 
ultimately affect decisions relating to the public interest.  
826
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. 
827
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 32. 
828
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 168. 
829
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199.  
830
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. 
831
 See Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1628. 
832
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. 
833
 See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647. 
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As such, a balance must be struck between the interests of the public and that of the 
individual public employee as citizen.834 The employment relationship in the public 
sector functions in an undeniably complex sector-specific context due to conflicting 
interests, as “the public has an interest in better services and lower taxes, whereas the 
public employee has an interest in higher wages and less work”.835 However, public 
employees have an equal stake in the public interest they serve836 and similarly seek 
employment (although it is of a public nature) for personal economic benefit. They are 
not mere volunteers who perform their services free of charge. 
It is illogical to reason that public servants must be denied their identity as ‘normal’ 
employees because the public holds them responsible and accountable for their 
universal interest. Reasoning of this nature places a heavy burden on public 
employees. Public interest cannot generally be regarded as the definable character of a 
public employment relationship.837 Fredman and Morris argue that it is the nature of the 
public job that indicates the regulatory significance of public interest in the exercise of 
public power in the public employment relationship838 and not whether it qualifies as an 
employment relationship in nature.839 The sector-specific context within which the 
                                            
834
 See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1684. 
835
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 19. 
836
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. 
837
 Public interest is however one of the defining characters of an administrative action as a form of public 
power. 
838
 See Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 152. 
839
 The public degree of a job is of value to the contextual interests/needs to be considered. This can 
however be viewed as a requirement of the job and not necessarily as a defining character of the job. 
See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1657. The following reasoning has developed: “A greater 
degree of exposure to the public ... may sustain a more stringent general ‘good character’ requirement – 
a high school principal might … be subject to dismissal for behaviour that is acceptable from someone 
such as the school’s janitor, whose job has less visibility. A job conferred on an individual of state may 
also carry with it a sensitivity to public opinion based upon its symbolic status. Teachers and policemen, 
who fill roles viewed by the community as models for good behavior, might thus be subject to greater 
state-imposed restraints than people whose jobs are less highly regarded … The same behavior by 
public employees with different jobs might also lead to different … [contextual] results on the basis of 
permissible inferences regarding effects on government service. For example, a custodian’s or social 
worker’s inability to handle his or her personal financial affairs properly might not be grave enough to 
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employment relationship is situated should be the primary and defining determinant of 
the requirements of the specific job, but not of the nature of the relationship as 
employment.840 A nexus between the context of employment and the public interest is 
required in assessing which interests call for specific protection, as well as the extent of 
that protection, in an employment dispute on a case-by-case basis.841  
3 2 2 Public Perception  
Public employees have been referred to as the “universal class”,842 because they are 
servants acting in the “universal interests of the community.”843 Some commentators 
have even described the public service as a “moral crusade”.844 Descriptions of this 
nature reflect the public’s perception of what they think the public service should be or 
ought to represent. 
Prior to the democratic transition, the South African public service formed part of the 
bureaucratic system that was mistrusted by the majority of the population. Marx 
appropriately states: “Anybody we like is efficient. Anybody we do not like is a 
bureaucrat.”845 However, pre-democratic perceptions of this nature cannot be allowed to 
justify negative differentiation in the form of separate labour regulation.    
                                                                                                                                            
warrant discharge where no direct job performance was affected; but the same conduct by an agent with 
fiscal responsibility could lead to a substantial loss of public confidence and to a judicial determination 
that a discharge for this reason was justified.” See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1654. 
840
 With regard to good character, it is for example of no interest to the public or the State, whether the 
public employee “goes to church, mows his lawn seasonably … or gives to the United Fund”. These are 
characteristics of a good or nice person, neighbour or citizen, but are removed from employment 
considerations. See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1658. 
841
 See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1660. 
842
 Hegel Philosophy of Right 132. See also Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611. 
843
 Hegel Philosophy of Right 132. See also Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611. 
844
 Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1628. 
845
 Marx 1949 (43) American Pol Sc Rev 1119. Because a bureaucrat is viewed as domineering and 
interfering, it can be argued that public servants carried a negative bureaucratic label because of the 
system, which in the past not only authorised but also insisted that they act in a domineering and 
interfering manner as a response to the government’s fear of revolt. As a result, the public service 
historically carried the burden of being regulated and governed by such a system and this at first sight 
superficially separates public servants from their private sector counterparts. 
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The public administration of the pre-democratic State “embraced ‘values and structural 
arrangements … at odds with those [now] embedded in the Constitution’”.846 In 
acknowledging this truth, the South African administration (following the developing 
trend of administrative law) moved from the bureaucratic side of Marx’s spectrum to the 
efficient side.847 This paradigm shift represents an attempt to address negative public 
perception. It does not affect the nature or essence of the employment relationship that 
the LRA seeks to regulate. 
Chapter 10 of the Constitution deals with the basic values and principles that govern the 
public administration and attempts to transform the public service into a trusted 
functioning component of government.848 The law generally recognises that the context 
of a case informs the applicable values and principles. This is no different when linked 
to public service considerations reflected in s 195 of the Constitution.849 
                                            
846
 Harlow 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 280. 
847
 This shift in focus is not unique to South Africa. In an American context, the court in Thompson v 
Gallagher 1973 (489) F 2d 443 (5th Cir) “set the stage for judicial articulation of how the balance of the 
state interest in efficiency is to be struck against the need to protect the public employee against … 
arbitrariness”. See Anon 1974 (122) Univ Penn LR 1647 at 1653. 
848
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 10. 
849
 Section 195 reads as follows:   
“(1)  Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
 Constitution, including the following principles: 
  (a)  A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained. 
  (b)  Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
  (c)  Public administration must be development-oriented. 
  (d)  Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. 
  (e)  People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in   
policy making. 
  (f) Public administration must be accountable. 
  (g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate 
information. 
  (h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human 
 potential, must be cultivated. 
  (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
 employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and 
 the  need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. 
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Public interest and inevitably public perception allows for sector-specific 
contextualisation of the public service in s 195.850 Principles found in s 195 are 
generally associated with a reformed approach to public administration and the public 
service.851 In this regard, the principles of accountability,852 responsiveness853 and 
transparency854 are of great importance to a government based on democracy.855 
                                                                                                                                            
 (2)  The above principles apply to— 
  (a)  administration in every sphere of government; 
  (b)  organs of state; and 
  (c)  public enterprises. 
 (3)  National legislation must ensure the promotion of the values and principles listed in subsection (1). 
 (4)  The appointment in public administration of a number of persons on policy considerations is not 
 precluded, but national legislation must regulate these appointments in the public service. 
 (5)  Legislation regulating public administration may differentiate between different sectors, 
 administrations or institutions. 
 (6)  The nature and functions of different sectors, administrations or institutions of public 
administration are relevant factors to be taken into account in legislation regulating public administration.” 
850
 Section 195 of the Constitution endorses the ideal of an efficient public administration. See Burns 
2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 286. The constitutional interpretation of ss 23 and 33 must take account of the 
relationship between these sections and other provisions in the Bill of Rights, as well as the general 
provisions in Chapter 10 of the Constitution that deals with the basic values and principles that govern the 
public administration. 
851
 See Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 287. 
852
 See Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 286. Cf Leyland and Woods Administrative Law 36. The 
Constitution sets the standard for administrative accountability. Section 92(2) of the Constitution provides 
that “Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise 
of their powers and the performance of their functions”. Emphasis added. In terms of s 133(2), the same 
holds true of the Members of the Executive Council of a province. Section 55(2) also states that the 
“National Assembly must provide for mechanisms ... to ensure that all executive organs of state in the 
national sphere of government are accountable to it ... [and] to maintain oversight of ... any organ of 
state”. 
853
 Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 289 states that “[a] responsive government is one which is alert to the 
needs of its people and addresses these needs”. In this regard, s 4 of PAJA is important as it emphasises 
that the public administration must be responsive to and address the “needs of the people”. 
854
 Transparency as a value of a democratic government is important when trying to change a society’s 
opinion that government decisions are shrouded in suspicion and mistrust. See Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 
279 at 290. 
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These principles contain the values directing the conduct of public employees. In effect, 
these principles reflect the public sector's version of “management doctrines”.856 
Management is the prerogative of an employer and is influenced by the needs of the 
specific workplace and associated workforce. Management in practice is a contextual 
exercise.857 
Section 195 aligns South Africa’s public service with the international trend858 to restore 
public trust in the public service.859 Section 195 has interpretative value when the 
application of the norms underlying s 23 is called for in a public employment context.860 
The interpretative character of s 195 cannot be read as a limitation on the granting of 
labour rights to public servants, or as an endorsement of the presumption of difference. 
                                                                                                                                            
855
 Burns 2002 (17) SAPL 279 at 286 and 292 states that the effectiveness of the rights-based approach 
in the facilitation of respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of the rights entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights is intrinsically linked to the constitutional duty placed on the public administration to carry out their 
functions in an accountable, responsive and transparent manner. The rights must therefore be viewed 
within the holistic context of the Constitution (all relevant provisions included) and its underlying values. 
856
 Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521. 
857
 Hughes Public Management and Administration 242 describes this reform: “[T]he traditional model of 
administration is obsolete and has been effectively replaced by a new model of public management. This 
change represents a paradigm shift from a bureaucratic model of administration to a market model of 
management closely related to that of the private sector. Managerial reform implies a transformation, not 
only of public management, but of the relationship between market and government, government and the 
bureaucracy, and bureaucracy and the citizenry.” See also Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 
522. 
858
 Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 527 describes this international trend: “On the national, 
sub-national and international levels, we need to reaffirm the true values of citizenship, which match and 
complement those of the public service.” 
859
 See Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 526. In the South African context, mistrust is 
rooted in the suppressive pre-constitutional history. 
860
 See Chirwa v Transnet Limited 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) par 76. The fact that ss 33, 195 and 197 of the 
Constitution can have interpretative value in understanding of the public employment relationship and the 
applicability of the s 23 right to fair labour practices, endorses the idea that the rights that are traditionally 
associated with the apparently different employment sectors are interdependent. Interdependence implies 
substantial similarity as it would otherwise be meaningless. See the discussion of the doctrine of 
interdependence in Chapter One, part 5 2 and Chapter Seven, part 2 2. 
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This constitutionally endorsed shift in focus embraced by the public service strives to 
alter public perception in favour of an ‘effective’ public administration “that can deliver 
services ‘efficiently’ and ‘economically’ but without violating individual human rights”.861 
The s 195 constitutional considerations are job- or sector-specific and therefore 
contextual in nature, but do not inform the nature of the employment relationship. 
3 2 3 Tripartism 
A tripartite approach to the promotion of co-operation in labour relations is recognised in 
labour systems throughout the world.862 It has similarly gained currency in South 
Africa.863 It must accordingly be considered whether the idea of tripartism supports or 
refutes the presumption of difference. 
Within a tripartite system, the three role players – the State, the employer and the 
employee (or their respective organisations and representatives) – each have a function 
and a role to fulfil in the industrial relationship.864 The State’s role in this system is 
aimed at evening out the factually weaker position of the (private) employee in contrast 
to that of the (private) employer. This approach is based on the philosophy of 
humanisation, partnership and the industrial relationship doctrine of the 20th century, 
which strives to achieve greater equality between the partners (which includes the 
State).865 Poolman describes the characteristics associated with this approach as open 
negotiations, decision-making of a democratic nature, as well as the support of 
collective interests.866 Within this structure, employers are clothed with certain duties,867 
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 Harlow 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 287. Transparency is a key element for an efficient public 
administration. 
862
 See Wiehahn Verslag Aantekeninge par 2.15. 
863
 See Wiehahn Verslag Aantekeninge par 2.15. Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 17 
emphasises that the Wiehahn Commission considered the idea of tripartism as fulfilling the equalisation 
function. It regarded tripartism as allowing the role-players to discuss problems and injustices and so to 
strive towards the formation of a labour system, which represents “all interests for the advancement of 
social justice”. 
864
 See Wiehahn Verslag Aantekeninge par 2.15. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 18 points out that industrial 
relations generally involve the three identified actors, but, as will be explained, exceptions are possible. 
865
 See Wiehahn Verslag Aantekeninge par 2.15. 
866
 See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 17. In other words, trilateral relations between the 
three role-players imply “collaborative relations between the social partners in sharing the broad objective 
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balanced by the duties of the employees868 that come into play within the labour 
system. It is the role of the State (specifically its legislative arm) to formulate the 
structure for such a system.869 In theory, tripartism transforms the actors in the unequal 
employment relationship into equal social partners and empowers them to address 
important policy issues.870 
An artificial argument can be made that public employees cannot participate in this 
equalisation process as the State simultaneously fulfils two of the three roles of the 
parties to tripartism.871 Reasoning of this nature supports the presumption of difference. 
However, this argument is flawed.  
Tripartism, as viewed by the ILO,872 is a concept that requires an equal amount of 
representation in the negotiation of interests, necessitates the protection of mutual and 
respective interests, and prevents role-players from neglecting their obligation to social 
justice873 in favour of their own interests.874 As such, tripartism does not inform the 
                                                                                                                                            
of promoting and preserving harmonious relations in the work environment and the country as a whole”. 
See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 18. 
867
 These duties of employers included the creation of job opportunities, granting employees the 
opportunity to complete the available work, not obstructing freedom of association, bargaining in good 
faith, providing a working environment that is mentally and physically safe for employees and developing 
skills of employees. See Wiehahn Verslag Deel 5 par 4.41.1. 
868
 The Commission stated that employees had the duty to perform adequately in terms of their 
employment agreements, to act in good faith when bargaining with employers and to respect and 
promote the property and interests of employers. See Wiehahn Verslag Deel 5 par 4.41.1. 
869
 See Wiehahn Verslag Deel 5 par 4.41.2. 
870
 See Mandela 1994 (15) ILJ 732. 
871
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 18 – 19 notes that it is a “distinctive feature of public sector employment 
… that the employer and the state are one and the same”. A conflict of interest and an abuse of power 
can potentially occur when the State as employer’s position is not explicitly regulated by one sphere of 
the law, to protect the rights of all parties involved. 
872
 According to the standards set for tripartism by the ILO, effective consultation should be the outcome, 
and for this to become reality the envisioned representation for and negotiation of employers and 
employees should take place on an equal footing. 
873
 Social justice, as interpreted with the values of the Constitution and the aim of labour law as 
expressed in the LRA, once again plays a key role in balancing the interests present in employment 
relationships. 
874
 See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 18. 
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nature of the employment relationship, but rather aims to promote the job- or sector-
specific contextual interests emanating from the employment relationship.875 The 
substantial similarity of the nature of public and private employment emphasises that 
the idea of equality (between employer and employee) underlies the labour rights of all 
employees - regardless of sector. In pursuit of equality in the public sector, two forms of 
state intervention are present: legislative determination of the labour structure and 
executive fulfilment of the role of manager or agent of the State as employer.876 What is 
somewhat misleading is that the executive largely determines the agenda (and mostly 
the content) of legislative involvement.877 Consequently, where the State’s interests as 
employer are present, the balance is fragile. 
Despite this fragility, an interest-based understanding of tripartism (which is the ILO’s 
approach) shows a tripartite system as only one method of promoting the idea of social 
dialogue (negotiations, consultations, exchange of information and collective 
bargaining).878 Put differently, a tripartite process is the ILO default for advancing social 
                                            
875
 In fact, recognition of tripartism illustrates that the interests calling for consideration allow for 
interdependent considerations endorsed by both administrative and labour law as the respective 
traditional protectors of public and private employees. 
876
 Harlow 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 279 at 281 refers to “the ‘balanced constitution’ model, in which 
government is subject in all its undertakings to a dual ‘control’ of law – on one side, by the legislator, on 
the other by the judiciary”. 
877
 Furthermore, since most of the labour law rules are negotiated between various stakeholders, 
including the executive branch of the State, before it is converted into binding rules by the legislature, the 
legislature does not play an active role in that pre-legislative stage and therefore the creation of the 
labour structure (apart from formally adopting the legislation). 
878
 Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 1. The ILO defines 
‘social dialogue’ as follows: “Social dialogue is defined by the ILO to include all types of negotiation, 
consultation or simply exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, 
employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist 
as a tripartite process, with the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist of 
bipartite relations only between labour and management (or trade unions and employers' organizations), 
with or without indirect government involvement. Social dialogue processes can be informal or 
institutionalised, and often it is a combination of the two. It can take place at the national, regional or at 
enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a combination of these. The main goal of social 
dialogue itself is to promote consensus building and democratic involvement among the main 
stakeholders in the world of work. Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential 
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dialogue, but it is not the only recognised form. Tripartism is merely one form, which is 
implemented if it is the best contextual option, as “[s]ocial dialogue can take a variety of 
forms, ranging from the act of tripartite process, with the Government as an official party 
to dialogue, or it may consist of bipartite relations only between labour and 
management, with or without indirect government involvement”.879 
Phrased differently, tripartism is merely a contextually informed method of endorsing 
social dialogue. It is equally consistent with the ideals of tripartite relations to recognise 
the possibility of public employees as role-players in a bipartite system.880 By allowing 
bipartite relations (through which it is acknowledged that State interest is an 
unavoidable element in public employment relationships),881 social dialogue is still 
maintained.882 However, the form of social dialogue remains a question of contextual 
                                                                                                                                            
to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage good governance, advance social and 
industrial peace and stability and boost economic progress.” See Social Dialogue, Labour Law and 
Labour Administration 1 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/areas/social.htm (2008/07/11). 
879
 Huluman The Practice of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 2. Emphasis added. The 
ILO identifies enabling conditions for social dialogue: “In order for social dialogue to take place, the 
following must exist: Strong, independent workers' and employers' organizations with the technical 
capacity and the access to relevant information to participate in social dialogue; Political will and 
commitment to engage in social dialogue on the part of all the parties; Respect for the fundamental rights 
of freedom of association and collective bargaining; and Appropriate institutional support.” See Social 
Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration 1. 
880
 The bipartite system regards the State, as regulator, as taking an indirect or invisible position in the 
social dialogue. The main actors in a bipartite system are employers (in the public service this includes 
the State acting in this capacity) and employees. 
881
 Apart from its position as employer, the role of the State in social dialogue is described as follows by 
the ILO: “For social dialogue to work, the State cannot be passive even if it is not a direct actor in the 
process. It is responsible for creating a stable political and civil climate which enables autonomous 
employers' and workers' organizations to operate freely, without fear of reprisal. Even when the dominant 
relationships are formally bipartite, the State has a role in providing essential support for the process 
through the establishment of the legal, institutional and other frameworks which enable the parties to 
engage effectively.” See Social Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration 1. 
882
 The compulsory establishment of the PSCBS is an important safety net in the bipartite relationship 
resulting from the fact that the State as regulator overlaps with the State as employer in the public sector. 
Among other things, the PSCBC has the objective to promote a sound employer-employee relationship in 
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interest and not of the nature or status of the relationship that underpins it.883 Social 
dialogue is the goal. Tripartism is just one way through which social dialogue can be 
promoted. As such, tripartism cannot be viewed as the ultimate (difference enhancing 
and defining) pursuit, the structure of which makes the balance between the State as 
employer and the State as legislator fragile and possibly unstable. 
What is important and substantially similar in both public and private employment is the 
promotion of social dialogue.884 Social dialogue is the common denominator. Social 
dialogue, the promotion of which is the aim of tripartite or bipartite systems, does not 
prescribe a one-size-fits-all system.885 Whether tripartite or bipartite, the goal and 
product remains effective social dialogue, regardless of the sector-specific context. In 
turn, social dialogue allows for the collective element in employment relationships, 
which in turn facilitates the pursuit of consensus in the employment relationship.886 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the public sector and conclude, supervise and enforce collective agreements. See Huluman The Practice 
of Social Dialogue in the South African Public Service 5 - 6. 
883
 See Chapter Two, part 3 2 for a discussion of the nature and extent of the substantial elements that 
underlie an employment relationship. 
884
 Recognition of the shared ideal of social dialogue keeps the State’s unemployer-like characteristics 
(as a contextual reality) in control, and allows the substantial similarities between public and private 
employment relationships to surface. In a tripartite system, it would be the role of the State as regulator to 
ensure that there is no abuse of power between the employer and the employees. The presence of the 
PSCBC and its role in the negotiation of collective agreements in the public sector checks the State’s role 
as regulator and constrains the abuse of power between the parties to a public employment relationship. 
Due to the fact that the State as regulator takes a backseat in a bipartite system, the PSCBC has the 
potential to regulate equal negotiations between the State as employer and public employees. 
885
 The ILO gives the following description: “Social dialogue takes into account each country’s cultural, 
historical, economic and political context. There is no ‘one size fits all’ model of social dialogue that can 
be readily exported from one country to another. Social dialogue differs from country to country, though 
the overriding principles of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining remain the same.” 
See Social Dialogue 2 http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/dialogue (2008/10/31). 
886
 The ILO identifies the main goal of social dialogue as the promotion of “consensus building and 
democratic involvement among the main stakeholders in the world of work”. See Social Dialogue 2. 
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3 3 Collective Bargaining 
In the absence of substantial difference of the public and private employment 
relationship, the argument that collective labour law does not find equal application in 
the public and private sectors can also be questioned. 
While private employers have always been encouraged, if not compelled, to bargain, 
allow for the negotiation of collective agreements and make use of grievance and 
arbitration procedures,887 the State as employer is traditionally regarded as immune 
from such persuasion. Originally, the absence of a collective element in public 
employment therefore supported the presumption of a fundamental difference with 
private employment.888 From a contemporary perspective, it becomes apparent that the 
presumed difference based on the collective is no more than a historical remnant. 
The traditional position was that the “resort to strike action or other forms of economic 
force by unions which … organized public employees ... [was] almost universally 
considered to be illegal, and this kind of limitation on unionism ... [was] solidly 
entrenched”.889 The traditional restrictions placed on public employment have 
undergone some liberating transformation.890 Various arguments have been presented 
as explanation for the fact that collective bargaining “came to the public sector much 
later than to the private workplace”.891 What is important is that collective bargaining 
nevertheless came to the public sector, creating yet another similarity through the 
transformation of labour law. 
The traditional view holds that limitation of collective labour law in public employment 
“stem[s] from the notion that the [State] … as sovereign stands in a different relation to 
                                            
887
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 34. 
888
 Cf the reasoning of Blair 1958 (21) MLR 265. 
889
 Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 35. 
890
 See Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 36. 
891
 Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1616. Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 30 – 31 
ascribe the lack of concern and development of labour regulation in the public sector to the development 
of unionism: “[T]he primary impact of aggressive trade unionism has been in the area of private 
employment, and there is no doubt that the growth of trade unionism has been a major factor contributing 
to the tremendously increased interest in and emphasis upon labor relations research ...” This is no more 
evident than in the development of labour law in South Africa. See Chapter Two, part 2. 
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civil servants than does the private sector employer to its employees”.892 This 
perspective regards public sector industrial action as “an attack on the authority of the 
state”.893 Stewart argues that, “[a]lthough this argument possibly has consequences for 
whether or not public employees can be publicly involved in political activity, and for the 
applicability of administrative law, it can have little impact on the right to resort to 
industrial action”.894 The mere “fact of the state being sovereign cannot give it carte 
blanche in its relationship with its employees”.895  
Contemporary adherence to the sovereign perspective in denying collective labour 
rights to the public service would allow the law to regress to the traditional idea of 
prerogative and offices held at pleasure.896 Stewart affirms this view to be “long since 
outdated in industrial relations thinking”.897 
This argument was heavily relied upon pre-democratically, as the “policy of the 
apartheid government was strongly opposed to extending labour rights including rights 
to collective bargaining to state employees.”898 The political influence of public 
employees were seen as a great threat to the State, a sentiment already expressed in 
Abood v Detroit Board of Education.899 Ngcukaitobi summarises this argument by 
stating that “the officials representing public employees in collective bargaining are, 
unlike their private counterparts, subject to a range of political influences [as] … ‘public 
employee unions attempt to influence governmental policy making’”.900  
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 Anon 1984 (97) HLR 1611 at 1616. Smith and McLaughlin 1962 (16) Indus & Lab R Rev 30 at 35 also 
acknowledge the fact that the State’s status as sovereign has been identified by some as the “rationale 
for existing legal limitations on the right of public employees to organize, or to bargain collectively, or to 
engage in strike or other forms of concerted ‘economic’ action”. 
893
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. 
894
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. 
895
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. 
896
 See Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 3. 
897
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27–28. 
898
 Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 3. 
899
 1995 (4) LCD 183 (USA). Note that even in the traditional argument, political influences merely 
amount to job- or sector-specific contextual influences. 
900
 Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 4. 
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In Abood v Detroit Board of Education,901 the court was of the opinion that public 
employees were denied the advantage of collective bargaining as their activities 
“raise[d] the ideals and beliefs of public employees onto a higher plane than the ideas 
and beliefs of private employees”.902 Ngcukaitobi also links this argument to reasoning 
that “the right to collective bargaining invariably limits the exercise of managerial 
discretion, the very basis of the laws created under apartheid”.903 This yet again brings 
a political element to the argument against collective labour law in the public sector.904 It 
must, however, be kept in mind that parliamentary power (culture of authority), 
associated with the apartheid government, has now been replaced with a supreme 
Constitution and a culture of justification.905 
Another closely related argument is based on the function and purpose of collective 
action. In the private sector, collective bargaining power is found in the economic 
pressure on profit margins.906 When viewing collective action in the public sector, the 
weapon apparently takes on a political instead of an economic character.907 Unlike 
private employers, the State can withstand collective action, as profit motives are 
irrelevant.908  
                                            
901
 1995 (4) LCD 183 (USA). 
902
 Abood v Detroit Board of Education 1995 (4) LCD 183 (USA) at 281. 
903
 Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 4 – 5. 
904
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 19, relying on the 1985 academic work of Golding, draws the political link: 
“Since the civil service is the political structure through which state power is exerted, worker struggles in 
the civil service have a political and ideological impact way beyond those in the private sector, where, in 
contrast, the impact is primarily on productivity and profitability. The public employer has a weapon at its 
disposal which the private employer lacks, and that is that the state has legislative power: employment 
decisions can be given the force of law.” 
905
 The idea of a culture of authority versus a culture of justification was first used by Mureinik 1994 (10) 
SAJHR 31. 
906
 See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. 
907
 See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. Although political and not economical, it is nevertheless a 
contextually informed character. 
908
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27 explains the basis of this argument: “The argument is that this form of 
political pressure puts public employees at an advantageous position relative to other pressure groups 
seeking an influence on the allocation of public resources. Although this may be true, it does not seem to 
be a compelling argument.” 
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Dotson extends the political-imbalance in this argument to a capacity-imbalance 
argument. Dotson states that collective bargaining is traditionally regarded as an 
ineffective way to grant public employees stronger negotiation power, as the strength of 
the State “with which to achieve and protect its interests in public employment ... are 
unmatched by the employee’s relative capacity”.909 Although the employees' resources 
or capacity might differ from that of the State, Dotson does acknowledge that “duties are 
the correlatives of rights, [and that] the position of each party would merely be the 
product of the other’s rights … the duties of the … [State] are fixed by the employee’s 
claims”.910  
The fact that the public and private sector differs with regard to political and economic 
power does not justify the granting of collective rights to the latter, while denying the 
former the same rights.911 There exists no substantial basis for the presumption of 
difference based on collective bargaining considerations, regardless of the fact that the 
leverage relied upon by private and public employees may be different, as the 
difference in leverage flows from the position of the employers whose power the 
employees attempt to equalise through collective action.912 Interconnected reasoning is 
found in the public interest consideration (which Dotson proclaims to be the determining 
factor in the collective labour rights debate in the public sector)913 which has already 
been identified as an essentially contextual consideration.914  
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 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200. 
910
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 203. 
911
 Another political argument is found in the fact that public servants have access to sensitive State 
information. However, Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 25 correctly states that “[i]n both private and public 
sectors there may be certain information which is sensitive and necessarily kept confidential and 
arrangements can be made for the protection of such information in both cases”. The argument therefore 
does not carry enough weight to justify the limitation of collective labour rights in the public service. 
912
 See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 27. See part 3 2 1 for a discussion of the link between employer 
power and employer resources. 
913
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 19 argues that public 
opinion can be a powerful weapon in the hand of public employees: “Public sector employees and their 
unions can lobby public opinion and have an impact in the political process and thereby put a form of 
pressure on the public employer from which the private employer is relatively immune. ‘Relatively’ … 
because public opinion certainly can have an impact on a private employer in the context of a labour 
dispute; consumer boycotts in South Africa over the last decade are evidence of this.” However, public 
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Dotson also reasons that carefully timed public sector strikes can inconvenience or 
even endanger the public.915 In SALGA v SAMWU,916 Van Niekerk AJ, however, 
explained that the public is generally and inevitably inconvenienced by strikes,917 as 
service delivery is affected. Regardless of the sector in which the strike takes place, 
third parties (namely the public) are indirectly affected by the consequences of a strike. 
For example, a strike by private airline security staff or private airline maintenance staff 
directly endangers the safety of the public. 
In addition to the consideration of the public interest, Stewart argues that public opinion 
can be a powerful weapon in the hand of public employees, as “[p]ublic sector 
employees and their unions can lobby public opinion and have an impact in the political 
process and thereby put a form of pressure on the public employer from which the 
private employer is relatively immune”.918 Stewart emphasises the fact that such 
immunity is relative and not substantial enough to deny collective labour rights in the 
public sector, “because public opinion certainly can have an impact on a private 
employer in the context of a labour dispute; consumer boycotts in South Africa over the 
last decade are evidence of this”.919  
Based on the public interest reasoning, some academics nevertheless hold “that public 
employees should be restricted in their ability to resort to industrial action compared to 
their private sector counterparts … based on the essentiality of public services to the 
community”.920 Labour development however reveals that the “argument can apply only 
to essential or emergency services and not all public services”.921 
                                                                                                                                            
employees have the potential to “harness public sympathy in support of strike action and against the 
government”.  
914
 See part 3. 
915
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 199. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26 points out that a 
“defining character of most government activity and services is that they are the only ones available to the 
public”. As such, “industrial action which disrupts such services has a very significant impact on the public 
which serves as substantial leverage in collective bargaining”. 
916
 2008 (1) BLLR 66 (LC). 
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 Regardless of whether the strike is linked to the private or public sector. 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 19. 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 19. 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26.  
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Stewart correctly concludes that “it is quite appropriate for public and private sector 
employees to be governed by the same collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
framework, with the exception of essential service workers”.922 This perspective echoes 
that of Wellington and Winter, that “the changing nature of … [public] employment and 
the ever visible example of collective bargaining in the private sector, has led to a 
liberalized common law and a growing body of enactment and has reduced to a 
whisper”923 the arguments presented against the introduction of collective labour rights 
into the public sector. 
As history has shown, “collective bargaining will remain central to South African 
industrial relations”.924 The purpose of collective bargaining is to equalise negotiation 
power.925 Its effectiveness is rooted in “the leverage that either side of industry can 
wield on the other”.926 Although it is generally assumed that the State holds “a stronger 
position than its private sector counterpart, the public employee is potentially also in a 
stronger position than its private sector counterpart.”927 Consequently, arguments in 
favour of distinct treatment of the two sectors, as far as collective labour rights are 
concerned, are misplaced.928 The Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission of the ILO, 
sent to investigate the previous labour system of South Africa shared this view,929 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26. Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 28 states that “it is quite appropriate for 
public and private employees to be governed by the same collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
framework, with the exception of essential service workers”. 
922
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 28. 
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 Wellington and Winter 1969 (78) Yale LJ 1107 at 1108 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26. 
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 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 24 explains: “Neither the different sources of authority, nor the different 
rationales for decision making that are characteristic of the public and private sectors, nor the various 
differences that flow from these, have much implication for the appropriate collective bargaining and 
dispute resolution procedures. In collective bargaining, each side of the industry is seeking to maximize 
its position. The balance of power between the two sides is the incentive to settle.” 
926
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26. 
927
 Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 26. 
928
 See Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 4. 
929
 Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 5. 
  
 
153 
emphasising the significant disadvantage for employees in the public sector should they 
be excluded.930 
4 CONCLUSION 
Although the primary rationale for employment decisions in the public and private 
sectors may differ, the variables influencing public or private employment decisions 
nonetheless intersect,931 endorsing the idea of substantial similarity. The intersection 
causes the traditional private/public distinction to blur in reality. Hutchinson, although 
radically rejecting the idea of judicial review, also rejects the traditional separation 
between State and private sector along the public/private distinction on which the 
presumption of difference is based.932 The intersection of variables is possible, as there 
is no practical distinction between public and private power. Both the State and private 
industry “is implicated in all activity that takes place within … [either] boundaries”.933
  
Fredman and Morris hold “that the State as employer has special contextual 
characteristics which mean that it can never conduct itself entirely according to the 
private sector model”.934 The focus should fall on the nature of the employment 
relationship and not on the superficial existential variable differences when considering 
whether the presumption is based on truth or myth. The private/public sector distinction 
identified in academic writings is contextually well reasoned, but, at the same time, 
recognises that the State “with its system of checks and balances, often blur lines of 
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 In the recognition of such disadvantage, the ILO recommended the development of a negotiation 
system for the determination of terms and conditions applicable to public employment relationships. See 
Ngcukaitobi The Right to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service 5. 
931
 See Stewart 1995 (16) ILJ 15 at 17. 
932
 Hutchinson 1990 (40) Univ Toronto LJ 374 at 380 elaborates: “There is no choice in dealing with 
corporations, for their activities pervade the lives of every citizen. How we put food on the table, what 
food we put on the table, what we pay to put food on the table, and what food we think we should put on 
the table are all questions that are deeply shaped by the actions of corporations and the life-images that 
they project. Corporate managers are leading public policy-makers.” 
933
 Hutchinson 1990 (40) Univ Toronto LJ 374 at 392. 
934
 Fredman and Morris 1990 (19) ILJ (UK) 142 at 143. Emphasis added. However, the authors do not 
deny that there are instances in which the State acts in a manner similar to that of private employers. 
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authority, with resulting confusion and overlap as compared with decision making in 
private employment”.935 As indicated, the overlap points to substantial similarity rather 
than difference. 
Accepting the idea that employment relationships can be divided between the purely 
private or the purely public “implies, somewhat misleadingly, that there is a simple 
answer to a simple question when in reality a more elaborately reasoned argument is 
required”.936 Woodruff emphasises that “[t]here are many popular assumptions that will 
not bear the best of analysis [of which one] is that the methods and conditions of private 
employment are vastly superior to those of public employment”.937 Reasoning of this 
nature is at the root of the unjustified presumption of difference between public and 
private employment relationships. 
With regard to the substantial element, namely the nature of the employment 
relationship, the public and private sector have similar characteristics and require 
similar labour regulation: 
• All employment relationships are equally describable as special legal 
relationships. Any argument to the contrary must fail, because social interests 
inform both public and private employment relationships. The legislator gave 
specific expression to this reality in setting out the objectives of the LRA.  
• The restrictions placed on the employment of public servants by the State are not 
sufficiently different to the restrictions experienced by private sector employees. 
In the absence of sufficient restrictive difference, a regulatory distinction is 
irreconcilable with the unifying spirit of the Constitution. All employment 
relationships, whether public or private, are reactive in nature. When the nature 
of the employment relationship is considered, it is irrelevant whether the terms 
and conditions are regulated by legislation or contract as both legal forms see 
the individual employee standing helpless against the public or economic take-it-
or-leave-it power of the employer.  
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It must however be acknowledged that uniform labour relations rules, justified by the 
substantial similarities in the nature of employment relationships, do not find application 
in isolation. As has been illustrated by the discussion of the development of labour law 
in Chapter Two, labour law and the regulatory rules associated with it are flexible in 
nature to allow for maximum effectiveness, with due regard to contextual variables. 
Contextual variables (such as resources, market influences and tripartite negotiations) 
influence the manner and extent to which uniform labour relations rules are 
implemented. It is therefore true that private and public employment appear to be 
different when viewed contextually. The differences are however not substantial enough 
to justify a regulatory difference: 
• The difference in resources available to the public and private sector employee 
do not justify the presumption of difference, as a multi-million dollar South African 
based international company’s employees are not viewed as employees of 
different status than those of a nationally owned franchise. They are all 
employees, they are all vulnerable and in a weaker bargaining position to that of 
their employers. The interests of the parties to the employment relationship 
remain substantially the same regardless of the sector. 
• Public perception also fuels the erroneous idea that public and private sector 
employment is different in nature. In a South African context, the presumption of 
difference is rooted in the outdated perspective that the public service forms part 
of the bureaucratic system mistrusted by the majority of the population. The 
Constitution informs a contemporary understanding (ss 195 and 197) that sees 
the public service as the transparent and trustworthy cogs of the executive 
engine of the country. Absent the job- or sector-specific contextual constraints of 
the public service, endorsed by mistrust, the presumption of difference cannot 
stand when viewed against the substantial similarities residing in the essence of 
all employment relationships. 
• With regard to the international endorsement of tripartism, it has also been stated 
that this concept, contextually endorsed, does not inform the nature of an 
employment relationship, whether public or private. It calls for proper recognition 
and negotiation of the interests of the parties to an employment relationship. The 
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interests at play in any given employment relationship are influenced by the 
contextual realities of the specific workplace and not the specific sector. 
Tripartism does not set out to define the character or status of those parties and 
cannot serve as endorsement for the idea that public and private employment is 
substantially different. 
With regard to collective labour law, it is not denied that traditionally collective 
bargaining was only applicable to private employment relationships. This traditional 
perception is also relied upon to justify the apparent differences. From a contemporary 
perspective the argument cannot stand. Public servants now also make use of 
collective bargaining to negate the unequal bargaining power of the State, possibly with 
more effect than in the private sector in which the idea developed. Although the impact 
of the collective action may differ in the public and private sector, it is a shared 
instrument endorsing the idea of substantial similarity.938 
Ultimately, all employees, whether public or private, inevitably find themselves regulated 
by both legislative provisions and contractual terms and conditions. No one legal form is 
reserved for the primary regulation of either public or private employment relationships. 
The endorsement of a presumption based on a continued job- or sector-specific 
contextual distinction between public and private employment creates an awkward legal 
picture. Frant argues that the complete legal isolation of public employment brings with 
it a problem, namely the attempt at the creation of a prototypical relationship.939 In doing 
so, inflexible rules are created in an attempt to control certain types of behaviour. Any 
employment relationship behaviourally reacts to job- or sector-specific contextual 
variables, without altering the substantial nature of the employment relationship.940 
Public employees or ‘servants’ are the “people inside the state, taking the day-to-day 
decisions that make it function”.941 The public service is recognised as a chosen career 
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 Note that the impact here concerned is yet another mere contextual difference. 
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 See Frant 1993 (37) American J Pol Sc 990 at 992. 
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 See Frant 1993 (37) American J Pol Sc 990 at 992. As Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 198 
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in which the employees are “citizens in lieu of the rest of us”.942 Nevertheless, it is still a 
career and public employees are still employees. In identifying a constitutionally justified 
approach to public employment one “must take into account … [all the] inherent 
conditions” of the public law labour connection, with regard to practical need and the 
balancing of interests and unequal power.943  
An open-ended reading of the constitutionally endorsed right to fair labour practices 
allows for the accommodation of contextual considerations, without forfeiting the nature 
of the underlying relationship, which imply that fair labour practice considerations should 
be evaluated within the factual circumstances of the public employment context. It is 
constitutionally permissible to balance the public interest (s 195) with the just 
administrative right of public employees as a citizen (s 33), all within the contextually 
influenced functioning of the right of every individual to fair labour practices (s 23). This 
is by no means an easy task, but “[t]he Constitution itself makes provision for the 
complex issues involved in bringing together again in one country areas which had 
been separated under apartheid”.944 
This means that any distinction between private and public employment should fall on 
the contextual focus of the profession, rather than the placement of the nature of the 
employment relationship in law: 
What distinguished the members of the public service profession, in its strict 
sense of the term … is their total dedication to the general as opposed to 
particularistic interests. Public servants are employed to help articulate, 
represent, defend, explain and give concrete expression to this public or 
general interest.945 
As such, the public interest is part of the job description of public employment. Doctors 
act in accordance with the Hippocratic Oath and therefore in the best interest of their 
patients. That does not make them any less employees in status when employed by a 
                                            
942
 Farina 2004 (19) SAPL 489 at 510. 
943
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 200. 
944
 Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC) at 
par 7.  
945
 Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 527. Emphasis added. 
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hospital. A vast array of professions exists, each with their own contextually influenced 
functions and job-specific rules to regulate those functions. All of these employees still 
fall within the uniform regulatory framework applicable to the relationship existent 
between employers and employees.946 This perspective of public employment leaves 
room for sufficient contextual recognition of the public (interest) element.947 This 
approach also recognises the fact that “there is an essential unity in all state-citizen 
relationships”,948 with public employment as “a specific aspect of the totality”.949 It does 
not require continued and unjustified adherence to any notion that a completely 
separate doctrine is called for in the regulation of public employment. 
With due regard to the protective unifying objective of labour law, in light of the values 
endorsed by the Constitution, the presumption should be rephrased in favour of the 
recognition of substantial similarity between public and employment relationships. 
At no time should the endorsement of regulatory equality, based on substantial 
similarity, be viewed as propagating absolute sameness in treatment. The 
constitutionally endorsed understanding of equality allows for different treatment of 
individuals in the promotion of substantive equality. Similar logic must be present when 
proclaiming that the absence of substantial difference in the character, nature and 
status of public and private employment relationships calls for equal labour rights. 
Equality in this sense merely endorses equal access to the protective rights and 
regulatory framework that has developed within the scope of the LRA. It does not imply 
absolute similarity in the scope of application and protection of the right to fair labour 
practices in every employment context. 
The fact that the presumption of a fundamentally different public employment 
relationship cannot stand, as is the case with the controversial and unconvincing 
arguments associated with it, causes one to view the jurisprudence that developed 
because of this presumption with suspicion. It appears that the judiciary has to some 
                                            
946
 All employment relationships must function within a legal framework and it would be impractical to 
draft and enact labour legislation stipulating the ethical and institutional parameters of every recognised 
career choice. See the discussion of Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 527 in this regard. 
947
 See Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 201. 
948
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 201. 
949
 Dotson 1956 (16) Publ Admin Rev 197 at 201. 
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degree failed to appreciate that the nature of public employment is similar to that found 
in the private sector and brings with it considerations of labour equity, which, in itself, 
allows for different forms and contexts, one of which (public employment) is influenced 
by particular public elements. In one sense, public employment combines specialised 
substance (labour law) and general form (administrative law). 950 
Furthermore, the fact that public and private employment relationships are substantially 
similar allows for proper consideration of the interaction and interdependence of the 
core concepts of administrative and labour law that respectively informed the 
development of both branches of law during the period of superficial suppression. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven will focus on an analysis of these core concepts against 
the background of the doctrine of interdependence as endorsed by the Constitution. 
Chapters Eight and Nine will thereafter illustrate the judicial (mis)understanding of the 
interaction between these norms informing the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action. 
                                            
950
 The LRA now directly regulates the employment relationship between the State and its employees. 
Similarly, State action always has a public element, which potentially involves PAJA, if the public power is 
exercised in the form of administrative action. Both the LRA and PAJA have undeniable constitutional 
roots in ss 33 and 23 respectively. These fundamental rights inform the specific employment relationship 
within a general administrative law relationship. See De Ville Judicial Review 237. The specific/general 
analysis will be further evaluated in Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
(ADMINISTRATIVE LAW) REASONABLENESS AND (LABOUR LAW) 
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
While Chapter Four illustrates that there is no substantive reason to differentiate 
between public and private employment relationships, it also reveals that the factual 
context in which a dispute between the parties to an employment relationship arises, 
influences the scope and application of the relevant regulatory concepts. Chapters Two 
and Three, dealing with the essence of labour and administrative law, set the scene for 
an evaluation of the pragmatic and reactive cross-fertilization of the relevant de jure and 
de facto level regulatory concepts that underlie administrative and labour law 
respectively, both of which can potentially find application in public employment 
disputes.  
The focus of this chapter is confined to the comparison between the administrative law 
concept of reasonableness and the labour law understanding of substantive fairness, in 
an attempt to evaluate the potential cross-fertilization at a substantive level. Chapter 
Five therefore draws a comparison between substantive fairness and reasonableness, 
as the latter concept is the general administrative law counterpart to the specialised 
labour law evaluation of a valid reason.951 
On its own, as unconnected abstract concepts, fairness and reasonableness are devoid 
of true regulatory meaning in practice.952 The practical application of these concepts 
calls for a pragmatic shift from formalism to functionalism. Only when the general 
                                            
951
 In moving away from the orthodox perspective of natural justice, both administrative and labour law in 
its development gave recognition to the duty to act fairly. This duty underlies both the constitutional rights 
to just administrative action and fair labour practices. Consequently, this duty underlies the development 
of both the concepts of reasonableness and substantive fairness. The conceptual reality, (as outlined in 
Chapter Two, part 3 5 and Three, part 3 5) allows for the in-depth evaluation of these normative 
considerations. 
952
 See Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607 at 633. 
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reasonableness framework finds application in a specific situation, does it become a 
standard with the potential to structure the practical application of substantive fairness 
considerations.953 Allowing the flexibility of the doctrine of fairness within the framework 
of reasonableness considerations empowers the judiciary to avoid legalistic 
reasoning.954 In so doing, the spirit and purport of the Constitution gains recognition, as 
it calls on the judiciary to reject formalistic logic.  
Although Chapter Five, in exploring this functional understanding, expands on the 
conceptual discussions in Chapters Two and Three, it is nevertheless necessary to 
recap the main developmental administrative and labour law moments. Building on this 
summary, the chapter attempts to illustrate that the development of reasonableness, as 
an administrative law concept, is based on general (one might even say universally 
acknowledged) guidelines as identified by the judiciary. In contrast, labour law for the 
most part (as initially based on the work of the Industrial Court) codifies the specialised 
development of the concept of fair labour practices.955  
The hypothesis for the discussion in Chapter Five is that that the equity guidelines 
associated with labour law, in contrast to administrative law, is more defined and 
specialised. As a result, more contextualisation takes place within the employment 
relationship when assessing what constitutes a fair and valid reason.  
Within the scope of this chapter (and the study in general) conceptual contextualisation 
should be understood as it relates to the character of labour and administrative law 
respectively, the one being specialised and the other general. When the term 
contextualised is merely interpreted as the application of concepts within a specific set 
of facts, then administrative and labour law can both be viewed as applying general 
principles within a specific context. So viewed, a comparison is meaningless. However, 
when the term contextualised is viewed within the assessment of the relation between 
specific and general law, then it has comparative value. As Chapter Two emphasises, 
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 Cf Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607 at 633. 
954
 See Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607 at 626 – 267. 
955
 Although labour law has continually attempted to codify the basic core guidelines for the concept of 
fairness, these guidelines are not formalistic rules to be slavishly endorsed by the judiciary irrespective of 
the circumstances of every individual case. 
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labour law focuses on and regulates a specific legal relationship.956 Through a period of 
intensive activity, labour law early on recognised the concept of substantive fairness, 
resulting in the development of detailed trends, perhaps more so than is the case with 
administrative law.957 So understood, contextualisation describes the process of 
adjustment of the content or meaning of the variable concepts within the employment 
relationship. Labour law contextualises the principles underlying justice at two levels: de 
jure (the applicable legal relationship) and the de facto (acknowledging that the legal 
relationship is always between the employer and employee). In contrast, administrative 
law can link the principles to the de jure level, but lacks a predefined understanding of 
the specific relationship (and the associated capacity in which the parties to that 
relationship act) to which the de jure level principles find application. It is this specific-
general distinction that allows for compatibility (and even interdependence) of 
conceptual contextualisation of both labour and administrative law. Phrased differently, 
administrative and labour law remain reconcilable in the respective approaches to 
reasonableness and substantive fairness evaluations.  
Ultimately, the goal of this chapter is to illustrate that general reasonableness guidelines 
originating in administrative law inform the labour law understanding of specific 
contextualised substantive fairness. It will be shown that the forced separation of labour 
and administrative law after the constitutional entrenchment of the rights to fair labour 
practices and just administrative action, both revolutionary and unconventional 
inclusions in a Bill of Rights, is baseless in the absence of any substantive conceptual 
conflict. 
To assist this evaluation, the administrative law perspective of the substantive 
dimension of justice will be recapped in part 2. The specific focus in part 2 will fall on the 
meaning of reasonableness (part 2 1) and the concepts of rationality (part 2 1 1), 
proportionality (part 2 1 2) and judicial deference (part 2 1 3) associated with it. The 
(substantive) understanding of reasonableness will be supplemented with a discussion 
                                            
956
 See Chapter Two, part 3 1. 
957
 Although the concept of fairness retains its variable character in labour law (reconcilable with variable 
reasonableness) certain practices have developed in specific contexts (such as for example the 
suspension or dismissal of an employee for misconduct) that act as indicators for when an employment 
decision is substantively fair. 
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of the administrative law understanding of adequate reasons (part 2 2). Consequently, 
part 2 will reveal that administrative law, absent pre-determined de facto guidelines, 
embraces general core concepts at a macro level. Phrased differently, it will be 
illustrated that administrative law, in the absence of specific contextual considerations, 
relies on the general abstract meaning of reasonableness (and its varying degrees), 
with the result that the judiciary must determine the required degree of reasonableness 
on a case-by-case basis. 
This process of contextualisation within the context of the employment relationship, 
which is the focus of part 3, already started with the Wiehahn Commission’s recognition 
of the principle of fair labour practices as the core labour law concept.958 Against this 
background and the discussion in part 2 of this chapter, part 3 will focus on the meaning 
of fairness (part 3 1) and how it impacts on the idea of managerial prerogative, 
specifically with consideration of the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the reasonable 
employer test in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd959 (part 3 1 1). Following this 
discussion, the meaning of adequate reasons (part 3 2) will be considered from a 
specialised labour law perspective with reference to contextual examples of unfair 
labour practices (part 3 2 1) and unfair dismissals (part 3 2 2), both areas where 
fairness guidelines have been developed at a de facto level. 
In turn, the discussion of the administrative law perspective of reasonableness and the 
labour law perspective of (substantive) fairness (in parts 2 and 3 respectively), will allow 
for a consideration of the possible reconciliation of these two concepts in the context of 
public employment. It is at this crossroads between contextualisation and codification 
that the mutual normative interdependence of administrative and labour law become 
important in an attempt to avert conceptual formalism. In part 4, normative reconciliation 
will be evaluated with due regard to the shared administrative and labour law duty to act 
fairly (part 4 1), the evaluation of fairness within the framework of reasonableness (part 
4 2) and the reconciliation of the Constitutional Court’s perspective in Bato Star Fishing 
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 See Chapter Two, part 2 2. 
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 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
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(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism960 and Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd961 (part 4 3). 
2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 
2 1 The Meaning of Reasonableness 
Under the influence of the Constitution, the concept of reasonableness has evolved into 
the substantive administrative law counterpart of substantive fairness in labour law. As 
an abstract concept, reasonableness shies away from formalistic isolation.962 No 
absolute standard for the determination of reasonableness is identifiable.963 The 
evaluation of reasonableness is a value-oriented test.964 The mere fact that 
administrative law generally recognises the necessity of a balance between the 
interests of parties in an unequal power relationship implies that reliance on the concept 
                                            
960
 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). From an administrative law perspective it is important to consider the impact 
of the seminal Bato Star-judgment, as it is to the development of reasonableness review what 
Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) pre-constitutionally was to the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations. 
961
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). Although the Constitutional Court grappled with reasonableness review in 
the context of an alleged unfair dismissal in casu, the comparison between the reasoning of the court in 
its earlier Bato Star-judgment and its recent Sidumo-judgment offers great insight in so far as the 
interdependent understanding of the idea of deference as respect (see part 2 1 3) in relation to the equity-
based approach that underlies the right to fair labour practices (as far as it relates to both fair dismissals 
and fair labour practices as envisaged in the LRA). 
962
 In Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (12) BCLR 1384 (C) at par 10, Van Zyl J 
(although referring to rationality as a synonym for reasonableness instead of acknowledging it as a mere 
component thereof) commented on the scope of a reasonableness evaluation: “It requires a proper 
consideration and assessment of all the relevant facts and circumstances. If such facts are ignored or 
misconstrued, the discretion cannot be properly exercised ...” Emphasis added. See also Steinberg 2006 
(123) SALJ 264 at 265. 
963
 See the judgment of Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) as referred to in 
Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council for Education [1996] 4 All SA 185 (B) at 205. 
964
 See De Ville Judicial Review 213 for a discussion of the value-oriented approach. For a discussion of 
fairness as a value-based test, see also Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Conversations 231. 
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of reasonableness calls for the evaluation of a decision’s justifiability.965 To perform this 
function, varying degrees of reasonableness have been identified.966 
The concept of reasonableness can find expression as either rationality (part 2 1 1) or 
proportionality (part 2 1 2). This standard-based perspective allows the concept to adapt 
to various circumstances.967 The applicability of the varying degree of reasonableness 
is determined with due regard to the idea of judicial deference (part 2 1 3).968 
2 1 1 Rationality969 
At its most basic, reasonableness requires an administrative decision to be explicable 
and rational.970 Phrased differently, reasonableness equates to a justifiable reason. A 
justifiable reason will be absent if the decision-maker fails to apply his or her mind971 or 
acts mala fide.972 In merely requiring a justifiable reason, reasonableness allows for “an 
area of ‘legitimate diversity’, [as] a space within which various reasonable choices may 
be made”.973 
                                            
965
 Cf Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 676. 
966
 The broad and flexible de jure (macro) level concept of reasonableness, adjusts its content in relation 
to the facts in which it finds application. Cf Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 676. 
967
 See Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 273. 
968
 In the evaluation of reasonableness, administrative law allows for a margin of appreciation. See 
Règimbald 2005 (31) Man LJ 239 at 267. In line with this understanding, Malan 2007 (1) SAPL 61 at 92 
explains that “[a]s long as a discretionary decision strikes a reasonable equilibrium in the circumstances, 
and is capable of being shown to be a justifiable decision in all the circumstances, it will fall into the 
unreviewable field of legitimate diversity”. Emphasis added. 
969
 See Chapter Three, part 2 3 2 1. 
970
 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) 
BCLR 118 (CC) at par 90; Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General, Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 (2) SA 191 (SCA) at par 18. See also 
Felix 2006 Acta Juridica 95 at 97; Galligan Discretionary Powers 5.  
971
 A decision-maker will fail to apply his or her mind if the decision is arbitrary, based on irrelevant 
considerations, or not supported by substantial evidence. 
972
 See WC Greyling & Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local Transport Board 1982 (4) SA 427 (A); 
Maharaj v Liquor Board [1996] 2 All SA 185 (N); SA Connexion CC v Chairman, Publications Appeals 
Board 1996 (4) SA 108 (T). 
973
 Hoexter 2000 (117) SALJ 484 at 510 refers to “legitimate diversity” as the “limits of reason”. 
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2 1 2 Proportionality974 
Reasonableness can also call for “an appropriate balance between the need to ensure 
that constitutional obligations are met ... and recognition for the fact that the bearers of 
those obligations should be given appropriate leeway to determine the best way to meet 
the obligations in all the circumstances”.975 This renders the concept of reasonableness 
a relational standard and a proportionality consideration.976  
Proportionality is central to the duty to act fairly, as that duty calls for consideration of 
the interests of all involved in or affected by the decision.977 The proportionality test 
aims to give substance and meaning to fundamental rights:978 In judging a decision 
unreasonable, judgment falls not on the correctness of the decision, but rather on the 
lack of a plausible justification.979 A value judgment will have to be made, which in turn 
                                            
974
 See Chapter Three, parts 2 3 3 2 and 3 5 2. 
975
 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) at par 87. This 
perspective is reflected by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 
(1) BCLR 1 (CC) and Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). Viewed as such, 
Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 273 describes the reasonableness paradigm as being “standard-based 
rather than rule-based”. Sullivan 1992 (106) Harv LR 22 at 57 – 59 explains that legal directives translate 
into either rules or standards “to signify where they fall on the continuum of discretion”. Rules allow less 
discretion to the decision-maker, while standards allow for an element of deference. See McCrudden 
2000 (20) Oxford J Legal Stud 499 at 515. Recognition of reasonableness as a standard endorses a 
contextual rather than formalistic judicial approach, as the “distinction in constitutional law between 
‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ is a version of the rules/standards distinction”. It is informative that 
Sullivan 1992 (106) Harv LR 22 at 59 – 60 regards categorization to correspond to rules, while balancing 
relates to standards. Cf RAV v City of St Paul 112 S Ct 2538 (1992) at 2567 – 2569. 
976
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 577 fn 46. De Ville Judicial Review 213 comments 
that the test for reasonableness, so understood, “appears to be similar to the test of fairness” as 
constitutionally understood. Hoexter 2000 (117) SALJ 484 at 510 comments that a reasonable decision 
(falling within the scope of this constitutional standard) will amount to one that falls within the “limits of 
reason”. See also Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 266. 
977
 See Chapter Three, part 2 2 1. 
978
 The effect of a decision or action will be unreasonable, if the individual’s adverse and the State’s 
beneficial consequences are disproportionate. See De Ville Judicial Review 205 fn 90 and 207; Schwarze 
European Administrative Law 679. 
979
 See Mureinik 1993 Acta Juridica 35 at 40. See also Pillay 2005 (122) SALJ 419 at 425. 
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requires a justifiable decision to be both “legally and morally defensible”.980 
Reasonableness, as proportionality, brings a higher standard to the evaluation than is 
the case with reasonableness as rationality.981 Règimbald elucidates that “[v]arying 
levels of the intensity of review will be appropriate in different categories of cases and 
this will ... correspond to the different formulations of the test (balancing, necessity, 
suitability)”.982 
When evaluating the justifiability of an administrative action, a holistic approach to the 
decision is required,983 which takes into consideration the factors identified by O’Regan 
J in the Bato Star-judgment that have been elevated to a broad test for 
proportionality.984 The required equilibrium is determined through the application of 
these guidelines to the facts of every case.985 This process determines whether 
rationality will be sufficient to balance the range of competing interests or whether a 
higher degree of reasonableness in the form of a full-scale proportionality analysis is 
required.986 
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 Pillay 2005 (122) SALJ 419 at 425. 
981
 See Wakwa-Mandlana and Plasket 2005 ASSAL 104 at 117. 
982
 Règimbald 2005 (31) Man LJ 239 at 267. Footnotes omitted. See also Règimbald 2005 (31) Man LJ 
239 at 262; Chapter Three, part 2 3 2 2. 
983
 See Driver and Plasket 2003 ASSAL 69 at 89; Hayes v Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning, Western Cape 2003 (4) SA 598 (C). 
984
 These factors have been set out in Chapter Three, part 3 5 2 2. See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 45 per O’Regan J. These 
factors serve as a condensed general version of the reasoning of South African jurisprudence regarding 
the substantive nature of reasonableness. In response to the guidelines identified by O’Regan J, Currie 
and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 676 fn 120 comment that “‘[r]easonableness means, in other words, 
what is reasonable”. The authors reason that this perspective “is not quite as pointlessly circular as it 
might look” if one takes into consideration that s 6(2)(h) of PAJA refers to “no more than the unqualified 
standard of reasonableness”. 
985
 Cf Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 48. 
986
 See De Ville Judicial Review 215. See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 677. 
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2 1 3 Judicial Deference 
The courts have taken to exercising a degree of deference when evaluating the 
reasonableness of administrative decisions taken by the executive.987 Deference as 
respect sees judicial intervention as an appropriate recourse when a decision is 
unreasonable.988 This perspective of deference embraces the idea that the required 
degree of reasonableness is dependent of the facts of every case.989 The judgment of 
the Constitutional Court in the Bato Star-judgment reflects this understanding of 
deference as respect.990  
                                            
987
 In administrative law, this implies deference for the executive, while in labour law deference is owed to 
the employer. In the public sector, the executive and the employer overlap. Fairness (whether it be called 
substantive or reasonable) nevertheless allows for interference with the power of the executive-employer 
when public power infused employment decisions are not justifiable on the facts or not justifiable on the 
reasons proffered for that decision. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 at par 48, O’Regan J emphasised that judicial interference with executive 
decisions are allowed (regardless of the idea of deference) when “the decision is one which will not 
reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not 
reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it”. See also Règimald 2005 (31) Man LJ 239 at 256. 
988
 See De Ville 2006 (2) PER 11/48; Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick 
Liquor Corporation [1979] 2 SCR 227. The idea of deference in administrative law is rooted in the 
constitutional principle of separation of power, which prevents the judiciary from taking over the 
executive’s policy-making function. See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 46 per O’Regan J. It is possible to draw a comparison between non-
intervention in policy-decisions where the executive has the advantage of the business of government 
when making such policies and non-intervention in business-related decisions of the employer when 
making work place policies where he or she has the advantage of expert knowledge of his or her 
business requirements.   
989
 Interference on the ground of unreasonableness is justified only when the required standard is absent, 
rendering the decision unjustifiable. See De Ville 2006 (2) PER 12/48; Hoexter Administrative Law 138; 
Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police [1979] 1 SCR 311. It is by no 
means implied that a court cannot interfere with an administrative decision on grounds of unlawfulness or 
procedural unfairness. The focus in this deference discussion is however intentionally confined to 
deference as it relates to unreasonableness, to allow for a comparison between reasonableness and the 
judicial approach to labour law’s perspective of substantive fairness, as per the focus outlined in part 1 of 
this chapter. 
990
 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 46 
per O’Regan J. For a discussion on the development of the idea of deference, see Dyzenhaus 1996 (16) 
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Deference understood as respect “is tied to the notion of variability”,991 in that the 
judiciary need not approach review “in an all-or-nothing fashion, and that the intensity of 
judicial scrutiny may vary according to the context”.992 O’Regan J declared that 
acceptance of the idea of deference as respect does not equate to judicial rubber-
stamping of unreasonable decisions “simply because of the complexity of the decision 
or the identity of the decision-maker.”993 Deference, so understood, does not exude a 
submissive character. 
The idea of deference as respect calls on the judiciary to consider the reason(s) for a 
decision, and not merely the decision itself, to determine whether the decision warrants 
interference.994 If the reasoning of the decision is defective, then the judiciary is at 
liberty to interfere with the decision and grant the appropriate remedy to cure the 
injustice.995 It calls on the judiciary to refrain from becoming a player in the game and 
rather to embrace the role of referee in striking a balance between competing 
interests.996 Deference as respect does not preclude the judiciary from deciding 
questions of law.997 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford J Legal Stud 641; Dyzenhaus 1998 (14) SAJHR 11; Dyzenhaus 2000 (20) Oxford J Legal Stud 
703; Dyzenhaus 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 445; Dyzenhaus 2005 (55) Univ Toronto LJ 691; Dyzenhaus and 
Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193; Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 (1) OUCLJ 5. 
991
 Hoexter Administrative Law 143. 
992
 Hoexter Administrative Law 143. This judicial respect in the approach to review goes hand in hand 
with conceptual variability.  
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 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 48. See 
Hoexter Administrative Law 145. Cf Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 (2) SA 302 
(SCA); Kaunda v President of the RSA 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC).   
994
 See De Ville 2006 (2) PER 1 at 14/48. 
995
 See De Ville 2006 (2) PER 1 at 15/48 and 16/48. The idea of deference as respect gives expression to 
the idea of interpretative charity. See Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 (1) OUCLJ 5 at 29; De Ville 
Judicial Review 23. 
996
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 32; Du Plessis Bill of Rights Compendium 2C–46; Du 
Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 67 – 72. 
997
 The judiciary is not deferring their justice driven and legally informed decision-making power. See R 
(on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL), 
referred to with approval by O’Regan J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 75 – 76. 
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2 2 Adequate Reasons 
The right to reasons generally functions as an adjunctive to procedural fairness.998 The 
requirement that a decision-maker must supply reasons for a decision, in adherence to 
the s 33(2) constitutional right to reasons, highlights the presence of a substantive 
dimension that “call[s] for the articulation of sometimes inexpressible value 
judgments”.999 Section 5(2) of PAJA further endorses the idea that administrative law 
requires adequate reasons.1000 The adequacy requirement qualifies the right to 
reasons.1001 With regard to s 5(2), it can be deduced that the mere production of 
reasons, regardless of its adequacy, is insufficient for constitutional compliance with s 
33 and its promise of just administrative action.1002 
The reasons provided must offer the affected individual sufficient information to 
understand the basis of the decision.1003 Justification emerges as the crucial 
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 See Chapter Six for an in depth discussion of procedural fairness, from both an administrative and 
labour law perspective. 
999
 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651 at 665 
per Sedley J. See also Hoexter Administrative Law 417. 
1000
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 428. Although s 5 is the principal PAJA provision pertaining to the 
right to reasons, this right also features in the procedural fairness provisions in ss 3 and 4. See Hoexter 
Administrative Law 433. 
1001
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 428. In Sidorov v Minister of Home Affairs 2001 (4) SA 202 (T) at 
209, the court, in considering the content and scope of s 33(2) of the Constitution, commented as to the 
underlying rationale: “Succumbing to the temptation of absolving the administration, functionary or organ 
from providing proper reasons for their actions would be to deny the very foundation of our Constitution 
...” Emphasis added. In the minority judgment in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western 
Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) at par 159, Mokgoro and Sachs JJ noted: “The giving of reasons satisfies 
the individual that his or her matter has been considered and also promotes good administrative 
functioning because the decision-makers know that they can be called upon to explain their decisions and 
thus be forced to evaluate all the relevant considerations correctly and carefully.” 
1002
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 254. See also Rèan International Supply Company (Pty) 
Ltd v Mpumalanga Gaming Board 1999 (8) BCLR 918 (T) at 926 per Kirk-Cohen ADJP. 
1003
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 257 explain that adequate reasons ultimately require that the 
decision maker provide “sufficient detail to justify the administrative action taken”. Cf Nomala v 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E). 
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substantive element, as the adequacy of the reasons for the decision must be 
proportional to the severity or impact of thereof.1004  
Hoexter identifies two requirements for adequate reasons. First, reasons must be 
specific, written in clear language and contain appropriate detail and be of a suitable 
length.1005 Secondly, a decision-maker must not merely proffer the “standard-form 
reasons”1006 that offer “no hint of the facts and reasoning process leading to those 
conclusions”.1007 Ultimately, the factual context of a decision determines the appropriate 
degree of detail required for an adequate reason.1008 Certain factors have emerged to 
assist in the de jure contextualisation of the variable nature of the ‘adequate’ 
qualification to the right to reasons:  
[T]he adequacy of reasons will depend on a variety of factors such as the 
factual context of the administrative action, the nature and complexity of the 
action, the nature of the proceedings leading up to the action and the nature 
of the functionary taking the action.1009  
                                            
1004
 This is apparent from Moletsane v Premier of the Free State 1995 (9) BCLR 1285 (E) at 1288, where 
the High Court reasoned that “[t]he more drastic the action taken, the more detailed the reasons which 
are advanced should be.” Consequently, the court held that “[t]he degree of seriousness of the 
administrative act should therefore determine the particularity of the reasons furnished”. See Currie and 
De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 681; De Ville Judicial Review 294 – 295; Nomala v Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E); Commissioner for the SAPS v Maimela 2004 
(1) BCLR 47 (T). 
1005
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 429. 
1006
 Hoexter Administrative Law 430. 
1007
 Hoexter Administrative Law 430. Cf Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) 
BCLR 844 (E) at 856. 
1008
 See Moletsane v Premier of the Free State 1995 (9) BCLR 1285 (E). 
1009
 Commissioner of the SAPS v Maimela 2004 (1) BCLR 47 (T) at 51. Consequently, the circumstances 
that inform a decision will influence the degree of adequacy required of the reasons proffered. Burns and 
Beukes Administrative Law 258 (with reference to De Ville) identify additional factors to assist in the 
determination of the adequacy of reasons: whether the issue involves an application for a benefit or a 
deprivation of a right; the nature of the right that is adversely affected; the nature of the proceedings 
preceding the action that is taken; the nature and complexity of the decision (including whether it is 
mainly based on questions of fact or interpretation of law); the nature of the authority to take the decision; 
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When considering these factors, it becomes apparent that they mimic the elements of 
the Bato Star proportionality test.1010 Although the idea of an adequate reason is 
contextually adaptable, Hoexter holds that “some of its ingredients at least must be 
common to all cases”.1011 According to the author, one such an ingredient is the 
requirement of “an inevitable connection between the adequacy of reasons and their 
explanatory power”.1012 Consequently, logic is a common denominator in all adequate 
reasons, as an adequate reason is explanatory in nature.1013  
3 LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVE 
3 1 The Meaning of Fairness 
The word ‘unfair’, as part of the concept of the unfair labour practice, does not merely 
act as an adjective, but “introduces an equitable component into the area of law 
covered by the definition”.1014 It touches on more than one social value, a reality that 
renders it complex in nature and rejects its rigid regulation.1015 In acknowledging this 
                                                                                                                                            
the time available to formulate the reasons; and the manner in which an administrative authority has 
chosen to give effect to this duty to furnish reasons. 
1010
 In similar fashion as the factors set out by O’Regan J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC), the adequate reasons factors require de 
jure contextual justification of the reason provided. 
1011
 Hoexter Administrative Law 428. Cf Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 679. 
1012
 Hoexter Administrative Law 428. 
1013
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 429. This is evident from the assertions of Schutz JA in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal judgment in Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd 
2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA) at par 40. Cf Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v 
Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748 at par 57 per Iacobucci J; Règimbald 2005 (31) Man LJ 239 at 255. 
1014
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 45. 
1015
 Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practices 11 describes the concept of the unfair labour practice 
eloquently, by stating that it “is an expression of the consciousness of modern society of the value for the 
rights, welfare, security and dignity of the individual and groups of individuals in labour practices”. Cf 
NEWU v CCMA 2003 (24) ILJ 2335 (LC) at 2339. 
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nature, the Industrial Court determined the focus of the fairness element of the concept 
of unfair labour practices with regard to the context of an employment dispute.1016 
Unfairness in the context of employment involves a “failure to meet an objective 
standard”.1017 This will be the case if the employer acts in an arbitrary, capricious or 
inconsistent manner.1018 This is the standard, regardless of whether the employer acts 
intentionally or negligently.1019 Unfairness can stem from a variety of labour practices, 
because it “arises from the lack of consideration implicit in all forms of behaviour”.1020 In 
developing the concept, the Industrial Court considered the different employment 
contexts in which this evaluation was generally relied upon in practice (at de facto level) 
and developed guidelines to assist in the determination of fair labour practices and 
dismissals.1021 The LRA now gives statutory recognition to these guidelines.1022 
                                            
1016
 See Marais Onbillike Arbeidspraktyke 15. Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 16 explains 
that, “[i]n the process of determining the ‘fairness’ or ‘unfairness’ of a ‘labour practice’, the relativeness of 
the particular allegedly unfair conduct must be understood in relation to its merits and all the relevant 
circumstances surrounding that conduct”. Emphasis added. Cf MAWU v BTR Sarmcol 1987 (8) ILJ 815 
(IC) at 830 – 831. Although labour law incorporated the idea of fairness in the specialised contextual 
evaluation of employment decisions, it also traditionally recognised that the presence or absence of a fair 
standard must be determined with due regard to the managerial prerogative of the employer. See 
Chapter Two, part 3 3. 
1017
 SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd 1997 (3) BLLR 325 (CCMA) at 332. 
1018
 See SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd 1997 (3) BLLR 325 (CCMA) at 332. This is in line 
with the administrative law perspective that a decision–maker acts arbitrarily if a decision, absent an 
adequate reason or discretion (see part 3 2), is exercised without consideration of the relevant merits. 
See De Ville Judicial Review 198. 
1019
 An employer or employee’s subjective perception of fairness does not dictate the standard required 
for a fair labour practice. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189. This is in essence the basis of the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 
(CC).  
1020
 Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practices 16. 
1021
 See Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 104 – 105. Cf Le Roux and Van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal; Rycroft and Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law. Cf NAAWU v Pretoria 
Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd 1985 (6) ILJ 369 (IC). 
1022
 See Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 106. Acceptance of the concept of fairness within the realm of 
labour relations has informed the LRA recognition that decisions relating to for instance promotions, 
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The requirement of substantive fairness is recognised as a component of s 23 of the 
Constitution, and accordingly promoted in the LRA as part of the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed or subjected to unfair labour practices (other than dismissal).1023 The 
rationale for substantive fairness, now embedded in the constitutional concept of fair 
labour practices, seeks to ensure that employment decisions are not taken 
arbitrarily.1024 Substantive unfairness points to a failure of justice.1025 
3 1 1 Sidumo Misunderstood 
The Constitutional Court with the Sidumo-judgment1026 has created the impression that 
managerial prerogative is no longer to be regarded with any measure of judicial 
deference in an unfair dismissal context.1027 The judgment revealed that commissioners 
(in acting in an administrative nature), as impartial adjudicators, must balance the 
interests of the parties without undue preference for the employer’s perceptions. The 
                                                                                                                                            
demotions, suspensions and other disciplinary measures short of dismissal can amount to unfair labour 
practices. 
1023
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 94. 
1024
 See Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 118. De Ville Judicial Review 199 explains that an arbitrary decision 
is one that is “regarded as being irrational, unreasonable, and leading to unequal treatment”. See also 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA v President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 
85. Cf Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 276; Northwest Township (Pty) Ltd v The Administrator, Transvaal 
1976 (4) SA 1 (T) at 10; NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 38.  
1025
 In Pep Stores v Laka 1998 (9) BLLR 952 (LC), the Labour Court explained that a failure of justice is 
present where a decision-maker ignores evidence presented to him or her, or commits “a serious error of 
law”. Cf Department of Justice v CCMA 2001 (11) BLLR 1229 (LC) at par 7 per Waglay J. 
1026
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). The instant case concerned the dismissal of a security guard with a clean 
fifteen-year service record. He was responsible for access control and was dismissed for his negligence 
in the implementation of detailed search procedures. The dismissal was the result of an internal 
disciplinary inquiry, an internal appeal and failed conciliation. The applicant successfully challenged his 
dismissal in the CCMA. The respondent approached the Labour Court for a review of the commissioner’s 
decision. The Labour Court found no reviewable irregularities. On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court 
reasoned that dismissal as sanction was not justified in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal overturned the Labour Appeal Court’s decision on appeal and held the dismissal to be a 
fair sanction. The case ended with the Constitutional Court finding that a reasonable decision-maker 
could reach the same conclusion as the commissioner. 
1027
 For a discussion of the idea of managerial prerogative, see Chapter Two, part 3 3. 
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court rejected the idea of deference as far as it translates to the traditional reasonable 
employer test.1028 This test is based on the English law understanding that 
reasonableness must be determined from the perspective of the employer.1029 This 
perspective of reasonableness is irreconcilable with the equity-based approach on 
which South African labour law is based.1030 Within this understanding of the 
reasonable employer test, deference attracts a subservient element. One is here 
dealing with deference as submission and not deference as respect.1031 The 
Constitutional Court correctly criticised the element of the reasonable employer test to 
the extent that it hinders impartiality, encourages bias and facilitates prejudice. 
However, a reading of the Constitutional Court’s judgment as a rejection of the idea that 
a band of reasonableness can exist would be unfortunate. Although the Sidumo-
judgment was one dealing specifically with the fairness evaluation of a dismissal, the 
broader meaning that underlies the court’s reasoning (as here reflected) adds value to 
the proper approach to employment related fairness evaluations. 
                                            
1028
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 70 per Navsa AJ. 
1029
 The reasonable employer test has its roots in the reasoning of Lord Denning in British Leyland UK Ltd 
v Swift [1981] IRLR 91 at par 11: “[T]here is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might 
reasonably take one view; another quite reasonably take a different view. One would quite reasonably 
dismiss the man. The other would quite reasonably keep him on. Both views may be quite reasonable. If 
it was quite reasonable to dismiss him, then the dismissal must be upheld as fair; even though some 
other employers may not have dismissed him.” In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 70, Navsa AJ rejected this test on the basis that this English law doctrine does 
not find application in South African law, as the English statute that regulates the review of a dismissal for 
fairness is differently worded than its LRA counterpart. See Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCMA 2007 (8) BLLR 
705 (LAC) at par 19 per Zondo JP. 
1030
 In BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU 2001 (7) BLLR 705 (LAC) at par 19, Davis AJA explained 
that fairness is regarded as a comparator, to ensure that reasons which inform employment decisions are 
fair to both parties in the employment relationship. This understanding of the spirit of the concept of 
fairness informs the aim of the Constitution and the LRA “to redress the power imbalances between 
employees and employers”, as was confirmed in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 74 per Navsa AJ. See also the discussion of the development of labour law in 
Chapter Two, part 2. 
1031
 See part 2 1 3. 
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The Constitutional Court has referred to deference as respect with approval in 
administrative law related constitutional jurisprudence.1032 Deference must amount to 
respectful interference, not unquestionable submission.1033 So understood, deference is 
reconcilable with the objective assessment of fairness as associated with the right to fair 
labour practices.1034 
It is submitted, that it is illogical to rely on the rejection of the reasonable employer test 
to support the conceptual separation of reasonableness and substantive fairness.1035 At 
no level does this exercise amount to deference as submission, as the taking into 
consideration of the factors that influenced the employers decision to, for example, 
dismiss the employee does not automatically require an analysis of these factors with 
the employer’s state of mind. It merely requires the circumstances to be considered, to 
adequately balance the interests, to ultimately evaluate whether interference is 
warranted based on the decision being tainted by general unreasonableness and 
specific unfairness.1036 What is required is a value judgment.1037 The discontent 
articulated by Parington and Van der Walt is therefore well founded: 
                                            
1032
 An understanding of deference as respect is required against the background of administrative law’s 
purpose to constrain the abuse of power. In terms of administrative law, the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers informs this perspective. See part 2 1 3; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC). 
1033
 As such, one cannot regard deference as implying submission to the more powerful against the 
vulnerable in an unequal power relationship, if not justifiable by means of the fairness-comparator. 
1034
 Deference as respect, within the reasonableness evaluation, requires a balancing of interests in a 
manner comparable to labour related fairness. 
1035
 Both concepts require consideration of the relevant circumstances that inform an adverse decision, 
and both concepts require the interests at play to determine the degree of judicial interference, albeit at a 
de jure and de facto level respectively. According to Partington and Van der Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 223 
– 224, this merely entails taking into “consideration the totality of relevant circumstances informing the 
employer’s decision to dismiss”. 
1036
 If unfairness is present, interference is warranted. If the employer cannot be said to have acted 
unreasonably in reaching the decision then, deference as respect for the employer’s managerial 
prerogative dictates against interference. Deference as respect for the executive’s policy prerogative 
similarly dictates against interference in the absence of unreasonableness. This is true of employment 
decision in general and not merely limited to dismissals. 
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The use of the word ‘deference’ in the context of the ‘reasonable employer’ 
approach is therefore, it is submitted, really an unfortunate misnomer, the 
rationale behind which, though not always properly applied or understood, is 
a safeguard ensuring commissioners do not interfere with the sanction of 
dismissal simply because it is not the sanction the commissioner would have 
favoured in the circumstances.1038 
If the evaluation of fairness from the perspective of the employer is constitutionally 
questionable, then fairness from the perspective of the commissioner is similarly 
questionable.1039 The value judgment that informs the exercise of deference as respect 
requires the commissioner’s objective assessment of the interests of both parties to the 
dispute.1040 An equitable objective assessment is required to determine whether the 
decision, which aggrieves the employee, is justifiable by fair reasons.1041 
                                                                                                                                            
1037
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 179 per Ngcobo J. 
The judgment of Nasva AJ in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 
79 reflects this sentiment: “In terms of the LRA, a commissioner has to determine whether a dismissal is 
fair or not. A commissioner is not given the power to consider afresh what he or she would do, but simply 
to decide whether what the employer did was fair. In arriving at a decision, a commissioner is not required 
to defer to the decision of the employer. What is required is that he or she must consider all relevant 
circumstances.” Emphasis added. The reasoning of Navsa AJ is equally true when viewed in the context 
of unfair labour practices. 
1038
 Partington and Van der Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 224 – 225. Footnotes omitted. In Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 46, O’Regan J did warn that 
“[t]he use of the word ‘deference’ may give rise to misunderstanding as to the true function of a review 
court”. 
1039
 The reason for this being, as explained in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 
1097 (CC) at par 180, that “a commissioner with an employer background could give a decision that is 
biased in favour of the employer, while a commissioner with a worker background would give a decision 
that is biased in favour of a worker”. 
1040
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 179. 
1041
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 180. As explained in 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 181, the reasonable 
decision-maker has a specific function to fulfil: “[W]hat is required of a commissioner is to take seriously 
the reasons for the employer establishing the rule and prescribing the penalty of dismissal for breach of it. 
Where an employer has developed and implemented a disciplinary system, it is not for the commissioner 
to set aside the system merely because the commissioner prefers different standards. The commission 
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From a labour law perspective, it is because of the employer’s managerial prerogative 
to develop and implement a disciplinary system that complements the business 
demands that deference as respect is owed. Ngcobo J therefore held that judicial 
acknowledgment of deference as respect within the process of formulating a value 
judgment “is not a reason for the commissioner to defer to the employer.”1042 It is 
however necessary for the reasonable decision-maker to ascertain the reasons for the 
employer implementing a particular rule and the importance of the rule in the operation 
of the employer’s business” to enable him or her to “weigh these factors in the overall 
determination of fairness”.1043  
The general Bato Star-statement of O’Regan J that “an administrative decision will be 
reviewable if ... it is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach”,1044 is 
reconcilable with the current specialised labour law outlook (minus the reasonable 
employer test) as will be elaborated upon in part 4 2.1045 Navsa AJ admitted as much in 
the Sidumo-judgment, by stating that the application of the Bato Star-standard “will give 
effect not only to the constitutional right to fair labour practices, but also to the right to 
administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”.1046 In the 
                                                                                                                                            
should respect the fact that the employer is likely to have greater knowledge of the demands of the 
business than the commission.” 
1042
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 182. Closer 
consideration of the Sidumo-judgment of Ngcobo J in fact lends support to the idea of deference as 
respect in rejection of deference as submission. It is interesting to note that Ngcobo J also wrote the 
concurring judgment in the controversial Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 1999 (11) BLLR 1117 
(LAC). In that judgment, Ngcobo J expressed support for the idea that a measure of deference is owed to 
the discretion the employer exercises in the choice of sanction as a disciplinary measure. See Country 
Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 1999 (11) BLLR 1117 (LAC) at par 29. In the Sidumo-case, Ngcobo J was 
presented with an opportunity to clarifying his interpretation of deference in an employment context. 
1043
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 182. 
1044
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 50. 
1045
 Cf Partington and Van der Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 228. 
1046
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 110 Navsa AJ. A nexus 
between the respective administrative and labour law infused reasoning that underlies the Bato Star-
judgment and the Sidumo-judgment is identifiable in the judgment of Willis JA in Palaborwa Mining 
Company Limited v Cheetham 2008 (6) BLLR 553 (LAC) at par 4. Myburgh 2009 (30) ILJ 1 at 17 reveals 
similar insight. 
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aftermath of the Sidumo-ruling, labour law specific fairness perspective aligns with the 
general approach of administrative reasonableness: An employer’s decision for 
example to dismiss an employee will be reviewable if a commissioner (in analysing the 
decision in an impartial, unbiased and unprejudiced manner) cannot foresee the 
possibility of himself or herself reasonably reaching a similar decision. Although the 
Sidumo-judgment was one dealing with the fairness evaluation of a dismissal, it has the 
potential to add a further dimension to the proper approach to fairness evaluations of 
labour practices, as the judgment is rooted in the broader fairness understanding of the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices. 
3 2 Adequate Reasons 
The concept of fairness requires judicial deference to be dependent on the specialised 
legal context that calls for the evaluation of justifiability. A substantively fair reason also 
requires an evaluation of the adequacy of the reason,1047 as influenced by the nature 
and impact of the employment decision, with due regard to competing rights and 
interests. Indicators as to what constitute adequate reasons in dismissal and other 
labour practice contexts have been identified in employment jurisprudence and 
subsequently codified in labour legislation.  
3 2 1 Unfair Labour Practices 
The broad concept of the unfair labour practice requires that the relationship between 
employers and employees be informed by considerations of fairness.1048 Although the 
LRA seeks to give effect to the right to fair labour practices, it does not embrace an 
open-textured definition of unfair labour practices, but instead codifies certain equity-
inspired practices.  
In affording employees protection against unfair labour practices, the LRA qualifies 
labour practices with the requirement of equitable considerations in a variety of de facto 
employment contexts. This legislative qualification emphasises the fact that labour law 
                                            
1047
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 217. 
1048
 See Chapter Two, part 2 2 for a discussion of the initial recognition and development of the concept 
of (un)fair labour practices. See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 184; Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 41. 
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inherently acknowledges the presence of competing rights in the fairness analysis.1049 
In essence, the right of every employee is protected in so far as it is unfairly limited by 
the employer’s decisions relating to promotions, demotions, probation, training, 
provisions of benefits, suspension etc. In order to determine whether the interests of the 
employee justifies judicial infringement on the interests of the employer, the impact of 
the decision on those affected by it must be brought into consideration, along with 
consideration of the justifiability of the employer’s decision through the evaluation of the 
reasons proffered.  
In identifying a range of possible unfair labour practices in s 186(2) of the LRA, the 
legislature acknowledges that the nature of the decision that constitutes unfair conduct 
is central to the substantive fairness evaluation. Among the specific forms of labour 
practices the LRA seeks to keep within the bounds of fairness are promotion, demotion 
and suspension decisions. There are, of course, other forms of labour practices that can 
attract judicial interference, namely employment decisions relating to probation, training 
or any decision constituting disciplinary action short of dismissal. However, unfair 
conduct relating to promotions, demotions and suspensions (as examples of labour 
practices with which employers deal on a regular basis) provide, for purposes of the 
current discussion, good and representative examples of the specific substantive and 
procedural fairness requirements in labour law that relate to the general factors 
underlying considerations of reasonableness and procedural fairness  in administrative 
law. 
3 2 1 1 Promotion 
As unfair conduct relating to promotions can constitute an unfair labour practice,1050  
s 186(2)(a) of the LRA seeks to protect employees against the unfair (non)promotion1051 
                                            
1049
 It acknowledges the right of every employee to fair treatment, along with the right of every employer 
to manage his or her business. 
1050
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 52. 
1051
 Reference to a promotion constituting an unfair labour practice in terms of the LRA is misleading. It is 
in fact the decision not to promote (the non-promotion) that amounts to the required conduct in such a 
challenge. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 53. 
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decisions of employers in the context of promotions.1052 The nature of the non-
promotion decision as it relates to unfair labour practices is key to the substantive 
fairness evaluation.1053 The decision must amount to the employee not being allocated 
“a position that is of higher status with more responsibility”1054 than the position 
previously held by him or her.1055  
In evaluating the fairness of the reason for the non-promotion decision, labour law 
requires consideration of the identity of the decision-maker, with due regard to the fact 
that competition is an undeniable element of the process.1056 An employee’s 
unhappiness at being passed over for promotion does not create a protectable 
interest.1057 Only in the presence of a reasonable expectation of promotion, can an 
                                            
1052
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 187. The idea of a non-promotion decision constituting an 
unfair labour practice, pre-supposes at de facto level an existing employment relationship between the 
parties to the dispute. The same holds true for a demotion. See part 3 2 1 2. Cf Bench v Phalaborwa 
Transitional Local Council 1997 (9) BLLR 1163 (LC); Vereeniging van Staatsamptenare obo Badenhorst 
v Department of Justice 1999 (20) ILJ 253 (CCMA). 
1053
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55. 
1054
 Mashegoane v University of the North 1998 (1) BLLR 73 (LC) at 77. 
1055
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 52 explains that an increase in salary 
is not an essential element for a promotion, although it is normally part thereof. Unfair labour practices 
relating to promotions in the public service attracted attention in the Jele-saga, about the unsuccessful 
promotion application of a public servant from the Department of Health to the Department of Transport. 
In both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court, it was reasoned that a public servant falls within 
one general public service (regardless of the different departments). This conclusion allows public 
servants to bring an unfair labour practice case to the appropriate bargaining council in the event of an 
unsuccessful promotion application, unless the regulating statute stipulates otherwise. See Jele v Premier 
of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 2003 (24) ILJ 1392 (LC); MEC for Transport: KwaZulu-Natal v Jele 
2004 (12) BLLR 1238 (LAC); Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 54 – 55. See 
also Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–19.  
1056
 Within this process, the decision not to promote an employee ultimately lies with the employer as the 
decision-maker. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55; SAMWU obo 
Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council 1999 (20) ILJ 714 (CCMA). Cf Cullen/Distell (Pty) Ltd 2001 (8) BALR 
834 (CCMA). See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189. 
1057
 An employee is generally not entitled to a promotion in light of the workplace reality of competition 
between employees. Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55 explains that this 
is the case even if an employee has acted in that higher position, which “does not in itself [create] an 
entitlement to be appointed on a permanent basis”. 
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entitlement be created.1058 If this is the case, the employer’s unfair conduct unjustly 
affects the employee’s interests.1059 
Although the impact of the decision ultimately comes into play when the presence of 
unfairness is determined, no requirement can be set for an employer to promote the 
best or most commendable candidate for a promotion.1060 As a result, arbitrators 
illustrate a fair degree of respect for the decision of the employer, as “[i]nevitably, a 
measure of subjectivity enters the selection process at some stage”.1061 The fact that 
the judiciary has shown deference, does not imply that employers have unlimited 
power. It merely implies that “[u]nless the appointing authority were shown to have not 
applied its mind in the selection of the successful candidate, the CCMA may not 
interfere with the prerogative of the employer to appoint whom it considers the best 
candidate”.1062 Consideration of the reasons given for the decision therefore requires 
consideration as to whether the decision-maker applied his or her mind.1063 The 
employer’s decision to promote the one employee above another must be capable of 
justification in terms of fair reasons, regardless of provision for an element of 
                                            
1058
 It is possible for the words or actions of an employer to create a legitimate expectation of promotion 
with a specific employee. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55. Cf the 
administrative law perspective in Chapter Three, part 2 2 2. 
1059
 Cf Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 57. 
1060
 See Cullen/Distell (Pty) Ltd 2001 (8) BALR 834 (CCMA); Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases 
LRA 8–19. Bad faith on the side of an employer has however been inferred “from the patent superiority of 
the unsuccessful candidate” in exceptional cases. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair 
Labour Practices 55. 
1061
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55. See Du Toit et al Labour Law 
through the Cases LRA 8–18; PSA obo Dalton v Department of Public Works 1998 (9) BALR 1177 
(CCMA). See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189. 
1062
 SAMWU obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council 1999 (20) ILJ 714 (CCMA) at 718, read with due 
consideration of the Constitutional Court’s Sidumo-reasoning. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the 
Cases LRA 8–17. Cf Van Rensburg v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 1997 (18) ILJ 1421 
(CCMA); Communication Workers Union obo Starck and Telkom SA Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 353 (CCMA). 
1063
 Evaluating the substantive fairness of an employer’s decision to promote an employee is not an easy 
undertaking. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189; See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 58. See also Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–18. Cf PSA obo 
Badenhorst v Department of Justice 1999 (20) ILJ 253 (CCMA). 
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subjectivity in the employer’s choice.1064 An objective standard is required in 
determining whether a promotion amounts to an unfair labour practice, and allows for 
determination of the real reasons for the decision in contrast to the reason proffered by 
the employer.1065 An objective standard will be absent if an employer acted 
inconsistently or in an arbitrary or capricious manner.1066 
In evaluating the reasons given for the non-promotion decision, the relevant factors 
surrounding the decision call for reflection. Consideration of all the relevant factors 
enables one to determine whether “the employer’s ‘standard of industrial justice’ falls 
short”1067 of the promotion standard required in the circumstances.1068 The employer, 
regardless of his or her prerogative to appoint employees of his or her choice, is not at 
liberty to rely on irrelevant criteria when identifying employees for promotion.1069 It 
                                            
1064
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour 
Practices 58. 
1065
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189. The CCMA has illustrated a willingness to undertake 
such an exercise in scrutinising the real reasons behind the employer’s decision. Scrutiny of this nature 
allows for the identification of a logical connection (if any) between the real reason and the ultimate non-
promotion decision. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–18. Cf PSA obo Badenhorst 
v Department of Justice 1999 (20) ILJ 253 (CCMA). General reasonableness is here also present as 
guideline to the substantive fairness analysis in the form of basic rationality considerations. 
1066
 See SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd 1997 (3) BLLR 325 (CCMA) at 332. See also Du 
Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–19; PSA obo Van Zyl v Department of Correctional 
Services 2008 (29) ILJ 215 (BCA). 
1067
 Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 109. See also Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union v Delmas Kuikens 
1986 (7) ILJ 628 (IC) at 635. 
1068
 Jurisprudence has identified the criteria applied for promotion selection as a relevant factor in the 
fairness enquiry. Consequently, an approach that calls on employers to adopt disciplinary codes has 
been incorporated in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. The reasons for the employer’s actions call 
for review, to assist the evaluation of the presence or absence of such criteria. See PSA obo Botes v 
Department of Justice 2000 (21) ILJ 690 (CCMA) at 698 as referred to in Arries v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 
1062 (LC) at par 19. 
1069
 Although the employer is empowered to determine the criteria for promotion, the criteria so 
determined must stand in reasonable relation to the requirements of the promotion position. See Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 57. Cf Rafferty/Department of the Premier 1998 (8) 
BALR 1017 (CCMA). 
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constitutes an unfair labour practice if the employer basis his decision on invidious, 
unacceptable or irrelevant criteria.1070 
In relation to the criteria consideration, the presence or absence of discrimination is 
another relevant factor. The criteria found in s 6(1) of the EEA operate as a yardstick for 
the determination of the fairness of a non-promotion decision.1071 The presence of 
discrimination as defined in the EEA can signify the presence of bad faith on the side of 
the employer. Bad faith in turn translates into an unfair non-promotion based on 
inadequate reasons.1072 In the absence of sufficient reasons, a decision lacks a rational 
connection between the information and the ultimate non-promotion.1073 A rational 
connection must be present for a fair non-promotion decision.1074 
3 2 1 2 Demotion 
The decision to demote an employee must be justifiable in terms of the reasons 
provided by the employer. The effecting decision will be fair if it is justifiable. In 
evaluating the fairness of a decision to demote an employee, similar considerations are 
present as in the case of a non-promotion decision.  
                                            
1070
 See Arries v CCMA 2006 (11) BLLR 1062 (LC) at par 17. 
1071
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 55 and 59. Seeing as the LRA 
does not identify any defences for the employer against an unfair labour practice claim, the employer can 
rely on the specific defences in s 6 of the EEA (such as affirmative action) that are available to counter 
allegations of unfair discrimination. Cf Department of Justice v CCMA 2004 (4) BLLR 297 (LAC). 
1072
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 56; Portnet v SALTAFF obo 
Lagrange 1998 (7) BALR 963 (IMSSA); IMATU/Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council 1999 (12) BALR 
1459 (IMSSA); Du Plooy and National Prosecuting Authority 2006 (27) ILJ 409 (BCA). 
1073
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 57. Cf Mashegoane v University 
of the North 1998 (1) BLLR 73 (LC); PSA obo Petzer v Department of Home Affairs 1998 (19) ILJ 412 
(CCMA) 
1074
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–18; PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of 
Justice 1999 (20) ILJ 253 (CCMA). 
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Although a demotion amounts to a degradation of the employee’s status,1075 the 
fairness evaluation is similar to that associated with non-promotion decisions. Yet, a few 
differences between promotions and demotions are identifiable, the most important 
being that a demotion often has a disciplinary element.1076 For such a decision to be 
substantively fair, the reason therefore must be reasonably justifiable in the 
circumstances, as a demotion affects the employee’s interests.1077 This calls for the 
evaluation of the adequacy of the employer’s reasons for demotion. To echo the Bato 
Star-test, the evaluation calls for consideration of all the relevant factors to the decision 
and the nature of, and impact on, the interests of the parties to the de facto employment 
relationship. 
A decision to demote an employee can only have the potential to amount to an unfair 
labour practice in terms of the LRA if it amounts to an actual demotion.1078 Only if the 
decision deprives the employee of a contractually entitled rank, status or benefit will it 
amount to an actual demotion.1079 In the absence of rank, status or benefit deprivation, 
the employee will not experience the required impact. Not every demotion amounts to 
an unfair labour practice. 
                                            
1075
 This is the case even if the decision leaves the employee’s salary and benefits unchanged. See 
Visser v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2002 (10) BALR 1031 (AMSSA); Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd 2003 (12) 
BLLR 1274 (LC); Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional 
Services 2008 (12) BLLR 1179 (LAC). See also Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20; 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 60; Ndlela v SA Stevedores Ltd 1992 (13) 
ILJ 663 (IC); Solidarity obo Kern v Mudau 2007 (6) BLLR 566 (LC). Cf SALSTAFF obo Vrey v Datavia 
1999 (6) BALR 757 (IMSSA). 
1076
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20. A decision to demote is not limited to a 
disciplinary context. A decision to demote an employee can also arise from an employer’s operational 
requirements. See Plaatjies v RK Agencies 2005 (1) BALR 77 (CCMA).  
1077
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20. 
1078
 For example, if an employer instructs an employee to move from an acting position back to his 
original position, the decision does not constitute a demotion. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 59. 
1079
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 60. See also Ndlela v SA Stevedores Ltd 1992 (13) ILJ 663 (IC); Van Wyk v 
Albany Bakeries Ltd 2003 (12) BLLR 1274 (LC); Minister of Justice v Bosch NO 2006 (27) ILJ 166 (LC); 
Solidarity obo Kern v Muau 2007 (6) BLLR 566 (LC); Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate 
Services, Department of Correctional Services 2008 (12) BLLR 1179 (LAC). 
  
 
186 
In considering the interests of employees, along with consideration of the impact of the 
decision, sight must not be lost of the interest of the employer. If a decision to demote 
(as a penalty) is based on a valid reason and imposed in terms of a fair procedure, an 
employer cannot be denied the right to discipline employees that neglect to adhere to 
the set standards in the workplace.1080 However, the operational interests of the 
business also attaches to the consideration of the interests of the employer.1081 A 
demotion as an alternative to dismissal or retrenchment must merely be justifiable in 
terms of the circumstances of the case.  
3 2 1 3 Suspension 
The legislature’s choice to include unfair suspension within the scope of s 186(2)(b) 
indicates that a decision to suspend may in certain circumstances be described as 
fair.1082 Depending on the nature of a decision to suspend, it can be either a disciplinary 
or a preventative measure.1083 The possibility of a fair suspension entitles an arbitrator 
                                            
1080
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 60 – 61. 
1081
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 60 explains: “Demotions may be 
deemed fair if they are aimed at avoiding retrenchment or dismissal for incapacity”. 
1082
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 73 holds that consideration is owed to 
the period of the suspension, as well as whether the employer followed “the provisions of the applicable 
disciplinary code or regulation”. When the fairness of the suspension of an employee is evaluated, the 
latter consideration is very important. The reasonableness of the suspension period is dependent on 
whether the suspension is preventative or punitive in nature. Another relevant consideration is whether 
the employer may withhold pay during the period of preventative suspension. Generally, it is unfair to 
withhold pay from a suspended employee, unless it is statutorily authorised or the relevant employee 
delayed the disciplinary hearing to which the suspension is a preventative measure. If the circumstances 
justify it, pay can be withheld where an employee is suspended as a punitive measure. Where the facts 
would justify dismissal, punitive suspension with no pay will be justifiable. See Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 74; Wahl v AECI Ltd 1983 (4) ILJ 298 (IC). Cf Rikhotso v 
Transvaal Alloys (Pty) Ltd 1984 (5) ILJ 228 (IC); Marcus v Minister of Correctional Services 2005 (26) ILJ 
75 (SE). 
1083
 The nature of the decision, in terms of the grammatical interpretation of s 186 of the LRA, comes 
across as suspension with a disciplinary dimension. Section 186 of the LRA groups a suspension with 
“other disciplinary action”. In Koka v Director-General Provincial Administration North West Government 
1997 (7) BLLR 874 (LC), the Labour Court extended the interpretation of suspension within the scope of 
unfair labour practices to include preventative suspension pending disciplinary action. See Ndlovu v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet 1997 (7) BLLR 887 (LC). See also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 194; Du 
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to evaluate the substantive justifiability of the decision.1084 Substantive fairness is 
required for a suspension to qualify as a fair labour practice, as it affects the interest of 
the relevant employee. Balance is required between the interests of the parties to the 
employment relationship to enable the employer to maintain discipline within his or her 
business in accordance with the standards set out in the relevant disciplinary code.1085 
This balancing exercise assists in determining whether the impact of the decision on the 
affected person is unreasonable. The degree of respect owed to the employer’s 
decision is determined with due regard to the consideration of this impact.1086 In short, 
the reasons given must justify the suspension as a necessary measure.1087 
                                                                                                                                            
Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–24; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour 
Practices 72. In Ortlieb/Khulani Springbok Patrols 1999 (4) BALR 423 (CCMA) at 425, a preventative 
suspension was described as “[a] practice, universally followed by employers … until serious charges 
against [employees] are properly investigated and, if they are found to have substance permitting the 
employee to answer to them”. 
1084
 In Sajid v Mohammed NO 2000 (21) ILJ 1204 (LC), the suspension of an employee was ruled unfair 
due to the absence of a reason substantiating the employer’s conduct. Although the employee was 
preventatively suspended, the employer did nothing to initiate an inquiry. Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 72 – 73 comments that preventative suspension will be fair if 
there is a prima facie case of misconduct against the employee and there exists sound reasons for 
denying him access to the workplace. 
1085
 If undue emphasis falls on employee interests, the employer will not be able to exercise the required 
degree of managerial control. 
1086
 Closely associated with this consideration is the identity of the decision-maker. 
1087
 Although respect is owed to the employer’s managerial decisions, the Labour Court in SAPO Ltd v 
Jansen van Vuuren NO 2008 (8) BLLR 798 (LC) at par 39 emphasised that an employer should not too 
hastily resort to suspension in the absence of a valid reason. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 194; 
Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–25. Albeit in the context of a preventative suspension, 
the statement of Van Niekerk J in Mogothle v Premier of the North West Province and Another 2009 (4) 
BLLR 331 (LC) at par 39 holds equally true for suspensions in general. The judge reasoned that, as a 
minimum it is firstly required “that the employer has a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie at least, 
that the employee has engaged in serious misconduct; secondly, that there is some objectively justifiable 
reason to deny the employee access to the workplace based on the integrity of any pending investigation 
into the alleged misconduct or some other relevant factor that would place the investigation or the 
interests of affected parties in jeopardy; and, thirdly, that the employee is given the opportunity to state a 
case before the employer makes any final decision to suspend the employee”. The third requirement 
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3 2 2 Unfair Dismissal 
At its most simplistic, an unfair dismissal is a dismissal without any adequately 
justifiable reason.1088 This understanding acknowledges the requirement of the 
substantive fairness for dismissal as a sanction, because dismissal is not merely an 
expression of retribution or reprisal.1089 Section 188(1) of the LRA stipulates that the 
employer can dismiss for misconduct, incapacity or operational requirements if a fair 
reason exists.1090 A contextualised understanding of fairness as it relates to the de facto 
level employment relationship is necessary, as each specific area dictates the range of 
possibly fair reasons.  
A fair reason requires an evaluation of the adequacy of the reason.1091 The evaluation 
of the adequacy of the reasons for dismissal requires a balance between the interests 
of both parties to the employment relationship within the specific context of the 
dispute.1092 This balance is found in labour law’s perspective of substantive fairness by 
                                                                                                                                            
identified by Van Niekerk J relates to the procedural dimension of fairness and is elaborated on in 
Chapter Six, parts 4 1 1 3 and 4 2 1 1 2. 
1088
 See Cassim 1984 (5) ILJ 275 at 294. 
1089
 See De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 (21) ILJ 1051 (LAC) at 1058. 
1090
 See Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 (8) BLLR 857 (LAC) at par 14. 
1091
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 217. 
1092
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 217. Certain categories of unfair 
reasons have crystallised in practice that can be linked to the victimisation of employees. Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 225 explains that s 187 of the LRA recognise these 
categories as automatically unfair, as “it will not generally avail the employer to argue that it was seeking 
to protect other, more urgent interests, or that it followed a fair procedure, or that for any other reason the 
dismissal should be considered fair”. The focus of the fairness enquiry in automatically unfair dismissal 
enquiries is the determination of “the true reason for the dismissal”. See Basson et al Essential Labour 
Law 95 – 97. Section 187 of the LRA reads as follows:   
“(1)  A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts contrary to 
section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is— 
(a)  that the employee participated in or supported, or indicated an intention to participate in or 
 support, a strike or protest action that complies with the provisions of Chapter IV; 
(b)  that the employee refused, or indicated an intention to refuse, to do any work normally done 
 by an employee who at the time was taking part in a strike that complies with the provisions 
 of Chapter IV or was locked out, unless that work is necessary to prevent an actual danger to 
 life, personal safety or health; 
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means of s 23 of the Constitution.1093 Section 188 of the LRA upholds the required 
constitutional balance, by recognising “an employer’s right to fairly dismiss an employee 
... as well as an employee’s right to be protected against unfair”1094 dismissal.1095 This 
once again emphasises that it is possible to view the fairness focus of labour law not as 
                                                                                                                                            
(c)  to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
the employer and employee; 
(d)  that the employee took action, or indicated an intention to take action, against the employer 
by—  
(i) exercising any right conferred by this Act; or 
(ii) participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act; 
 (e)  the employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to her pregnancy; 
(f)  that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any 
arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language, marital status or family responsibility; 
(g)  a transfer, or a reason related to a transfer, contemplated in section 197 or 197A; or 
(h)  a contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, by the employer, on account of an 
employee having made a protected disclosure defined in that Act. 
(2)  Despite subsection (1)(f)— 
(a)  a dismissal may be fair if the reason for dismissal is based on an inherent requirement of the 
particular job; 
(b)  a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement 
age for persons employed in that capacity.” 
For purposes of drawing a comparison between labour law substantive fairness and administrative law 
reasonableness, only the unfair dismissal approach as reflected in s 188 of the LRA will form the focus of 
the discussion in this chapter. 
1093
 See NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 40. In response, the LRA circumscribes the 
traditional managerial prerogative of employers in that employers cannot lawfully contract out of their 
statutory obligations. Limitations placed on the managerial prerogative of the employer in the context of 
the promotion of fair labour practices have both a procedural and substantive dimension. See Cohen 
2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 26 at 32. See George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1996 (8) BLLR 985 
(IC) at 997 per Landman P for a discussion of the labour law evolution of the idea of managerial 
prerogative. See also Chapter Two, part 3 3. 
1094
 Cohen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 26 at 28. 
1095
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 216 reasons that the LRA, in 
incorporating fairness as the yardstick for a just dismissal, “extends the common-law concept of 
dismissal”.  
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a limitation, but as a value-added dimension of the multi-faceted legal riddle, that is the 
employment relationship. 
3 2 2 1  Conduct 
As is the case with all other employment decisions, a substantively fair misconduct 
dismissal, objectively evaluated,1096 requires a defensible and adequately reasonable 
reason.1097 In Malan v Bulbring NO,1098 the Labour Court explained that the “issue of 
whether conduct justified termination of an employment contract requires an analysis of 
the conduct and its effect on the employment relationship”.1099 The evaluation of the 
circumstances and relevant factors of the case therefore assists the evaluation of the 
reasons for, as well as the impact of, the decision to dismiss.1100 
Fairness decrees that the employer should be empowered to take disciplinary action 
when the employee is guilty of misconduct,1101 as “[t]rust is obviously an operational 
requirement of any business”.1102 The employer has an interest in promoting and 
                                            
1096
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219. In SACWU v Afrox Ltd 1999 
(10) BLLR 1005 (LAC) at par 32, the Labour Appeal Court noted: “The enquiry into the reason for the 
dismissal is an objective one, where the employer’s motive for the dismissal will be merely one of a 
number of factors to be considered. This issue (the reason for the dismissal) is essentially one of [factual 
and legal] causation”. 
1097
 See Oliver v Foschini Group Ltd 1995 (8) BLLR 102 (IC) at 110; GIWUSU v VM Construction 1995 
(9) BLLR 99 (IC) at 106. The fairness of the reason and the sanction must “be decided in accordance with 
the guidelines” identified by the Industrial Court and incorporated in the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal.  
1098
 2004 (10) BLLR 1010 (LC). 
1099
 Malan v Bulbring NO 2004 (10) BLLR 1010 (LC) at 1017. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the 
Cases LRA 8–31. 
1100
 According to Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 123, these elements are not to be considered in isolation.  
A value judgment, based on a holistic view of the facts and circumstances and with due regard to the 
interests of both parties to the employment relationship, is called for. See NEHAWU v Medicor (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Vergelegen Medi-Clinic 2005 (1) BLLR 10 (LC) at par 42 per Potgieter AJ. 
1101
 See Dekker 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 372 at 377. 
1102
 Dekker 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 372 at 377. The following specific forms of misconduct have been 
identified: absence from work, abusive language and racist comments, assault, competing with the 
employer/conflict of interest, damage to the employer’s property, disclosing confidential information, 
dishonesty, drug use, drinking on duty, falsification of records, fraud, bringing the employer’s name into 
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protecting this trust element in the workplace.1103 The workplace rules put in place to 
maintain the trustworthy standard of employees must also be reasonable to not infringe 
unduly on the rights and interests of employees.1104  
Holistically viewed, the decision to dismiss will only be reasonable and based on a fair 
reason if the following can be shown: the misconduct was actually committed by the 
employee,1105 the employee was aware of the fact that his or her conduct was in 
contravention of a reasonable rule that amounts to misconduct,1106 and the employer’s 
decision to dismiss corresponds to past action taken against similar acts of misconduct 
by employees.1107 For the decision to be substantively fair, a finding of guilt (in 
                                                                                                                                            
disrepute, insubordination or insolence, negligence, sexual harassment, sleeping on duty, theft or 
unauthorised possession and unauthorised use of the employer’s property. See Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 291 – 322 for a detailed discussion of these specific forms of 
misconduct. 
1103
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 119 – 120. 
1104
 See Item 7 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal; s 188(2) of the LRA; Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 118 – 119; Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–32. 
1105
 Once the reasonableness of the relevant rule is established, the contravention of the reasonable rule 
calls for consideration. Determining the justifiability of the reasons to dismiss based on the employee’s 
conduct also requires an evaluation of guilt and innocence. Grogan 2008 24(6) Employment LJ 
(Electronic Version) explains that the idea of deference as respect does not influence the judicial review 
discretion with regard to the guilt or innocence of an employee. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination 
and Unfair Labour Practices 219 – 220. 
1106
 For the requirement that a reasonable rule must be in place, see Basson et al Essential Labour Law 
116 – 118; NUM v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd 1986 (7) ILJ 739 (IC); Van Zyl v Duvha Opencast 
Services (Edms) Bpk 1988 (9) ILJ 905 (IC); Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 (14) ILJ 1449 (LAC); Louw v 
Delta Motor Corporation 1996 (17) ILJ 958 (IC). 
1107
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219 – 220. Even though the 
employer has the discretion to dismiss for misconduct, fairness implies that similar cases receive similar 
treatment. In NUMSA v Henred Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd 1994 (15) ILJ 1257 (A) at 1264, Van der 
Heever JA stated: “Equity requires that the Courts should have regard to the so-called ‘parity principle’.” 
See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–32; Coca-Cola Bottling East London v CCMA 
2003 (2) BLLR 159 (LC) at par 27. Cf SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson Ltd 1999 (8) BLLR 741 (LAC) at 751; 
Cape Town City Council v Masitho 2000 (21) ILJ 1957 (LAC); CEPPWAWU v Metrofile (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) 
BLLR 103 (LAC); SRV Mill Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 2004 (2) BLLR 184 (LC); Minister of Correctional 
Service v Mthembu NO 2006 (27) ILJ 2115 (LC). 
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contravention of a reasonable rule) must be supplemented by an appropriate 
sanction.1108 
As is the case with the qualification of an appropriate reason as a component of the s 
33(2) right to reasons for a just administrative action, the qualification of an appropriate 
sanction undeniably reveals a substantive reasonableness standard. In evaluating the 
justifiability of the sanction, the idea that some respect is owed to an employer’s 
managerial prerogative dictates that an appropriate sanction is not necessarily the best 
sanction, but merely an acceptable sanction.1109 Deference as respect (in light of the 
Sidumo-judgment)1110 requires acknowledgment of the fact that “[t]he determination of 
an appropriate sanction is ... largely within the discretion of the employer”.1111 If the 
employer exercises his or her discretion unfairly, interference is justified.1112  
The courts have fleshed out certain relevant factors to the appropriateness of a sanction 
for misconduct. Item 3 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal incorporates these 
factors in determining the required parameters of the range of acceptability. These 
factors underlying de facto level contextualised labour law specific substantive fairness 
resemble the de jure level Bato Star-factors relied upon for a general reasonableness 
evaluation.1113 Within this range of factors one finds the following: the gravity of the 
misconduct,1114 the circumstances surrounding the misconduct,1115 the nature of the 
                                            
1108
 See Grogan 2008 24(6) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1109
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 277. 
1110
 See part 3 1 1. 
1111
 Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza 1999 (2) BLLR 1117 (LAC) at par 33. The word ‘appropriate’, 
points to a range of acceptable sanctions in any given set of circumstances. See Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 281. 
1112
 See Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza 1999 (2) BLLR 1117 (LAC) at par 33. Judicial 
interference, in terms of the right to fair labour practices and the LRA, will only be justifiable if the 
employer’s chosen sanction is unreasonable and unfair. Judicial interference with regard to the sanction 
is logically justifiable in a similar manner as interference with the decision to dismiss will be justifiable if 
the applicable rule allegedly contravened is found to be unreasonable. The employer’s discretion with 
regard to the rule and sanction is not untouchable if it is exercised unreasonably. 
1113
 In echoing the reasonableness considerations, the fairness evaluation also has due regard to the idea 
of deference as respect, albeit respect for managerial instead of executive discretion. 
1114
 This begs the question whether the misconduct amounted to a serious breach of the trust 
relationship. Cf Oliver v Foschini Group Ltd 1995 (8) BLLR 102 (IC) at 110; FAWU obo Sjade v Premier 
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work performed by the employee,1116 the nature of the work and services rendered by 
the employer,1117 the circumstances of the infringement itself (as there may be 
mitigating circumstances),1118 and the nature of the employee’s job.1119 These factors in 
essence call for consideration of the relationship between the employee (as the 
individual that stands to lose his or her source of income) and the employer (as the 
‘victim’ of the misconduct).1120 The factors considered in the substantive fairness 
evaluation of a misconduct dismissal are reconcilable with the Bato Star-guidelines at 
all three evaluation levels, namely reasonable rule, contravention of the reasonable 
rule, and appropriate sanction. The specific misconduct context enables the fairness 
enquiry to ascribe weight to the general reasonableness factors that act as framework 
for the evaluation of the decision. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Milling 1997 (18) ILJ 1134 (CCMA); National Council of Food and Artificial Workers Union obo Roberts v 
Ons Handelshuis Koop 1997 (18) ILJ 1176 (CCMA). In NUM v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines 
(Operations) Ltd – President Steyn Mines; President Brand Mine; Freddies Mine 1992 (13) ILJ 366 (IC) at 
368, Dannhauser SM stated: “Considering that dismissal should be the sanction of last resort and that it 
is especially serious for mineworkers because of the limited scope for re-employment, I am not 
persuaded that dismissal was an unfair sanction.” See also Changula v Bell Equipment 1992 (13) ILJ 101 
(LAC) at 111. 
1115
 Cf Boardman Brother (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1998 (19) ILJ 517 (SCA). 
1116
 Cf the discussion of Maphatane v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 1996 (17) ILJ 964 (IC) in Basson et al 
Essential Labour Law 121. 
1117
 Cf Standard Bank of South Africa v CCMA 1998 (19) ILJ 903 (LC). Accompanying this consideration 
is factors such as the nature and size of the employer’s workforce and the position of the employer and 
its profile in the market place. 
1118
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 122 point out that an employee found guilty of assault may have 
been provoked or even have acted in self-defence. If such circumstances exist, dismissal will not be 
warranted. Cf Nkomo v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers 1989 (10) ILJ 937 (IC); JD Group Ltd v De Beer 1996 (17) 
ILJ 1103 (LAC).  
1119
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 120 – 125. 
1120
 The nature of these competing interests along with the impact of the decision on the lives and well-
being of those affected, fall within the scope of this consideration. Basson et al Essential Labour Law 123 
– 124 explain that this exercise calls for consideration of “the employee’s length of service, status within 
the undertaking, previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances”, which can also include 
“marital status, the number of dependants and the employee’s age”. 
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3 2 2 2 Capacity 
In its broadest sense, incapacity refers to an employee’s inability to perform his or her 
work to the standard required by the employer.1121 Incapacity can arise from an 
employee’s “lack of skill or from physical or mental deficiency”.1122 Although both 
misconduct and incapacity dismissals are in essence dismissals for conduct by the 
employee, the employee is not ‘at fault’ when dismissed for incapacity.1123 Regardless 
of the absence of fault, a dismissal for incapacity is legally permissible when the 
employee’s inability to perform the work contractually agreed upon grants the employer 
an adequate reason for the termination of the employment contract.1124 The Code of 
Good Practice: Dismissal identifies two broad categories of no-fault incapacity 
dismissals: poor work performance and ill health or injury. 
3 2 2 2 1 Poor Work Performance 
Legislative and judicial acceptance of poor work performance as a fair reason for 
dismissal demonstrates respect for the managerial discretion of employers to establish 
“reasonable performance standards”1125 for the workplace. The object of (substantive) 
fairness in dismissals of this nature is “to ensure that employers do not abuse the right 
to dismiss employees for incapacity”.1126 A dismissal for poor work performance will be 
defensible, in the absence of a reasonable alternative, if the employee failed to meet an 
attainable performance standard.1127 The recognition of deference as respect in this 
context obliges the employer to avoid abuse of discretion in coming to such a 
decision.1128 
                                            
1121
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. 
1122
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. 
1123
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. Cf Sun Couriers (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA 2002 (23) ILJ 189 (LC). 
1124
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. 
1125
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. 
1126
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. 
1127
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 220. 
1128
 This is evident from the reasoning of the Labour Appeal Court in Somyo v Ross Poultry Breeders 
(Pty) Ltd 1997 (7) BLLR 862 (LAC) at 866: “An employer who is concerned about the poor performance 
of an employee is normally required to appraise the employee’s work performance; to warn the employee 
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Substantive fairness calls on the employer to prove the incapability of the employee.1129 
An adequate reason will only exist if it can be illustrated that the employee’s failure to 
meet the required standard is due to poor work performance.1130 Item 9 of the Code of 
Good Practice: Dismissal assists in de facto level contextualising of the fair reason 
requirement. Evaluating the substantive fairness of an incapacity dismissal, guided by 
the item 9 requirements, calls for an objective assessment of the relevant employee’s 
work performance.1131 
3 2 2 2 2 Ill Health or Injury 
When ill health or injury renders it difficult or impossible for an employee to perform his 
or her contractually undertaken functions, an employer is authorised to make an 
informed and fair decision to dismiss.1132 Item 10 of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal indicates that ill health or injury will not constitute a fair reason for dismissal in 
the absence of the following considerations:1133 
What was the cause of the injury or illness? What is the extent to which the 
employee is unable to perform duties? Were alternatives to termination 
                                                                                                                                            
that if his work performance does not improve, he might be dismissed; and to allow the employee a 
reasonable opportunity to improve his performance.” 
1129
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405 – 406. It will not suffice for the 
employer to prove simply that the performance standard of the business was not met. 
1130
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 407; White v Medpro 
Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd 2000 (10) BALR 1182 (CCMA) at 1187. 
1131
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 405. The Industrial Court early on 
in Gostelow v Datakor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Corporate Copolith 1993 (14) ILJ 171 (IC) already indicated 
that work performance must be evaluated from both the employer and the employee’s perspective to 
enable a value judgment to be drawn as to the objective and reasonable justifiability of a dismissal. This 
is now also recognised by the guidelines in item 9(b)(i) and (ii) in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 406. 
1132
 See Van Eck and Lombard 2004 (1) TSAR 20 at 32. If operational necessity so dictates, the employer 
can fill the position of the injured or ill employee, rendering him or her redundant and terminating his or 
her employment. See Davies v Clean Deale CC 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1233.  
1133
 It is not only physical illness that may constitute a valid reason for dismissal. In X v Elvey International 
(Pty) Ltd 1995 (16) ILJ 1210 (IC), the Industrial Court indicated that even mental illness or stress can fall 
within the nature, degree and extent of the guidelines found in item 10. See Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 141. Cf NEHAWU v SA Institute for Medical Research 1997 (2) BLLR 146 (IC). 
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considered or was the adaptation of the duties of the employee considered? 
Was the employee afforded the opportunity to state a case and given the 
opportunity to be represented by a trade union representative or fellow 
employee?1134 
In determining the impact of the degree of the incapacity on the decision to dismiss, the 
productivity of the employee requires consideration.1135 In Davies v Clean Deale CC,1136 
the Industrial Court identified guidelines to assist in the evaluation of fair ill health or 
injury dismissals: 1137 
(a) If the disability is due to workplace related injury or illness, the 
employer has a greater duty to accommodate the employee. 1138 
(b) The employer must first determine, in consultation with the 
employee, whether he or she is capable of performing his or her 
employment duties (as required prior to injury or illness), and if not, 
determine the extent of that inability.1139 
(c) After consultation, the employer must determine whether the duties 
of the employee can be adapted to allow him or her to exercise those 
duties in a manner that allows for him or her to fulfil the functions as 
previously done, whether alone or with reasonable assistance.1140 
                                            
1134
 Van Eck and Lombard 2004 (1) TSAR 20 at 32. Cf Lynoch v Cereal Packaging Ltd [1988] IRLR 510 
at 512 as referred to by Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 419. 
1135
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 141. Cf Philander v Eco Car Hire CC 2001 (6) BALR 631 
(CCMA). 
1136
 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC). 
1137
 The court in Food Workers Council of SA v SA Breweries Ltd 1992 (13) ILJ 204 (IC) at 208 referred to 
these guidelines with approval. See Carr v Fisons Pharmaceuticals 1994 (7) BLLR 10 (IC) at 15.  
1138
 See Davies v Clean Deale CC 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1232 – 1233. The employer’s duty to 
accommodate the incapacitated employee somewhere within the business will weigh heavier than an 
employee suffering from an unrelated illness of injury. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 141 – 142. 
Cf Carr v Fisons Pharmaceuticals 1995 (16) ILJ 179 (IC). 
1139
 See Davies v Clean Deale CC 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1232 – 1233. The permanent or temporary 
nature of the ill health of injury is also an important consideration when considering the adequacy of the 
dismissal. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 141. 
1140
 See Davies v Clean Deale CC 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1232 – 1233.  
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(d) If the employee cannot return to the position held prior to the injury or 
illness, the employer must ascertain whether an alternative position 
(even if at reduced salary) is available.1141   
An employer’s decision to dismiss will only be considered substantively fair if a serious 
effort has been made to “adapt the employee’s duties or position or to find alternative 
work”1142 within the confines of the relevant business. 
3 2 2 3 Operational Requirements 
Section 213 of the LRA defines operational requirements as “requirements based on 
the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer”. It is clear that a 
dismissal based on the operational requirements of a business is the only option in the 
three-fold permissible dismissal scheme that does not relate to an employee’s conduct 
or capacity.1143 The substantive fairness requirement in this context is a factual one.1144 
Respect for the employer’s prerogative to organise his or her business structures as he 
or she sees fit leads to substantive fairness, at its most basic, requiring two 
considerations: 
Firstly, the employer must prove that the proffered reason is one based on 
the operational requirements of the business ... Secondly, the employer must 
prove that the operational reason actually existed and that it was the real 
reason for the dismissal.1145 
                                            
1141
 See Davies v Clean Deale CC 1992 (12) ILJ 1230 (IC) at 1232 – 1233.  
1142
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 142. Cf Tither v Trident Steel 2004 (4) BALR 404 (MEIBC); 
NUMSA obo Swanepoel and Oxyon Services CC 2004 (25) ILJ 1136 (BCA); Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 424. 
1143
 See Durban Integrated Municipal Employees Society v Tongaat Town Board 1993 (2) LCD 54 (IC); 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 428. 
1144
 The factual evaluation calls for a holistic consideration of all the evidence according to the court in 
FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC). See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 151 – 
152. 
1145
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 151. 
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Substantive fairness requires that the employer does not abuse his or her prerogative 
when making business-based decisions.1146 What a fair dismissal for operational 
requirements calls for is the de facto contextualisation of the fairness considerations.1147 
To accomplish this, the employer must prove the fairness of the decision by illustrating 
that it was based on facts that translate into the economic, technological, structural or 
similar business needs.1148  
Managerial deference for the employer’s right to organise his or her business has led to 
the judicial acceptance that an increase in profitability or an improvement of efficiency 
can qualify as a fair reason.1149 Granting the employer some leeway in the manner in 
which he or she opts to regulate the operational aspects of business, does not 
undermine the proportional balance of interests required by the right to fair labour 
practices.1150 Fairness still functions as a comparator:1151 
To this extent the court is entitled to enquire as to whether a reasonable 
basis exists on which the decision, including the proposed manner, to 
dismiss for operational requirements is predicated. Viewed accordingly, the 
test becomes less deferential and the court is entitled to examine the content 
of the reasons given by the employer, albeit that the enquiry is not directed to 
                                            
1146
 Restraining abuse of power in the unequal employment relationship is the general purpose underlying 
the incorporation of substantive fairness within the scope of labour law. 
1147
 In OCGAWU v Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd 2001 (12) BLLR 1358 (LC) at par 90, the Labour Court 
endorsed this understanding. 
1148
 This by no means implies that dismissal for operational reasons will only be substantively fair if the 
reason related to a necessary cut in costs or expenses. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 151. 
1149
 See Hendry v Adcock Ingram 1998 (19) ILJ 85 (LC) at 92; Basson et al Essential Labour Law 151. 
This perspective was also confirmed in Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 2003 (24) ILJ 133 (LAC) at par 
33 (as referred to in Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v NUM 2005 (3) BLLR 219 (LAC) at par 57). See also 
Mineworkers Union and Solidarity obo Macgregor v SA National Parks 2006 (27) ILJ 818 (LC); Forecourt 
Express (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union 2006 (27) ILJ 2537 (LAC). 
1150
 See SACTWU v Discreto – a Division of Trump and Springbok Holdings 1998 (12) BLLR 1228 (LAC) 
at par 8. 
1151
 See BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU 2001 (7) BLLR 705 (LAC) at par 19 per Davis AJA. 
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whether the reason offered is the one which would have been chosen by the 
court. Fairness, not correctness is the mandated test.1152 
In CWIU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd,1153 Zondo JP however explained that judicial respect for 
the employer’s prerogative does not render his or her operational decisions 
incontestable, as respect shown for the employer’s specific business expertise “is not 
absolute and should not be taken too far”.1154 In FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd,1155 Gamble 
AJ explained that the courts have moved towards a “less deferential test for proof of 
substantive fairness” in retrenchment cases, as it amounts to no-fault dismissals, which 
is “meant to be a measure of last resort”.1156 In placing reliance on General Food 
Industries Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Bakeries v FAWU,1157 Gamble AJ in FAWU v SA 
Breweries Ltd1158 opted for a quote from the academic work of Rycroft1159 to summarise 
the courts’ perspective: 
In summary, an employer intending to restructure by way of redefining jobs 
and making all or a group of existing jobs redundant must be able to show: (i) 
a reasonable and commercial rationale for the decision to restructure; (ii) that 
the particular decision has been taken in a manner which is also fair to the 
employees to be retrenched; (iii) that the retrenchment of the employees is 
essential to achieve the purposes of the restructuring; (iv) that the criteria for 
appointment to the “new” jobs are clear and justifiable, linked specifically to 
the new job description; (v) that guidance is given to employees as to which 
of the restructured jobs they might be eligible [sic]; (vi) that employees are 
                                            
1152
 BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU 2001 (7) BLLR 705 (LAC) at par 19. Emphasis added. 
Brassey et al The New Labour Law 94 note that there is “no commercial rationale for an unreasonable 
order”. See Marais Onbillike Arbeidspraktyke 35. 
1153
 2003 (11) BLLR 1081 (LAC). 
1154
 CWIU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 2003 (11) BLLR 1081 (LAC) at par 69. See also Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 442. 
1155
 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC). 
1156
 FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC) at par 40. See Christianson 2004 ASSAL 610 
at 641. 
1157
 2004 (7) BLLR 667 (LAC). 
1158
 FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC). 
1159
 Rycroft 2002 (23) ILJ 678. 
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given an opportunity in the interview to answer any questions about past 
performance that might be used as a criterion for not appointing them to the 
job; and (vii) that the eventual selections are objectively justifiable.1160 
These principles form the basis for the substantive fairness evaluation of a dismissal for 
operational reasons.1161 When considering the principles, the fifth and sixth 
considerations tend to align more with procedural fairness considerations, while the 
emphasised elements read like a rationality review as found in administrative law.1162 
The Labour Court adapted this element of reasonableness as an element of substantive 
fairness, but nevertheless holds that fairness and not rationality is to be regarded as the 
proper test,1163 as an objectively justifiable reason translates into a fair reason.1164 
However, the substantive fairness that the judiciary requires looks similar to 
reasonableness, because fairness does not require correctness.1165 
4 RECONCILIATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LABOUR LAW 
PERSPECTIVES 
While administrative law has primarily and in general terms recognised the variable 
potential of reasonableness at a de jure (macro) level, labour law has allowed a 
conceptual fairness understanding to develop at de facto level through contextualised 
guidelines. This is evident from the judicial consideration given to the fairness element 
in unfair labour practice and dismissal cases.1166 Reasonableness, in administrative 
law, has not been granted similar specific guidance at a de facto level, regardless of the 
                                            
1160
 FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC) at par 58. Emphasis added. 
1161
 See Christianson 2004 ASSAL 610 at 642. 
1162
 The existence of a rational link between the particular decision and the purpose sought renders the 
decisions objectively justifiable and therefore reasonable. 
1163
 See FAWU v SA Breweries Ltd 2004 (11) BLLR 1093 (LC) at par 153 per Gamble AJ. 
1164
 Cohen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 26 at 28 declares that the reasons proffered by an employer for the 
retrenchment of employees must be “properly and genuinely justifiable by operational requirements”. See 
also SACTWU v Discreto (A Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings) 1998 (12) BLLR 1228 (LAC).  
1165
 See BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU 2001 (7) BLLR 705 (LAC) at par 19. 
1166
 The de facto level contextualisation is also evident in the extent to which those considerations have 
been legislatively endorsed as guidelines in pursuit of fairness. 
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fact that rationality and proportionality considerations are generally associated with 
reasonableness evaluations.1167 
There is a real danger of labour law’s contextualised conceptualism warping into 
formalistic conceptualism, if the judiciary does not carefully approach the codification of 
fairness as mere guidelines. The judiciary must constantly remind itself that the codified 
labour law fairness considerations are simply indicators that developed in an attempt to 
highlight the underlying values endorsed by the concept of fairness in specialised 
contexts over the years. Indicators of this nature cannot be relied upon to oust general 
reasonableness considerations in every context, because of the presence of an 
employment nature to the legal relationship, as it in fact requires a specific context to 
inform the de jure level recognised concepts. Formalism will stifle the variable nature of 
a fairness evaluation if guidelines are judicially elevated to strict directives.  
To the extent that labour law codifies fairness consideration, the factors emanating from 
such codification are flexible in nature and must be so respected and applied by the 
judiciary. The character of the contextually developed specialised fairness guidelines 
reveal the capacity to co-operate and merge with the abstract general normative pillars 
of administrative law.1168 
It is possible for the de jure level administrative law understanding of reasonableness to 
find expression (to variable degrees) in various specialised de facto labour law contexts, 
even if these contexts are legislatively pre-defined by the LRA’s provisions regulating 
fairness in dismissals and other labour practices. This reconciliation is possible, as both 
specific labour law and general administrative law at its most basic endorse the duty to 
act fairly. 
                                            
1167
 Although it can be argued that PAJA does give specific content to rationality through the factors 
identified in s 6(2)(f)(ii), it still amounts to mere de jure level contextualism, which has a general character 
as it does not provide guidance as to the de facto applications of the factors. 
1168
 The considerations underlying the labour law approach to misconduct illustrate this fact, when 
consideration is given to the factors that influence the possible sanctions. The flexibility of the apparent 
codification is also evident when disciplinary rules are considered. 
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4 1 A Shared Duty to Act Fairly 
While labour law easily embraced the substantive element of fairness, administrative 
law at first viewed it with suspicion. Despite this, some administrative law specialists 
early on acknowledged that the duty to act fairly called for a wider standard than mere 
procedural fairness,1169 with a fairness enquiry focussing on both “what is done and how 
it is done”.1170 This perspective of the duty to act fairly, reminds of labour law’s 
requirement for both a fair reason and a fair procedure as components of a fair 
decision.1171 The substantive element of fairness has emerged in a general form in 
administrative law as the concept of reasonableness.1172 
Every legal relationship determines the essential applicable canons of fair play.1173 In a 
situation where the legal relationship is a public employment relationship, it is 
characterised by the presence of public power. The templates of the fair play canons 
associated with the general factors that underlie a reasonableness evaluation are 
informed by the specialised substantive fairness considerations as dictated by the 
specific relationship.1174 The broad reasonableness factors gain substance in the public 
employment context when used as a framework for a de facto level substantive fairness 
                                            
1169
 See Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 607 at 628; HTV Ltd v Price Commission [1976] ICR 170 at 186 and 189 
per Denning MR and Scarman LJ; Chapter Three, part 2 2 1. 
1170
 Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] 2 All ER 122 at 132 per Lawton LJ. 
1171
 The requirement of a fair reason describes labour law’s substantive fairness at its most simplistic. 
1172
 Along with the constitutionalisation of the right to just administrative action, the judiciary has 
somewhat reluctantly developed the substantive dimension of variable reasonableness concept. See 
Chapter Three, part 3 5 2. 
1173
 An undertaking to determine the content of the concept of fairness will always result in a finding that 
fairness is a value judgment, dependent on the factual matrix of every case. See Greater Letaba Local 
Municipality v Mankgabe NO 2008 (3) BLLR 229 (LC) at paras 28 – 29. 
1174
 The nature of the employment relationship (determined by the presence or absence of public power) 
determines the extent to which fairness dictates the essential canons of fair play within that relationship. 
See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 587; Smit 2003 (2) Stell LR 205 at 213 – 214. The de 
facto level employment specific considerations are necessary, as Règimbald 2005 (31) Man LJ 239 at 
156 points out that reasoning of this nature (based on broad factors comparable to the Bato Star-
guidelines) although good in theory, does “not answer the question as to how one must assign weight to 
considerations that pull in different directions, even if the standard of reasonableness ... allows for a 
‘somewhat probing examination’”. 
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enquiry.1175 It is possible for the specific context of a specialised fairness analysis, 
viewed within the de jure level framework of the general reasonableness factors, to 
require consideration of the substantive implications of a decision.1176 
In the application of the broad Bato Star-guidelines to the evaluation of, for example, a 
substantively fair dismissal, it becomes apparent that general reasonableness and 
specialised substantive fairness function in a complementary manner. This should not 
come as a surprise, as administrative law is based on “the underlying principle that the 
duty to act fairly rests on anyone who is called upon to decide anything in the exercise 
of public power”.1177 
4 2 Substantive Fairness within a Reasonableness Framework 
Once the formalistic labels are discarded, the essence of the concepts of 
reasonableness and fairness reveals a shared rationale, the duty to act fairly, which 
allows for interdependence between general reasonableness and specific fairness.1178  
                                            
1175
 Employment considerations assign weight and content to the broad based factors as per the needs of 
the specific dispute. In the de facto contextualisation of the de jure level Bato Star-guidelines, De Ville 
2004 (20) SAJHR 577 at 608 encourages the judiciary to scrutinise the factors underlying a 
reasonableness evaluation on a continual basis. Navsa AJ in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 108 reiterated the Constitutional Court’s perspective: “[S]crutiny of a 
decision based on reasonableness introduced a substantive ingredient into review proceedings. In 
judging a decision for reasonableness, it is often impossible to separate the merits from scrutiny.” Cf 
Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 677; Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (12) 
BCLR 1384 (C). 
1176
 While the public power context will allow labour law to draw on the developed reasonableness 
guidelines, the employment context will allow the expansion of these considerations on a substantive 
level in a manner that administrative law in general may possibly view as to extreme. This is justified in a 
labour law context, as labour law allows for substantive fairness considerations in the review of an 
employment decision. 
1177
 Wakwa-Mandlana and Plasket 2005 ASSAL 104 at 119 with reference to Board of Education v Rice 
[1911] AC 179 at 182. 
1178
 This shared rationale allowed for the Industrial Court, in developing the concept of fair labour 
practices, to look towards reasonableness as a standard. The approach initially adopted by the Industrial 
Court resembles the balance required in an administrative law reasonableness enquiry. Labour law at an 
early stage therefore recognised labour practices as substantively fair if reasonable in relation to the 
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Reasonableness in general requires a decision to be defensible.1179 The correlation 
between administrative law reasonableness and labour law substantive fairness 
becomes even more obvious when one considers that a defensible labour practice or 
dismissal requires that the employer must justify the reason he or she proffers for the 
related decision.1180 
Although not expressly declared as a functional framework for the substantive fairness 
evaluation of unfair labour practices and dismissals by the judiciary, the Bato Star-
guidelines for reasonableness are clearly identifiable in labour law.1181 The possibility of 
normative interdependence is further emphasised by the fact that labour law has 
implicitly shown acceptance of the administrative law idea of deference.1182 
When so simplified, it illustrates that the basic substantive dimensions of 
reasonableness and adequate reasons in administrative law are compatible with labour 
law, to such an extent that it almost appears as if the general reasonableness 
framework was designed to facilitate a specialised substantive fairness enquiry in the 
context of unfair labour practices and dismissals as discussed above. Consequently, if 
an employer failed to apply his or her mind, the decision may be challenged and judicial 
interference will be justified.1183 
                                                                                                                                            
reasons given. See Chapter Two, parts 2 3, 2 4 and 3 5; Marais Onbillike Arbeidspraktyke 15; Poolman 
Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 16; Lefu v Western Areas Gold Mining Co 1985 (6) ILJ 380 (IC) at 
387; Robbertze v Matthew Rustenburg Refineries (Wadeville) 1986 (7) ILJ 64 (IC) at 70. 
1179
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219. The synonym for defensible 
is justifiable, which is the description that administrative law ascribes to a reasonable (adequate) 
decision. 
1180
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219. 
1181
 These guidelines being the nature of the decision, the identity of the decision-maker, the range of 
relevant factors, the reasons given for the decision, the impact of the decision on the affected individual, 
and the nature of the competing interests. 
1182
 See parts 2 1 3 and 3 1 1. 
1183
 See SAMWU obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council 1999 (20) ILJ 714 (CCMA) at 718. See also 
Basson et al Essential Labour Law 189; Du Toit et al Labour law through the Cases LRA 8–17. Cf 
Mashegoane v University of the North 1998 (1) BLLR 73 (LC); PSA obo Petzer v Department of Home 
Affairs 1998 (19) ILJ 412 (CCMA). 
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It is in evaluating the appropriateness of the purpose of conduct where moral 
defensibility (as viewed from a constitutional perspective) moves towards the 
substantive justice balance required in employment decisions. The substantive element 
of reasonableness is especially evident when considering what will constitute a 
reasonable reason.1184 Reasonableness does not require correctness or perfection.1185 
In unison with labour law, the requirement of adequate reasons in administrative law 
merely dictates that what constitutes a satisfactory reason will ultimately depend on the 
circumstances of a case.1186 The duty to give adequate reasons for a decision runs 
through general administrative law into specific labour law, without any forced 
superficial legal reasoning. Both at general administrative and specialised labour law 
level, a decision will be inadequate and unfair if the evidence on which a decision is 
based is not properly considered rendering the decision “arbitrarily, irregularly and 
otherwise ... [not] in accordance with reason and justice”.1187 
The judiciary should recognise that, when it comes to fairness and the ideals that 
underlie it, no set standard artificially excluding reasonableness as rationality or 
proportional can justifiably be formulated, as “new guidelines ... will emanate from ... 
court[s] in future”1188 on a case-by-case basis. In light of statements like these, uttered 
by the then Industrial Court, it is difficult to see how the broad constitutional strides 
made in administrative law with regard to the variable abstract concept of 
reasonableness cannot find a co-operative balance with the ever evolving scope of 
substantive fairness as associated with labour law.  
                                            
1184
 See Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand 2005 (5) SA 357 (W) at par 53. 
1185
 See Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 266; Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana Ltd v Reynolds NO 
1995 (3) SA 74 (B) at 94. The de jure contextualisation of reasonableness as rationality in the context of 
dismissal based on operational requirements when applied as framework for the specialised evaluation of 
substantive fairness illustrates this fact. 
1186
 Cf Rèan International Supply Company (Pty) Ltd v Mpumalanga Gaming Board 1999 (8) BCLR 918 
(T) at 926. Hoexter Administrative Law 428 explains that the adequacy of the reasons will also depend on 
the statutory context in which the reasons are required. Therefore, labour legislation can be relevant to 
the determination of the adequacy of the reasons requested when an employment decision also amounts 
to administrative action. 
1187
 Oskil Properties (Pty) Ltd v Chairman of the Rent Control Board 1985 (2) SA 234 (SE) at 246. See 
also Hoexter Administrative Law 420. 
1188
 Durand v Ellerine Holdings Ltd 1991 ILJ 1076 (IC) at 1083. 
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Fairness must be capable of meaningful application in a polycentric context.1189 The 
process whereby courts develop the guidelines for fair labour practices on a case-by-
case basis is crucial if fairness is to continue to be more than a mere moral adjunct. If 
fairness in labour law is unduly restricted and isolated from other areas of the law, it 
runs the risk of losing touch with the transformative nature and social value of South 
Africa’s legal system.1190 Judicial neglect of this nature will render fairness an empty 
formalistic concept disharmonious with the constitutional and social values it is 
fundamentally ordained to endorse. Judicial neglect of this nature will undermine 
transformation, as it is in fairness’ association with the de jure level contextualised 
variable nature of reasonableness that one finds its transformative potential.1191  
Courts must refrain from such neglect if they aim to give full expression to the 
interdependent spirit of the Constitution. What is required is an acknowledgment that 
our courts must take a practical principled approach to public employment disputes that 
allow for normative interdependence if practically (and therefore contextually) required. 
This is possible within the scope of labour law as “[t]he whole tenor of progress in 
labour law is to fair labour practices and justice for employees and employers and away 
from a narrow construction”.1192 
4 3 Reconciling Bato Star and Sidumo 
The fact that de facto pre-determined employment related guidelines for fairness have 
been judicially developed and legislatively codified is not ground enough for the 
exclusion of de jure level developed reasonableness considerations, such as those 
articulated by the Constitutional Court in the seminal case of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Environmental Affairs.1193 
                                            
1189
 Fairness, as the core of labour law, is a flexible concept that is dependent on variables, such as the 
factors influencing general reasonableness, to obtain substantive meaning. 
1190
 Judicial neglect and disregard for the obligation to develop law in line with the normative value system 
of the Constitution is unforgivable. 
1191
 See Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 276. 
1192
 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele 2005 (26) ILJ 749 (LAC) at 764. Emphasis added. See also Dekker 
2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 372 at 374. 
1193
 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC). 
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Steinberg explains that the elements found in the Bato Star-analysis, when simplified, 
merely call for a two-step process of contextualisation: “The first entails locating the 
issue at hand in its appropriate constitutional setting ... The second step entails an 
analysis of the factual setting in which the question of reasonableness arises.”1194 This 
approach allows for both de jure (first step) and de facto (second step) contextualisation 
as associated with general administrative law and specific labour law respectively. 
Consequently, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd1195 
translated the administrative law developed Bato Star-approach to reasonableness into 
labour law terms. It may therefore be useful to compare the Bato Star and Sidumo-
judgments. 
As explained, administrative law acknowledges that the concept of reasonableness, at 
its most basic, requires the standard of rationality, which (when considering the 
substantive interests that cling to fundamental rights) can expand to considerations of 
proportionality.1196 In the Sidumo-judgment, the Constitutional Court impliedly (albeit in 
the context of a dismissal) acknowledged this scale of reasonableness as associable 
with employment standards and the understanding of fairness.1197 Knowledge of the 
legislative provisions and guidelines informing the de facto context of the dispute, as 
well as the relevant de jure standard of reasonableness evaluation, provides guidance 
for the degree of deference as respect owed to the decision-maker’s discretion. 
Consequently, the provisions and guidelines that codify the jurisprudentially identified 
standards that inform fairness in relation to dismissals and other labour practices draw 
                                            
1194
 Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 277. 
1195
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC).  
1196
 The factual context of a dispute informs the reasonable degree of deference owed. 
1197
 Myburgh 2009 (30) ILJ 1 at 19 explains that a reading of Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) reveals that reasonableness can be approached in a process-based manner 
or a result-based manner. This in effect translates to the basis that De Ville Judicial Review 213 identified 
for (process-based) rationality as reasonableness and (result-based) proportionality as reasonableness. 
Myburgh 2009 (30) ILJ 1 at 19 explains the difference in emphasis: “Typically, the result-based cause of 
action would be invoked when there has been a consideration of all relevant factors but it is contended 
that the result is, nevertheless, unreasonable, whereas the process-related cause of action would be 
invoked when there is a controversy about whether all materially relevant factors were considered.” See 
also Myburgh 2009 (30) ILJ 1 at 4. The focus in the Sidumo-judgment appeared to be primarily result-
based.  
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this general understanding of reasonableness into the scope of a specialised 
understanding of fairness.1198  
The newly ascribed character of deference as respect that emanates from the 
Constitutional Court’s Sidumo-reasoning now arguably informs the understanding of this 
ultimate question, namely “whether there was a fair reason for the dismissal (or labour 
practice) and whether it was in accordance with a fair procedure”.1199   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to general reasonableness, the degree of deference (applied to different 
employment type decisions) functions on a sliding scale. As demonstrated by the 
preceding discussion, as well as the illustration above, deference as respect allows for 
                                            
1198
 This specialisation of administrative law reasonableness through its association with labour law 
fairness will be useful for the contextual protection of the right to fair labour practices, as long as 
formalism does not creep into the understanding and application of the relevant LRA provisions and 
guidelines. Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 46 observes that certain criteria 
have been recognised as “hallmarks of unfair [employment] conduct”. Jurisprudence has recognised the 
presence of unfairness where favour is shown to a specific employee or group “on the basis of irrelevant 
criteria”, where the employer acts in an arbitrary fashion (regardless of established rules), where the 
employer acts irrationally in that he or she acts “on the basis of unproven or untested views and 
suppositions” and where the rights and interests of the employee is or stands to be adversely affected 
without an opportunity for him or her to state his or her side of the story. 
1199
 Grogan 2006 ASSAL 605 at 633. Cf SABC v CCMA 2006 (6) BLLR 587 (LC). Formalism threatens to 
creep into the judiciary’s reasoning when guidelines are elevated to a labour law equivalent of jus cogent 
norms, which in turn attracts the idea of non-derogation. It is undeniable that substantive fairness has 
evolved into a labour law version of an erga omnes obligation for employer and employees alike, but 
formalistically clinging to distinctions and guidelines shows a disregard for the universal fairness 
obligation. Judicial respect for labour law’s erga omnes obligation merely calls on the judiciary to consider 
one ultimate question that remains universal in all employment disputes. 
Illustration 3: The Deference Scale 
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stricter judicial scrutiny of the adequacy of the reasons underlying decisions of a 
disciplinary character, such as misconduct related dismissal, demotion or 
suspension.1200 The degree of legislative regulation of employment type decisions differ, 
as indicated by the discussion surrounding the adequacy of reasons related to varying 
types of dismissal and labour practices. Consequently, the degree of regulation 
influences the degree of deference for the employer’s decision and affects his or her 
margin of appreciation.1201 
An evaluation of the categories in which a dismissal or a labour practice related 
decision can be justifiable, brings about the logical conclusion that the reason for the 
decision must relate to the ground that impelled the employer to take certain steps.1202 
The variable nature of reasonableness renders it adaptable to an employment context. 
In turn, the variable nature of fairness allows for its functioning within the framework of 
general reasonableness in an employment specific context. Interdependence, so 
allowed, gives context specific content to both the flexible de facto level substantive 
fairness and the de jure level reasonableness. 
Accordingly, the holistic consideration of all the relevant factors in the context of every 
case in essence informs reasonableness and fairness on the sliding scale. If the factors 
underlying the reasonableness/fairness evaluation, objectively considered by a 
reasonable decision-maker, reveal substantive irregularities that render the decision 
unreasonable and unfair, the degree of interference is determined as per the type of 
employment decision and the related degree of deference.  
The blurring of the notional lines that influence deference as respect should not render it 
conceptually difficult to keep in mind that specific contextual fairness remains the 
ultimate focus in applying the general Bato Star-factors within the reasonableness 
                                            
1200
 Stricter scrutiny is justifiable in that the legislature has curbed the scope of managerial prerogative in 
this context with prescribed parameters for decisions of this nature. 
1201
 For example, when it comes to the evaluation of the fair reason for dismissal, an employer’s 
managerial prerogative is less restricted when the decision is based on operational reasons than is the 
case when it is based on misconduct. 
1202
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 217. 
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framework.1203 The specific substantive labour fairness evaluation easily falls within the 
general framework of the reasonableness evaluation of the Bato Star-analysis. 
Reasoning of this nature brings considerable value to the deliberate vagueness of fair 
labour practices within the scope of s 23 of the Constitution in the context of public 
employment. The LRA similarly embraces a vague test for substantive fairness, as it 
also does not attempt to define the concept of fairness.1204 The interdependent 
reasoning therefore carries the same value-added potential at legislative level. The 
specific element the LRA brings to the flexible evaluation of substantive fairness is the 
required identification of a fair reason for a dismissal or other labour practices within the 
context of the decision, whether it relates to promotion, demotion, suspension, conduct, 
capacity or operational requirement decisions. Unfortunately, these specific types of 
employment decisions are at the root of the artificial distinction between variable labour 
substantive fairness considerations and variable administrative reasonableness 
considerations.1205 The courts appear to embrace the perspective that once a decision 
is specifically classifiable as relating to an unfair labour practice or an unfair dismissal, 
the administrative law related general reasonableness framework does not warrant 
consideration. The legislative codification of the specific types of decisions appears to 
reveal a practical rather than a prescriptive rationale. This rationale in reality invites 
courts to be innovative in the contextual determination of the weight ascribed to the 
factors underlying the substantive fairness enquiry.1206 
                                            
1203
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 218 emphasises that “the division 
between dismissals related to the conduct or capacity of employees, and those related to the employer’s 
operational requirements, is not absolute”. 
1204
 See the reasoning in NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC).  
1205
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219 comments: “[C]ourts operating 
under the 1956 LRA resisted applying these terms inflexibly. By codifying the forms of [employment 
decisions] ... in the current LRA, the legislature probably intended the expressions to be nothing more 
than guides for selecting the forum for particular kinds of dismissal disputes, and for assisting the relevant 
forum to choose the appropriate principles when deciding the disputes.” Emphasis added.  
1206
 For examples, see Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 219. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The debate that surrounds the simultaneous application of ss 23 and 33 of the 
Constitution has given rise to the perspective that the relationship between 
administrative and labour law makes for uneasy bedfellows.1207 This perspective 
underlies the turf-war between the High Court and the Labour Court as Chapters Eight 
and Nine illustrate. The negative perspective that flows from this power play can be 
avoided, if employment related fairness is viewed as a specialised function against the 
general understanding of reasonableness. This perspective is to be preferred above 
one that regards the one right (and interrelated concepts) as a legal limitation of the 
other right (and interrelated concepts). Such a limitation-based approach will see the 
victorious right influenced by the jurisdictional interests of a specific court and not the 
merits of every individual case.  
Recognition of the applicability of the s 33 right (in addition to the s 23 right) in a public 
employment dispute does not deprive labour law of the recognition and protection of the 
duty to act fairly within an employment context.1208 Labour law, in embracing the idea of 
fair labour practices, can fulfil its regulatory function without unduly limiting other 
applicable rights and interests, as it is “a hybrid of private and public laws”.1209 
The idea of normative interdependence that supports expression of this hybrid 
character or labour related rights underlies the holistic character of the fundamental 
rights in the Constitution.1210 In short, normative interdependence regards fundamental 
rights as mutually supportive, co-operative and not exclusionary in their protection and 
promotion, because the normative basis of fundamental rights is reconcilable. It is 
                                            
1207
 See Quinot 2000 Resp Mer 16. 
1208
 Cf Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaart 2001 (12) BLLR 1301 (SCA) paras 11 – 15; Denel (Pty) Ltd v 
Vorster 2004 (25) ILJ 659 (SCA) at 665. 
1209
 Parry v Astral Operations Ltd 2005 (10) BLLR 989 (LC) at 999 – 1000. Cohen 2007 (19) SA Merc LJ 
26 at 28 explains that at the establishment of the employment relationship, labour law draws heavily on 
the contractual rules of private law. The continued existence and viability of the employment relationship 
is statutorily safeguarded by public law through “the protection of both the employees and employers”. 
Emphasis added. See also Van Jaarsveld 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 355 at 356. 
1210
 See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the doctrine of normative interdependence that underlies the 
interdependent fundamental rights-relationship. 
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clearly visible in the substantive fairness and reasonableness components of the rights 
to fair labour practices and just administrative action respectively. The underlying 
rationale of both substantive fairness and reasonableness allows for easy co-operation 
between these two rights.  
Normative co-operation at a substantive level is possible where the presence of public 
power allows for contextual intersection between the rights.1211 This is especially true in 
light of the fact that labour law merely requires a fair reason for a substantively fair 
employment decision. Labour law does not prescribe a set type or list of fair reasons, in 
a similar fashion as administrative law merely requires a reasonable reason. Both 
labour and administrative law therefore merely requires an adequately justifiable reason 
in the circumstances of a specific case. Further support for this normative co-operation 
is noticeable in the fact that a correct and unified perspective of judicial deference 
illustrates that labour law functions as a specialised version of the general 
administrative law perspective that only inadequacy merits interference. 
Labour law is a specialised field of regulatory rules.1212 General administrative law 
regulates administrative type public power by means of general concepts.1213 Thus, the 
concept of reasonableness has a general regulatory function, while substantive fairness 
translates general reasonableness guidelines into specialised regulatory considerations. 
Although the character of fairness renders it difficult to pen down the precise meaning of 
                                            
1211
 Driver and Plasket 2003 ASSAL 69 at 102 note that the normative link between general 
reasonableness and specific substantive fairness is unfortunately hampered by the fact that courts tend 
to “run the concepts of lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action into each other”. See 
for example the judgment of Smuts AJ in Mohammed v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (6) SA 169 
(SE). A reason for conceptual confusion can be found in the fact that development of the nature of 
unreasonableness review post-1994 has been limited, as courts are cautious of any administrative law 
concept that calls for limited objective consideration of the merits without entering the realm of appeals. 
See Driver and Plasket 2003 ASSAL 69 at 93. The development of a constitutional understanding of 
reasonableness has mostly taken place within the context of socio-economic rights. See Government of 
the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule 
v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
1212
 See Chapter Two. 
1213
 See Chapter Three.  
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fairness, “reasonable people can generally recognise acts that are patently unfair, and 
can discern the reasons that make them unfair”.1214  
The Constitution endorses the understanding that reasonable considerations guide the 
equitable standard required by fairness, specifically substantive fairness,1215 for every 
employment decision.1216 Administrative law has developed to recognise that 
reasonableness is determined on a scale. The de jure contextualisation of a disputed 
decision determines the required degree of reasonableness. Reasonableness at its 
most basic level requires mere rationality, while stringent regulation of the unequal 
power relationship requires proportionality considerations. Within a specific labour law 
setting, this general administrative law understanding is identifiable. In the de facto 
contextualisation of a dismissal for operational reasons, the basic understanding of 
reasonableness as rationality can for example direct the specialised fairness enquiry. 
On the other hand, the regulation of, for example, a misconduct dismissal under the 
LRA and the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal is more severe. As a result, the fairness 
enquiry in that context calls for proportionality considerations. At that point of 
intersection, general proportionality infiltrates the specialised understanding of unfair 
labour practices.1217  
In summary, once the general framework of reasonableness finds application in a 
specific employment context, it attracts that specific nature and content. Both the 
concepts of fairness and reasonableness are flexible in nature and variable in 
                                            
1214
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 45. Stulberg 1998 (13) Ohio St J on 
Disp Resol 909 at 911 comments that substantive fairness amounts to “the functional equivalent of the 
difference principle in Rawls’ scheme” of justice. See Rawls A Theory of Justice 75 – 83. 
1215
 The substantive and procedural dimensions of the fairness principle was confirmed by the Labour 
Court in Booysen v SAPS 2008 (10) BLLR 928 (LC) at par 15. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the 
Cases LRA 8–2. 
1216
 Grogan 2005 ASSAL 585 at 587 appropriately notes that the “overlap between labour and 
administrative law inherited from the pre-constitutional dispensation has expanded with the arrival of a 
constitutional right to fair and rational administrative action”. Emphasis added. 
1217
 The extension of the general constitutional substantive due process concept into the specific 
substantive standard renders it possible to impose liability on the party in an employment relationship 
who causes harm to the other party without justification. See Perritt Employee Dismissal Law and 
Practice 11–79. 
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content.1218 In the specific employment context, a de jure contextualised version of 
reasonableness guidelines inform the nature of specialised substantive fairness. 
General reasonableness provides the framework in which the variable content of 
substantive fairness is determined. Due to the variable nature of reasonableness, the 
context informs the content of the concept. This formula forms the basis of the 
substantive reasonableness-fairness relationship1219 that aligns with the normative 
interdependence of constitutional rights, as Chapter Seven illustrates. However, the 
substantive dimension of fairness is complex and not easily grasped and accepted by 
the judiciary, as Chapters Eight and Nine highlights. In contrast to this new and 
constitutionally informed formula of substantive interdependence, the procedural 
dimension of fairness has been a shared aim of administrative and labour law since the 
initial acceptance of the duty to act fairly. It is closely associated with the principles of 
natural justice, specifically the audi alteram partem principle. The compatibility of the 
approach of administrative and labour law to procedural fairness is the focus of Chapter 
Six.  
                                            
1218
 Cf Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 45. At certain levels, depending on 
the context in which the concepts are referred to, the content can render the concepts synonyms due to 
the similarity in nature. It is therefore possible for fairness to translate into reasonableness as embraced 
by administrative law. 
1219
 Similar reasoning sees employment-specific substantive fairness as finding application within the 
general reasonableness framework due to the presence of public power. Regardless of the angle at 
which one views reasonableness and substantive fairness, the contextual result remains the same. 
Phrased differently, if one removes the specialised contextual considerations from the substantive 
fairness evaluation in an employment disputes (as characterised by the presence of public power) the 
general framework of a reasonableness enquiry remains. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A SHARED CONCEPT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary relies strongly on the rule of law, a foundational constitutional principle,1220 
as a type of constitutional compass to assist it in evaluating whether a decision is 
just.1221 The reason for this being that, intrinsic within the constitutional understanding of 
the rule of law, is the “moral value of fair procedure”.1222 Substantive and procedural 
considerations collectively inform a moral understanding of fair employment 
decisions.1223 The importance of the conceptual distinctions lies in the fact that 
procedural unfairness may render an employment decision unfair, even if the decision is 
justifiable based on a fair reason.1224 Procedural fairness supplements substantive 
fairness, in providing an element of transparency and an opportunity for dialogue that 
supports the substantive interdependence of general reasonableness and specific 
substantive fairness.1225 A discussion of procedural fairness within the scope of this 
study is a prerequisite for the evaluation of interdependence between ss 23 and 33 the 
Constitution based on the shared normative influence of fairness.  
As there is no single set of principles that inform natural justice,1226 the focus of this 
chapter falls on the determination of the extent to which administrative and labour law 
share a similar perspective of procedural fairness, and the degree of reconciliation 
                                            
1220
 See s 1 of the Constitution. 
1221
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 10 – 13. 
1222
 Allan Constitutional Justice 77. 
1223
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 414. 
1224
 See NUM v Libanon Gold Mining Co Ltd 1994 (15) ILJ 585 (LAC) at 586. Cf Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 137; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 414. 
1225
 In POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 76, Plasket J referred to 
the judgment of Megarry J in John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 at 402 and pointed out that context-specific 
procedural fairness grants structure to the fairness evaluation. 
1226
 See Chairman, Board of Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) at par 14. See also 
NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd 1985 (6) ILJ 369 (IC) at 378; S v Baleka 1986 (1) SA 361 
(T) at 382; Robbertze v Matthew Rustenburg Refineries (Waseville) (Edms) Bpk 1986 (7) ILJ 64 (IC) at 
68 – 69; Bosch v THUMB Trading (Pty) Ltd 1986 (7) ILJ 341 (IC) at 344.  
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practically endorsed.1227 Part 2 will show that procedural fairness, from both a labour 
and administrative law perspective, seeks to promote the same core values. To 
illustrate the practicality of a unified approach to procedural fairness, the basic 
administrative law understanding of the concept will briefly be reiterated in part 3.1228  
This administrative law perspective allows for comparison with the labour law 
perspective of procedural fairness in part 4. From a labour law perspective, the 
emphasis will fall on the core values of procedural fairness, namely transparency (part 4 
1) and dialogue (part 4 2). The extent to which a right to representation is recognised 
will be considered in part 4 3.1229 This comparative exercise will illustrate that 
procedural interdependence is justified, due to a shared aim underlying the pursuit of 
justice in both labour and administrative law.  
Ultimately, Chapter Six illustrates that the audi alteram partem rule has developed to 
embrace ideas of transparency and dialogue, with due regard to the flexible 
constitutional perspective of fairness. Labour and administrative law incorporate these 
ideas of transparency and dialogue through a shared procedural fairness rationale. 
 
 
 
                                            
1227
 The development of administrative and labour law reveals a similar procedural perspective of this 
moral requirement, unlike the substantive perspective. Due to this difference in historical development 
(the focus of the discussion in Chapters Two and Three) and the reflection of the underlying substantive 
concepts of the rights to just administrative action and fair labour practices (in Chapter Five) a closer look 
at the relevant procedural dimensions is called for, before the possible reconciliation of these concepts 
can be considered. While Chapter Five reveals how reasonableness and fairness considerations can co-
operatively inform the ss 23 and 33 constitutional rights at a substantive level, Chapter Six accordingly 
aims to show that the procedural relationship between administrative and labour law proves that 
normative interdependence is possible and in fact jurisprudentially recognised. 
1228
 For a detailed discussion see Chapter Three, parts 2 2 and 3 5 1. 
1229
 Representation considerations are necessary, as the expression of the fairness dimensions of 
transparency and dialogue may require legal assistance where complex circumstances surround a 
dispute. 
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2 PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND THE CORE VALUES IT SEEKS TO 
PROMOTE 
The Industrial Court drew on public sector principles to develop a labour law 
understanding of procedural fairness.1230 As such, administrative law acted as a source 
for labour law’s development of procedural fairness. A contemporary unified perspective 
of procedural fairness perspective has now emerged with the Constitution as the shared 
supreme source. 
Procedural fairness must not merely be understood in instrumental terms.1231 It has its 
roots in the social exchange theory.1232 It requires consideration of “the influence of 
normative ... and contextual ... elements on justice dynamics”.1233 Procedural fairness, 
as a constitutional duty with a flexible core,1234 no longer requires the judiciary to look 
for forced arguments to protect and promote the rights and interests of the affected 
individuals.1235 The acceptance of this flexible character is mirrored in the fact that both 
labour and administrative law recognise that there is no set formula for a procedurally 
fair hearing, as the nature of the hearing is determined by the circumstances of the 
                                            
1230
 See Chapter Two, part 2 3. 
1231
 See Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg Case No: CCT 24/07 at par 134. See also Quinot 2007 (8) ESR 
Review 25 at 26. 
1232
 The theory results from the intersection between economics, psychology and sociology. The social 
exchange theory emerges in various forms that can be simplified to “the same central concept of actors 
exchanging resources via a social exchange relationship”, as explained by Devan Theories Used in IS 
Research: Social Exchange Theory http://www.istheory.yorku.ca/Socialexchangetheory.htm 
(2009/04/22). Homans 1958 (63) Am J Soc 597 at 606 explains that the goods or resources being 
interchanged can be material or non-material (symbols, approval or prestige). The exchange at the point 
of intersection promotes equilibrium. 
1233
 Mossholder, Bennett and Martin 1998 (19) J Organiz Behav 131 at 132. See also Morgan and 
Sawyer 1979 (42) Social Psych Quart 71. 
1234
 See Administrator, Transvaal v Theletsane 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) at 206; Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research v Fijen [1996] 2 All SA 379 (A) at 388; Chairman, Board of Tariffs and Trade v Brenco 
Inc 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) at par 14; Smith v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, RSA [2003] 
1 All SA 628 (C) at 638. 
1235
 See Quinot 2007 (8) ESR Review 25 at 26. 
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dispute.1236 A checklist approach to procedural fairness is associated with formalism, as 
the listed requirements attract rigid application.1237 This approach is rejected “in favour 
of substantial compliance with the norms of fair process”.1238 Recognition of the flexible 
character allows for pragmatic expression of the core rules of natural justice within the 
idea of fair play,1239 in accord with the context of every case.1240  
Despite the acknowledgment of contextually sensitive procedural standards as an 
element of fairness, a well-defined understanding of procedural fairness has emerged 
through the recognition of two basic tenets:1241 “the right to be heard and the right to be 
subjected to impartial enquiry”.1242 These tenets are also reflected in the natural justice 
“maxims audi alteram partem (‘hear the other side’) and nemo iudex in propria causa 
(‘no one may be a judge in his own case’)”.1243 The adaptation of procedural fairness to 
a variety of settings, as guided by these tenets, allows the judiciary to not only see that 
                                            
1236
 Mossholder, Bennett and Martin 1998 (19) J Organiz Behav 131 at 133 note that “the concept of 
contextual procedural justice can be found ... in terms of individuals’ perceptions of ... justice”. See 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen [1996] 2 All SA 379 (A) at 387 – 377; Moropane v 
Gilbeys Distillers & Vinterns (Pty) Ltd 1997 (10) BLLR 1320 (LC); Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 
1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 113; Komane v Fedsure 1998 (2) BLLR 215 (CCMA); Cohen 2005 (17) SA 
Merc LJ 32 at 33, 36 and 46. 
1237
 See Cohen 2005 (17) SA Merc LJ 32 at 36; Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, Gallant v CIM Deltak 1986 (7) 
ILJ 346 (IC) at 357; Cornelius v Howden Africa Ltd t/a M & B Pumps 1998 (19) ILJ 921 (CCMA). Cf Aram 
and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1238
 Cohen 2005 (17) SA Merc LJ 32. See Molelane Toyota v CCMA 1999 (6) BLLR 555 (LC) at 560. Cf 
Mondi Timber Products v Tope 1997 (3) BLLR 263 (LAC). 
1239
 See Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 (8) BLLR 699 (SCA) at par 4; Du Toit 2008 
(125) SALJ 95 at 96 – 97.  
1240
 Context is determined in terms of social perspective, which implies that procedural fairness must be 
variable as its dynamics can affect multiple individuals in distinguishable situations that cannot be 
understood in terms of any one meaning. Cf Mossholder, Bennett and Martin 1998 (19) J Organiz Behav 
131 at 133. 
1241
 See Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1242
 Cohen 2005 (17) SA Merc LJ 32 at 46. See also Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v 
Komjwayo 1992 (13) ILJ 573 (LAC) at 587; Hauser v Partnership in Advertising (Pty) Ltd 1994 (11) BLLR 
36 (IC) at 39; Olivier v Foschini Group Ltd 1995 (8) BLLR 102 (IC) at 110 – 111. 
1243
 Cohen 2005 (17) SA Merc LJ 32 at 35. See Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 
(LAC) at 115. 
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justice is done, but also that justice is perceived to be done in the eyes of society.1244 It 
is due to this perception that participation is a crucial ingredient of procedural 
fairness.1245  
In the employment context, procedural fairness aims to promote industrial peace.1246 
Three reasons have been identified for the incorporation of the general idea of due 
process in the field of employment: practical necessity, normative perspective and 
theory of participation.1247 Practical justification is found in the fact that the maintenance 
of procedural fairness outside the courtroom creates “a fair and less costly means of 
resolving disputes”.1248 The fact that “the concept of due process [lies] at the heart of 
the law of governance”,1249 which transcends the public/private law divide, forms the 
basis of normative justification.1250 Through the theory of participation, due process 
brings a ‘voice’ to the employment relationship “as a type of feedback from employees 
and thus as a mechanism of recuperation and adaptation”.1251 The theory of 
participation emphasises the importance of the promotion of dialogue, a core value of 
procedural fairness and a shared ideal of both labour and administrative law. The 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process grants individuals “a sense of 
control, participation and accordingly significance and worth”.1252 It endorses the 
                                            
1244
 In De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) at par 131, Mokgoro J highlighted the foundational 
design and important purpose of procedural fairness. See also Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The 
Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1245
 See also Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 201; 
Mossholder, Bennett and Martin 1998 (19) J Organiz Behav 131 – 132; Kotze v Rebel Discount Liquor 
Group (Pty) Ltd 2000 (2) BLLR 138 (LAC) at par 145 per Conradie JA. 
1246
 See Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 115. 
1247
 See Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1248
 Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1249
 Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1250
 In overcoming the divide, the normative justification allows for the transition and synergy of norms 
with a similar rationale in both spheres, where the promotion of justice requires it. See Aram and 
Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. 
1251
 Aram and Salipante 1981 (6) The Academy of Management Review 197 at 198. Quinot 2007 (8) ESR 
Review 25 at 27 presents a similar view of the theory of participation in the context of administrative law. 
1252
 Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg 
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constitutional value of dignity.1253 When it comes to the possibility of an employee losing 
his or her job, labour law recognises that the “employee is entitled to be treated with 
respect ... and to emerge from the process with some semblance of dignity”.1254 
Dialogue, as a dignity informed value of procedural fairness, calls for an element of 
transparency.1255 Although formalism is to be avoided, the codification of the existing 
administrative and labour law procedural fairness perspective promotes the idea of 
transparency, as it increases participation and confidence in the process through the 
provision of adequate notice and sufficient information.1256 The idea of transparency 
operates against arbitrary action and decisions.1257 Without the element of transparency 
as a component of procedural fairness, the capricious exercise of discretion results in 
unfair conduct and decisions.1258 Through its acceptance and specialised 
contextualisation of the principles of natural justice, labour law acknowledges the 
beneficial element of transparency in countering unfair procedural conduct. However, 
unlike administrative law, labour law does not frequently give express recognition to the 
element of transparency. The consideration of transparency is rather implied when 
evaluating the procedural fairness of an employment decision. 
                                                                                                                                            
v City of Johannesburg Case No: CCT 24/07 at par 136. See also Quinot 2007 8(1) ESR Review 25 at 
26. Nedelsky 1989 Yale LJ & Feminism 7 at 27 emphasises this rationale. 
1253
 In Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 627, Sachs 
J emphasised the importance of this dialogue element in the promotion of the value of dignity. 
Mossholder, Bennett and Martin 1998 (19) J Organiz Behav 131 embrace the dialogue-dignity 
understanding of procedural fairness. See also Quinot 2007 (8) ESR Review 25 at 27 for a discussion of 
this perspective of procedural fairness as endorsed by administrative law. 
1254
 OCGAWU v Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd 2001 (12) BLLR 1358 (LC) at par 93. This is equally true of 
the rationale for substantive fairness. See Chapters, part 3 1. 
1255
 Jacobs Regulatory Reform in the Netherlands 125 identifies transparency as a component of 
procedural fairness, as it “is essential to establishing a stable and accessible regulatory environment that 
… ensures against undue influence by special interests”. 
1256
 See Ginsburg and Chen Administrative Law and Governance in Asia 108. Cf Jacobs Regulatory 
Reform in the Netherlands 125. 
1257
 Such action is regarded as unfair from both a labour and administrative law perspective. See 
Ginsburg and Chen Administrative Law and Governance in Asia 108. 
1258
 See Ginsburg and Chen Administrative Law and Governance in Asia 108. 
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The procedural fairness elements of dialogue and transparency require that an 
employee be granted an opportunity to be heard before a decision that adversely 
affects him/her is taken. This perspective gives expression to the LRA objective of 
industrial peace.1259 It carries no weight that a hearing might not make any difference to 
the employee’s fate.1260  
In short, the importance of procedural fairness resides in the fact that it “facilitates the 
reasonable realisation of other (substantive) rights ... [and is] a central element of both a 
priori design ... and of ex post facto scrutiny, when courts constitutionally assess … 
state action”1261 as associated with public employment decisions. As such, the absence 
of a hearing amounts to “a manifest failure of natural justice”.1262 This fact is 
emphasised by the administrative law perspective of procedural fairness that gives 
expression to the core values as set out above. 
3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 
A brief overview of the administrative law understanding of procedural fairness is 
necessary to identify the general rules associated with this dimension of fairness, to 
allow for a comparison with the labour law perspective. Chapter Three illustrates that 
these rules function at de jure (macro) level within the realm of general administrative 
                                            
1259
 See Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 115. 
1260
 See Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 37; Yichiho Plastics (Pty) Ltd v Muller 
1994 (15) ILJ 593 (LAC) at 603; Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 113 – 
115; Quinot 2007 (8) ESR Review 25 at 27.  
1261
 Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg 
v City of Johannesburg Case No: CCT 24/07 at par 141. This illustrates the close link between the de 
facto contextualised substantive and procedural dimensions of fairness. Brassey 1990 (11) ILJ 213 at 218 
explains: “The reason for dismissal determines the form of the process – enquiry or consultation – and 
shapes its content; without a reason, the form would be amorphous and the content empty. And of 
course, having fixed on the reason, the employer is bound to it as a justification for that dismissal; were it 
otherwise, were he subsequently permitted to rely on some other reason, the due process requirement 
would become a dead letter.” 
1262
 Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 114. 
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law and gain a specific de facto dimension when applied in specialised fields, such as 
labour law. 
At de jure level, the audi alteram partem principle requires proper, reasonable and 
timeous notice, disclosure of sufficient information, an opportunity to be heard and 
reasons for the administrative decision.1263 Where justified by the circumstances of a 
dispute, the right to representation forms part of the cluster of considerations that give 
expression to the audi alteram partem principle.1264  
The constitutional right to just administrative action reflects a broad understanding of 
the natural justice principles, and finds expression in the flexible approach encapsulated 
in s 3 of PAJA that codifies the macro-level sub-rules of procedural fairness.1265 While 
the meaning of administrative action within the context of s 3(1) is controversial,1266 it is 
                                            
1263
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 321. The focus of Chapter Five includes a discussion of 
the right to reasons, due to its close proximity to the right to adequate reasons. The other general 
components of audi alteram partem will be analysed in this chapter.  
1264
 Where an individual is not allowed an opportunity to present his side in circumstances where a 
decision carries the potential to adversely affect the rights and interests of the individual, a violation of the 
audi alteram partem principles occurs. See Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 
(SCA) at par 25; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 331. 
1265
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 330; Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) at par 
28 per Jafta AJ. 
1266
 Section 1 of PAJA qualifies the s 33 concept of administrative action. Although s 3 of PAJA refers to 
that concept, the scope thereof is controversial. Cf Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public 
Works 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA) per Nugent JA; Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 
(CC) at paras 29, 31 and 35 per Jafta AJ and paras 125 and 126 per O’Regan ADCJ. Hoexter 
Administrative Law 359 argues that s 3 introduces a contradiction. Although s 1 of PAJA is by no means 
an example of great drafting technique, its place as the definition-clause cannot be ignored. In contrast to 
s 1 that only focuses on possible rights-infringements, s 3 sets standards for procedural fairness where 
both rights and legitimate expectations of individuals are adversely affected. As such, s 3 of PAJA can be 
interpreted as widening the restrictive perspective of s 1, when dealing with procedural fairness. 
Academics however admit to the possibility of a contrary restrictive perspective of the procedural fairness 
provision. For academic proposals as to a solution for this apparent conflict, see Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 113 and 217, Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 93, De Ville Judicial Review 222 – 223 
and Hoexter Administrative Law 359. The judiciary, in avoiding a declaration of unconstitutionality of 
certain PAJA provisions in the light of such conflict and controversy, unfortunately still jump through 
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undeniable that s 3(2) “provides for certain minimum requirements of procedural 
fairness in s 3”1267 as the basic standard for fairness. There may however be 
circumstances where these minimum requirements will be insufficient.1268 In such 
circumstances, contextual adaptability is endorsed by the fact that s 3(5) of PAJA allows 
for procedural provisions in another empowering provision1269 to be followed, as long as 
it can be regarded as fair within the general nature of the principle.1270 Section 3(5) is a 
legislative acknowledgment that there is no set generic procedural fairness formula.1271 
This permissible ‘difference’ does however not necessarily allow for a choice that 
disregards the minimum core in s 3(2).1272 What is certain is that the choice should not 
amount to less protection than would be the norm,1273 and what would constitute the 
norm will depend on the circumstances of the case.1274  
                                                                                                                                            
interpretative hoops to read the Act in an acceptable manner until such time as Parliament decides to 
address the conflict and controversy. 
1267
 Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 par 14. The minimum requirements are stipulated in s 3(2): adequate notice of proposed 
administrative action; reasonable opportunity to make representation; clear statement of administrative 
action; adequate notice of the right of review or appeal and adequate notice of the right to request 
reasons. See also Hoexter Administrative Law 332 – 338.  
1268
 See Plasket Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 15; Harksen v DPP [2002] 1 All SA 284 (C). 
1269
 Hoexter Administrative Law 344 points out that the inclusion of an agreement within the definition of 
empowering provision, “allows also for contractual freedom to stipulate the requirements of fairness in 
individual cases”. However, this cannot be regarded as “the contractual waiver or exclusion of fairness: 
the procedure must still be ‘fair’ even though it may be ‘different’”.  
1270
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 344. 
1271
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 344. This provision is an important contribution, if read as a method 
to circumvent administrators from merely upholding the appearance of even-handed behaviour in 
resorting to s 3(2) as a checklist, as Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 365 emphasises: “It is certain that 
someone who is biased or determined to take a particular course of action will often bend over backwards 
to appear even-handed or indeed well-disposed. It would be sad if the sole effect of the growth of fairness 
was a proliferation of manuals written to help officials clothe their decisions in the garb of fairness.” 
1272
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 344. Grey 1982 (27) McGill LJ 360 at 365 explains that even a 
minimum requirement for fairness “is necessarily fluid and variable”. 
1273
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 344. 
1274
 This approach is clearly articulated in s 3(2)(a) of PAJA.  
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The decision maker cannot constantly switch between the ‘different’ procedure and s 
3(2) of PAJA.1275 This is of particular importance in disciplinary procedures affecting 
public employees. If a specific disciplinary code, stipulating specific procedures, is in 
place, the State (as employer) cannot take away comprehensive protection found in the 
code in favour of s 3(2) when disciplinary procedures commence.1276 This approach is 
in line with the idea that the concept of procedural fairness is relative.1277 At de jure 
level, general administrative law therefore adopts “a broader general test of fairness”1278 
adaptable to the demands of every context in which it regulates power relationships.1279 
The principles are also contextualised at the de facto level, with due regard to 
workplace specific (non-rigid) disciplinary codes that outline preferred disciplinary 
procedures.1280 
The interest of the affected individual must be balanced in relation to the decision by the 
empowered decision-maker in the administrative relation. The acknowledgment of 
interests at play in a legal relationship is the equation-tool by which the general rules of 
fairness translates into the contextually required equity standard of the applicable de 
jure level principles and procedures.1281 A set list of interests that qualify for the 
protection of procedural fairness cannot be predetermined in a formalistic manner.1282  
                                            
1275
 There must be some degree of certainty and consistency. Furthermore, the fair alternative within the 
circumstances must grant similar or more extensive protection than that found in s 3(2) of PAJA. This is 
evident from the judgment of Plasket J POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 
(E) at par 71. 
1276
 See Denel (Pty) Ltd v Venter 2004 (25) ILJ 659 (SCA) at par 15 per Nugent JA. See also Hoexter 
Administrative Law 344. 
1277
 See Perritt Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 11–88. The judiciary has accepted that the de jure 
level constitutional perspective of procedural fairness recognises “the need for flexibility in the application 
of the principles of fairness in a range of different contexts”, as explained in Chairman, Board on Tariffs 
and Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) at par 14. 
1278
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 333. 
1279
 This administrative law perspective of procedural fairness is jurisprudentially endorsed by Corbett CJ 
in Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (4) BCLR 531 (A) at 544. 
1280
 See Perritt Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 11–88. 
1281
 See Van Huyssteen v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C) at 
1213; De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) at par 153. The specific interests of the parties to 
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The labour law approach to unfair labour practices (as found in the context of 
promotions, demotions and suspension)1283 and dismissals on the ground of 
misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements provides a specialised (pre-
determined) context for the application of the test for procedural fairness, also 
associated with administrative law.1284 
4 LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Although the application of the rule is firmly established in both labour and 
administrative law,1285 there is no fixed formula for adherence to the audi alteram 
partem rule in either.1286 Labour law has adapted the rules of procedural fairness to 
specialised and probable unfair labour practice and unfair dismissal scenarios.1287 
However, labour law does not regard specialisation as judicial licence to interpret 
procedural guidelines as set rules.1288 
                                                                                                                                            
the employment relationship informs the de facto level contextualisation that provides a complementary 
understanding to the general de jure level idea of procedural fairness. 
1282
 See Van Huyssteen v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C) at 
1214; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 332. 
1283
 As acknowledged in Chapter Five, there are other examples of unfair labour practices, but the 
evaluation focuses specifically on these three examples, because employers are confronted with 
considerations of promotions, demotions and suspensions on a regular basis in practice. These forms of 
labour practices allow for a good comparative basis. 
1284
 Cf Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) at par 14; Burns and 
Beukes Administrative Law 333. 
1285
 See Chapter Two, parts 2 3 and 3 5 for a discussion of the role of the audi alteram partem rule from a 
traditional common law, as well as a regulatory contemporary, perspective. See Modise v Steve’s Spar 
Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at paras 16 and 17 per Zondo AJP; Cf Administrator, Transvaal v 
Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A); Chapter Three, part 2 1 2. 
1286
 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission v Du Preez 1996 (3) SA 997 (C) at 1008. 
1287
 In Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 126, the Labour Appeal Court 
admitted as much in stating that the legislation and codes in place “have, to a large degree, been distilled 
from the practice of the previous 15 years”. 
1288
 See Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd 1997 (10) BLLR 1320 (LC) at 1324; 
Molelane Toyota v CCMA 1999 (6) BLLR 555 (LC) at 560; NCBAWU v Masinga 2000 (2) BLLR 171 (LC); 
Eddels SA (Pty) Ltd v Sewcharan 2000 (9) BLLR 1038 (LC); Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 321; 
  
 
226 
When determining whether a decision amounts to an unfair labour practice or unfair 
dismissal, equity demands consideration of the procedural dimension of fairness as a 
pragmatic manifestation of the principles of natural justice.1289 When dealing with 
dismissal for misconduct,1290 incapacity1291 or operational reasons,1292 procedural 
fairness is a standard requirement in all three instances. The difference lies in the fact 
that the objective that contextually informs the procedural dimension of fairness 
associated with these three grounds of dismissal differs. Contextual pragmatic 
considerations similarly determine whether employment decisions (that do not result in 
dismissal) amount to unfair labour practices.1293 However, the mere fact that an 
employee has a right to be heard, does not guarantee the result that the employee 
desires.1294   
4 1 Transparency: Notification and Sufficient Information 
Transparency of the dispute resolution process is an important component of 
procedural fairness and finds expression in the requirement of adequate notice and 
sufficient information, as it renders the process open, gives an affected individual a 
voice and limits the abuse of power.1295 A dispute resolution process that ignores the 
requirements of adequate notice and sufficient information ignores the constitutional 
principles of openness, transparency, accountability and fairness.1296  
                                                                                                                                            
Cohen 2005 (17) SA Merc LJ 32 at 35 – 36. Cf the expression of the natural justice tenets in the ILO 
Convention 158 of 1982. 
1289
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 58; Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v 
NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC). 
1290
 See items 4 – 5 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
1291
 See item 8 and 10 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
1292
 See s 189 of the LRA. 
1293
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 58. 
1294
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 58. This is reconcilable with the 
administrative law idea that it is not for the court to substitute the employer’s decision for what it regards 
to be the best decision; it must merely regulate power relationships to facilitate fair decisions. 
1295
 See Stiglitz and Charlton Fair trade for all 82. 
1296
 See Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC) at par 25. Cf 
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province [1997] 4 All SA 363 (Ck). The public 
  
 
227 
In a constitutional context, transparency gives expression to procedural fairness as 
interactional justice.1297 Although not always expressly identified as requirements in 
pursuit of transparency, labour law gives expression to the adequate notice and 
sufficient information ideals. The Code of Good Conduct: Dismissal, for example, calls 
on employers to notify employees of anticipated disciplinary steps, as well as relevant 
information.1298 The judiciary has confirmed that the considerations underlying 
transparency must be of an adequate and sufficient standard,1299 and acknowledged 
that (akin to the administrative law perspective) it is possible for a fresh procedure to 
cure the transparency deficiencies of the initial process.1300 
4 1 1 Unfair Labour Practices 
4 1 1 1 Promotion 
Procedural fairness demands adherence to applicable procedure when an employer 
considers the promotion of an employee.1301 The employer must be transparent about 
the preferred policy and criteria that regulate the selection process.1302 Knowledge of 
this nature will empower an employee who wants to challenge any irregularities, for 
example, where an employer without good reason departs from a set practice,1303 the 
                                                                                                                                            
administration focussed s 195(1)(g) of the Constitution identifies the link between transparency and 
timely, accessible and accurate information. 
1297
 Van der Bank, Engelbrecht and Strümpher 2008 (6) SAJHRM 1 at 2 explain that “[i]nteractional 
justice refers to the thoroughness of the information provided (i.e. informational justice)”. 
1298
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 336. 
1299
 See Union of Pretoria Municipal Workers v Stadsraad van Pretoria 1992 (13) ILJ 1563 (IC); Korsten v 
MacSteel (Pty) Ltd 1996 (8) BLLR 1015 (IC); Van Eyk v Minister of Correctional Services 2005 (27) ILJ 
1706 (LC); Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 336. 
1300
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–15. 
1301
 Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–15 explain that the procedure, in terms of which 
such a decision is considered, may originate in “legislation, a collective agreement, company policy or an 
established practice”. 
1302
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 190.  
1303
 See NUTESA v Technikon Northern Transvaal 1997 (4) BLLR 467 (CCMA). See also Basson et al 
Essential Labour Law 190. 
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promotion strategy is changed retrospectively,1304 the selection panel is improperly 
composed1305 or the minimum requirement is reduced after application time has 
lapsed.1306 Transparency requires real and not just superficial information sharing.1307 
4 1 1 2 Demotion 
Transparency is a particularly important element of procedural fairness where a 
decision has a disciplinary character. A demotion is an example of such a decision that 
carries the potential to constitute an unfair labour practice.1308 Due to its disciplinary 
character, labour law requires that the same procedural approach to fairness be 
adopted with demotions as is associated with dismissals: An employer must inform an 
employee of the possible realisation of a decision and the reasons therefore.1309 
Transparency requires an employer provide an employee with sufficient information and 
promotes effective participation in the dialogue stage for all the affected parties.1310 
4 1 1 3 Suspension  
Suspension is another employment decision that is classifiable as an unfair labour 
practice if not approached in a transparent manner. The dialogue element of procedural 
fairness in the context of a suspension decision does not require an employer to grant 
                                            
1304
 See NUTESA obo Members v Border Technikon 2005 (12) BALR 1302 (CCMA). See also Du Toit et 
al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–19. 
1305
 See Van Rensburg v Northern Cape Provincial Administration 1997 (18) ILJ 1421 (CCMA). See also 
Basson et al Essential Labour Law 190.  
1306
 See PSA obo Van Zyl v Department of Correctional Services 2008 (29) ILJ 215 (BCA). See also Du 
Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–19. 
1307
 In IMATU/Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council 1999 (12) BALR 1459 (IMSSA), an employee who 
was affected by a non-promotion decision was found to be the victim of an unfair labour practice because 
he, on enquiry as to the reason for being overlooked, received only a cryptic reply without substantive 
reason for the preference of the successful candidate. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair 
Labour Practices 57. 
1308
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20.  
1309
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20; TOWU obo Malan v Commuter Handling 
Services (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) BALR 327 (CCMA). A decision to demote an employee will be fair if mitigating 
factors exist in circumstances that would usually justify dismissal.  
1310
 Adherence to the dialogue stage is also required for a procedurally fair dismissal. See part 4 1 2. 
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an employee a hearing before a decision to dismiss.1311 It does call for the employer to 
inform the employee of the suspension (including the reasons for and the terms and 
conditions of the suspension)1312 and afford the employee the opportunity to influence 
the decision. 
4 1 2 Unfair Dismissal 
4 1 2 1 Conduct 
Transparency is a key ingredient for procedural fairness in the context of misconduct 
dismissals, as an employee has the right to be informed of the nature of the alleged 
misconduct and the pertinent details of the charges.1313 Absence of such information 
can render a hearing procedurally defective.1314 Transparency, as an element of the 
required fair play, is also evident in the standard idea that an individual should receive 
timely notice of the proceedings.1315 The degree of transparency, so understood, is 
                                            
1311
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 194. 
1312
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 194. 
1313
 The disclosure does not call for the precision of criminal charges, but must clearly indicate which 
rules have allegedly been violated. The charges are usually presented in writing and an employer must 
read and explain the charges to an illiterate employee. Such disclosure usually accompanies the 
notification of the disciplinary hearing. In Korsten v MacSteel (Pty) Ltd 1996 (8) BLLR 1015 (IC), the 
Industrial Court explained that the required information allows for proper preparation by the employee to 
utilise the opportunity to state his or her case. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 126; Cameron 
1988 (9) ILJ 147 at 153; Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases Sch8–12; Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 335; Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 
(A) at 652; Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, Gallant v CIM Deltak 1986 (7) ILJ 346 (IC) at 357; Ndindwa v 
Mnquma Local Municipality [2003] JOL 11026 (Tk) at par 5. 
1314
 Practice dictates that an employer must not only inform an employee of the details of the charges, but 
also of the surrounding facts. However, procedural fairness merely requires the disclosure of information 
comprehensive enough to enable the employee to determine the basis of the allegations against him or 
her. See Turner v Jockey Club South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 (A); MAWU v Transvaal Processed Nuts, 
Bolts and Rivets (Pty) Ltd 1988 (9) ILJ 129 (IC); Basson et al Essential Labour Law 126; Cameron 1988 
(9) ILJ 147 at 153; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 335. Cf Bassett v 
Servistar (Pty) Ltd 1987 (8) ILJ 503 (IC).  
1315
 Notification includes the date, time and place of the hearing. The employee must be given fair time to 
prepare a response to the allegations for the disciplinary hearing. See Administrator, Transvaal v 
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determined according to the circumstances and complexity of the case, as well as the 
particularity of the charges.1316  
This shared administrative and labour law transparency-perspective is emphasised by 
the phrasing of s 3(2)(b)(i) of PAJA1317 and item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal.1318 In POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Service,1319 Plasket J elaborated 
on the shared transparency perspective by relying on s 3(2)(b)(i) to determine whether 
the notice given in a collective labour context could be described as adequate. In casu, 
the Department of Correctional Services sent a letter to striking public employees 
stating that that they faced dismissal due to their unauthorised absence and gross 
insubordination.1320 The Department stated that the employees facing dismissal had 48 
hours to make representation as to why their services should not be terminated, in 
absence of which their dismissal would become official.1321 Plasket J reasoned that, 
regardless of the attempt to grant the employees an opportunity to state their case, 48 
hours could not be said to constitute adequate notice as contemplated by s 3(2)(b)(i) of 
PAJA.1322 
Adequate notice however requires a balanced approach: the employee deserves a 
reasonable time to prepare his or her case, but the disciplinary hearing must take place 
                                                                                                                                            
Theletsane 1991 (2) SA 192 (A); Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 322; Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 284.  
1316
 See FAWU v BB Bread (Pty) Ltd 1987 (8) ILJ 704 (IC); Ndindwa v Mnquma Local Municipality [2003] 
JOL 11026 (Tk) at par 7; Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume One 193; Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 284; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour 
Practices 335. 
1317
 Section 3(2)(b)(i) of PAJA requires adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed action. 
See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 225. 
1318
 Item 4(1) requires that the employee be notified of the allegations using a form and language that the 
employee can reasonably understand. Although neither s 3 nor item 4(1) makes express reference to the 
disclosure of information, the absence of express wording makes no difference, as fairness from both an 
administrative and labour law perspective calls for a contextual evaluation. See Hoexter Administrative 
Law 334. 
1319
 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E). 
1320
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 14. 
1321
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 14. 
1322
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 73.  
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without unreasonable delay.1323 These two seemingly contradictory reasonableness 
requirements are in fact reconcilable, as an employer will not waive his or her right to 
institute disciplinary action if it is delayed due to an employee’s request for adequate 
time to prepare.1324 
4 1 2 2 Capacity 
As the concept of fairness is variable in nature, the guidelines for procedural fairness 
are not set in stone.1325 Generally, when the poor work performance of employees are 
at issue, procedural fairness requires an employer to inform the “poor performers of 
their deficiencies and to give them an opportunity to improve with proper assistance and 
guidance”.1326 Proper notification, as one of the rules of procedural fairness, calls on an 
employer to warn an employee prior to action being taken.1327 A clear initial warning 
serves the purpose of informing the employee of his or her underperformance and 
subsequent monitoring.1328 If, after appropriate assistance and reasonable opportunity 
to improve, the employee is still underperforming, the employer must issue a final 
warning to inform the employee of the continued deficiency and a pending hearing.1329 
                                            
1323
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 336. In Department of Public 
Works, Roads and Transport v Motshoso 2005 (10) BLLR 957 (LC), a three-year delay of a disciplinary 
hearing was held to be unreasonable. 
1324
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 336 – 337. 
1325
 Preliminary requirements such as the initial warning of a risk of dismissal, may be overlooked in 
cases where incapacity manifests itself as gross incompetence, results in serious consequences, 
attaches to an employee that is incapable or unwilling to change, or holds the position of a senior 
manager. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 415. 
1326
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 414. Items 8 and 9 of the Code of 
Good Practice: Dismissal emphasises the inherently adaptable requirements for a procedurally fair 
dismissal on the ground of poor work performance. The specialised contextual test for a reasonable 
opportunity and assistance, as found in item 8, is an objective one. See Basson et al Essential Labour 
Law 136 – 139; Du Toit Labour Law through the Cases Sch8–26; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 414 – 416; Gostelow v Datakor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Corporate Copilith 1993 
(14) ILJ 171 (IC); Schreuder v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit 1999 (20) ILJ 1936 (LC). 
1327
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 415; Visser v Safair Freighters 
(Edms) Bpk 1989 (10) ILJ 529 (IC). 
1328
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 415. 
1329
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 417. 
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Even though a dismissal on the ground of poor work performance is regarded as a no 
fault dismissal, the hearing that precedes such a decision takes the form of a 
disciplinary hearing for misconduct.1330 In the absence of the disciplinary element, 
hearings of this nature are rather termed incapacity inquiries.1331 
4 1 2 3 Operational Requirements 
The LRA maintains procedural transparency in the context of dismissals on the ground 
of operational requirements, by requiring employers to issue employees with written 
notices of their contemplated retrenchment. Section 189 of the LRA gives the 
impression that an employer should offer this written notice in a singular document that 
relays “all relevant information”.1332 
If consultation in the context of operational requirements is to be adequate and fair, the 
employees (and their representatives) cannot be “kept in the dark about the facts that 
have led the employer to conclude that retrenchment is necessary”.1333 Transparency in 
the procedure will be lacking unless the employees and their representatives have 
received “sufficient information to appraise or challenge the employer’s proposals or to 
formulate alternatives”.1334 The dialogue requirement will be ineffective if not all relevant 
information is disclosed in writing.1335 However, the employees are not entitled to 
unlimited information regarding the operation of the employer’s business, but only 
relevant information.1336 
                                            
1330
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 417. See also Du Toit Labour Law 
through the Cases Sch8–26. 
1331
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 417 explains that incapacity inquiries 
are aimed at establishing “whether the employee is capable of attaining an acceptable standard of work”. 
1332
 Section 189(3) of the LRA gives an indication of what evidence may be regarded as relevant. See 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 452. 
1333
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 464. 
1334
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 464. 
1335
 See s 189(3) of the LRA. Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 464 notes 
that only then can a fair degree of transparency be said to be present, as all parties will be able to “make 
informed representations and suggestions on the subjects for mandatory consultation”. 
1336
 Relevance is contextually determined in terms of the facts of every specific case. Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 464 explains that relevance along with “adequacy must be 
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4 2 Dialogue: Opportunity to make Representation 
The de jure level administrative law perspective of the audi alteram partem rule 
emphasises that the facilitation of dialogue is central to the promotion of procedural 
fairness.1337 Prior to the Constitution, much of the Industrial Court’s jurisprudence 
focussed on the protection of private sector employees’ right to be heard.1338 
Consequently, labour law also views the audi alteram partem rule as a “rudimentary 
principle of work-place justice”1339 that endorses dialogue through participation.1340 
Procedural fairness of this nature relates to both fair labour practices and just 
administrative action, as constitutionally protected in ss 23 and 33.1341 Procedural 
fairness, so understood, gives expression to interactional justice, as it refers to 
                                                                                                                                            
measured against the intended purposes for which the information is requested”. Cf Atlantis Diesel 
Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 (1) BLLR 1 (A); NUMSA v Comark Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1997 (18) ILJ 516 
(LC); United People’s Union of SA v Grinaker Duraset 1998 (19) ILJ 107 (LC). 
1337
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 304. 
1338
 See Cameron 1988 (9) ILJ 147. Cf Transport and General Workers Union v S Bothma and Son 
Transport 1987 (8) ILJ 343 (IC); Whitcutt v Computer Diagnostics and Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1987 (8) ILJ 
356 (IC); Long v Chemical Specialities Tvl (Pty) Ltd 1987 (8) 523 (IC); King v Beacon Island Hotel 1987 
(9) ILJ 485 (IC); Kantolo v Super Rent (Cape) (Pty) Ltd t/a Connaught Motors and Super Rent Truck Hire 
1988 (9) ILJ 123 (IC). 
1339
 Building Construction and Allied Workers Union v E Rogers and C Buchel CC 1987 (8) ILJ 169 (IC) at 
176. 
1340
 As illustrated in Chapter Three, part 2 2 1 administrative law came to a similar pre-constitutional 
understanding, in equating the rules of natural justice (including audi alteram partem) with the duty to act 
fairly. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127; Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 52; Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 331. A vast number of labour cases have 
emphasised dialogue as associated with natural justice, by acknowledging the fact that an employee is 
entitled to a disciplinary hearing prior to his or her dismissal. See Cameron 1988 (9) ILJ 147 at 150; 
Transport and General Workers Union v S Bothma and Son Transport 1987 (8) ILJ 343 (IC) at 355; King 
v Beacon Island Hotel 1987 (8) ILJ 485 (IC) at 489 – 490; Long v Chemical Specialist Tvl (Pty) Ltd 1987 
(8) ILJ 523 (IC) at 534; Govender v MA Motala Lads Hostel 1987 (8) ILJ 809 (IC) at 812; Kantolo v Super 
Rent (Cape) (Pty) Ltd t/a Connaught Motors and Super Rent Truck Hire 1988 (9) ILJ 123 (IC) at 128. 
1341
 Both sections embrace procedural fairness in the pursuit of justice. See Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 320; Yates v University of Bophuthatswana 1994 (3) SA 815 (B) at 836. 
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interpersonal justice1342 (as supplement to informational justice)1343 by giving expression 
to the dignity of the affected individuals.1344 
Dialogue, through consultation and the opportunity to state one’s case, underpins this 
consensus-based approach to just dispute resolution.1345 Dialogue assists in the 
contextual evaluation of fairness by facilitating a judgment on the substantive elements 
of the case. If forces parties to comprehend that the justice of the outcome depends on 
the context, nature and scope of the issue in dispute.1346 
4 2 1 Individual Context 
The right to be heard or the right to make representation generally attracts the 
assumption of an oral hearing prior to a decision being taken.1347 There exists no 
justification for this assumption.1348 Constitutionally understood, it is however logical to 
deduce that the context of a case may render it unfair to hold a hearing in the absence 
                                            
1342
 Van der Bank, Engelbrecht and Strümpher 2008 (6) SAJHRM 1 at 2 define interactional justice “as 
the perceived fairness of the interpersonal treatment used to determined outcomes”. It refers to “the 
amount of dignity and respect … demonstrated when presenting an undesirable outcome”.  
1343
 Van der Bank, Engelbrecht and Strümpher 2008 (6) SAJHRM 1 at 2 explain that thoroughness of 
information provided determined the presence or absence of informational justice. 
1344
 See Van der Bank, Engelbrecht and Strümpher 2008 (6) SAJHRM 1 at 2. Jurisprudence stresses the 
need for a hearing before dismissal as an expression of interpersonal justice in both the common law and 
fair labour practice context. See Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 113. 
Cf Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 39 – 40; Zondi v Administrator, Natal 
1991 (12) ILJ 497 (A) at 505; Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo 1992 (13) 
ILJ 573 (LAC) at 587; Black Allied Workers Union v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Bluewaters Hotel 1993 (14) 
ILJ 963 (LAC) at 971. 
1345
 The idea of participation, as found in administrative law, gives practical effect to the dialogue 
component of procedural fairness. See Allan Constitutional Justice 77 – 78; Fishkin The Dialogue of 
Justice 128. Cf Valerie and Levi Trust and Governance 279. 
1346
 See Allan Constitutional Justice 80. 
1347
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 334; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 
336. 
1348
 There is also no common law right to appear in person at an oral hearing. See Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 323; Hoexter Administrative Law 334. 
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of a person or on written representation alone, as this would negate the rationale of the 
right to be heard.1349  
While administrative law has no general default position,1350 both labour and 
administrative law regard the real question to be whether an individual has been 
granted a real opportunity to state his or her case.1351 Ultimately, the equity-based 
question of representation depends on the context in which the question arises.1352 
4 2 1 1 Unfair Labour Practices 
4 2 1 1 1 Promotion 
Although the employee does not necessarily have a right to automatic promotion, a 
non-promotion decision does affect the interest of the employee.1353 Consequently, the 
procedural fairness dialogue element calls for the employer to inform the employee of 
the decision.1354 Dialogue is further emphasised by the fact that the employee can claim 
an opportunity to make representation, if a legitimate expectation of promotion 
                                            
1349
 See Currie and Klaaren Benchbook par 3.17; Hoexter Administrative Law 341 – 342; Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 339. Cf Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 
1996 (8) BCLR 1085 (T); Davies v Chairman, Committee of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1991 (4) 
SA 43 (W); Helderberg Butcheries (Stellenbosch) (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Valuation Court, Somerset West 
1977 (4) SA 99 (C). 
1350
 Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of PAJA support this common law perspective. Section 3(2)(b)(ii) 
acknowledges that a minimum standard of procedural fairness allows for a “reasonable opportunity to 
make representation”, while the opportunity to appear in person is recognised as an optional requirement 
in s 3(3)(c), as the opportunity to represent your case in writing may be sufficient in certain 
circumstances. PAJA therefore allows for the de jure contextual determination of the manner and form in 
which audi alteram partem can find expression. See Hoexter Administrative Law 334. 
1351
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 342; Barlin v Licensing Court for the Cape 1924 AD 472 at 480. 
1352
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 342. 
1353
 This is usually the case with employees in senior positions. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the 
Cases LRA 8–18. 
1354
 This was confirmed in PSA obo Badenhorst v Department of Justice 1999 (20) ILJ 253 (CCMA). The 
commissioner reasoned that the employee is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to promote his or her 
candidature. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–18. 
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exists.1355 However, the employer’s failure to adhere to the contextually informed 
standard of procedural fairness will not necessarily entitle the employee to an actual 
promotion.1356 
4 2 1 1 2 Demotion 
The judiciary has accepted that a decision to demote an employee, in the absence of an 
opportunity for that employee to state his or her case, amounts to a procedurally unfair 
labour practice.1357 Consultation and counselling is required prior to a decision to 
demote being implemented.1358 The employee is entitled to an opportunity to make 
representation.1359 In the absence thereof, the demotion can amount to an unfair labour 
                                            
1355
 Administrative and labour law recognise that a legitimate expectation is more than a spes and less 
than a right. It entitles the employee to be heard before an adverse decision is taken and can be said to 
be present if an express promise was made to an employee or a regular practice exists that would justify 
an expectation of promotion. An employer can therefore create a legitimate expectation of promotion 
through words or conduct. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 190; Du Toit Labour Law through the 
Cases LRA 8–18; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 58. Cf Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 at 943 – 944; PSA v Department of 
Correctional Services 1998 (7) BALR 854 (CCMA); Meyer v Iscor Pension Fund 2003 (5) BLLR 439 
(LAC). 
1356
 See National Commissioner of the SA Police Service v Basson 2006 (27) ILJ 614 (LC); Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 58 – 59. 
1357
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 59. 
1358
 See Van Niekerk v Medicross Health Care Group (Pty) Ltd 1998 (8) BALR 1038 (CCMA) at 1043; Du 
Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20. 
1359
 See Koopman v City of Cape Town 2005 (5) BALR 563 (CCMA); Du Toit et al Labour Law through 
the Cases LRA 8–21. 
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practice.1360 A fair demotion therefore requires both a fair reason and a fair 
procedure.1361 
4 2 1 1 3 Suspension 
Circumstances allowing, the employer must grant the employee and opportunity to be 
heard prior to him or her being suspended.1362 The opportunity to be heard does not 
necessarily translate into the employee being granted an oral hearing.1363 The 
employee must be granted the opportunity to make representation prior to a decision 
being taken,1364 as a suspension has an adverse impact on the future of the employee’s 
career as well as on his or her reputation.1365 Fairness further requires that the 
employer follow the relevant regulations, disciplinary code, or in the absence thereof, 
follow the general principles of natural justice.1366 The audi alteram partem principle 
cannot be overlooked.1367 The scope of the principle merely differs depending on 
whether the suspension is preventative or punitive in nature.1368 Where suspension has 
                                            
1360
 The Labour Appeal Court confirmed this in Van der Riet v Leisurenet t/a Health and Racquet Clubs 
1997 (6) BLLR 721 (LAC). See Du Toit Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20 and 8–21; Nxele v 
Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional Services 2008 (12) BLLR 
1179 (LAC). Cf SALSTAFF obo Vrey v Datavia 1999 (6) BALR 757 (IMSSA); Plaatjies v RK Agencies 
2005 (1) BALR 77 (CCMA). 
1361
 Cf Glass v University of Zuluand 2006 (4) BALR 388 (CCMA) where the commissioner found that the 
employer was not obligated to consult the employee as the disciplinary code made provision for demotion 
as a disciplinary measure. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–20.  
1362
 See SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO 2008 (8) BLLR 798 (LC) at par 39. 
1363
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 73. 
1364
 An opportunity to make representation after suspension would still be considered fair if the employer 
can be said to have an open mind. See Dladla v Council of Mbombela Local Municipality 2008 (8) BLLR 
751 (LC). 
1365
 See Muller v Chairman of the Ministers’ Council: House of Representatives 1991 (12) ILJ 761 (C); 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 74. 
1366
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 73. Cf Marcus v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2005 (26) ILJ 75 (SE). 
1367
 See Muller v Chairman of the Ministers’ Council: House of Representatives 1991 (12) ILJ 761 (C); 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 74. 
1368
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 74. Du Toit et al Labour Law 
through the Cases LRA 8–24 note that the same effect may result from both preventative and punitive 
suspension. Cf Ngwenya v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 2001 (8) BLLR 924 (LC). 
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a disciplinary character, the requirements for a fair hearing are the same as for an 
inquiry preceding a decision to dismiss on the ground of misconduct.1369 However, 
logically a full-scale inquiry is not necessary in the case of preventative suspension.1370 
In the case of a suspension pending a disciplinary hearing, a reasonable suspension 
period is required.1371 The mere fact that an inquiry is to follow does not imply that the 
audi alteram partem principle can be ignored.1372 In contrasts, a punitive suspension 
does require a formal hearing.1373 In short, the dialogue requirement will be adhered to 
if the investigation takes place in reasonable time, all relevant factors are taken into 
consideration and the employer informs the employee of the applicable process without 
undue delay.1374 
4 2 1 2 Unfair Dismissal 
4 2 1 2 1 Conduct 
The s 3(2) of PAJA codification of the general minimum standards of procedural 
fairness is mirrored in a specialised manner by item 4 of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal.1375 However, in giving expression to the nature of the value of fairness, 
neither item 4(1) nor s 3(2) stipulates exact form-guidelines for the expression of this 
                                            
1369
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 74; County Fair v CCMA 1998 (6) 
BLLR 577 (LC); South African Breweries Ltd (Beer Division) v Woolfrey 1999 (5) BLLR 525 (LC). Du Toit 
et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–25 explain that suspension without pay is only justified in 
circumstances where dismissal would be justified absent any mitigating factors. 
1370
 Procedural fairness in the context of preventative suspension calls for a misconduct inquiry within a 
reasonable time. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 73 – 74; Minister of 
Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council 2007 (5) BLLR 467 (LC). 
1371
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–25; Naidoo v Rudolph Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 
2008 (6) BALR 497 (NBCCI). 
1372
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–25. 
1373
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 8–25. Cf Ngwenya v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 
2001 (8) BLLR 924 (LC); Dladla v Council of Mbombela Local Municipality 2008 (8) BLLR 751 (LC). 
1374
 See Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government 1999 (8) BLLR 821 (LC) at par 17. 
1375
 See Webber v Fattis & Monis 1999 (20) ILJ 1150 (CCMA) at par 20. Item 4(1) requires that the 
employee be allowed the opportunity to present his or her case in response to the allegations made 
against him or her. 
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right, as the form the right to be heard takes on depends on the circumstances.1376 
Absent formalistic prescriptions, the form of dialogue that facilitates “reflection before 
any decision to dismiss”1377 is nevertheless regarded as an essential component for 
procedural fairness. As a disciplinary hearing for misconduct implies possible dismissal 
that affects the livelihood of the employee, the required dialogue gravitates towards 
personal appearance at the hearing.1378 However, if the employee is unreasonable in 
refusing to attend the hearing, the employer cannot be faulted for continuing with the 
enquiry in his or her absence.1379  
In line with the labour law perspective, PAJA does not regard the right to appear in 
person as a minimum core procedural fairness requirement.1380 The gravity of the issue 
dictates whether a formal hearing is required.1381 In labour law, this translates into the 
consideration of whether the rights and interests of the accused employee outweigh 
those of the employer and the other employees when considering the scope of the 
natural justice benefits in the particular circumstances of the dispute.1382 An employee 
must merely be granted a real opportunity to state his or her case and address any 
                                            
1376
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127 and 193. 
1377
 Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA 2006 (9) BLLR 833 (LC) at 841. 
1378
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 339 explains that “[a] disciplinary 
hearing held in the absence of the accused employee is generally unfair”. See also Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 323; Currie and Klaaren Benchbook par 3.17; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and 
Unfair Labour Practices 339; Hoexter Administrative Law 341 – 342. Cf Helderberg Butcheries 
(Stellenbosch) (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Valuation Court, Somerset West 1977 (4) SA 99 (C); Malapile v 
Germiston Ceramics and Potteries 1988 (9) ILJ 855 (IC); Davies v Chairman, Committee of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1991 (4) SA 43 (W); Fraser v Children’s Court Pretoria North 1996 (8) 
BCLR 1085 (T). 
1379
 Before the employer takes such action, a reasonable attempt must be made to determine an absent 
employee’s whereabouts. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 339 – 340 
for further discussion and examples of unreasonable absence. 
1380
 Section 3(3) of PAJA. Cf s 3(2) of PAJA. 
1381
 See South African Jewish Board of Deputies v Sutherland NO 2004 (4) SA 368 (W) at par 34; 
Hoexter Administrative Law 342. 
1382
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 341. 
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adverse evidence.1383 The employee must therefore comprehend the proceedings if he 
or she is fully to participate.1384 Although the right to state one’s case extends to 
participation, both labour and administrative law hold that it is the extent of this 
discretionary element of fairness, and not the element itself, that is less certain.1385 
Consequently, calling and cross-examining witnesses are not rights that form an 
inherent part of the natural justice rules.1386 Section 3(3) of PAJA allows the 
administrator to exercise his or her discretion in allowing the questioning of 
witnesses,1387 while item 4 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal does not provide 
any guidelines on the matter. Similarly, the chairperson has the discretion to determine 
whether the facts of the case call for cross-examination to be allowed in pursuit of 
workplace justice.1388 As such, neither labour nor administrative law recognises a 
general right to cross-examine or refute evidence. However, if the context of the case 
calls for such an opportunity in pursuit of fairness, the opportunity to cross-examine may 
be viewed as a necessary component of an individual’s real opportunity to respond.1389 
As the purpose of a hearing is to determine whether the employee is at fault, the 
presiding officer must evaluate the evidence and weigh up the respective perspectives 
of the employer and employee. In determining whether the employee is at fault, the 
presiding officer is required to evaluate the evidence presented.1390 If the presiding 
officer does not approach the evidence with an open mind, he or she will be open to 
                                            
1383
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 340; Jeffrey v Persetel (Pty) Ltd 
1996 (1) BLLR 67 (IC) at 79. Cf Baxter Administrative Law 553; Hoexter Administrative Law 340. 
1384
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 340. 
1385
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 340. Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 
340. 
1386
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 325. 
1387
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 325. 
1388
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127. 
1389
 The necessity of such an opportunity in the context of every individual case is the yardstick against 
which this discretionary element is measured from both a labour or administrative law perspective. 
Necessity is evaluated with due regard to what the interest of justice requires in a particular set of facts. 
For a discussion of the employment context implications, see Cameron 1988 (9) ILJ 147 at 156 and 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 341. Cf Hoexter Administrative Law 340. 
1390
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 344. 
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claims of bias.1391 The required absence of bias links to the duty to act in good faith.1392 
Any impression of bias is unacceptable, as the appearance of a fair procedure is just as 
important as an actual fair procedure.1393 
4 2 1 2 2 Capacity 
When it comes to a decision to dismiss an employee because of incapacity (whether 
due to poor work performance or ill health), procedural fairness demands that the 
affected employee be assessed and consulted.1394 The required assessment prior to a 
decision being taken enhances dialogue through consultation.1395 This fact was 
emphasised by the reasoning of the Industrial Court in Gostelow v Datakor Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Corporate Copilith,1396 where it was held that “without an assessment, any 
                                            
1391
 Both labour and administrative law recognise the rule against bias. See Burns and Beukes 
Administrative Law 320 – 321; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 344 – 345; 
Yates v University of Bophuthatswana 1994 (3) SA 815 (B) at 836. For further discussion on the rule 
against basis see Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo 1992 (13) ILJ 573 
(LAC) at 583, where the court quoted Cameron 1986 (7) ILJ 183 at 213. 
1392
 In the context of a disciplinary hearing, the presiding officer must act with the absence of bias for 
good faith to be present. See Hauser v Partnership in Advertising (Pty) Ltd 1994 (11) BLLR 36 (IC) at 39 
per Pio AM. Cf Kotze v Rebel Discount Liquor Group (Pty) Ltd 2000 (2) BLLR 138 (LAC) at par 45. In 
commenting on the trilogy of Appellate Division cases (Council of Review, South African Defence Force v 
Mönnig 1992 (3) SA 482 (A); BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers’ Union 
1992 (3) SA 673 (A); Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A)) 
in which the common law test for disqualifying bias was refined, the Labour Appeal Court in Mondi Timber 
Products v Tope 1997 (3) BLLR 263 (LAC) at 272 observed that “[w]hat emerges from these cases is that 
the test for disqualification is not actual bias but a reasonable apprehension of bias”. 
1393
 See Cameron 1986 (7) ILJ 183 at 213. 
1394
 See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases Sch 8–26 to Sch 8–27. The importance of dialogue 
was emphasised in Henn v Eskom 1996 (6) BLLR 747 (IC) at 761, with reference to Hendricks v 
Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co of SA Ltd 1994 (15) ILJ 304 (LAC). See also Old Mutual Group 
Schemes v Dreyer 1999 (20) ILJ 2030 (LAC) at 2031. 
1395
 In Davies v Clean Deals CC 1992 (13) ILJ 1230 (IC), it was confirmed that an employee is entitled to 
participate in such an investigation or assessment. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases Sch 
8–30. 
1396
 1993 (14) ILJ 171 (IC). The reasoning of the Industrial Court in this judgment is reflected in the criteria 
found in item 9(b) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. See Du Toit et al Labour Law through the 
Cases Sch 8–26. 
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judgment regarding the employee’s performance will be neither objective nor 
reasonable”.1397 
4 2 1 2 3 Operational Requirements 
The dialogue component of the fair procedure duty of the employer is higher in the case 
of operational requirement dismissals than dismissal for another reason.1398 Dismissal 
for operational requirements draws the dialogue requirement closer to the substantive 
dimension of fairness.1399 In this context, the dialogue component finds expression 
through consultation in good faith.1400 If the consultation-based dialogue component is 
lacking, fairness will be lacking.1401 Item 3 of the Code of Good Practice on Dismissals 
Based on Operational Requirements therefore calls for a consultation process that 
commences as soon as the employer contemplates reduction of the workforce by 
                                            
1397
 Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases Sch 8–26. This sentiment was echoed by the Labour 
Appeal Court in NUM v Libanon Gold Mining Co Ltd 1994 (15) ILJ 585 (LAC) at 586. See also See Du 
Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases Sch 8–27. 
1398
 See Chetty v Scotts Select A Shoe 1998 (19) ILJ 1465 (LAC) at par 24; Du Toit et al Labour Law 
through the Cases LRA 8–57. 
1399
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 156. In SACTWU v Discreto (A Division of Trump & 
Springbok Holdings) 1998 (12) BLLR 1228 (LAC) at par 8, Froneman DJP confirmed that it is difficult to 
draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural dimensions of fairness in the context of 
dismissal on the ground of operational requirements. See also De Bruin v Sunnyside Locksmith Supplies 
(Pty) Ltd 1999 (8) BLLR 761 (LC); Wheeler v Pretoria Propshaft Centre CC 1999 (11) BLLR 1213 (LC); 
Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1999 (20) ILJ 89 (LC); Broll Property Group (Pty) Ltd v Du Pont 
2006 (27) ILJ 269 (LAC). 
1400
 This is reflected in s 189(2) of the LRA, which calls for the consulting parties to partake in a process 
aimed at reaching consensus. The LRA however does not define ‘consultation’ in this specific context, but 
it is informed by the purpose behind s 189. Manamela 2006 (14) JBL 27 at 28 accordingly proclaims that 
“[p]rior consultation remains the crux of the procedural fairness of a dismissal based on operational 
requirements”. 
1401
 See Broll Property Group (Pty) Ltd v Du Pont 2006 (27) ILJ 269 (LAC) at par 26; Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 483. Manamela 2006 (14) JBL 27 at 28 explains that, for any 
substantive fairness to be present, the employer must meet the procedural consultation requirement “at 
the stage when a final decision to dismiss has not yet been reached but the possibility of dismissal has 
been foreseen”. 
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means of retrenchment.1402 According to the main purpose behind s 189 of the LRA is 
“to achieve a joint consensus”1403 through a “joint problem solving exercise”.1404 Thus, 
the dialogue process only has value when consultation takes place at the appropriate 
stage.1405 In facilitating dialogue to such an extent that it maintains an environment 
conducive to substantive fairness,1406 the procedural fairness required for operational 
dismissals also gives expression to the administrative law idea of participation.   
In the absence of an attempt to seek consensus, the reason for the non-compliance 
must be determined.1407 Scrutinising a consultation process to determine the presence 
or absence of procedural fairness is no easy task, as the LRA endorsed duty to consult 
“clearly goes beyond the employer simply having to give employees or their 
representative trade unions an opportunity to give advice or an opportunity to make 
representations”.1408 Adequate consultation is required.1409 
                                            
1402
 In Keil v Foodgro (A division of Leisurenet Ltd 1998 (12) BLLR 1228 (LAC) at par 10, it was confirmed 
that the dialogue requirement gains effect “through the constructive engagement implicit in this process ... 
[through which] the need to retrench is confirmed as well as the selection of those employees who are to 
be retrenched”. 
1403
 Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1999 (20) ILJ 89 (LC) at 96. See also Du Toit et al Labour Law 
through the Cases LRA 8–55; Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 (1) BLLR 1 (A); Alpha 
Plant and Services (Pty) Ltd v Simmonds 2001 (3) BLLR 261 (LAC). For consensus to be reached, 
consultation (as required by s 189(1) of the LRA) is necessary. 
1404
 Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 (1) BLLR 1 (A) at 6. 
1405
 See Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 (1) BLLR 1 (A) at 6. However, the Labour Court 
in Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1999 (20) ILJ 89 (LC) at 96 explained that a checklist approach 
to the requirements in s 189 of the LRA is not appropriate, as “[t]he proper approach is to ascertain 
whether the purpose of the section ... has been achieved”. See also Sikhosana v Sasol Synthetic Fuels 
2000 (1) BLLR 101 (LC) at 106. 
1406
 See Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1999 (20) ILJ 89 (LC) at 100. Cf Dhlamini v Faraday 
Wholesale Meat Supply 1999 (8) BLLR 771 (LC). 
1407
 Procedural fairness requires that consultation must take place, regardless of whether it is the 
employer’s perspective that it would make no difference to his or her ultimate decision. See SACTWU v 
Discreto (A Division of Trump & Springbok Holdings) 1998 (12) BLLR 1228 (LAC) at par 9; Johnson & 
Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1999 (20) ILJ 89 (LC) at 97; Du Toit et al Labour Law through the Cases LRA 
8–55 with reference to Whall v BrandAdd Marketing (Pty) Ltd 1999 (6) BLLR 626 (LC) at paras 24 – 25. 
1408
 CWIU v Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd 1997 (9) BLLR 1186 (LC) at 1201. 
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4 2 1 2 3 1 Large-scale retrenchment 
Section 189A of the LRA alters the content and scope of the dialogue component of 
operational requirement dismissals.1410 While the transparency requirement of notice 
remains unaltered regardless of the scale of the retrenchment, a facilitator may be 
appointed to assist with the promotion of participatory dialogue in the context of a large-
scale retrenchment.1411 In the event of such facilitation, the employer will only be 
allowed to retrench employees 60 days after notice of the contemplated retrenchments 
has been issued.1412 Thereafter employees have two options: embark on a protected 
strike or refer their dispute to the Labour Court.1413 If the Labour Court is approached, 
an order can be obtained “compelling the employer to comply with a fair procedure, 
restraining the employer from dismissing an employee before complying with a fair 
                                                                                                                                            
1409
 The Appellate Division in Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 (1) BLLR 1 (A) at 6 
explained that “[t]he scope and extent of the consultation may be attenuated in certain circumstances 
because of eg considerations of urgency or confidentiality or some equally compelling reason”. 
1410
 The aim of s 189A of the LRA is merely to see to it that open-dialogue in a fair procedure is ensured 
in the context of intended large-scale retrenchments prior to a decision to dismiss employees for 
operational reasons being finalised. Section 189A(1) indicates what constitutes a large scale 
retrenchment. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 448. 
1411
 Consensus-seeking facilitation must take place in terms of the time requirements set out in the 
applicable regulations promulgated by the Minister of Labour. See s 189A(3) of the LRA; Grogan 
Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 447. In the event that a facilitator is not appointed 
and notice of the intended retrenchments has been issued, the dispute may be referred to the CCMA 
within 30 days by any of the parties. See also s 189A(13) of the LRA. 
1412
 See s 189A(7) of the LRA; Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 447; NUM v 
De Beers Consolidated Mines 2006 (27) ILJ 1909 (LC). Cf Leoni Wiring Systems (East London) v 
NUMSA 2007 (28) ILJ 642 (LC). 
1413
 It is open to employees or their trade unions to apply to the Labour Court for an order compelling the 
employer to comply with a fair procedure during the consultation process. Employees can therefore 
compel an employer to give expression to the dialogue dimension of procedural fairness. Section 189A of 
the LRA grants employees and their trade unions an opportunity to utilise their collective power through 
the option of protected strikes, as well as recourse to the Labour Court. See Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 447. 
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procedure, directing the employer to reinstate an employee until it has complied with a 
fair procedure, or award compensation, if no other order is appropriate”.1414 
4 2 2 Collective Context 
A fair dismissal for strike participation calls for two procedural elements: a fair ultimatum 
and observance of the audi alteram partem rule.1415 A fair ultimatum requires that the 
employer clearly communicate what is demanded of the striking employees in a manner 
that is understood by the strikers, indicate when and where they must comply, indicate 
what the sanction will be if they fail to comply with the ultimatum, allow the striking 
employees the time to reflect and respond by either complying with or rejecting the 
ultimatum.1416 The communicated ultimatum should amount to a bona fide attempt by 
the employer to persuade employees to resume their work.1417 
Initially labour law viewed (unprotected) strikers as having waived their right to a pre-
dismissal hearing.1418 At that stage, a fair ultimatum alone was generally regarded 
sufficient to dismiss employees partaking in a strike in a procedurally fair manner,1419 as 
                                            
1414
 The option of approaching the Labour Court should be resorted to with caution, as the aim is not to 
stifle the consultation process if the employer is genuinely attempting to address any flaws or obstructions 
in the dialogue process. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 448. 
1415
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 533. The opinion that the 
employees deserve dismissal due to their actions does not warrant neglect of the procedural dimension 
of fairness, as procedural deficiencies can affect the substantive fairness of the dismissal. See S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at par 137 (per Chaskalson P) and par 331 (per O’Regan J); 
POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 79, 80, 81 and 83 per 
Plasket J. 
1416
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 535 – 537. Cf Performing Arts 
Council (Transvaal) v Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union 1992 (13) ILJ 1439 (LAC); Plaschem 
(Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 (14) ILJ 1000 (LAC); ICS Group t/a Dairybelle (Bloemhof) v National Union of 
Food Beverages Wine Spirits and Allied Workers Unions 1998 (19) ILJ (LAC); Ramotsepane v Barmot 
Truck Hire 2002 (6) BLLR 525 (LAC); NULAW v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2004 (25) ILJ 1469 (LC). 
1417
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 535 – 537. 
1418
 See Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at paras 19 and 93 per Zondo AJP. 
1419
 Cf the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, which also does not specifically provide that employers 
must comply with the audi alteram partem rule before dismissing illegal strikers. Therefore, no provision 
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the ultimatum would otherwise be ineffective.1420 In NUMSA v Malcomess Toyota (a 
division of Malbak Consumer Products (Pty) Ltd),1421 the Labour Court in fact reasoned 
that requiring a hearing after the dismissal of strikers “would be tantamount to the 
employer second-guessing its own decision”1422 without resolving the underlying 
issues.1423 
This initial stance did not leave the labour court unsympathetic to the plea of employees 
who did not partake in the strike out of free will, or who were absent due to illness 
during the time of the strike.1424 It was acknowledged that it would be reasonable to 
invite dismissed employees to, for example, show that they were intimidated to partake 
in the strike action,1425 but reasoned that it would be impractical to allow for individual 
hearings prior to the dismissal of strikers.1426 An exception however emerged in the 
form of the argument that “a hearing should nonetheless be given to the collective 
bargaining representative of the strikers and to those who bona fide believed that, as a 
result of whatever reason, their absence was justified”.1427  
                                                                                                                                            
for a hearing before dismissal is found in the Code when the dismissals of illegal strikers are under 
consideration. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 542. 
1420
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 543 - 544. Cf NUMSA v Fibre Flair 
CC t/a Kango Canopies 1999 (20) ILJ 1859 (LC).  
1421
 1999 (20) ILJ 1867 (LC). 
1422
 NUMSA v Malcomess Toyota (a division of Malbak Consumer Products (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (20) ILJ 1867 
(LC) at par 123. 
1423
 See NUMSA v Malcomess Toyota (a division of Malbak Consumer Products (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (20) ILJ 
1867 (LC) at par 123. 
1424
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 544. 
1425
 See NUMSA v Malcomess Toyota (a division of Malbak Consumer Products (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (20) ILJ 
1867 (LC) at par 120. Respect for the audi alteram partem rule, so understood, ensures the protection 
and promotion of substantive fairness, as a dismissal of an employee who was sick during the time of the 
strike, could not amount to a fair reason for dismissal. Fair treatment is multi-dimensional. Information on 
which to base a fair dismissal can only properly be obtained if an opportunity to make representation is 
granted to employees. 
1426
 See Brassey 1990 (11) ILJ 213. Cheadle, as referred to in Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 
(5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 26, draws a distinction between adherence to the audi alteram partem rule 
before and after dismissal. 
1427
 Brassey 1990 (11) ILJ 213 at 226. Cf MAN Truck and Bus SA (Pty) Ltd and United African Motor and 
Allied Workers Union 1991 (12) ILJ 181 (ARB) at 192.  
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From an administrative law point of view, De Ville notes that it will only be justifiable to 
comply with the audi alteram partem rule after the decision is taken if the circumstances 
of the case are exceptional.1428 It is however required that the decision-maker retain “a 
sufficiently open mind to allow herself to be persuaded that she should change her 
decision and the affected individual must not have suffered prejudice by being afforded 
a hearing afterwards”.1429 The judgment in Van Zyl v New National Party1430 supports 
the idea that a hearing after the fact is to be the exception rather than the rule, as it is in 
“accord with the general common-law practice that procedural justice must be observed 
before rather than after, the taking of an administrative decision”.1431 Proper regard 
must be had to the object, nature and purpose of administrative decisions as weighed 
against the likely effect of the decision in the context of the constitutional ethos of 
efficiency and good governance (as it relates to the right to just administrative 
action).1432 
                                            
1428
 De Ville Judicial Review 245 explains that this will for example be the case “where the matter is one 
of urgency or where for some other reason it was not possible to hear the person before the taking of a 
decision”. 
1429
 De Ville Judicial Review 245. Cheadle, as referred to in Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) 
BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 26, appears to respect the cautionary comments of De Ville and the judiciary in 
the administrative law context. The administrative law exceptions remind of labour law’s exceptions 
identified in crisis-zone cases. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume 1 196 – 197. Cf Lefu v 
Western Areas Gold Mining Co Ltd 1985 (6) ILJ 307 (IC); Cameron 1988 (9) ILJ 147. See also Lebota v 
Western Areas Gold Mining Co Ltd 1985 (6) ILJ 299; NUM v Buffelsfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd (Beatrix 
Mines Division) 1988 (9) ILJ 341 (IC). 
1430
 2003 (10) BCLR 1167 (C) at par 96. 
1431
 Van Zyl v New National Party 2003 (10) BCLR 1167 (C) at par 96. The court found that ss 3(2)(b) and 
3(3) of PAJA do not reveal a contrary legislative intent. A departure from the procedural fairness 
provisions in s 3(2), as provided for in s 3(4), must consequently be reasonable and justifiable in the 
context of every case. See Submissions of the Amici Curiae: Community Law Centre (UWC) and Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 
Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg Case No: CCT 24/07 at par 143. 
1432
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 343. Similar to the perspective of the Labour Appeal Court in JDG 
Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Price ‘n Pride v Brunsdon 2000 (1) BLLR 1 (LAC) at par 58, administrative law 
embraces the general rule of audi alteram partem compliance prior to the decision, with exceptions only 
allowed if reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances. See also Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 
1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 
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Convergence of labour and administrative law is obvious when considering the scope of 
the audi alteram partem rule, as reflected in Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath.1433 The 
majority acknowledged that labour law usurped the audi alteram partem rule in a 
manner similar to that of administrative law.1434 In considering the development of 
employment and administrative jurisprudence relating to the audi alteram partem rule, 
Zondo AJP found that “in the context of dismissal, an employer is obliged to observe the 
audi rule where his decision may adversely affect an employee’s rights”.1435 In true 
                                            
1433
 2000 (21) ILJ 519 (LAC). 
1434
 Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 20 per Zondo AJP. Although the 
majority noted that there was no reason to read the audi alteram partem rule as different in content from 
the audi alteram partem rule acknowledged in administrative law, Zondo AJP qualified the path audi 
alteram partem took to reach labour law. Although Zondo AJP argued that the audi alteram partem 
principle was rooted in employment law via the English law, it must not be forgotten that administrative 
law, as embraced in South Africa, also has its roots in English law and has historically strongly been 
influenced by developments in that jurisdiction. Cf Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour 
Practices 544. See Chapter Three, part 2 2 for a discussion of the development of procedural fairness in 
administrative law. Administrative law’s traditional influence on public employment resulted in all 
dismissals (regardless of individual misconduct or collective strike participation) requiring respect for the 
employee’s right to state his or her case. Zondo AJP emphasised that an employee does not waive his or 
her right to be heard when partaking in a strike. See Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 
496 (LAC) at paras 20, 39 and 47 per Zondo AJP. See also Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair 
Labour Practices 544 – 545. Cf Laws v Rutherford 1924 AD 261 at 263; Hepner v Roodepoort-
Maraisburg Town Council 1962 (4) SA 722 (A) at 778; Mayekiso v Minister of Health and Welfare 1988 
(9) ILJ 227 (W); Mokoena v Administrator of the Transvaal 1988 (9) ILJ 398 (W); Mokopanele v 
Administrator, Oranje-Vrystaat 1988 (9) ILJ 779 (O); Zenzile v Administrator of the Transvaal 1989 (10) 
ILJ 34 (W); Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A); Zondi v Administrator, Natal 1991 (12) 
ILJ 497 (A). 
1435
 Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 36 per Zondo AJP. Zondo AJP 
drew a distinction between the issuing of an ultimatum and the granting of a disciplinary hearing. Prior to 
the issuing of an ultimatum, the right to be heard grants the representatives of the strikers the opportunity 
to explain why an ultimatum should not be issued. If the strikers ignore the ultimatum, then dismissal may 
follow. After dismissal, the right to be heard grants the employees (collectively or individually, depending 
on the circumstances) the opportunity to deny involvement altogether or explain the circumstances 
surrounding their participation, for example intimidation. Basson et al Essential Labour Law 316 explain 
that it is not a requirement that a proper hearing be held prior to the ultimatum, but merely “that genuine 
contact should be made with the employees and their representatives”. See Grogan Dismissal, 
Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 545. See also Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 (8) 
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variable nature, the fairness of the opportunity to be heard in the strike context depends 
on the circumstances.1436 Ironically, the judicial expansion of the audi alteram partem 
rule in the collective labour law context occurred with consideration of the reasoning of 
the Appellate Division in Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile.1437 
Administrative law, as developed under s 33 of the Constitution, does not stand blind to 
the possibility that procedural fairness can find expression in a collective context. 
Although s 4 of PAJA does not refer to strikes, it allows for the protection and promotion 
of procedural fairness in instances where the rights of the public in general are 
adversely affected.1438 The required public interest must be affected by a decision 
where “constitutional, statutory or common law rights of members of the public are at 
issue”.1439 If a group’s labour rights potentially stand to be affected collectively by an 
administrative decision, s 4(1) requires that an inquiry be held and that the group be 
allowed an opportunity to share their perspective with the decision maker.1440 
Administrative law is not ignorant of the idea that the flexible concept of fairness can 
                                                                                                                                            
BLLR 857 (LAC), where the employer reached agreement with the trade union prior to the issuing of an 
ultimatum. Karras t/a Floraline v SA Scooter and Transport Allied Workers Unions 2001 (1) BLLR 1 (LAC) 
at paras 26 – 28 confirms that this perspective is in line with item 6(2) of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal, which stipulates that “[p]rior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity, 
contact a trade union official to discuss the course of action it intends to adopt”. 
1436
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 545. This fact was emphasised in 
Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath 2000 (5) BLLR 496 (LAC) at par 96. 
1437
 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). Some academics and judges view the Zenzile-judgment as irrelevant in light of 
the constitutional and legislative extension of the right to fair labour practices to public sector employees. 
See the discussion in Chapter Eight, part 3 1. 
1438
 Within the scope of s 4, PAJA regards the term ‘public’ as including “any group or class of the public”. 
Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 242 explain that s 4 finds application when a decision of an 
administrative nature, relating to the interest of a group of the public, reveals a general impact of 
significant public effect. Section 4 can therefore also be read as referring to the interests of public 
employees as a group. 
1439
 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 242. 
1440
 Section 4(1) of PAJA further stipulates that this must take place within the context of a fair procedure. 
The form of the fair procedure is left to the discretion of the decision-maker. 
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find expression in a collective manner, as longs as it amounts to a fair opportunity to 
make representation.1441  
As the standard and form of fairness is contextually determined, at both a de jure and 
de facto level, it is illogical to argue that administrative and labour law cannot co-
operate in the promotion and protection of fairness in a collective context, such as strike 
dismissals). Both labour and administrative law emphasise the importance of adherence 
to the audi alteram partem rule. Item 4(4) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal only 
allows an employer to dispense with pre-dismissal procedures in “exceptional 
circumstances”. Labour law does not allow for absolute exceptions to the rule. It only 
allows for an exception to the rule prior to dismissal, if the circumstances so demand. 
An employer must still allow the dismissed employee to state his or her case after the 
fact. From an administrative law perspective, s 3(4)(a) of PAJA does allow for deviation 
from the minimum standards in s 3(2), which includes the audi alteram partem rule, “if it 
is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances”.1442 
4 3 Representation 
Transparency and dialogue form the underlying values of procedural fairness. 
Circumstances may arise where adherence to the values of transparency and dialogue 
become problematic. Without a legal representative to ensure that these values are 
effectively adhered to, the individual facing potential adverse affects through the impact 
                                            
1441
 The collective element of the opportunity to be heard in administrative law was also acknowledged in 
the common law context in R v Hodos and Jajhbay 1927 TPD 101. The case concerned the interests of a 
group ordered to move by a general decree. See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 283. 
1442
 Section 3(4)(b) of PAJA lists the relevant factors that an administrator must take into account when 
determining whether a s 3(4)(a) departure is reasonable and justifiable: the objects of the empowering 
provision; the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action; the likely effect of 
the administrative action; the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and 
the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance. See also s 3(5) of PAJA that reads 
as follows: “Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure 
which is fair but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the administrator may act in accordance 
with that different procedure.” Cf SANDU v Minister of Defence: In re SANDU v Minister of Defence 2003 
(9) BLLR 932 (T). 
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of a decision by the State or private employer may be at a disadvantage in complex 
cases. 
With regard to legal representation, two issues require evaluation: 
1. Is there a general right to legal representation?1443  
2. Does labour law allow for the possibility that the absence of legal representation 
can allow for a finding of procedural fairness, as has been the case in 
administrative law?1444 
Both labour and administrative law acknowledge that the right to legal representation is 
not part of the audi alteram partem rule.1445 In the context of employment law, an 
employee facing a disciplinary procedure is entitled to assistance, but not necessarily 
legal representation.1446 Item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal states that 
the employee should be entitled to representation by or the assistance of a fellow 
employee or trade union representative.1447 Labour law makes this concession for two 
reasons: moral support for the employee and balancing the employee’s position against 
that of the employer.1448 These two purposes collectively strive to ensure the 
                                            
1443
 See De Ville Judicial Review 182. 
1444
 In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2000 (4) SA 621 (C) 
at paras 28 – 41, the decision of the disciplinary committee was set aside due to the committee’s failure 
to consider the allowance of legal representation. See De Ville Judicial Review 182. 
1445
 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 324 – 325 note that the constitutional right to procedural fairness 
does not alter the common law as far as legal representation is concerned. Van Dokkum 2000 (21) ILJ 
836 – 837 elaborates on the rationale for this general approach in an employment context. 
1446
 The assistance referred to can come in the form of a trade union representative or fellow employee. 
See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127.  
1447
 While legal representation is allowed in the case of review to the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal 
Court, there is no absolute right to legal representation at a disciplinary enquiry or the CCMA in cases 
concerning misconduct or incapacity dismissals. In terms of rule 25(1)(a) of the CCMA Rules, legal 
representation is generally not allowed at the conciliation stage. At the arbitration stage, the CCMA 
generally allows legal representation, except at incapacity or misconduct dismissal disputes.  
See Collier Disciplinary Enquiries 1 http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/ServicesProducts/presentations/17th/ 
DebbieCollier.doc.   
1448
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 343. 
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maintenance of fairness and the pursuit of justice in the disciplinary process.1449 This 
form of representation does not exclude the possibility of legal representation at all 
disciplinary enquiries, as the complexity of the case and the relevant disciplinary code 
determines the employee’s entitlement to legal representation.1450 
Although the Public Service Disciplinary Code and Procedure does not as a rule allow 
for legal representation at a disciplinary hearing,1451 its provisions do not prohibit the 
presiding officer from allowing representation of this nature in his or her discretion.1452 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and 
Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani1453 confirmed the existence of this discretion in 
complex and difficult cases.1454 The discretion must be exercised in a fair manner1455 
and calls for consideration as to whether it is reasonable for the applicant to present his 
or her own case.1456  
                                            
1449
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 343. 
1450
 See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 342. 
1451
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127. Clause 7.3(e) of the code reads as follows: “In a 
disciplinary hearing, neither the employer nor the employee may be represented by a legal practitioner.” 
See Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 2003 (9) 
BLLR 963 (T) at par 20. 
1452
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127. 
1453
 2005 (2) BLLR 173 (SCA). 
1454
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 127. 
1455
 See Basson et al Essential Labour Law 128; Collier Disciplinary Enquiries 1; Majola v MEC, 
Department of Public Works, Northern Province 2004 (25) ILJ 131 (LC). 
1456
 In echoing this understanding of discretion, the court in Afrox Ltd v Laka 1999 (5) BLLR 467 (LC) 
referred to the factors mentioned in s 140(1) of the LRA in the exercise of the discretion. This section 
(since repealed and replaced by a similar rule 25 of the CCMA Rules) stipulated that parties are not 
entitled to legal representation at arbitration proceedings unless (in the absence of consent between all 
the parties) “the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation, after considering – (i) the nature of the question of law raised by the dispute; 
(ii) the complexity of the dispute; (iii) the public interest; and (iv) the comparative ability of the opposing 
parties or their representatives to deal with the arbitration of the dispute”. Where an earlier agreement to 
allow legal representation has been reached, a decision to ignore such an agreement amounts to legal 
misconduct on the side of the arbitrator. This analysis was followed in Vaal Toyota (Nigel) v Motor 
Industry Bargaining Council 2002 (10) BLLR 936 (LAC). The Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC: 
Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani 2005 (2) BLLR 
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The exercise of the discretion brings with it certain responsibilities.1457 In Mafongosi v 
United Democratic Movement,1458 the applicants challenged their dismissal on the 
ground of procedural unfairness. On the day of their disciplinary hearing, the employees 
arrived without legal representation. As a result, the presiding officer postponed the 
hearing for a week. According to the applicants, a week was insufficient to obtain the 
legal representation to which they were entitled in the context of the case.1459 Jafta AJP 
reiterated that there is no right to legal representation in the common law roots of 
administrative law (and therefore labour law),1460 but exceptions discretionarily granted 
in individual cases must be respected.1461 Jafta AJP found that the applicants had been 
treated unfairly. De Ville argues that s 3(3)(a) of PAJA lends itself to the interpretation 
that legal representation is a requirement “in serious and complex cases”.1462 
In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee,1463 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the general approach does not unjustifiably 
                                                                                                                                            
173 (SCA) also embraced this perspective. If the circumstances dictate that it would be fair and 
reasonable to allow such representation and it is refused, the refusal amounts to a procedural injustice. 
See Commuter Handling Services (Pty) Ltd v Mokoena 2002 (9) BLLR 843 (LC). 
1457
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 344 explains that presiding officers 
must allow representatives to perform the function for which their presence is discretionarily allowed and 
not unjustly hinder them from doing so. 
1458
 [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk). 
1459
 The applicants lacked the funds to obtain legal representation and could not raise the required funds 
in the period of a week. See Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk) at paras 
14 – 15. 
1460
 See Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk) at par 16. 
1461
 The High Court in Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk) at par 16 
elaborated: “[W]here such right has been given common sense dictates that the beneficiary of such right 
would be entitled to its full employment without hindrance from the decision-maker who should afford the 
affected party the opportunity to exercise the right. The right to legal representation is extremely important 
in any proceedings and therefore the decision-maker is bound not to pay lip-service thereto.” 
1462
 De Ville Judicial Review 254. Cf Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (4) BCLR 
531 (A). Baxter Administrative Law 555 also acknowledges the idea that the right to legal representation 
is given effect to in complex cases. See also Wiechers Administrative Law 211. The Industrial Court (as 
the predecessor of the Labour Court) also acknowledged the discretion to allow legal representation, if 
the legal and factual issues of a case were complex. See Pretorius 1986 (7) ILJ 18 at 21. 
1463
 2002 (23) ILJ 1531 (SCA). 
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limit any constitutional right.1464 The court emphasised that every case should be 
separately evaluated to determine whether an individual is entitled to such 
representation by taking into account “the nature of the charges brought, the degree of 
factual or legal complexity attendant upon considering them, [and] the potential 
seriousness of the consequences of an adverse finding”.1465 In Schoon v MEC, 
Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province,1466 the High 
Court supplemented these factors with the following: 
[T]he potential suitably qualified lawyers, ... the availability of the person who 
may well represent the applicant, the fact that there is a legally trained 
person presenting the case against the applicant, and any other fact relevant 
to the fairness or otherwise of confining the applicant to the kind of 
representation for which the representation rule expressly provides.1467 
                                            
1464
 For similar reasoning, Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Madau 2003 (10) BLLR 
1034 (LC) per Landman J. 
1465
 Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon, Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 (23) ILJ 1531 
(SCA) at par 21. See also Mafongosi v United Democratic Movement [2003] 1 All SA 441 (Tk) at paras 16 
– 18; Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 2003 (9) 
BLLR 963 (T). Prior to the decision of Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon, Internal Disciplinary 
Committee 2000 2002 (23) ILJ 1531 (SCA), the Industrial Court already took note of the following 
considerations in exercising its discretion to allow or refuse legal representation: “The complexity of the 
legal and factual issues in any case ... [t]he serious nature of the proceedings and, in particular, the 
potential consequences for the livelihood and status of an applicant in losing his job ... [a] party’s personal 
standard of education, his experience and knowledge ... [t]he history of the matter ... [t]he necessity to 
maintain a balance between the parties to ensure fair play ... [t]he purpose of any objection raised against 
legal representation [as] ... [i]t may often be the case that the only purpose that a party can have in 
objecting to legal representation is to gain an unfair tactical advantage over an untrained and 
inexperienced opponent.” See Pretorius 1986 (7) ILJ 18 at 21. 
1466
 2003 (9) BLLR 963 (T). The case concerned a disciplinary enquiry relating to the alleged misconduct 
of an employee who was denied legal representations at the hearing. 
1467
 Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 2003 (9) 
BLLR 963 (T) at par 27. The court reasoned that the provisions of the Public Service Disciplinary Code 
and Procedure informed the applicable context of the fairness evaluation. After taking into consideration 
all the relevant factors to establish the degree of complexity, the court found there to be no contextual 
reason to justify the denial of legal representation. See Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, 
Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 2003 (9) BLLR 963 (T) at par 30. 
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Although jurisprudence generally accepts that legal representation is a refutable right, 
both labour and administrative law require that the employer, chairperson or 
administrator apply their minds to the individual’s request for assistance by a legal 
representative.1468 Although the colloquial phrasing of the underlying discretion may 
differ in labour and administrative law jurisprudence, the crux remains the same. 
Fairness demands that legal representation be allowed if it is required to give the 
affected individual a real opportunity to state his or her case.1469 Even the s 3 PAJA 
inspired argument that representation should be allowed “in serious and complex 
cases”1470 merely boils down to one single consideration in both labour and 
administrative law: Does fairness demand it? The discretionary privilege of legal 
representation can be regarded as a sine qua non for the right to a fair hearing, if it is 
essential to the expression of the substance of procedural fairness.1471 
5 CONCLUSION 
Although transparency and dialogue dimensions of procedural fairness are explicitly or 
implicitly recognised, procedural fairness has no fixed parameters, as it is contextually 
determined.1472 Administrative and labour law share a similar flexible understanding of 
the guidelines for the protection and promotion of procedural fairness: 
• Both labour and administrative law require reasonable notification of disciplinary 
proceedings, with no apparent conflict between s 3(2) of PAJA and item 4(1) of 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
                                            
1468
 The Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, 
Northern Province v Mahumani 2005 (2) BLLR 173 (SCA) confirmed this. 
1469
 This is what is implied from the factors identified in Afrox Ltd v Laka 1999 (5) BLLR 467 (LC), Hamata 
v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee 2002 (23) ILJ 1531 (SCA) and 
Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 2003 (9) BLLR 
963 (T). 
1470
 De Ville Judicial Review 254. See Pretorius 1986 (7) ILJ 18 at 21. 
1471
 See Cuppan v Cape Display Supply Chain Services 1995 (16) ILJ 846 (D) at 847; Chamane v The 
Member of the Executive Council for Transport, Kwazulu-Natal 2000 (10) BLLR 1154 (LC) at 1159. 
1472
 See Nkomo v Administrator, Natal 1991 (12) ILJ 521 (N). Both administrative and labour law 
contextually embrace the principles of natural justice. 
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• The absence of a reasonable disclosure of the allegations against the employee 
renders a disciplinary hearing procedurally defective from both a labour and 
administrative law procedural fairness perspective. 
• Both labour and administrative law recognise the right to be granted an 
opportunity to make representations (whether in person or in writing) as the core 
fairness element of the audi alteram partem rule and procedural fairness in 
general. PAJA’s provisions dealing with individual and collective fairness are 
reconcilable with procedural fairness as developed in labour law with regard to 
the right to be heard in the individual and collective context. If PAJA is 
reconcilable with this aspect of labour law, then administrative law in general 
does not hamper labour law’s maintenance of procedural fairness elements in 
the employment relationship. 
• Although labour law holds a more generous position as to the presence of the 
individual at the enquiry, administrative law tends to embrace situations that 
grant more rather than less protection of rights and interests than found in the 
minimum standards of s 3(2) of PAJA. 
• Both labour and administrative law similarly embrace the basic test of fairness 
that requires freedom from bias in the disciplinary proceedings. 
• As to the right to legal representation, both labour and administrative law 
recognise that there is no absolute right to legal representation. However, both 
acknowledge that it would be grossly irregular for such representation to be 
denied in complex and serious cases. Item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal, rule 25 of the CCMA Rules and s 3(3)(a) of PAJA reflect this 
perception and can be read in a complementary fashion. 
From a practical perspective, labour and administrative law stand in agreement as to 
the regulatory approach to and rationale for procedural fairness. Labour law has 
adapted the procedural fairness perspective of administrative law to the employment 
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context, as a supplement to substantive fairness, in cases where the rights and interest 
of employees stand to be affected by unfair labour practices and dismissals.1473 
The mere fact that labour law has historically mimicked administrative law’s procedural 
fairness standards and trends can bring to question the necessity of administrative law 
considerations within the contemporary, constitutionally influenced, labour law approach 
to procedural fairness. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,1474 the Constitutional Court in fact went 
so far as to state, “that because the LRA has been extended to virtually all employees, 
including those in the public sector, it is no longer necessary to apply the principles of 
administrative law to the field of employment relations”.1475 It is true that administrative 
law was pre-constitutionally stretched to its limits in attempting to grant public 
employees protection that resembled that of fair labour practices. It is also true that the 
developments in administrative law at that time were mimicked by the Industrial Court in 
giving expression to the procedural dimension of the concept of fair labour practices. It 
is furthermore true that the administrative law based understanding of procedural 
fairness has infiltrated labour legislation currently giving effect to the constitutional right 
to fair labour practices. Is it then also true that, because of this shared history, 
administrative law procedural fairness considerations have nothing to add to the labour 
law understanding of procedural fairness? 
If it can indeed be argued that there is no longer a basis for the consideration of the 
justice principles underlying administrative law because labour law has already adopted 
those considerations, it can also be said that labour law no longer has to have regard to 
the principles underlying the Constitution as these principles have been adopted in the 
LRA. Such an argument is ludicrous and clearly out of step with the Constitution. The 
mere fact that the Constitution is being ‘mimicked’ in other areas of the law does not 
lessen its importance and applicability. The same holds true for the now constitutionally 
endorsed administrative law considerations that forms the traditional basis of the labour 
law understanding of procedural fairness. 
                                            
1473
 This is the case regardless of whether one is dealing with an employment relationship in the private 
or public sector. 
1474
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
1475
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 134. 
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An interdependent approach allows for the one right associated with one area of the law 
(expressing these principles) to consider on a continuous basis the innovative methods 
with which the other right associated with another area of the law (sharing these 
principles) applies those procedural values of justice.1476 If a reconciliation of 
administrative law principles in the realm of labour law is regarded as ‘superfluous’, it 
may cause labour law to lose its fairness axis. Absent the possibility of considering the 
‘superfluous’ administrative law considerations of procedural fairness, labour law may 
develop an inclination to look at the procedural fairness guidelines from a purely 
informational justice perspective, neglecting the required interpersonal justice 
perspective.1477 Procedural fairness requires an interactional approach to justice, as is 
evident from the flexible character it attracts. A co-operative attitude towards the shared 
core justice perspective of administrative law, presents labour law with the continuous 
opportunity to test its balanced approach to justice. An interdependent approach allows 
for the value based checks-and-balances of justice. In fact, the doctrine of 
interdependence functions all the better when two rights share normative cores, as will 
become evident from the discussion in Chapter Seven.  
In reflection, it is submitted that interdependence at a procedural level is easily 
identifiable and justifiable. The interrelated nature of substantive fairness and 
reasonableness is less obvious. One reason for this is to be found in the judiciary’s 
continued pre-occupation with formalism. Holistically viewed, the obvious along with the 
hidden, the dimensions of fairness give expression to the doctrine of interdependence 
as embraced by the spirit and purport of the Constitution. It allows for ss 23 and 33 of 
the Constitution to find expression in a mutually supportive manner, without showing 
any disregard to the regulatory aim of labour law in public employment. At its core, 
labour law requires justice in the workplace. The Constitution requires that justice be 
maintained in a manner that is compatible with its content. That content includes s 23, 
which is the primary focus of the LRA. However, that content also groups s 23 together 
with other fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights (such as s 33) in an attempt to give 
comprehensive contextual protection to individuals on a case-by-case basis. 
                                            
1476
 See Chapter Seven for a detailed discussion of the constitutionally endorsed doctrine of 
interdependence.  
1477
 See part 4 2. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LABOUR 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of the Constitution (specifically the Bill of Rights) serves as proof of the 
choice to promote certain rights central to the social, economic, and political 
discourse.1478 Fundamental rights do not merely regulate relationships, but also stand in 
relationship to one another. These enshrined rights, such as the rights to fair labour 
practices and just administrative action, do not exist in a vacuum. The constitutional 
context brings with it a normative value system that informs all fundamental rights even 
if not specifically so articulated in the provision of a specific right. The normative 
considerations ensure that the spirit of the Constitution is holistically expressed. Even 
though different rights are expressed in separate provisions of the Bill of Rights, the 
normative web of the Constitution dictates against an interpretation that views 
fundamental rights as forever unconnected regardless of the circumstances of a case. 
This constitutional idea of normative interdependence is endorsed in the public 
employment context by the fact that both administrative and labour law rights are aimed 
at the promotion of social justice, which is central to the constitutional value of 
democratic accountability.1479 By merely admitting to the existence of this shared 
constitutional perspective, a causal link is noticeable in the relationship between labour 
and administrative law.  
                                            
1478
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 13 
1479
 Administrative law and its associated rights give expression to the ideal of democratic justice through 
the idea of democratic accountability. Section 1 of the LRA specifically identifies the promotion of social 
justice as one of its primary purposes. In addition, labour law claims procedural fairness to be one of the 
key normative elements on which it relies to realise this purpose. Furthermore, one of the three 
dimensions of procedural fairness is democratic participation. The idea of democratic participation also 
resides in the idea of collective bargaining. Democracy and participation in the workplace are yet more 
purposes identified by the LRA to be realised along with the ideal of social justice. 
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In similar fashion, it can be reasoned that fairness, as a constitutional norm, has the 
potential to encapsulate the interrelated character of the rights and concepts associated 
with both labour and administrative law, as Chapters Five and Six illustrate.1480 
Unfortunately, South African jurisprudence reveals an inclination to undermine the value 
and flexibility of broad concepts, such as fairness, due to the (traditional) judicial 
tendency to perceive formalism as legal certainty.1481 This results in the denial of 
fairness as an interdependent norm. Archaic formalism of this nature has led to the 
compartmentalisation of constitutional rights.  
Formalists view fairness, as associated with labour and administrative law, as ‘two’ 
apparently different concepts due to the traditionally constructed absolute autonomous 
character of both labour and administrative law. As a result, formalism undermines the 
idea that fairness in a specialised labour law context carries the potential to amount to 
fairness in a general administrative law context 
To successfully scrutinize the judiciary’s (flawed) perspective in Chapters Eight and 
Nine, it is necessary to evaluate the relationship between the rights of the Bill of Rights 
with due regard to three constitutional principles to allow for an informed evaluation of 
the specific relationship between ss 23 and 33. Consideration will be given to flexibility 
as the first constitutional principle (part 2 1). This principle acknowledges that the 
flexible nature of the norms underlying the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action (as discussed in Chapters Five and Six) is in fact a general theme 
underlying the idea of rights as relationships. This idea of flexibility will be linked to the 
doctrine of interdependence as endorsed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (part 2 2). The third constitutional principle, the judicially developed understanding 
                                            
1480
 The concept of fairness as referred to here, incorporate both procedural fairness and substantive 
fairness (within the general framework of reasonableness) and associated concept of lawfulness as far as 
it is not at odds with fairness. Pre-constitutional jurisprudence revealed that conduct that may be 
regarded as lawful (such as the termination of a contract of employment upon proper notice without 
reasons at common law) does not by implication bring about a just or fair result. As a result, Harmse JA in 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen [1996] 2 All SA 379 (A) at 386 declared that “[a] 
lawful dismissal is not necessarily a fair dismissal”. However, if lawfulness is viewed within the context of 
constitutional justice it carries the potential to fall within the general understanding of fairness, because 
constitutional lawfulness properly understood will never be intended to bring about an unjust result. 
1481
 This tendency is highlighted in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
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of specificity, that in practice undermines the first two principles, will also be outlined 
and discussed (part 2 3). 
The aim of this exercise is to assist in the evaluation of the relationship between the 
rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action and their associated legal 
principles in the chapters to follow. 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
2 1 Flexibility 
Nedelsky points out that “[i]t is hard to believe in timeless values with immutable 
content”1482 as propagated by legal formalists. The value and right of equality is a 
perfect example, as the content and legal understanding of equality has shifted from 
formal to substantive over the years, yet it is still termed equality. In contrast to 
formalism, conceptualism is unavoidable.1483  
                                            
1482
 Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1. Frant 1993 (37) American J Pol Sc 990 at 991 elaborates 
that “[r]ules cannot be perfect, and following them rigidly will inevitably result in many suboptimal 
decisions”. Howard 1965 (44) Tex L Rev 35 at 37 holds that “[e]ven the best of rules, based on the 
soundest considerations of policy and justice, can survive beyond its time and become anachronistic”.  
1483
 Throughout its development, South African law has illustrated a fondness to rely on (autonomous) 
conceptualism as a type of formalism in the pursuit of legal certainty. Hoexter 2004 (4) Macquarie LJ 165 
at 168 however explains that such judicial logic relies “on technical or mechanistic reasoning instead of 
substantive principles, and … prefer formal reasons to moral, political, economic or other social 
considerations”. This casts a negative light of conceptualism. Formalism and conceptualism are not 
synonyms. Conceptualism can however be distorted when applied in a formalistic milieu. The positive 
element of conceptualism in the law has given birth to principles such as fairness, reasonableness and 
lawfulness. Botha 2002 (4) TSAR 612 at 616 – 617 explains that “our conceptual system [is] ... ‘grounded 
in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other members of our culture in our daily 
interaction with other people and with our physical and cultural environments’”. Conceptualism in its true 
and proper sense therefore requires contextual evaluation and application. However, when the judiciary 
attempts to give a fixed or predictable content to inherently flexible concepts, conceptualism falls into the 
trap of formalism. Botha 2002 (4) TSAR 612 at 620 therefore emphasises that “[c]ontext and purpose are 
central to categorisation ... [and] judgments of the proximity of an object to what is seen as the central 
case of the category in question invariably rest upon an evaluation of context and purpose”. Hoexter 
Administrative Law 201 explains that conceptual reasoning should thus not evolve into an all-or-nothing 
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Formalism can be avoided if legal perspectives stay true to the essence and reality of 
the relevant normative concepts. The concepts only gain substantive meaning when 
contextualised in terms of the reality of every case.1484 When concepts are adapted to 
the context of every case, it requires judicial acknowledgment of the “need to confront 
the history of rights and acknowledge the depth of the changes that have taken place in 
both popular and legal understandings of rights”.1485 The character of a constitution as a 
living instrument in fact necessitates this requirement.1486 The South African 
                                                                                                                                            
approach, used to justify the use of the concept in terms of a threshold question. According to Poole 2005 
(25) Oxford J Legal Stud 697 at 701 (with reference to Barzun), that unity (as found in conceptualism) 
does not imply uniformity as “essential unity  … within constitutionalism stems from an agreement on 
three essential matters: first, that it is possible to identify a set of values regarded as essential to human 
flourishing; second, that it is possible in the form of rights; and third, that these values and rights are most 
consistently recognized and protected by” constitutionally entrenched rights and the law giving effect 
thereto. Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 810 – 811 also emphasises that “the principle of 
interdependence ... underlies and informs ... unity of purpose”. Such unification is rooted in the 
Constitution: “In each of your national Constitutions you have a single document, but the laws enforcing 
the Constitution are always different laws enacted successively, even if they converge.” See the Plenary 
of the GA (Cassin from France) A/PV 375 (1952) (France) 514/19 at 21. Such a convergence or meeting 
of legislative regulation is identifiable in the relationship between PAJA and the LRA, as the two statutes 
have a compatible constitutional purpose, namely constraint of the abuse of power. As a result, it cannot 
be declared that the provisions of the LRA and PAJA can be “kept scrupulously separate” in all context. 
See Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 811. 
1484
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 3. 
1485
 Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 3.  
1486
 In Tyrer v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1 at par 30, the European Court of Human Rights declared that the 
European Convention of Human Rights (the counterpart of the South African Bill of Rights) “must be 
viewed ‘as a living instrument ... which must be interpreted in the light of the present-day conditions’”. It 
was accordingly emphasised that the application of human rights must be interpreted and evaluated from 
a contextual perspective. In the South African context Sachs J emphasised the “organic and ever-
evolving” nature of the constitutional principles in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 150. This is an important observation and consideration, as it is undeniable that 
“we are living in a changing society”, as Chaskalson CJ 1989 (5) SAJHR 293 at 296 so eloquently states. 
Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 829 further notes that in line with the living instrument character 
of instruments which enshrine human rights for the benefit of society, it also holds true that, “[i]f the 
totality of evidence suggests that interdependence is a more meaningful concept now than it was in the 
early [years] ... [the judiciary] must take this into account”. Consequently, even though administrative law 
and labour law rights where legally separate pre-constitutionally due to the social, economic and political 
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Constitution, with its intentional inclusion of a Bill of Rights, is such a living instrument, 
retaining an adaptable character through its flexible normative value system. These 
organs adapt to the circumstances in which the instrument finds it application – it 
responds to the idea of legal evolution.1487 Consequently, the rights of fair labour 
practices and just administrative action, informed by the living norm of fairness, are not 
isolated in function. These rights must be interpreted and applied with regard to the 
contemporary political,1488 social1489 and economic contextual considerations1490 of legal 
evolution.1491 
To be effectively interpreted, the variable character of the principles (such as fairness 
and reasonableness) underlying the relevant rights must be judicially acknowledged. 
Formalism undermines this exercise. The variability of fairness and reasonableness, as 
concepts of justice, allows its content to vary according to the circumstances of every 
case.1492 Flexibility forms a crucial element of fairness. It allows for the realisation of a 
                                                                                                                                            
influences of the time, that does not automatically justify the separation of the right to fair labour practices 
and just administrative action post-constitutionally. This realisation is complimented by the fact that rights 
are not isolated in function and must take account of and find application within the contemporary 
political, social and economic considerations as Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 3 
elaborates: “We need to conform the history of rights and acknowledge the depth of the changes that 
have taken place in both popular and legal understandings of rights.”  
1487
 At the Constitutional Amendment Bills public hearings of the Justice and Constitutional Development 
Portfolio Committee on 14 September 2001, Chaskalson CJ explained that the Constitution is not “a rock-
like institution ... [that] always give[s] effect to the intentions of the original parties to the agreement”. 
1488
 It is possible to link the presence of public power to political considerations. As history has revealed 
political tides have had an immense influence on the development or stagnation of labour and 
administrative law. See Chapter Two, part 2 and Chapter Three, part 2 for a discussion of the historic 
development of both areas of the law. 
1489
 The promotion of social justice is an inherent aim of both labour and administrative law. 
1490
 The influence of economic considerations on both the public and private sector is undeniable. Strike 
action in the private sector has the potential to affect the economic stability of a country (and therefore the 
public sector). Similarly, any economic action in the public sector directly affects the private sector. See 
Chapter Four, part 3 3. 
1491
 See Botha 2002 (4) TSAR 612 at 616 – 617. 
1492
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 201. 
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just outcome in every individual legal dispute.1493 Permitting the context-specific 
application of a variable concept, such as fairness, allows for the following enquiry: 
What is the content of the duty of fairness in the particular public employment 
situation?1494  
This acknowledgment of variability is not limited to a fairness enquiry.1495 The variable 
nature of the concept of lawfulness also requires “the courts to apply different degrees 
of rigour in different circumstances to the question whether a statutory formality has 
been complied with”.1496 The concept of reasonableness is “not cast in stone, and it is 
quite possible for a court to decide that what is reasonable in one case is unreasonable 
in another”.1497 
                                            
1493
 From an administrative law perspective, Hoexter Administrative Law 201 notes that “the courts have 
long accepted (at common law, and now under the Constitution and the PAJA) that fairness is something 
to be tailored to suit the circumstances of the case before them”. As such, the idea of “[v]ariability is well 
established in the context of procedural fairness, where an appreciation of flexibility is particularly crucial 
to the smooth running of the administration”. Labour law draws on the administrative law understanding of 
procedural fairness and similarly accepts its required contextual variability as explained in Chapter Six. 
The acceptance of variable norms of justice is also a general understanding embraced in labour law. The 
Labour Appeal Court in WL Ochse Webb & Pretorius (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen 1997 (18) ILJ 361 (LAC) at 
365 explained that “[n]either employer nor employee benefits from a static employment concept where 
their respective rights and obligations are cast in stone at the commencement of the employment 
relationship”. 
1494
 See Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193 at 211. Hoexter Administrative Law 
201 explains that the courts should ask positive rather than negative questions: “The right question is not 
‘when and on what basis may we withhold fairness from an aggrieved individual?’ but ‘what does fairness 
require in the particular case?” 
1495
 Hoexter Administrative Law 201. 
1496
 Hoexter Administrative Law 201. The fact the constitutionally imported variable element of lawfulness 
allows a court to evaluate the required degree of lawfulness applicable in every case, renders it more 
possible and plausible that a lawful decision can amount to a fair decision if these concepts are 
(contextually) interpreted in pursuit of supreme constitutional justice. 
1497
 Hoexter Administrative Law 201. This fact has been emphasised by the Constitutional Court on more 
than one occasion. See Chapter Three, parts 2 3 and 3 5 2; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 45 per O’Regan J; Minister of Health v New Clicks 
SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 145 per Chaskalson CJ. 
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Even though the essence of a norm must not be affected by its variation in contextual 
application,1498 formalistic compartmentalisation of constitutional rights remains 
inadequate when called upon to balance unique contextual interests.1499 Formalism 
undermines the unique character of every dispute and inhibits the proper development 
of knowledge obtained from past experiences.1500 Consequently, O’Regan J in Sidumo 
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd1501 declared formalistic jurisprudence to be “at odds 
with the substantive vision of the Constitution”.1502 Building on this identification of 
formalism as a judicial evil, Sachs J explained that Sidumo-type cases illustrate “the 
need for our constitutional jurisprudence ... to move away from unduly rigid 
compartmentalisation so as to allow judicial reasoning to embrace fluid concepts of 
hybridity and permeability in those matters”.1503 Although not explicitly articulated, 
Sachs J presented the doctrine of interdependence as the answer to the problem of 
archaic formalism.1504  
This acknowledgment of hybridity and permeability “leads to direct and unrestrained 
engagement with the particular constitutional interests and values at stake”1505 within 
the specific context of every case. It allows for contextualisation of human rights in a 
situation-sensitive manner, based on normative interdependence, which maximises the 
promotion of affected rights. In turn, it minimises the impact of formalism. This approach 
appropriately places the focus on constitutional justice and its underlying variable 
                                            
1498
 Türmen Contemporary Issues in Human Rights 3. Chaskalson 1989 (5) SAJHR 293 at 297 argues 
that “[a]ll law must postulate some kind of common denominator of just instinct in the community”. In 
South Africa, the Constitution, with its underlying normative value system, now forms the common 
denominator in South Africa’s transformative community. 
1499
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 4. 
1500
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 173. South Africa’s pre-constitutional jurisprudence 
is proof enough of this fact. 
1501
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
1502
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 135. 
1503
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 142. 
1504
 In NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 126, Sachs J reasoned that “[o]ne 
of the great gains achieved by following a situation-sensitive human rights approach is that analysis 
focuses not on abstract categories, but on the lives as lived and the injuries as experienced by different 
groups in society”.  
1505
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 159. 
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norms. The acknowledgment that “the very notion of a fair labour practice requires that 
fairness be the touchstone throughout”1506 forces one to admit that fairness is the 
determining factor in issues calling for substantive consideration. If the pursuit of 
fairness in a specific case calls for consideration of administrative law aspects, for 
example general reasonableness guidelines, the applicability of the right to just 
administrative action cannot be ignored in favour of a judicial attempt to preserve the 
legal regulatory power of labour law in an absolute autonomous form. Allowing a 
formalistic limitation based on such a traditional perspective1507 undermines the spirit of 
the Constitution,1508 as well as the flexible character of norms such as fairness and 
reasonableness.1509 
2 2 Interdependence 
The Constitution (specifically the Bill of Rights) embraces a transformative vision.1510 
That vision accepts the idea of contextual conceptualism,1511 which in turn finds 
                                            
1506
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 145 per Sachs J. 
Emphasis added. 
1507
 The traditional or purist perspective holds that labour law should regulate employment decisions 
without interference from other legal specialities, such as administrative law. 
1508
 The Constitution must in fact be the first point of call in any equity-based evaluation in pursuit of 
justice. Rawls 1985 (14) Phil & Publ Aff 223 at 246 – 247 explains the relationship between fairness and 
justice: “Justice as fairness seeks to identify the kernel of an overlapping consensus, that is, the shared 
intuitive ideals which when worked up into ... conception of justice turns out to be sufficient to underwrite 
a just constitutional regime.” See also Currie 1999 (15) SAJHR 138 at 145; Stacey 2007 (22) SAPL 79 at 
84. Plasket (PhD Rhodes 2002) 45 – 46 notes that it has been held, “[that] the principle of fundamental 
justice includes both procedural and substantive due process”. Cf Singh v Minister of Employment and 
Immigration 1985 (14) CRR 13 (SCC). 
1509
 Note that the level of uncertainty associated with flexible norms is also associated with a 
transformative constitution. See Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129 at 130. Bowman 1986 (5) Auckland ULR 361 
correctly emphasises that it is “[t]he non-procedural content of fairness” that allows for reasonableness to 
overlap with the substantive element of fairness.  
1510
 See Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129 at 133. 
1511
 Contextual conceptualism calls for the context-specific application of variable concepts, such as 
fairness and reasonableness. Cf De Vos 2001 (17) SAJHR 258 at 261 and 263. 
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meaningful expression through the doctrine of normative interdependence.1512 De Vos 
accordingly reasons that, “[d]epending on the particular context, many rights would thus 
be interrelated and would be mutually supportive”.1513 
Section 1 of the Constitution expressly identifies the basic principles that tie together the 
constitutional provisions to be human dignity, equality, the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-discrimination, democracy, constitutional supremacy and the 
rule of law.1514 These values, as “abstract foundational norms”,1515 must be invoked as 
interpretive tools in aligning general law with the spirit and purport of the Constitution.  
Both the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action have been 
described as unusual constitutional inclusions in the Bill of Rights.1516 Even though 
included in the Constitution for different reasons, these two rights are not completely 
separable in all circumstances. In Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern 
Cape Province,1517 Froneman J emphasised that “[f]undamental constitutional rights do 
not operate in tightly fitted compartments”.1518 The reason for this being that 
fundamental rights “overlap and are interconnected”1519 in many, if not most 
                                            
1512
 De Vos 2001 (17) SAJHR 258 at 264 notes that, “[i]f one accepts that the Constitution encompasses 
a transformative vision ... then it becomes difficult not to accept that the various rights in the Bill of Rights 
must be viewed as interdependent, interrelated and mutually supporting”. The normative value system of 
the Constitution informs the interdependence of the fundamental rights as the common denominator.  
1513
 De Vos 2001 (17) SAJHR 258 at 264. 
1514
 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 7 fn 30. 
1515
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 8. 
1516
 The former was included as a compromise. See Chapter Two, part 2 4. The latter’s uniqueness lies in 
the fact that a constitution in principle sets out to regulate the exercise of public power. If not viewed 
within the context of South Africa’s particular history, such a specific provision for just administrative 
action is superfluous. See Pillay 2005 (20) SAPL 413 at 414 with reference to Farina 2004 (19) SAPL 489 
at 499. Cf Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 8. 
1517
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). 
1518
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 31. 
1519
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 31. 
Admittedly not all rights have a reconcilable normative basis (such as found in the relationship between 
ss 23 and 33 of the Constitution) to justify the application of the doctrine of normative interdependence. 
Some rights-relationships may call for considerations of normative pluralism (what Van der Walt 2008 (1) 
CRR 77 at 88 explains as indicative of a “conflict between two opposing normative values or ideologies”). 
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instances.1520 The legal justification for judicial reliance on normative interdependence 
of human rights is therefore rooted in the Constitution.1521 In relying on the idea of 
normative hybridity,1522 Sachs J in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd1523 
identified “[t]he idea of permeability … as one means of giving practical legal effect to 
the abstract doctrine of interdependence”.1524 The hybridity of concepts or norms 
propagated by Sachs J is an inherent and crucial element of the permeable pragmatism 
                                                                                                                                            
Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129 at 132, in commenting on Van der Walt’s argument, explains that where 
normative pluralism is present the judiciary will be required to consider “the tension between stability and 
transformation” calling into consideration the subsidiarity theory. An in-depth analysis of normative 
pluralism (and the subsidiarity principle as far as it relates to competing rights or legislation) falls outside 
the scope of this study, which (as explained in Chapter One) focuses on a specific rights-relationship 
where normative interdependence (and its requirement of normative unity) is argued to be present. It can 
however be stated in passing that in denying the normative interdependent nature of ss 23 and 33 of the 
Constitution (as Chapters Five and Six clearly reflects) by means of arguments based on conceptual 
formalism, the judiciary may be creating false impressions of normative pluralism and attract unnecessary 
stability/transformation tension questions. The normative relationship between ss 23 and 33 as described 
within this study does not require a “patchwork compromise”. See Van der Walt 2008 (1) CRR 77 at 87. 
1520
 See Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 
31. 
1521
 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 148, Sachs J stated: 
“Acceptance of hybridity is based on the fact that protected rights in a constitutional democracy overlap, 
intersect and mutually reinforce each other. Though, in particular factual situations, the interest secured 
by the rights might collide, there can be no intrinsic or categorical incompatibility between the rights 
themselves. Courts should not feel obliged to obliterate one right through establishing the categorical or 
classificatory pre-eminence of another. On the contrary, the task of the courts is to seek wherever 
possible to balance and reconcile the constitutional interests involved. In this endeavour, the courts will 
be strongly guided by the constitutional values at stake.” Emphasis added. 
1522
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 142. 
1523
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
1524
 Permeability is defined by Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 771 as “the openness of a treaty 
[or legislation] dealing with one category of human rights to having its norms used as vehicles for the 
direct or indirect protection of norms of another treaty [or legislation] dealing with a different category of 
human rights”. The idea of interdependence and permeability (as understood by Scott, as well as Sachs J 
in his Sidumo-judgment) has also been referred to as “connexity” and linked to the idea of social justice. 
See Hudson Towards a Just Society: Law, Labour and Legal Aid 107 – 117. 
  
 
269 
of the doctrine of interdependence.1525 The emphasis placed on the theoretical doctrine 
of interdependence and its operational alter ego of permeability is not a new idea for the 
Constitutional Court, but has now presented itself with the potential to pierce the 
formalistic veil separating the true relationship between labour and administrative law.  
Interdependence (and permeability) was first acknowledged by the Constitutional Court 
in NCGLE v Minister of Justice,1526 where Ackermann J emphasised the 
inappropriateness of the separation of and pecking order approach to rights based on 
the outdated assumption that “rights have to be compartmentalised and then ranked in 
descending value”.1527 This interdependent perspective is supported by the reality that 
multiple violations of the rights of a specific person, group or society as a whole can 
take place simultaneously:1528 
Human rights are better approached and defended in integrated rather than a 
disparate fashion. The rights must fit the people, not the people the rights. 
This requires looking at rights and their violations from a person-centred 
rather than a formula-based position, and analysing them contextually rather 
than abstractly.1529 
As a result, Ackerman J approved a contextual approach to the interdependent 
application of rights. The judge recognised that “[o]ne consequence of an approach 
based on context and impact would be the acknowledgment that”1530 the grounds and 
                                            
1525
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 771 explains that hybrid norms are “[n]orms that overlap, 
either implicitly as a product of the interpretative process or explicitly on the face of the textual provisions, 
[and] are particularly relevant”. 
1526
 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC). 
1527
 NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 112. The case specifically called for 
the consideration of the interdependence of the rights of equality and dignity, as the arguments before the 
court concerned the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws. Although the context and rights under 
consideration do not directly relate to ss 23 and 33, the general legal reasoning impacts on every case 
concerning fundamental rights. 
1528
 See NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 112. 
1529
 NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 112. 
1530
 NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 113. 
  
 
270 
values underlying rights can intersect,1531 so that those rights call for evaluation in a 
unified fashion and “not separately and abstractly”.1532 
Following this initial endorsement of the doctrine of interdependence, the effective 
promotion and protection of socio-economic rights have since called on the 
Constitutional Court to acknowledge the interdependence of human rights in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom1533 and Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development.1534 As socio-economic 
and labour rights traditionally share the status of second generation rights, the 
Constitutional Court’s acceptance of the interdependence of fundamental rights in the 
socio-economic context is informative and holds specific significance for the 
development of labour law. The Labour Court has specifically identified labour law as an 
area of the law that gives expression to socio-economic rights: 
Labour and employment law under the Constitution compels a mind shift 
from a linear common law approach to a polycentric socio-economic 
approach. After all, labour rights fall under the broad family of socio-
economic rights. Not to treat them as such would defeat the aims of the 
Constitution.1535 
                                            
1531
 In Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 49, Ackerman J also 
made the argument that individual constitutional values are interdependent in giving substance to each 
other in the same manner in which values inform rights as the basis of the interdependence of human 
rights: “Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and 
fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an abstraction … Although 
freedom is indispensable for the protection of dignity, it has an intrinsic constitutional value of its own. It is 
likewise the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched. Viewed from this 
perspective, the starting point must be that an individual’s right to freedom must be defined as widely as 
possible, consonant with a similar breadth of freedom for others.” 
1532
 NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 113. 
1533
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
1534
 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  
1535
 Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 27. Emphasis added. The 
Constitutional Court on numerous occasions emphasised the importance of the concept of 
reasonableness in determining whether socio-economic rights have been infringed. See Steinberg 2006 
(123) SALJ 264 at 276. It is only logical that the labour rights (as a variation of socio-economic rights) 
should embrace a similar reasonableness perspective in the evaluation of fair labour practices. 
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Administrative law does not stand unaffected by the development of the doctrine of 
interdependence as it relates to socio-economic rights. In fact, it is in the socio-
economic contexts where it is most evident that administrative law’s general principles 
are remarkably invasive and “permeate virtually every facet of the legal system”.1536 The 
relationship between the right to just administrative action and socio-economic rights 
illustrates that, depending on the context of the case, rights in the Bill of Rights are 
mutually supportive, as “different rights will often operate in support of each other, since 
the realisation of one right may be dependent on the realisation of another”.1537  
Constitutional jurisprudence to date shows that one right can potentially have a variety 
of dimensions that renders its application in different circumstances (usually calling for 
the presence of another right) a practical reality and not merely theoretical.1538 The 
Constitutional Court has declared “[a]ll rights in our Bill of Rights [to be] ... inter-related 
and mutually supporting”.1539  
Sachs J, as the champion of the doctrine of interdependence, in Minister of Health v 
New Clicks SA (Pty)1540 explained that fluid hybridity of norms and rights call for a 
hybrid regulatory system finding application in a range of contextual possibilities. 
Accordingly, the application of normatively informed rights calls for a “difference of 
emphasis rather than of kind”.1541 The point of intersection between the rights to fair 
                                            
1536
 Baxter Administrative Law 2, quoted in Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 8. 
1537
 De Vos 2001 (17) SAJHR 258 at 264. See also the Constitutional Court’s support for this perspective 
in Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at par 67, Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental 
Council of SA 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at par 16 and NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 
(CC) at paras 31 and 114.  
1538
 See Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at par 83 per Yacoob J. 
1539
 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at par 23. Mokgoro J in Khosa v 
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 
par 41 elaborated on the growing constitutional doctrine of interdependence in stating that rights 
“reinforce one another at the point of intersection”. 
1540
 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
1541
 Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 640. 
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labour practices and just administrative action on the spectrum informs the public 
employment contextual content of the applicable hybrid regulatory system.1542  
Past constitutional cases (although not dealing specifically with the relationship between 
administrative and labour rights in a public employment context) “emphasised the 
intersection and inter-relatedness of different protected rights in particular manners, and 
highlighted the influence of overlapping values”1543 at appropriate points of 
intersection.1544 As a result, Sachs J proclaimed that, “far from promoting eclecticism, 
acknowledgment where appropriate of hybridity encourages paying appropriate 
attention in a focused way to the context, the interests and values involved”.1545 For that 
                                            
1542
 A comparison can be drawn between this point of intersection approach and the sliding scale 
approach to the determination of the degree of a reasonableness evaluation (as either rationality or 
proportionality) as developed in administrative law. See Chapters Three and Five. 
1543
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 152. For similar 
reasoning in a public employment context with specific reference to ss 23 and 33 of the Constitution, see 
Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 35 per 
Froneman J. 
1544
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 153. The 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence reveals a related rights (or neighbouring rights) interdependence 
perspective, in perceiving rights as mutually reinforcing and dependent but still distinct. Rights are 
regarded as equally important, therefore complimentary yet separate. As such, indirect permeability is 
preferred by the court, as “distinct from organic permeability because it involves the question whether a 
right ... applies to a right  ... not whether this latter right is part of the former”. See Scott 1989 (27) 
Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 783. In contrast, when considering the interdependence of values and rights, the 
Constitutional Court tends to lean more to the idea of organic interdependence and therefore direct 
permeability. As such, constitutional values are regarded as the core of the rights and thereby informing 
the rights. For an example of the latter see Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) 
and Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
1545
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 156. In support of the 
separatist approach to the different rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, academics grasp to decisions 
such as Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) for Constitutional Court logic 
apparently in support thereof. It is true that the Constitutional Court in the context of the facts and rights 
applicable in casu found that the overlap of rights called for the determination of the “more specific right” 
in determination of the “primary constitutional breach”. In casu, the court was called upon to consider the 
right to dignity (which is also recognised as a constitutional value and inclined to direct permeability) and 
reasoned as follows: “Section 10 … makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our 
Constitution, it is a justifiable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected. In many cases 
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reason formalism is countered by the application of the doctrine of interdependence as 
“more weight is given to context, interests and values [and therefore constitutional 
justice], and less to categorical reasoning”.1546 
An interdependent approach is not unknown to labour law. Labour law specifically relies 
on the variable principle of fairness as a dual-purpose norm, substantive and 
procedural, in giving effect to its constitutional character.1547 To this end, the LRA 
includes the principles of natural justice as developed in administrative law as a 
dimension of procedural fairness.1548  
The idea of the interdependence is also not unfamiliar in administrative law. Sossin 
explains that interdependence is an undeniable factor within the context of 
contemporary administrative law: 
Administrative relationships, and administrative law, ought to be organized 
around the ideal of interdependency. A fair, impartial and reasonable 
decision cannot be divorced from the needs, expectations and rights of 
                                                                                                                                            
however, where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned may 
be of a more specific right ...” Emphasis added. This argument of the Constitutional Court should be read 
within its proper context and permeability-perspective as explained. The Constitution specifically 
enshrines the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Although constitutional values have been 
rendered enforceable as rights in the Bill of Rights, it is logical that in certain circumstances where 
appropriate they may be better promoted and protected by rights that are more specific in an organic 
interdependent manner. However, the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action are 
already such specific rights that grant expression to the fundamental values of the Constitution, and must 
be viewed from a related rights interdependence perspective. Consequently, the reasoning in Dawood v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) cannot merely be transferred onto the constitutional 
relationship between labour and administrative law. Argyriades 2003 (69) Int Rev Admin Sc 521 at 524 
explains: “[C]onvergence in some areas may be paralleled with differences in others. These need to be 
acknowledged and understood, refined and redefined over time and in several contexts”. 
1546
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 156. 
1547
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 42. 
1548
 The Constitutional Court admitted as much in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 
42, where Skweyiya J stated that while “the procedural fairness requirements will satisfy the audi alteram 
partem principle and the rule against bias ... an employee is [also] protected from arbitrary and irrational 
decisions, through substantive fairness requirements and a right not to be subjected to unfair labour 
practices”. 
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affected parties. An intimate approach to administrative law is intended to 
shift our focus from the form to the substance of … rights [at issue] …1549 
The implicit recognition of interdependence in both labour and administrative law allows 
for a purposive approach to the disclosure and consideration of social, economic, moral 
and political factors within the scope of public employment. Such an approach would 
result in the mutual interests of both parties being effectively regulated through 
maximum constitutional protection. Effective regulation allows for labour equity and 
administrative integrity to be recognised and promoted as constitutional aspirations.  
The advantage of the constitutionally enforced interrelationship and interdependence 
between administrative and labour law is found in the fact that “[r]eliance on the 
administrative justice provisions focus on ensuring that public power is exercised 
lawfully, reasonably and procedurally fairly, and other specific rights [such as fair labour 
practices] will be used to test the moral content of the law”.1550 Consequently, the 
meaning given to one right “can also be enriched by recognising and giving appropriate 
expression to the inter-connectedness between that right and other fundamental 
rights”.1551 In Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province,1552 Froneman J 
best described the impact of this realisation on public employment: 
The nature of the legal employment relationship between the applicant, a 
public employee, and the department, and organ of state, is a complex one 
that is not ... capable of exclusionary compartmentalisation ... The common 
law contract of public employment is ‘framed’ by administrative law principles 
and should include, as a constitutionally mandated implied legal term, the 
right to fair labour practices. Fairness is required in administrative justice, in 
labour legislation, and, yes, in contract too. And fairness has much to do with 
                                            
1549
 Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 854. 
1550
 Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 50. See also Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par 19. South Africa’s legal history, in a labour 
and administrative law context is evident of the law’s need for moral content. For that reason, 
“[o]bligations divorced from corresponding rights become intolerable”. See Chaskalson 1989 (5) SAJHR 
293 at 298. 
1551
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 37. 
1552
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). 
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equality, dignity and freedom; founding values of our Constitution. To view 
these interlocking aspects of a public employment relationship in separate 
compartments of their own would deprive one of viewing the whole and 
complete picture of such a relationship. And in the process, one might forget 
to ask and assess the real substantive issue at stake in a particular case.1553 
When the underlying values and norms are given proper consideration, it becomes 
apparent that the Constitution calls for a holistic interpretation.1554 The normative value 
system of the Constitution itself creates and allows for overlap of fundamental 
provisions, which in turn allows for a normative overlap of two branches of law. In 
POPCRU v Minister of Minister of Correctional Services,1555 Plasket J consequently 
declared that such an “overlap of two or more branches of law is not unusual in our 
legal system.”1556 Consequently, clear separation between labour and administrative 
law is as much a contemporary legal myth as the divide between private and public 
law.1557  
Value-based constitutional interdependence is further identifiable within the job or 
sector-specific context of public employment. In Johannesburg Municipal Pension Fund 
                                            
1553
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 50. Emphasis 
added. 
1554
 This is evident from the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 149: “The values of the Constitution are strong, explicit and clearly 
intended to be considered part of the very texture of the constitutional project [as is evident from a 
reading of ss 1, 36(1) and 39(1)(a)]. They are implicit in the very structure and design of the new 
democratic era. The letter and the spirit of the Constitution cannot be separated, just as the values are 
not free-floating ... so is the text not self-supporting, awaiting occasional evocative enhancement. The 
role of constitutional values is certainly not simply to provide a patina of virtue to, otherwise bald, neutral 
and discrete legal positions. Text and values work together in integral fashion to provide the protections 
promised by the Constitution. And by their nature, values resist compartmentalisation [and therefore 
formalism].” If the values that inform rights in an organic interdependent manner resist 
compartmentalisation, the character of the rights so informed cannot promote compartmentalisation. 
1555
 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E). 
1556
 POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 61. 
1557
 In POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 61 fn 66, Plasket J 
further declared: “We no longer believe the myth that administrative law and contract cannot mix.”  
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v City of Johannesburg,1558 Malan J explained that “[s]ection 195 [of the Constitution] 
expresses the broad values and principles upon which public administration is 
founded”.1559 One of these broad values (as stipulated in s 195(1)(i)) is that public 
employment practices must be based on fairness.1560  
In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,1561 Ngcobo J noted that the provisions found in s 195 echo 
the s 23 right to fair labour practices and s 33 right to just administrative action.1562 
Supplementary to s 195 and interrelated to ss 23 and 33, is “section 197(2) [which] 
provides that the terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be 
regulated by national legislation”.1563 Ngcobo J elaborated on this comment: 
These provisions must be understood in the light of section 23 ... and, in 
particular, section 23(1) which guarantees to everyone the right to fair labour 
practices. Section 197(2) does not detract from this. It must be read as 
complementing and supplementing section 23 in affording employees 
protection.1564 
This statement of Ngcobo J is proof of the fact that associated rights and, by 
implication, associated legislation can be read in a complementary fashion that supports 
                                            
1558
 2005 (6) SA 273 (W).  
1559
 Johannesburg Municipal Pension Fund v City of Johannesburg 2005 (6) SA 273 (W) at par 17. See 
also Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional Services 2006 
(10) BLLR 960 (LC) at paras 48 and 51. In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 16, 
Mthiyane JA stated that “[s]ection 195 does not create rights, but sets out the basic values and principles 
that govern public administration”. Even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has stated that no right to 
relief can be founded on s 195 values, those values can inform rights such as s 23 and 33 because the 
Constitution is characterised as a normative value-based system. 
1560
 On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Ngcobo J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at 
par 146 noted that “[s]ection 195 which sets out the basic values and principles governing public 
administration, includes as part of those values and principles, ‘empowering and personnel management 
practices based on ... fairness. These provisions contemplate fair employment practices ... 
[Consequently] dismissals in the public service must comply with the values set out in section 195(1)”. 
See Chapter Four, part 3 2 2. 
1561
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
1562
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 146. 
1563
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 146. 
1564
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 147. Emphasis added. 
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the spirit and purport of the Constitution in the promotion and protection of s 23 through 
the LRA. In commenting on the relationship between the LRA (giving effect to s 23) and 
the Public Service Act (giving effect to s 197),1565 Ngcobo J elucidated that, “[f]or its 
part, the Public Service Act which governs among other things, the ‘terms and 
conditions of employment’, expressly provides that the power to discharge an officer or 
employee ‘shall be exercised with due observance of the applicable provisions of the 
Labour Relations Act 1995’”.1566 This is proof of hybridity in the legislature’s attempt to 
give effect to the provisions of the Constitution, as s 197 is undeniably linked to the 
public administration, which in turn attracts the principles of administrative law.  
Supplementary to the principles and values in ss 195 and 197, is the fact that the 
exercise of public power, even in employment relationships, has to be exercised in an 
accountable, responsive and transparent manner.1567 These values carry great 
historical and constitutional meaning.1568 Even though it is arguable that consideration 
of those values “may give rise to and account for difference in the content given to fair 
labour practices in public employment relationships, compared to those for private 
employment relationships”1569 it does not take anything away from labour law’s context-
                                            
1565
 Section 197 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
“(1) Within public administration there is a public service for the Republic, which must function, and 
be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which must loyally execute the lawful policies 
of the government of the day. 
(2) The terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be regulated by national 
legislation. Employees are entitled to a fair pension as regulated by national legislation. 
(3) No employee of the public service may be favoured or prejudiced only because that person 
supports a particular political party or cause. 
(4) Provincial governments are responsible for the recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer and 
dismissal of members of the public service in their administrations within a framework of uniform 
norms and standards applying to the public service.” 
1566
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 147. 
1567
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
22 per Froneman J. 
1568
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
33. 
1569
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 22 
per Froneman J. 
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specific approach.1570 Contextually informed considerations of additional values can 
only enrich the development of labour law.  
The fact that labour law can embrace extension through the principles developed under 
administrative law was emphasised by Jafta JA in Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd 
v Gumbi.1571 In taking stock of labour law’s development, Jafta JA explained that the 
requirement of audi alteram partem was extended to the employment relationship in 
pursuit of fairness and justice in the workplace.1572 Consequently, allowing 
administrative law to find application along with labour law in a public employment 
context does not carry with it the potential to undermine labour rights, but rather to 
endorse and enrich such rights. 
The doctrine of interdependence is rooted in the legal reality that “the Constitution which 
regulates the exercise of all power, and entitles all persons not only to fair labour 
practices (as enacted in the LRA) but also to just administrative action (now embodied 
in PAJA)”1573 is the supreme authoritative starting point of every attempt at dispute 
resolution. This statement emphasises that ss 23 and 33 and the legislation giving 
effect thereto can function interdependently if circumstances allow.  
In summary, the normative basis of all rights and legislation reside in the supreme 
Constitution. In the case of ss 23 ad 33, the relevant norms are fairness, 
reasonableness and lawfulness with one shared supreme objective, namely 
                                            
1570
 In MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
33, Froneman J noted that “[t]he exercise of public power in individual employment relationships ... [is] 
not primarily concerned with democratic values of accountability, responsiveness and openness ... [as 
the] exercise of that public power affects individuals at the first level as employees, not as concerned 
citizens”. As a result, the judicial “scrutiny of the exercise of this specific form of public power would, at a 
particular level, primarily be concentrated on employment concerns and only secondarily on democratic 
and public administration concerns”. Administrative concerns are nevertheless present and not to be 
completely ignored. 
1571
 2007 (8) BLLR 699 (SCA). 
1572
 See Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 (8) BLLR 699 (SCA) at par 7; MEC, 
Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 24. 
1573
 Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 49 per Cameron JA. Emphasis added. 
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constitutional justice. This perspective was emphasised by Froneman J in MEC, 
Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose:1574 
[T]here is now an important difference between the present state of the law 
compared to pre-Constitution law. That difference lies in the fact that the 
values of the Constitution now underlie all law, be it public or private law, 
whether expressed in legislation or in common law. This should imply, I 
would respectfully suggest, a convergence and harmonisation of underlying 
principles when the same set of facts arise for adjudication in an employment 
context, be it under the common law contract of employment, labour 
legislation or administrative law legislation.1575 
2 3 Specificity  
The diverse range of fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are each 
individually provided for in separate provisions which allows a distinction to be drawn in 
the interpretation and application of the rights.1576 This perspective allows for a 
distinction, but it does not prescribe distinction. Within the scope of this interpretation of 
the fundamental rights, there is room for the recognition of flexibility and the 
interdependent application of the rights. Unfortunately, this constitutionally allowed 
distinction has warped into a constitutional principle of specificity that regards separate 
provisions as a directive for interpretative distinction.1577   
The principle of specificity regards it as a necessity to separate specialised rights when 
giving effect to such rights through legislation. The principle is elevated to a 
                                            
1574
 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E). 
1575
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 17. 
Emphasis added. 
1576
 It is arguable that such a separation and denial of flexibility and normative interdependence (where 
appropriately proven to be present in a rights-relationship) can give rise to considerations of normative 
pluralism which in turn can give rise to fears of normative anarchy and uncertainty which (according to 
Dewar and Amis, as referred to by Van der Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77 at 88) “can be avoided as long as 
contradictions are restricted by common purpose”. 
1577
 The Constitutional Court in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) has recently applied this 
restrictive interpretative constitutional approach in an attempt to clarify the relationship between labour 
and administrative rights in the public employment context. 
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constitutional principle through reasoning that the Constitution inherently recognises the 
need for specificity when effect is given to the fundamental rights, as a modern complex 
society based on the rule of law requires specialisation.1578 In Gcaba v Minister for 
Safety and Security,1579 the Constitutional Court identified the right to fair labour 
practices (and the LRA) and the right to just administrative action (and PAJA) as two 
such rights.  
This understanding of specificity embraces the development of set rules in terms of 
specialised legislation in giving effect to specific rights. The underlying rationale for this 
is that set rules allow for speedy resolution of disputes and effective protection of 
specific rights within a particular area of the law. Based on this perspective, Cheadle 
proclaims: 
Although the two rights and their respective laws may share similar 
characteristics, the Constitution contemplates that these two rights and the 
areas of law that they cover will now be subject to different forms of 
regulation, review and enforcement. Accordingly, as a matter of constitutional 
scope, the right to fair administrative action in s 33 of the Constitution does 
not apply to administrative decisions concerning employment and labour 
relations because those relations are comprehensively dealt with under s 
23.1580 
                                            
1578
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56. 
1579
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56. 
1580
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741. In Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga 
Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at par 93, Ngcobo J stated that “[o]ur Constitution does not sanction a state 
of normative anarchy”. The fear of normative anarchy is associated with the idea of normative pluralism, 
which in turn forces the judiciary to choose one set of values over another on a case-by-case basis, 
thereby requiring the implementation of the principle of legal subsidiarity as far as it relates to competing 
rights/legislation. This reminds of the specificity reasoning of Cheadle. See Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129 at 
132; Van der Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77 at 82. In the scope of this study, in the absence of competing rights 
and norms, the LRA and PAJA should be viewed as complementary legislation and not kept strictly 
separate based on specificity arguments. In line with this understanding, the idea of subsidiarity (in as far 
as it relates to legislation), in the words of Van der Walt 2008 (1) CRR 77 at 111, finds application as 
follows: “If more than one statute … complement each other, the subsidiarity principle should be that … 
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The ‘constitutional’ principle of specificity, as sketched by Cheadle, amounts to nothing 
more than mere formalistic categorisation as pre-constitutionally embraced by the 
judiciary. Judicial reasoning that either labour or administrative law can regulate public 
employment, but not both simultaneously because specificity prevents it, will result in 
one constitutional principle being favoured over another.1581 Viewed against its historic 
landscape, both labour and administrative law pre-constitutionally struggled to shed the 
shackles of classification.1582  
Specificity as an absolute barrier to interdependent interpretation and application of 
fundamental rights stands in conflict to the Constitutional Court’s earlier jurisprudence 
that clearly indicates that fundamental rights must be generously interpreted.1583 
The acknowledgment of normative interdependence allows for the realisation of the 
maximum protection and promotion of fundamental rights as per the context of every 
                                                                                                                                            
complementary legislation must be applied to optimally give effect to the Bill of Rights and to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill.” This perspective of subsidiarity is reconcilable with the doctrine of 
interdependence as outlined in Chapter One, part 5 2. 
1581
 See Poole 2000 (29) ILJ (UK) 61 at 65; Chapter Eight. 
1582
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 135, 142 and 151. 
In SACWU v Afrox Ltd 1999 (10) BLLR 1005 (LAC) at par 22, per Froneman DJP explained that the 
evolution from the old to the new legal system is informative in that it illustrates that the normative value 
system informs all areas of the law, especially labour law. 
1583
 Cf S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at par 14; S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at 648 – 649. 
See Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 126. In Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 105, Navsa AJ correctly pointed out that formalism 
of this kind has no place in the current constitutional milieu: “[It is a] misconception that the rights ... are 
necessarily exclusive and have to be dealt with in sealed compartments. The right to fair labour practices, 
in the present context, is consonant with the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. Everyone has the right to have these rights enforced ... In the present context, these 
rights in part overlap and are interconnected.” Emphasis added. Note that Navsa AJ made reference to 
rights protection in plural and not merely a singular right. One dispute and set of facts can therefore 
require the protection of more than one right, the protection of which an applicant is entitled too. The 
context of every case dictates the appropriate constitutional interdependence of the rights, and norms 
informing them. In a context requiring the interdependent protection of both ss 23 and 33 the scope of the 
rights indicate the relevant norms (fairness, reasonableness and lawfulness) as linked to the 
constitutionalised rule of law (and associated value of legality). 
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case.1584 The formalistic idea of specificity however counters the constitutionally 
endorsed doctrine of normative interdependence. Specificity, so understood, limits the 
degree of protection in any context, as it prescribes the interpretation of those rights and 
the associated specialised legislation in isolation. Specificity in this sense negates the 
idea of maximum protection through constitutionally endorsed normatively informed 
interdependence of fundamental rights.  
The principle of specificity may be regarded as a constitutional principle proper only if it 
is relied upon to identify the preferred particular system of law in which a specific right is 
traditionally given effect to, without interpretative consideration of other rights and 
legislation, and if an interdependent approach is not required in the context of the case. 
Maximum protection must remain the ultimate goal and an interdependent expression of 
the purport of the Constitution the default position. 
3 CONCLUSION 
The first two constitutional principles, namely flexibility and interdependence, are true 
constitutional principles and seek to address formalistic interpretation and application of 
fundamental rights. In contrast, the third principle of specificity is a relic of the past. The 
idea of specificity has judicially, and somewhat artificially, been granted a constitutional 
colour, but in reality merely adopts as its interpretative basis the formalistic reasoning 
the first two constitutional principles seek to address. 
The conflict between flexibility and interdependence, on the one hand, and absolute 
specificity on the other, places strain on the development of a workable constitutional 
relationship between labour and administrative law.  
In accepting constitutional specificity as an absolute principle, the judiciary is not 
interpreting fundamental rights within the scope of the Constitution, but rather 
interpreting the rights in isolation in the pre-constitutional understanding of the branches 
of law with which the specific rights can be associated. Specificity is undeniably present, 
as each fundamental right is included in its own section in the Bill of Rights and each 
                                            
1584
 As Steinberg 2006 (123) SALJ 264 at 281 states, this is evident from the fact that “[a] standard of 
reasonableness that incorporates proportionality, fairness, equality and dignity, is likely to offer 
considerable protection to the interests” of the adversely affected individuals. 
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fundamental right has its own historic reason for its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. If that 
were the beginning and the end of the application and interpretation of constitutional 
provisions, the arguments of the Constitutional Court in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd1585 (as 
endorsed by Cheadle)1586 would stand free of criticism. The Constitution however 
demands more of the judiciary tasked with protecting and promoting the values and 
rights enshrined therein. The Constitution requires that each individual set of facts be 
evaluated within its own unique context and that the applicable rights and their 
protective scope be determined with due regard to that context. Specificity as endorsed 
by Cheadle does not allow contextualisation to dictate the applicable rights. 
In South Africa, the values and principles of the Constitution are the common 
denominators in South Africa’s transformative community. In the constitutionalised 
labour and administrative rights, the specific common denominator is the concept of 
flexible fairness as associated with the variable concept of reasonableness.1587 The 
bottom line is that fairness (as a variable norm) calls for “a balanced and equitable 
assessment”1588 of every case in its specific context.1589 The specific branch of law and 
its associated rules should not prescribe and predetermine the protective constitutional 
scope of fundamental rights regardless of contextual demands. 
It is true that the Bill of Rights include a variety of specific rights each with a traditional 
affiliation to a specific branch of law. A specific provision, such as the right to fair labour 
practices and its associated specialised legislation, must however be interpreted with 
due regard to the ultimate spirit and purport of the Constitution as a living instrument, 
not the other way around.1590 A relative form of specificity can claim a constitutional 
right of existence if made subject to the flexibility endorsed interdependent core of the 
Constitution. In Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd,1591 Cameron J made the following 
                                            
1585
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
1586
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741. 
1587
 See Chapters Three, Five and Six. 
1588
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 271. 
1589
 In a certain context, constitutional fairness may require the application of both labour law’s 
substantive fairness and administrative law’s reasonableness to reach such a result. See Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 271. 
1590
 The Bill of Rights in turn must be viewed within the holistic scope of the Constitution. 
1591
 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 603. 
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constitutionally inspired comment as to the duty that rests of the judiciary to adhere and 
apply the Constitution:  
In a system founded only on the common law and statute, the Appellate 
Division’s findings would be judicially definitive. But the terrain of the law in 
South Africa has profoundly changed. All South African courts must now, as 
a first duty, take into account the provisions of the Constitution, particularly its 
fundamental rights provisions. As observed earlier, the Constitution is 
designed to create a new legal order in South Africa. In fulfilling this aim, the 
Constitution treads a prudent path between legal revolution and legal 
continuity … But the requirements that the fundamental rights guarantees be 
given ‘due regard’ may entail that even the high authority of pre-constitution 
judicial determination be superseded. To have ‘due regard’ to something 
means to take it into proper account, to give appropriate consideration to it. 
The phrase ‘spirit, purport and objects’ is broad and encompassing. It 
includes the values which underlie the Constitution, the objectives the 
Constitution as a whole seeks to attain, and the enactment’s sense, tenor 
and ostensible meaning ...1592 
In theory, the constitutional principles discussed in this chapter and viewed in isolation 
are uncontroversial. However, and in practice, the first two principles are of greater 
constitutional importance due to their concern for contextual consideration. Formalistic 
thinking conflicts with the spirit and purport of the Constitution. The judiciary is tasked 
with giving expression to the Constitution and its underlying contextually variable 
principles. In this vein, the purpose of Chapter Eight will be to evaluate the attitude of 
the South African judiciary (up to and including the decision of the Constitutional Court 
in the Chirwa-judgment) to the interaction between labour and administrative law in light 
of the discussion in Chapters Five and Six, as well as the principles discussed in this 
chapter. In turn, Chapter Nine will consider judicial developments after the Chirwa-
decision. In particular, Chapter Nine will consider the extent to which the Constitutional 
Court has endorsed the doctrine of interdependence that emerged from its own 
jurisprudence in support of the spirit and purport of the Constitution. 
                                            
1592
 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 603. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOUR AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 1980s UP TO CHIRWA V TRANSNET LTD 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Under the influence of the Constitution, no branch of the law (regardless of historical 
development)1593 functions in an absolute autonomous manner.1594 Both labour law and 
administrative law now carry the character of relative autonomy, regardless of labour 
law’s traditional description as sui generis.1595 Both these constitutionally influenced 
specialised spheres of law are susceptible to social, economic and political 
considerations,1596 while retaining “a degree of autonomy in relation to those systems 
that it may in turn be able to influence”.1597 The relative autonomous character of labour 
and administrative law supports the idea of interdependence in public employment as 
informed by the flexible normative overlap between reasonableness and substantive 
fairness and a shared procedural fairness perspective.1598 A normative overlap is 
                                            
1593
 See Chapters Two and Three for a discussion on the development of labour and administrative law 
respectively. 
1594
 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 
2000 (3) BCLR 118 (CC) at par 44.  
1595
 See Chapters Three and Four. Cf Jabbari 1994 (2) Oxford J Legal Stud 189 at 195. 
1596
 As Chapter Two, part 3 4 and Chapter Three, part 3 4 outlines, labour law initially progressed due to 
social, economic and political influences, while administrative law stagnated in formalism because of such 
influences. As such, both labour and administrative law are legal products of social reality. See Jabbari 
1994 (2) Oxford J Legal Stud 189 at 197. 
1597
 Jabbari 1994 (2) Oxford J Legal Stud 189 at 195. 
1598
 The identification of a contextual setting (public employment) for the interdependent application of 
fundamental rights by no means implies simplicity, as every individual public employment dispute carries 
its own unique contextual considerations. See Chapter Four, part 3 2. See also Chapters One, part 5 2 
and Seven, part 2 2 for a discussion of the doctrine of interdependence. See Chapters Five and Six for a 
discussion of the interdependent nature of the norms that underlie labour and administrative law. 
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undeniably present when fairness is evaluated in the public employment context.1599 
This overlap, as well as the realisation that public power is potentially present where the 
State acts as employer,1600 has given rise to a debate about the proper legal approach 
to and forums in which to resolve public employment disputes.  
The aim of this chapter is to test the various arguments that underlie the debate against 
the understanding of normative interdependence.1601 The discussion reflects a mixed 
judicial perspective, as the arguments do not necessarily relate to one another, and do 
not all find application in every case. What all these arguments do have in common, is 
that the judiciary has to some degree relied on these sometimes vague and very 
simplistic arguments in an attempt to solve the contemporary conundrum of the labour 
and administrative law relationship. The two main schools of thought underlying the 
rights-relationship, with which the mixed arguments are associated, can be outlined as 
follows:  
On one view any type of employment is a relationship that should properly be 
governed by labour law, including the rights contained in s 23 of the 
Constitution, to the exclusion of administrative law, the PAJA and the rights 
in s 33. On another view the exercise of public powers inevitably attracts 
administrative law as well as labour law, so that remedies are available in 
both branches of law in cases of public-sector employment.1602 
                                            
1599
 Under the Constitution, the overlap has escalated with the enactment of the LRA and PAJA, which 
give effect to ss 23 and 33 respectively. See Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version); 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
1600
 See Chapter Three, parts 3 1, 3 2 and 3 3; Chapter Four, parts 2 3 and 3; Chapter Nine, part 2 2. 
1601
 The evaluation of the various arguments is limited by the following two considerations. Firstly, 
comments as to the reading of the Constitution are confined to the relationship between ss 23 and 33 of 
the Constitution, as the core of labour and administrative law respectively. Secondly, comments are 
informed by the understanding that the doctrine of normative interdependence cannot find application 
where conflict (and associated arguments for justifiable limitations) is present. See the understanding of 
the idea of interdependence as outlined in Chapter One and Seven, part 2 2.  
1602
 Hoexter Administrative Law 194. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 128, Ngcobo 
J gave a similar summary of the current legal division. 
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The first school of thought (part 3) reminds of traditional formalistic separatism, now 
seemingly protected by the principle of specificity if left unqualified.1603 It will be shown 
that formal separatism is largely based on four questionable arguments, namely that the 
Zenzile-principle is no longer good law (part 3 1); an (over)simplification of the goals of 
labour and administrative law (part 3 2); a specific (albeit sometimes questionable) 
interpretation of the relationship between the LRA and PAJA (part 3 3); and the idea of 
“law-ousting-law”1604 (part 3 4). The second school of thought focuses on jurisdictional 
conflict (part 4). Consideration will be given to the jurisdictional argument proffered in 
favour of the Labour Court (part 4 1) and the argument underlying the parallel choice of 
cause of action and associated forums (part 4 2). What is immediately apparent is that 
both schools of thought (at least to some degree) rely on contextual difference for the 
‘proper’ understanding of the rights-relationship.1605  
An evaluation of these arguments requires, as point of departure, consideration of the 
traditional judicial perspective (part 2). Specific consideration will be given to the idea 
that administrative law pre-constitutionally only influenced the public employment 
context out of necessity (part 2 1). This perspective in turn requires an evaluation of the 
decision in Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile1606 (part 2 2).  
Following the evaluation of the two schools of thought (part 3 an 4), it will be illustrated 
that these arguments are not the only options available to the judiciary with which to 
resolve the debate, as the idea of genuine interdependence has to some degree started 
to influence judicial reasoning. Consideration will be given to the extent to which the 
judiciary has acknowledged the constitutionally supported doctrine of interdependence, 
                                            
1603
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 3. In an attempt to circumvent interdependence as part of the essence of 
constitutionalism, post-apartheid separatists hold that the Constitution itself separates labour and 
administrative rights in unconnected provisions. Separatists further proclaim that the jurisdictional conflict 
between the Labour and High Courts necessitates such an approach. See part 3 for a detailed discussion 
of the associated arguments.  
1604
 This description is borrowed from the academic work of Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 323. 
1605
 See Chapter Four, part 3 1 for a discussion of the impact of contextual considerations.  
1606
 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). 
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in the absence of normative conflict,1607 in their evaluation of the rights-relationship 
between ss 23 and 33 of the Constitution (part 6). 
The ultimate aim of this chapter is to illustrate that, when properly scrutinised from a 
constitutional interdependent perspective, most arguments supporting the two schools 
of thought appear to be judicially misunderstood and misconstrued. Although the 
doctrine of interdependence has been identified and accepted,1608 questions remain 
about the extent to which the judiciary applies the doctrine of interdependence in the 
contextual reality of public employment when proclaiming to give full expression to their 
constitutional duty to promote the fundamental rights and freedoms. 
2 TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
2 1 Necessity 
Traditionally the focus fell on common law contract-based regulation of public 
employment.1609 A paradigm shift came with the recognition of the potential of the 
principle of fairness in the pursuit of justice in the public workplace in Administrator, 
Transvaal v Traub.1610 It led to the recognition that “the question whether a public official 
is bound to adhere to the rules of natural justice turns not on proof of the actual or 
                                            
1607
 See Chapters Five and Six. 
1608
 See Chapters One and Seven. 
1609
 See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599. In Staatsdiensliga van Suid-Afrika v Minister van Waterwese 1990 
(2) SA 440 (NC) at 448, it was held that adherence to the principles of natural justice were not required in 
cases where a public employment contract was terminated for reason of redundancy on due notice. 
1610
 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). The senior hospital house officers and interns were refused (re)appointment by 
the director and denied the opportunity to state their case. Prior to the refusal, the affected individuals 
criticised the hospital’s policy in a letter published in a medical journal. On the facts of the case, the duty 
to act fairly was held to dictate that an opportunity to present their case should have been granted. 
Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) is generally referred to as an important 
administrative law case due to its expansion of the principles of natural justice and the acceptance of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation. Hlophe 1990 (107) SALJ 198 also links the case was also linked to “the 
field of labour law as it established that employees with legitimate expectations must be accorded a fair 
hearing [as far as circumstantially possible] before being refused reappointment”. 
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potential infringement of some legal right but on considerations of fairness”.1611 At the 
time, this form of reasoning was the only manner in which fairness could become a 
required element in public employment relationships in a manner similar to that 
recognised by private sector labour legislation.1612 It resulted in the development of a 
subtle form of normative interdependence between labour and administrative law norms 
based on necessity.1613 From the perspective of effectivist or foundational 
interdependence,1614 administrative law fairness at the time rendered fair labour 
practices less illusionary in a public employment context.1615 This influence was 
reflected in the reasoning of the Appellate Division in Administrator, Transvaal v 
Zenzile:1616 
The fact that by the law of contract an indisputable right may have accrued to 
an employer to dismiss his employee does not, for the purposes of 
                                            
1611
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 601. Emphasis added. See Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 
(4) SA 731 (A) at 840. Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186 at 192 comments that “Traub … invites the courts to 
extend procedural protection to cases, such as those involving some dismissals, where the facts ‘cry out’ 
[in the words of Corbett CJ] for a legal remedy”. Judicial review was accepted out of necessity. Although 
Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 states that “[i]t is trite law that the position of ... [public] employees differs 
from that of their common-law counterparts in that they can challenge a decision to dismiss them in terms 
of the ordinary principles of judicial review”, this cannot justify the classification of public employment as a 
status distinguishable from private employment. 
1612
 At the time, the State as employer and public employees were susceptible to legislative exclusion. 
See Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1987 at 1989; Chapter Two, part 2 3. 
1613
 See Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 780. See also Raz 1984 (93) Mind 194 at 198 as 
referred to by Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 781 fn 32. The idea of necessity first required a link 
to already acknowledged norms of administrative law and then expansion into employment aspects. 
1614
 Scott 1989 (27) Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 780 – 781 explains that effectivist or foundational 
interdependence is present where “[t]o protect right x will mean directly protecting right y.” 
Interdependence of this nature can only be practically possible if there is a “degree of explicit overlap”. 
See Chapter One. 
1615
 In the legal relationship under consideration, fairness (as linked to considerations of lawfulness and 
reasonableness) pre-constitutionally provided the basis for interdependent protection, and today it 
continues to do so in pursuit of constitutional justice. 
1616
 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). The case concerned the dismissal of hospital employees who partook in a work-
stoppage. They were issued an ultimatum to return by a certain time. The employees refused and were 
summarily dismissed without being afforded a hearing.  
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administrative law, mean that the requirements of natural justice can have no 
application in relation to the actual exercise of such right. And when ... the 
exercise of the right to dismiss is disciplinary, the requirements of natural 
justice are clamant.1617 
2 2 The Zenzile-Principle 
In Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile,1618 the Appellate Division revealed a judicial 
awareness of the legal necessity1619 to recognise the interrelatedness of administrative 
and labour law,1620 when contextually so required. The Zenzile-judgment therefore had 
two dimensions, one pragmatic (based on necessity) and the other rooted in law. The 
extension of fairness as a creative solution to address the exclusion of public 
employees from fair labour practice regulation was only possible because of the 
existence and presence of a specific legal fact, namely the presence of public power in 
employment decisions of the State (acting as employer). 
Due to the fact that the Zenzile-case was decided on specific employment facts (the 
summary termination of employment without a hearing in reaction to a work stoppage), 
it did not “give unambiguous guidance on the scope of public-sector employees’ 
procedural rights”1621 for dismissals based on other reasons1622 and notice 
requirements. It did show potential for extension, due to the flexible nature of the 
                                            
1617
 Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 36 per Hoexter JA. In terms of this pre-
constitutional statement, the law of contract may grant/create the rights, but does not play the primary 
role in the regulation of the rights. Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 603 explains that “[t]he disciplinary 
element of an administrative action ha[d] been singled out primarily for purposes of extending the scope 
of the audi principle beyond the restrictions imposed by the ‘prior-rights’ doctrine and the equally 
stultifying principle that audi did not find application in a contractual context”. 
1618
 1991 (1) SA 21 (A). 
1619
 Necessity is a characteristic of organic or direct interdependence. See Chapter One and Chapter 
Seven, part 2 2. 
1620
 Although the court referred to contract law, it must be kept in mind that the mere presence of a 
contract in an employment relationship is merely evidence of the creation of such a relationship and does 
not characterise it. See Chapter Two, part 3 2 where it is explained that an employment relationship 
carries a status different from that existing between ordinary contracting parties. 
1621
 Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 604. 
1622
 For example, redundancy instead of discipline. This illustrates the unavoidable influence of context. 
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concept of fairness.1623 The Zenzile-judgment ignited a judicial debate1624 about the 
development and application of the principles of natural justice beyond mere summary 
dismissal.1625 It called for consideration of the broader potential of the principle of 
fairness (and associated norms), as found in administrative law,1626 in the context of 
dismissal disputes.1627  
In Administrator, Transvaal v Theletsane,1628 the Appellate Division expanded on its 
understanding of fairness by accepting that the scope thereof is dependent on the 
circumstance of every case.1629 Didcott J, in Sibiya v Administrator, Natal1630 found that 
it could also be reasoned, on principle or logic, that fairness requires the extension of 
the Zenzile-principle to all terminations of employment regardless of the form of notice 
                                            
1623
 See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 237 at 244; Olivier 1994 (9) SAPL 50 at 56. 
1624
 See Sibiya v Administrator, Natal 1991 (12) ILJ 530 (D) at 532 per Didcott J.  
1625
 See Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 600. 
1626
 Fairness considerations were contextualised as administrative law principles in a pre-constitutional 
effort to grant public employees access to civil courts for decisions akin to unfair labour practices, 
because the previous LRA denied public employees access to the Industrial Court and its equity 
jurisdiction. See Chapter Two, part 2 3. 
1627
 Reasons varied from breach of contract (Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A)), 
redundancy (Staatsdiensliga van Suid-Afrika v Minister van Waterwese 1990 (2) SA 440 (NC) to 
misconduct. See Grogan 1992 (109) SALJ 186 at 192. 
1628
 1991 (2) SA 192 (A). In this case, the respondents sought and order declaring their dismissal for their 
participation in a stay-away unlawful, in the absence of the opportunity to state their case in a hearing 
prior to their dismissal.  
1629
 In Administrator, Transvaal v Theletsane 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) at 209, the Appellate Division stated 
that “[n]o specific, all-encompassing test can be laid down for determining whether a hearing is fair – 
everything will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case”. In Nkomo v Administrator, Natal 
1991 (12) ILJ 521 (N) at 527 (a case where it was held unfair to give written ultimatum letters to illiterate 
employees, without verbal explanation that their participation in an illegal strike would lead to dismissal), 
Page J explained that “[t]he courts have been careful not to lay down fixed parameters for the type of 
hearing required by the audi alteram partem rule as the question of whether a particular hearing was a 
fair one depends on the circumstances of each case”. See also Hersch 1993 (14) ILJ 1131 at 1135; 
Olivier 1994 (9) SAPL 50 at 57; SA Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (A) at 13 
per Milne JA. 
1630
 1991 (2) SA 591 (D). The services of employees (employed temporarily in a full-time capacity) were 
terminated on one month’s notice, without the opportunity to make representations prior to the decision. 
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or reason.1631 It was held that an approach to the contrary would disregard the 
requirement of lawfulness where the State exercises its right to dismiss, which depends 
“on the way in which it was exercised, [and] on the procedure that was then 
followed”.1632  
The Zenzile-approach by no means ignored the reality that at the time the judiciary 
relied on administrative law principles to regulate employment relationships in the public 
sector.1633 Didcott J in Sibiya v Administrator, Natal1634 admitted this, by declaring that a 
contemplated invasion of the right of public servants was “sufficient in the field of 
employment to bring the rule [of procedural fairness] into operation”.1635 On appeal, the 
court clearly identified the justification for reliance on administrative law principles in the 
sphere of public employment to be, “[a]s in the Zenzile case ... [the fact that] the 
employer was a public authority whose decision to dismiss involved the exercise of a 
                                            
1631
 See Sibiya v Administrator, Natal 1991 (2) SA 591 (D) at 593. See also Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599 
at 600 for a summary of Didcott J’s Sibiya-reasoning.  
1632
 Sibiya v Administrator, Natal 1991 (2) SA 591 (D) at 593.  
1633
 See Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1987 at 1989; Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 
(4) SA 731 (A); Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A); Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 
(4) SA 532 (A). Although within the public sector context the audi principles were nevertheless found to 
protect the idea of fairness in an employment relationship, the Appellate Division did not identify it as an 
administrative law relationship for purposes of the application of the principle. It was merely argued that 
the employer in the employment relationship was a public authority, which attracted the principles of 
natural justice to employment decisions in that context. Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1987 
at 1989 explain that the historic context of these cases necessitated administrative law reasoning within 
the context of the public employment relationship. It was therefore the context, not the nature of the 
relationship, which influenced the court’s reasoning. See Chapter Four, parts 3 1 and 3 2. 
1634
 1991 (2) SA 591 (D). The services of employees (employed temporarily in a full-time capacity) were 
terminated on one month’s notice. The employees were not granted the opportunity to make 
representations at a hearing prior to the decision to dismiss them being taken. 
1635
 Sibiya v Administrator, Natal 1991 (2) SA 591 (D) at 593. Emphasis added. The reasoning of Grogan 
1991 (108) SALJ 599 at 606 is questionable, as he argues that the judgment placed public employment 
relationships “squarely where it belongs – in the domain of administrative law”. It is submitted, that  
Didcott J merely reasoned that administrative law principles logically found application within “the field of 
employment” due to the normative interdependence present (at that stage not yet expressly 
acknowledged), as it was appropriate in the context of such cases.  
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public power”.1636 Through this statement, the court revealed the crux of the general 
Zenzile-principle: It is not the fact that one is dealing with a public employee that attracts 
the underlying ideals of the rule of law (and administrative law), but that a public 
employer exercises public power while being party to the employment relationship. 
Although the pragmatic considerations underlying the extension of fairness may no 
longer exist (as public employees are now included in legislation dealing with fair labour 
practice), the legal fact (and the associated Zenzile-principle) remains intact when 
viewed against the background of our Constitution.  
3 FORMALISTIC SEPARATISM 
Those jurists wishing to maintain a separation between labour and administrative law 
and the associated rights generally rely on four arguments: the inapplicability of the 
Zenzile line of cases, the goal of labour law (as expressed in the LRA), the 
interpretation of statutes and the idea that the applicability of labour law cancels out the 
applicability of administrative law. Although these arguments are not necessarily related 
or collectively relied upon in practice, the rationale behind each remains the same, 
namely separatism. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the strength of each argument. 
3 1 The Apparently Unnecessary Zenzile Line of Decisions 
Zenzile-type cases are widely relied upon as justification for the presence of 
administrative law within the regulatory framework of public employment disputes,1637 
                                            
1636
 Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A) at 539. Emphasis added. 
1637
 Preceding the Zenzile-judgment was the case of Administrator, Orange Free State v Mokopanele 
1990 (3) SA 780 (A), in which the Appellate Division was granted the opportunity (in the context of strike 
dismissals) to decide on the legal status of public employees. Grogan 1991 (12) ILJ 1 labels it “a test 
case of considerable importance”. The respondent employees (contractually employed as cleaners) 
refused to work until hospital authorities recognised their trade union. They were presented with dismissal 
ultimatums. The respondents returned to work, but were nonetheless dismissed for their participation in 
the strike. Following the reasoning of the judgment in Mokoena v Administrator of Transvaal 1988 (4) SA 
912 (W), the court a quo set aside the dismissals as wrongful and unlawful. See Grogan 1991 (12) ILJ 1 
at 2 – 3. In Administrator, Orange Free State v Mokopanele 1990 (3) SA 780 (A) at 783, the court (taking 
into consideration the court a quo judgment of Van Coller J in Mokopanele v Administrateur, Oranje 
Vrystaat 1988 (9) ILJ 779 (O)) in determining the scope of the application of the principles of natural 
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as it reveals a pre-constitutional call for the avoidance of formalistic categorisation.1638 It 
is therefore logical that those supporting a separation between labour and 
administrative law will proclaim that administrative law considerations have no place in 
the regulation of public employment, as “any type of employment is a relationship that 
should properly be governed by labour law”.1639 This perspective flows from the judicial 
tendency to regard administrative law “as removed from those legal relations that 
govern private and commercial affairs, such as marriage, property, contract and 
companies”.1640 Corder points out that this is a mistaken judicial attitude “to which only 
the wilfully blind continue to adhere”,1641 as the public/private divide or statutory/contract 
distinction in employment relationships and disputes “rests on historical accident rather 
than any point in principle”.1642 It is illogical to classify employment relationships and 
disputes as only having a private law character due to the presence of contractual 
considerations. Those that seek to exclude administrative law principles from public 
employment rely on the absence of public power, an approach premised on continued 
adherence to the orthodox public/private divide in the determination or categorisation of 
employment relationships and disputes.1643 Two such examples can be found in PSA 
                                                                                                                                            
justice reflected upon the fact that the dismissals were given by a statutorily authorised body. The 
following considerations were highlighted: (1) This was not a pure case of a master and servant 
relationship since the action taken against the applicants was based solely on statutory powers. (2) The 
discharge of any worker necessarily affected his or her rights and the applicants were therefore entitled to 
be heard before being summarily discharged. (3) Even leaving aside the applicants' pension rights, non-
observance of the rules of natural justice can render a discharge unlawful. The failure of the 
administration to grant the applicants and opportunity to be heard rendered the dismissals invalid. 
1638
 This is clear from the court’s refusal to regard public employment as classified as and regulated by 
‘purely’ one area of law, be it contract, labour or administrative law. According to Baxter 1979 (96) SALJ 
607 at 610 and 627, the judiciary already pre-Zenzile started moving away from a traditional approach of 
forced classification towards a flexible and functional approach of contextual conceptualism. 
1639
 Hoexter Administrative Law 194. See for example Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG 
Sendingkerk van Suid-Afrika 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) and Turner v Jocky Club of South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 
(A) for examples of the impact of the principle of natural justice on the private employment sector. 
1640
 Corder 1989 (5) SAJHR 1. 
1641
 Corder 1989 (5) SAJHR 1. 
1642
 Fredman and Morris State as Employer 268. 
1643
 Within the scope of this study, the public/private divide argument must not be read as an attack on 
the fact that the definition of administrative action is primarily based on the identification of public power, 
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obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture1644 and SAPU v National Commission of the South 
African Police Service,1645 in which the Labour Court reverted to the public/private 
divide and associated compartmentalisation that the Zenzile- and Sibiya-judgments 
attempted to avoid.   
In PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture,1646 Pillay J held that administrative and 
labour law are mutually exclusive as public law considerations (as associated with 
public power) are irreconcilable with labour law.1647 In SAPU v National Commission of 
the South African Police Service,1648 Murphy AJ found inspiration in this divisional 
approach.1649 
                                                                                                                                            
as required by PAJA and endorsed by the Constitutional Court. What is regarded as questionable, and 
even outdated, is the argument that the character of an employment relationship must be categorised as 
private and not public on the understanding that the contract law basis renders it purely private giving rise 
to the assumption that public power (and therefore administrative action) is absent, rendering (public) 
administrative law considerations irrelevant. 
1644
 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC). 
1645
 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC). 
1646
 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC). The union contended (on behalf of the applicant) that the respondent’s 
refusal to promote the applicant amounted to both an unfair labour practice and an unfair administrative 
action. Counsel for the applicant initially alleged that the respondent failed to adhere to the provisions of 
PAJA in the process of affirmative action appointments. This argument was later withdrawn. In the 
interest of justice, Pillay J proceeded to comment on the relationship between labour and administrative 
law and the applicability of PAJA to labour disputes. 
1647
 In PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC) at par 11, Pillay J reasoned: 
“Labour law is not administrative law. They may share many common characteristics. However, 
administrative law falls exclusively in the category of public law, whereas labour law has elements of 
administrative law, procedural law and commercial law.” 
1648
 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC). The applicant saw the change in the shift system of the SA Police as a 
unilateral change to the terms and conditions of employment. The bargaining council took the matter 
under review. The applicant urgently approached the court for a restraining order pending the review, 
based on the argument that the respondent had breached the bargaining council constitution, a court 
order, a collective agreement and the rights of the police member’s right to just administrative action. This 
case is an example of the school of thought supporting reliance on labour law and s 23 of the Constitution 
to the exclusion of administrative law and s 33 of the Constitution. 
1649
 See Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 321. 
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Prior to the SAPU-judgment, “a long line of decisions had held that employment-related 
decisions taken by public sector employers in the exercise of statutory powers involved 
the exercise of public power”.1650 In the SAPU-case, Murphy AJ found the 
Commissioner’s power to determine the working hours to be sourced in statute,1651 but 
declared himself in agreement with the Constitutional Court that “the source of the 
power, while relevant, is not necessarily decisive”.1652 Murphy AJ emphasised the 
consideration of the nature of the power1653 and found “nothing inherently public about 
setting the working hours of police officers”.1654 Although it was correctly stated that 
courts have to consider the nature of the power exercised, Murphy AJ somewhat 
restrictively based his enquiry on the public/private divide approach that predates the 
                                            
1650
 In acknowledging this in Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of 
Correctional Services 2006 (10) BLLR 960 (LC) at paras 62, 63 and 69, Freund J (in approving the 
general Zenzile-principle) reasoned that the legislature in enacting PAJA must have been aware of the 
“line of decisions in which employment-related decisions taken by public sector employers in the exercise 
of statutory powers had been held to involve the exercise of public powers”. Freund J held that “[t]here is 
nothing in the definition of ‘administrative action’ which suggests an intention to alter the principle 
established by these decisions”. As the LRA does not directly deal with employment decisions taken in 
the public interest (as authorised in the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994) Freund J could not accept 
“that the extension of the [LRA] … to the public sector demonstrates an intention by the lawgiver to 
remove rights that public sector employees already had within the realms of administrative law ... [as] 
section 157(2) of the LRA ... demonstrates an assumption that the State in its capacity as an employer 
may execute ‘administrative acts’ or conduct which may violate fundamental constitutional rights”. 
1651
 Section 24(1) of the South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995. 
1652
 SAPU v National Commissioner of South Africa 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 51. In doing so, Murphy 
AJ considered Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 4242 (SCA), a case in which the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was confronted with the argument that tender conditions gave rise to 
contractual rights and fell outside the sphere of administrative law. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected 
this argument and held that it is, depending on the facts of the case, possible for a contractually endorsed 
decision or action to amount to an administrative action. See SAPU v National Commission of the South 
African Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at paras 51 – 52; Hoexter Administrative Law 176 and 195. 
1653
 Cf President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) in which a similar consideration was 
emphasised. 
1654
 SAPU v National Commissioner of South Africa Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 51. 
Murphy AJ reasoned that the “nature of the power exercised and the function performed in the setting or 
agreeing of shift times does not relate to the government’s conduct in its relationship with its citizenry to 
which it is accountable in accordance with the precepts of representative democracy and governance”. 
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constitutional call for a single legal system.1655 Labour law, as aligned with the 
Constitution, cannot function properly on traditional contractual (private) law 
considerations alone.1656 The SAPU-perspective that public employment decisions no 
longer involve the exercise of public power, disregards the jurisprudence developed by 
the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court, the initial overseer of the concept of fairness, 
moved away from conventional lawfulness consideration associated with contract law, 
and allowed for the development of labour law “beyond the contractual paradigm in 
order to explain the new relationship between employer and worker”.1657 While Murphy 
AJ confined contractual considerations to the private sphere without full consideration of 
                                            
1655
 See SAPU v National Commissioner of South Africa Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at paras 
51 – 53. Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill 2007 (28) ILJ 769 at 770 explain that the “orthodox position at common 
law was that the mere existence of a contract was sufficient to render the relationship a private law one 
which excludes the principles of natural justice”. In SAPU v National Commissioner of South Africa Police 
Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at paras 54 – 55, Murphy AJ admitted that his reasoning in favour of a 
purely private law perspective based on the fact that the “Constitution draws an explicit distinction 
between labour and administrative practices as two distinct species of jurisdictional acts ... forms of 
regulation, review and enforcement” may be perceived as “strained or artificial”. While recognising the 
unification and transformative objective of the Constitution to create one legal system, subject only to it as 
the supreme source. Murphy AJ unfortunately reverted to traditional categorisation even though he 
submitted that such reasoning may be described as formalistic by some. 
1656
 In Van Neel v Jungle Oats Company (Unreported) Case Nr NHK 11/2/170, (quoted in Marais 
Onbillike Arbeidspraktyke 12 fn 55), it was emphasised that, “[i]n order to accommodate the multitude of 
doubtful situations inherent in labour relations ... certain equitable latitude outside the strict scope of law 
of contract must ... be tolerated and permitted in order that principles might evolve ‘wat self gestalte in die 
arbeidsreg kan aanneem’”. 
1657
 Du Toit 2008 (125) SALJ 95 at 99 explains: “In Steel, Engineering & Allied Workers Union of SA v 
Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd Landman AM first distinguished between ‘the narrow contractual relationship 
between the respondent and its employees [and] the wider employment relationship which existed 
between them’. Following several contrary decisions by the Industrial Court, the Appellate Division [in 
National Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Borg-Warner SA (Pty) Ltd] eventually upheld the notion of 
an ‘employment relationship’ capable of existing outside the bounds of contract, governed by equity and 
terminating only ‘when both parties agree, or when equity permits’.” Strydom (LLD UNISA 1997) 9 
explains that with such reasoning the Industrial Court recognised the new essence of labour law, namely 
that “the contract of employment cannot be separated from the economic and social realities within which 
it comes into being”. Properly perceived, public employment stretches beyond the realm of contract law. 
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the character of this ‘new relationship’,1658 Plasket J in POPCRU v Minister of 
Correctional Service1659 attempted to bring some constitutional logic to the debate. The 
judgment turned on the consideration of the obscure concept of public power.1660 In 
                                            
1658
 In SAPU v National Commission of the South African Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 52, 
Murphy AJ reasoned that employment contracts are contextually distinguishable from tender contracts. 
Tendering was held to have a public nature and serving a public interest in contrast to employment 
relationships with its immediate objective and impact on the parties to the relationship internally. 
1659
 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E). This case, dealing with the dismissal of correctional officers, is an example of 
the fusion of collective labour law and administrative law. A disciplinary code and procedure had been 
agreed upon as part of a collective agreement (recorded as Resolution 1 of 2001). In SAPU v National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 71, Murphy AJ held that  
s 23 of the LRA affirmed the unique nature of collective agreements, as it “gives statutory force to such 
agreements including the variation of pre-existing contracts of employment, even those of a non-
unionised minority of the workforce”. In Hlope v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (3) BLLR 297 (LC) 
at par 19, Van Niekerk J stated that s 23 of the LRA “confirms the binding nature of collective agreement 
and provide for their terms into individual contracts of employment”. A collective agreement between the 
State and its employees creates a source of employment regulation. In light of POPCRU v Minister of 
Correctional Service 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 72, it can be argued that, if a public employer acts with 
the power and authority granted in terms of such a collective agreement and implements employment 
decisions in accordance with the collectively altered employment contract, such an exercise of collective 
and contractual power by such an employer as an organ of state could qualify as an administrative action 
in terms of s 1 of PAJA. The contractual power is clothed with the statutory force of for example 
Resolution 1 of 2001 and no longer indirectly linked to the implementation of legislation by an organ of 
state. On the POPCRU-facts, the disciplinary procedure from which the respondents diverted was put in 
place by a collective agreement. The fact that the employer was not allowed to follow any procedure that 
could be proven fair does not justify an argument that administrative law precluded labour law from 
exercising the flexible principle of procedural fairness as developed in labour jurisprudence. Section 23 of 
the LRA binds an employer to a collectively agreed procedure, much as s 3 of PAJA. Absent an agreed 
procedure, PAJA would have dictated fair procedures that include the minimum content of fairness (s 
3(2)(b)) as sufficient as long as the affected parties where granted an opportunity to be heard. Plasket J 
emphasised that neither in labour nor administrative law is fairness “licence to opportunistically or 
expediently depart from agreed or prescribed procedures which otherwise bind the decision-maker”. 
1660
 In POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 52 – 54, Plasket J 
found the argument that a decision to dismiss does not constitute an exercise of public power (and as 
such a decision does not affect the public at large) unconvincing. The judgment mainly focused on the 
impact of public power and not on whether administrative law rights and legislation oust labour law rights 
and legislation. Considering the public interest element of public power, Plasket J found that “the statutory 
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considering the Zenzile-principle,1661 Plasket J emphasised the fact that the power 
relied upon in that case – despite the presence of an employment contract - had a 
statutory basis1662 and reasoned that the dismissal decision had a similar statutory 
                                                                                                                                            
basis of the power to employ and dismiss correctional officers, the subservience of the respondents to the 
Constitution generally and section 195 in particular, the public character of the Department and the pre-
eminence of the public interest in the proper administration of prisons and the attainment of the purposes 
specified in section 2 of the Correctional Services Act all strengthen my view that the powers that are 
sought to be reviewed in the matter are public powers as envisaged by the common law, the Constitution 
and the PAJA”. Plasket J commented on this issue: “[P]ublic power is not limited to exercises of power 
that impact on the public at large. Indeed many administrative acts do not. The exercise of public power 
to arrest is a good example of an administrative action that would only have a significant impact on the 
arrestee and perhaps, the complainant ... [W]hat makes the power involved a public power is the fact that 
it has been vested in a public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest, and not in his 
or her own private interest or at his or her own whim.” Emphasis added. In determining the species of 
public power, the focus should not fall on the functionary, but on the function. See President of the RSA v 
SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143. Plasket J’s reasoning goes a step further, in calling for 
consideration of the relation between the function and a public interest. See Brand 2006 (3) JQR 
(Electronic Version). 
1661
 The principle being that public employment contracts do not fall beyond the reach of administrative 
law where public power is present in the exercise of an employment decision. See part 2 2. 
1662
 See the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. An organ of state gains the authority and capacity to 
employ and conclude an employment contract from statute. If the employment contract then prescribes 
the terms for dismissal or refers to the legislation regulating public employment as forming part of that 
contract, then the organ of state’s decision to dismiss cannot be severed from the public power with 
which the employment relationship came into being. See Chapter Nine, part 2 2. Since the coming of the 
Constitution, the private/public divide in the employment context has been shifted to the periphery of legal 
reasoning along with formalistic conceptualism, as it does not embrace the idea of transformative 
constitutionalism. This is evident from the fact that conduct of private persons or organisations can also 
be classified as public in nature and falling within the regulatory scope of administrative law generally and 
PAJA specifically. In Tirfu Raiders Rugby Club v SA Rugby Union [2006] 2 All SA 549 (C) at par 28, 
Yekiso J explained that it is the legal reality that where it can be said that the public has a sufficient 
interest in the decision of a private association, as it has the potential to affect the public, that decision is 
public in nature. See Brand 2006 (3) JQR (Electronic Version); Van Zyl v New National Party 2003 (19) 
BCLR 1167 (C). Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 659 however emphasise, with reference to 
Marais v Democratic Alliance 2002 (2) BCLR 171 (C) at par 51, “that mere public interest in a decision 
does not make it an exercise of public power or the performance of a public function”. 
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basis.1663 In Nell v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,1664 Southwood J 
also made it clear that s 33 of the Constitution “is designed to control the conduct of the 
public administration, ie when it exercises public power”.1665 As such, s 33 of the 
Constitution gives recognition to the general Zenzile-principle.1666 Consequently, it “is 
clear from this case and the Zenzile and Sibiya judgments that conduct may constitute 
administrative action even where it takes place in … [an employment] contractual 
context”.1667 
Recognition of the conflicting approaches in the POPCRU- and SAPU-judgments, as 
well as the cases following each,1668 reveals that the relationship between labour and 
administrative law cannot be determined by a general rule stipulating either that these 
branches of law must be kept separate, or must always interact. A general denial of 
                                            
1663
 Along with this, Plasket J in POCRU v Minister of Correctional Service 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 
54 reasoned that “the public character of the Department ... [and the] pre-eminence of the public interest 
in the proper administration of prisons and the attainment of the purposes specified in section 2 of the 
Correctional Services Act” indicated that the decision constituted an exercise of public power amounting 
to an administrative action. See Brand 2006 (3) JQR (Electronic Version). 
1664
 2006 (7) BLLR 716 (T). This case concerned the suspension of the applicant (a senior deputy master 
of the High Court) for the alleged inappropriate acceptance of gifts. The applicant approached the High 
Court and argued that the action of the department infringed on his right to just administrative action. In 
answer, the respondent argued that the court did not have the necessary jurisdiction to decide the matter, 
as the decision to review did not amount to an administrative action. 
1665
 Nell v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 (7) BLLR 716 (T) at par 19. 
1666
 See part 2 2. 
1667
 Nell v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 (7) BLLR 716 (T) at par 19.  
1668
 Ngcobo J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) specifically weighed the judgment of 
POCRU v Minister of Correctional Service 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) against that of SAPU v National 
Commissioner of South Africa Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC). Cases following POPCRU are 
Simelela v MEC for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 1985 (LC), Johannesburg 
Municipal Pension Fund v City of Johannesburg 2005 (6) SA 273 (W), Nell v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2006 (7) BLLR 716 (T) and Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate 
Services, Department of Correctional Services 2006 (10) BLLR 960 (LC). Cases following SAPU are 
Greyvenstein v Kommisaris van die SA Inkomste Diens 2005 (26) ILJ 1395 (T), Hlope v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2006 (3) BLLR 297 (LC), Louw v SA Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 1960 
(W), Western Cape Workers Association v Minister of Labour 2006 (1) BLLR 79 (LC). 
  
 
301 
public power amounts to formalistic categorisation.1669 Jurists that still support the 
public/private divide as a method of excluding public power considerations from public 
employment disputes, appear to ignore the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in AAA 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council,1670 that “powers exercised 
[by the State] in terms of contract can nevertheless be public”.1671 Consequently, the 
denial of the presence of public power (per the Zenzile-principle understanding) by 
reasoning that labour law relies on contractual considerations cannot stand.1672 Public 
power can only be said to be absent if so determined in a case-specific evaluation of 
the nature of the decision.  
In summary, it is not the constitutional aim of administrative law to advance labour 
law.1673 It is, however, the constitutional aim of administrative law to control the exercise 
of public power. The Zenzile-judgment should not be regarded as incorrect in 
emphasising the possibility of the contextual presence of public power in public 
employment decisions.1674 The impact of the formalistic compartmentalisation that 
                                            
1669
 See Chapter Nine, part 3 6, for a discussion of the Constitutional Court’s articulation of a general 
presumption that labour practices do not amount to administrative actions, along with the inherent danger 
of such a presumption inspiring formalistic categorisation. 
1670
 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC). 
1671
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 317. 
1672
 See Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 318. 
1673
 Phrased differently, administrative law no longer has to act as a surrogate for labour law in the 
context of public employment. 
1674
 Although it is true, as pointed out by Mthyiyane JA in Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) 
at par 15, that the “factual matrix in which Zenzile [and] Sibiya were decided has changed”, the general 
principle regarding the regulation of public power can still find application in the current constitutional 
milieu. In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at paras 51 – 55, Cameron JA emphasised that 
the general Zenzile-principle is based on legal logic and principle and not merely historical necessity. In 
casu, Cameron JA acknowledged the apparent conflicting judgments on public power, namely Cape 
Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (10) BCLR 1026 (SCA) and 
Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA) “turned on its own facts”, which 
required the contextual adaptation of the applicable norms and therefore did not erase the general 
Zenzile-principle that the exercise of public power attracts the principles of administrative justice. In 
Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 55, Cameron JA noted that this reasoning also 
applied to employment relationships. Consequently, it is undeniable that “employment with a State organ 
triggers a public dimension that imposes public duties that the courts will supervise”. 
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underlies attempts to oust the legal principle underlying the Zenzile-ratio has 
unfortunately also impacted on the manner in which the underlying purpose of the 
relevant legislation is perceived (part 3 2) and the manner in which rules of 
interpretation impact on the implementation of the relevant legislation (part 3 3), while 
also informing the law-ousting-law approach (part 3 4). 
3 2 Oversimplified Purpose of the LRA 
Labour rights and administrative justice cannot be simplified to justify separation from 
other rights. Such an undue simplification for the sake of an ‘easy’ formalistic solution 
makes a mockery of the vision of the Constitution. In his SAPU-judgment, Murphy AJ 
emphasised that “[t]he two rights are entrenched in two separate provisions in the 
Constitution, each with its own aims and specialised legislation (the LRA and PAJA) 
that seeks to give effect to its own distinction objectives”.1675 In Chirwa v Transnet 
Ltd,1676 Skweyiya J echoed this understanding by articulating the apparent objectives of 
administrative and labour law as follows: 
The purpose of the administrative justice provisions is to bring about 
procedural fairness in dealings between the administration and members of 
the public. The purpose of labour law as embodied in the LRA is to provide a 
                                            
1675
 As explained by Skweyiya J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 46. 
1676
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). Ms Chirwa, a human resources executive manager of the Transnet Pension 
Fund Business Unit, was dismissed after an enquiry by her supervisor on grounds of inadequate 
performance, incompetence and poor employee relations. She challenged her dismissal based on 
procedural unfairness in the CCMA. When conciliation failed, she decided to approach the High Court 
instead of taking her case further within the labour relations dispute resolution mechanisms. In front of the 
High Court is was argued on behalf of Ms Chirwa that her dismissal violated her constitutional right to just 
administrative action, as given effect to by PAJA. The application of the principles of natural justice led 
the court to find that Ms Chirwa’s dismissal was unfair. An order of reinstatement was granted. Transnet 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court did not reach a unanimous verdict. The majority 
found that the review of the dismissal did not fall within the scope of PAJA. Ms Chirwa challenged the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Constitutional Court. It was argued, on behalf of Ms 
Chirwa, that the dismissal was reviewable under ss 3 and 6 of PAJA, as Transnet is an organ of state and 
therefore exercises public power when it acts.  
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comprehensive system of dispute resolution mechanisms, forums and 
remedies that are tailored to deal with all aspects of employment.1677 
This is an oversimplification of the underlying aim of both administrative and labour law. 
Firstly, “a comprehensive system of dispute resolution” is not the only purpose of the 
LRA.1678 It is merely one of the primary objectives identified in s 1 of the LRA.1679 The 
LRA cannot be treated as a candy shop from which the judiciary can pick the objectives 
to which it wants to give effect in the application of the Act. Section 1 of the LRA seeks 
to advance the multi-dimensional purpose of labour law and s 23 as articulated in the 
LRA. The purpose of labour law, as revealed in the LRA, is more complex than 
Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ gave credit in their separate majority Chirwa-judgments.1680 
                                            
1677
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 47. 
1678
 See ss 1 and 3 of the LRA. 
1679
 Section 1 identifies the following labour objectives: “The purpose of this Act is to advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the 
primary objects of this Act, which are –  
(a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution;  
(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International 
Labour Organisation;  
(c) to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers and 
employers’ organizations can –  
 (i)  collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment and 
other matters of mutual interest; and  
(ii)  formulate industrial policy; and  
(d) to promote –  
(i) orderly collective bargaining;  
(ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level;  
(iii) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace; and  
(iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes.” 
1680
 In his dissenting Chirwa-judgment, Langa CJ (with Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ concurring) expressed 
himself in agreement with the reasoning of O’Regan J in Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, 
Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC). He emphasised that a literal rather than a purposive reading 
should be applied to s 157 of the LRA and declared the judgments of Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ to be in 
conflict with the earlier Fredericks-reasoning. Langa CJ further cautioned the judiciary to not substitute 
the legislator’s choices with their own preferred policy considerations. See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 
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The simplification also robs administrative law of a proper understanding of its purpose. 
In Minister of Health and another v New Clicks SA (Pty),1681 Sachs J formulated a 
proper description of the purpose of administrative law: 
I believe that s 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
and PAJA are together designed to control the exercise of public power in a 
special and focused manner, with the object of protecting individuals or small 
groups in their dealings with the public administration from unfair processes 
or unreasonable decisions.1682  
The primary purpose of administrative law is to restrain the abuse of public power.1683 
The requirement of procedural fairness is a tool to realise this purpose. Procedural 
fairness also forms a component of the regulatory framework of labour law. Put 
differently, a genuine interdependent approach is not stifled by the purposes of either 
labour or administrative law, properly considered. In fact, the objectives of the LRA 
encourages interpretation and application with due regard to the Constitution.1684  
Section 23 of the living Constitution is the reason for and the basis of the LRA. In giving 
effect to s 23, that right must be understood within its proper context, as an 
interdependent constitutional right. It is not free-floating and must not be seen as such 
when considering the objects of the LRA, which would be an approach that disregards 
the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution. The purpose of the LRA must be 
advanced by fulfilling its primary objects. The primary objects of legislation cannot be 
read in isolation from the purpose it is said to advance. Any person applying the LRA 
                                                                                                                                            
(2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 160 – 170; Chapter Nine, part 3 3. See also Nonzamo Cleaning Services 
Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 30. 
1681
 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
1682
 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 583. 
1683
 See Chapter Three, part 3 1. 
1684
 In Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1998 (2) BLLR 107 (LAC) at 125, Marcus AJ reasoned that 
“[t]he interpretative injunction contained in section 35(3) of the interim Constitution means that the Labour 
Relations Act must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit, purport and object of ... [the] Constitution”. 
See also SACWU v Afrox Ltd 1999 (10) BLLR 1005 (LAC) at par 18 per Froneman DJP. Pargellis (quoted 
in Schubert 1967 (16) Journal of Public Law 16) explains that the Constitution is a living instrument 
continually changing “in every age to the level of culture attained”. See part 3 3 for a discussion of the 
interpretation-based argument for separatism.  
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must interpret its provisions to give effect to its primary objects (as the means to the 
ends of the advancement of the LRA purpose), in compliance with the Constitution 
(which includes the right to just administrative action) and the public international law 
obligations of South Africa.1685 Consequently due consideration must be given to the 
advancement of economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace. An oversimplification as found in Chirwa v Transnet 
Ltd1686 undermines these pertinent considerations. In truth, the purpose of both labour 
and administrative law is completely reconcilable when properly considered - both 
labour and administrative law aim to curb the abuse of power in an unequal power 
relationship by balancing relevant interests. 
3 3 Interpretative Limitation of the LRA and PAJA1687 
In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,1688 the majority also considered the interpretative dimension 
of the relationship between PAJA and the LRA and, with strong reliance on s 210 of the 
LRA, concluded that the LRA trumps PAJA in the sphere of employment.1689 It is ironic 
that the Chirwa-majority (and other pro-separatists judgments), who regarded the pre-
                                            
1685
 See s 3 of the LRA. 
1686
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC).  
1687
 Although the discussion of interpretative rules may appear vague and unnecessary it usually forms 
the basis or point of departure in pro-separation judgments. Even if minimal, the role of the rules of 
interpretation calls for brief consideration. 
1688
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
1689
 In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 50, Skweyiya J reasoned: “Only the 
Constitution itself or a statute that expressly amends the LRA can take precedence in application to such 
labour matters. When PAJA was promulgated ... section 210 [of the LRA] remained untouched [in its 
provision that ‘if any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act and the 
provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any act expressly amending this Act, the provisions of 
this Act will prevail’]. The Legislature ... enacted PAJA without altering section 210 ... [I]t would appear 
that the Legislature intended that PAJA should not detract from the pre-eminence of the LRA and its 
specialised labour dispute mechanism.” As PAJA is constitutionally ordained to give effect to s 33, the 
practical extension to the constitutional provision, it can arguably be read as falling within the s 210 
reference to the law protected by the Constitution. PAJA does not expressly amend the LRA. The LRA’s 
specific provisions must be read in line with the Constitution (which includes s 33) and consequently the 
general provisions of PAJA, even if PAJA does not find direct application due to the fact that the LRA is 
specialised. See Chapter Seven, part 2 3. 
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constitutional Zenzile-line of cases as no longer applicable, revert to pre-constitutional 
interpretation cases to justify their approach. One such case is Barker v Edgar,1690 
where reliance was placed on the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant to find that 
each statute must be left to regulate its own subject-matter,1691 creating the 
presumption “that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the 
special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly”.1692 As is evident from 
the Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd,1693 an argument that the constitutionally 
endorsed normative content of PAJA interpretatively supplements that of the LRA does 
not qualify as interference by the former with the latter.1694 PAJA is a general reflection 
of the specific normative regulation that is found in the LRA.1695 It supplements the 
specialised provisions of the LRA where those specific provisions are silent on crucial 
                                            
1690
 [1898] AC 748 (PC). 
1691
 Subject-matter is not easily divisible, without encroaching on one or more rights through an attempt to 
separately regulate another right. 
1692
 Barker v Edgar [1898] AC 748 (PC) at 754 (cited in R v Gwantshu 1931 EDL 310). See Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 101 per Navsa AJ. In The Vera Cruz 
1884 (10) App Cas 59 at 68 (referred to by Conradie J in Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) 
at par 28) it was reasoned that “if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in the 
later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially 
dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, 
altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular 
intention to do so”. 
1693
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). The case concerned the dismissal of a security guard with a clean 
service record of 15 years, dismissed for negligence after an internal disciplinary inquiry, an internal 
appeal and failed conciliation. The applicant successfully challenged his dismissal in the CCMA. The 
Labour Court found no reviewable irregularities. On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court found that dismissal 
was not a justifiable sanction in the circumstances of the case. On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, dismissal was held to be a fair sanction. The case ended with the Constitutional Court finding that 
a reasonable decision-maker could reach the same conclusion as the commissioner (ie that dismissal 
was not justified). 
1694
 Legislative supplementation should not be regarded as interference. See Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 
(1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 29 per Conradie JA. 
1695
 It is therefore not necessary to apply The Vera Cruz-argument to interpret PAJA’s away or to fight its 
application as an indirect repeal or alteration of the LRA.  
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issues, such as the constraint of public power.1696 A shared constitutional and normative 
basis allows for such a supplementary perspective.1697 Contemporary legislation cannot 
be allowed to find application in isolation, as per the Barker-perspective in the absence 
of any element of interference or normative conflict, when one considers the existence 
of a single legal system based on the holistically viewed Constitution, as the supreme 
informative core of all legislation.1698 Froneman J in MEC, Department of Roads and 
Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose1699 accordingly emphasised that legislation (as is the 
case with the common law) “should be interpreted, developed and applied to give 
expression to the fundamental right to fair labour practices for the parties in an 
employment relationship”.1700 Such an interpretative approach does not exclude PAJA 
endorsed reasoning, but also does not grant it free reign to trample over other 
fundamental rights in regulating the promotion of just administrative action.1701  
                                            
1696
 With regard to the other normative overlaps between lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural 
fairness, PAJA cannot be regarded as an (interfering) extension if the overlap already existed in legal 
theory when the LRA (as the specific Act) was enacted prior to the general PAJA.  
1697
 As Chapters One and Seven reflects, the doctrine of normative interdependence can only function in 
the absence of normative conflict. 
1698
 PAJA was enacted in terms of s 33(3) to give expression to the right to just administrative action, 
which forms part of the holistically viewed Constitution. In commenting on the SAPU- and Haschke-
judgments, Conradie JA in Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 26 noted that “the 
interpretational difficulties to which the provisions of the LRA and PAJA have given rise can only be 
addressed by a holistic approach”. Emphasis added. 
1699
 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E). 
1700
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 18. 
This is also reflected in the reasoning of Van der Walt 2008 (1) CRR 77 at 111 as far as the applicability 
of the idea of subsidiarity in the application of complementary specialised and general legislation.  
1701
 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 89, 91 and 92, 
Navsa AJ elucidated: “Section 33(3) of the Constitution provides that national legislation must be enacted 
to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 
145 of the LRA constitutes national legislation in respect of ‘administrative action’ within the specialised 
labour law sphere. Of course, section 145 has to meet the requirements of section 33(1) of the 
Constitution ie it has to provide for administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair ... 
Nothing in section 33 of the Constitution precludes specialised legislative regulation of administrative 
action such as section 145 of the LRA alongside general legislation such as PAJA ... PAJA is a 
codification of the common law grounds of review. It is apparent, though, that it is not regarded as the 
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In short, in the absence of pre-constitutionally developed interpretative constraints, 
PAJA does not preclude normative interdependence between labour and administrative 
law. Specialised provisions, as found in the LRA,1702 must be read against the backdrop 
of general legislation through the prism of the Constitution with its interdependent 
normative value based system.1703 The LRA in fact prescribes, in s 3, “that its provisions 
must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution”.1704 This presents proof of the 
co-operative intent of the legislature in enacting statutes in conformity with the 
Constitution and its underlying, supreme values. 
                                                                                                                                            
exclusive legislative basis of review.” In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 
(CC) at paras 145 and 146, Sachs J agreed with the broad manner in which Navsa AJ interpreted s 145 
of the LRA and found that Ngcobo J too viewed s 145 broadly regardless of the fact that he (unlike Navsa 
AJ) found no administrative action to be present. Consequently, Sachs J found himself in “the pleasant 
but awkward position of agreeing with colleagues who disagree with each other … [as] the rationale of 
each of their judgments is essentially the same”. Sachs J noted that both Navsa AJ and Ngcobo J 
“unsurprisingly arrive at the same outcome ... because, in substance, thought not in form, they concur in 
the context, interests and values involved”. Both to some extent (albeit unwittingly) relied on the idea of 
normative interdependence in interpreting s 145.  
1702
 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 94, 100 and 103, 
Navsa AJ emphasised that the “LRA is specialised negotiated legislation giving effect to the right to fair 
labour practices”. The inclusion of public sector employment within the scope of the negotiated LRA was 
the will of all role players: “The State, in both its executive and legislative arms, was involved in finalising 
the LRA together with persons representing business, labour and community [or public] interests … [More 
specifically, the] Legislature had knowledge of section 210 of the LRA and deliberately decided not to 
repeal ... section 145 of the LRA ... [which] resulted from intense negotiations that led to the enactment of 
the LRA.” 
1703
 This line of reasoning is reconcilable with the Sidumo-reasoning of Navsa AJ. Navsa AJ proclaimed 
that it is possible for an administrative action to be present in a labour law context and not directly 
regulated by PAJA. It was argued, that s 33 of the Constitution informs the application of the LRA in such 
circumstances. Navsa AJ did consider the PAJA based development of concepts, such as 
reasonableness, as it relates to s 33 and indirectly applied the jurisprudence relating to the application of 
PAJA. In doing so, Navsa AJ illustrated how general legislation can be indirectly relied upon to give 
normative based expression to specialised legislation where the two instruments are drawn into the same 
context through simultaneous applicability of two fundamental constitutional rights. 
1704
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 105. 
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3 4 Law-ousting-law1705 
With the constitutionalisation of the right to fair labour practices and the inclusion of 
public servants within the regulatory ambit of the LRA, the argument emerged that the 
application of administrative law in the context of public employment disputes is 
unnecessary.1706 This perspective is evident in the reasoning in the SAPU-, Haschke- 
and Chirwa-judgments. While it is true that PAJA may not find direct application due to 
applicability of specialised legislation, this understanding should not undermine the 
applicability of the norms associated with s 33 of the Constitution.1707 Stacey refers to 
arguments ignoring such norms as the “law-ousting-law” approach, because it allows for 
the denial of “the constitutional protections of rights to administrative justice where they 
are nevertheless applicable”.1708 It is submitted that this law-ousting-law argument (or 
what Cheadle likes to refer to as the demarcation of constitutional rights and 
legislation)1709 is based on a one-dimensional reading of the Bill of Rights, as far as the 
relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action is 
concerned, as it embraces the idea of absolute specificity with no regard for the twin 
constitutional imperatives of flexibility and interdependence, in circumstances where 
there is no normative conflict in the rights-relationship.1710  
                                            
1705
 The title is borrowed from the academic work of Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 323. 
1706
 See Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 320. 
1707
 See Ngcukaitobo and Brickhill 2007 (28) ILJ 769. The rigid review argument raised by Pillay J, no 
longer poses a problem. In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 
89, 91 and 92, Navsa AJ explained that PAJA does not have to find direct application in cases where 
labour matters stand to be reviewed in terms of s 145 of the LRA, but that s 145 must be infused with s 
33 constitutional principles. 
1708
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 324. 
1709
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 at 747 – 748 articulates his Chirwa-based law-ousting-law understanding: 
“The CC has accordingly held that s 33 does not apply to decisions made by the state as employer that 
are subject to s 23 and that therefore the PAJA does not apply either. This means that if a public 
employer’s decision is an unfair labour practice either under s 23(1) of the Constitution or any legislation 
giving effect to it, then that decision is not administrative action for the purposes of either s 33 of the 
Constitution or PAJA. It follows from this that even if a dismissal constitutes the exercise of public power 
and meets all the requirements of the definition of administrative action under PAJA, the dismissal would 
still not constitute an administrative action for the purposes of s 33 on the Constitution and PAJA.” 
1710
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 2. 
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As already discussed, the SAPU-arguments of Murphy AJ are open to criticism in the 
employment context, as it is based on the orthodox private/public divide that endorses 
formalistic categorisation of employment disputes.1711 Any argument that the Bill of 
Rights endorses a public/private divide in the protection of the rights of parties to an 
employment dispute, given the Constitution’s transformative character that supports 
more rather than less protection, is questionable.1712 In the Haschke-judgment, Pillay J 
nevertheless attacked administrative law’s applicability from numerous angles.1713 
These arguments have resurfaced among commentators in light of the Chirwa-
judgment in the form of the law-ousting-law argument. 
It is submitted, in light of the jurisprudence to date, that the supporters of the idea that s 
23 of the Constitution provides for comprehensive protection (thereby ousting s 33 
constitutional protection) are in fact reacting to an underlying fear that recognition of a  
s 33 based cause of action will undermine the applicability of the LRA, which aims to 
unify both public and private employment relationships.1714 This argument fails to take 
into consideration that the LRA is specific in its provisions in giving effect to s 23, while 
s 33 and its associated legislation (PAJA) adopts a general approach. Both rights and 
associated legislation share the same constitutional framework, and due to the 
specific/general character does not create normative conflict (pluralism) if properly 
                                            
1711
 See part 3 1. 
1712
 This argument must not be confused with an argument that the Bill of Rights does not allow for a 
distinction in the manner in which rights and obligations find application in respect of private and public 
actors. It is not the intention of this dissertation to delve into arguments surrounding horizontal 
application. The focus is restricted to the argument as to the applicability of both administrative and 
labour rights (as enshrined in the Constitution) in public sector employment disputes. 
1713
 Pillay J formulated the following arguments in the Haschke-judgment: any deficiency in labour 
legislation can be supplemented by the s 23 right to fair labour practices; the s 6 review in PAJA is too 
rigid when viewed against the s 145 review of the LRA; and the rationality test as found in administrative 
and labour law is different. See Ngcukaitobo and Brickhill 2007 (28) ILJ 769 at 773. 
1714
 In truth, this argument is a jurisdictional argument that has been generalised into an argument that 
labour law and administrative law are mutually excluding. This argument attempts to preclude public 
employees from bypassing the dispute resolution mechanisms found in the LRA: the CCMA, the Labour 
Court and the Labour Appeal Court. However, the jurisdictional debate should not overshadow and 
undermine the pursuit of merit-based justice by means of the genuine interdependent normative purpose 
of labour and administrative fairness.  
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understood.1715 This allows for the substance of the LRA to be read against the general 
normative backdrop of PAJA (albeit indirectly applied),1716 while both must be 
interpreted through the prism of the Constitution.1717 
In the absence of normative conflict, Cheadle nevertheless appears to support the idea 
that the presence of labour rights ousts the application of administrative law 
considerations on the basis that the Chirwa-majority “decided that the scope of 
administrative action in s 33 does not extend to include labour practices contemplated 
in s 23”.1718 Both the Chirwa-majority and Cheadle base this view on the idea that the 
specific provision for separate labour and administrative rights in the Bill of Rights 
justifies such an approach. If the two dimensions of the Zenzile-judgment are correctly 
understood, the validity of this approach (if confined to the traditional over-extension of 
administrative law principles to protect public servants) cannot be faulted.1719 The Bill of 
Rights however appears to leave intact the core second Zenzile-dimension, namely the 
purpose of “administrative law as a means of controlling public power and affirming the 
dignity of individuals”.1720 If the approach of Cheadle and the Chirwa-majority is broadly 
interpreted to also exclude co-operative and interdependent application of fundamental 
rights, then it stands in stark contrast to the purport of the Bill of Rights that (in the 
absence of normative conflict) calls for maximum protection.1721 If, in the absence of 
any normative conflict, the presence of the right to fair labour practices is understood as 
ousting (or limiting) the applicability of the right to just administrative action, then the 
                                            
1715
 See Chapters Five and Six. See Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129 and Van der Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77 for a 
detailed discussion of normative pluralism. 
1716
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) per Navsa AJ; Chapter 
Ten. 
1717
 In terms of the doctrine of avoidance, direct application of the Constitution should not be the first point 
of call. See S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). Indirect application should nevertheless primarily focus 
on giving effect to constitutional considerations. 
1718
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 at 745. 
1719
 See parts 2 2 and 3 1.  
1720
 Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 841 at 846. This is the primary basis of the Zenzile-principle. 
1721
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Service 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 58 – 61; Van der 
Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77 at 111. 
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former will go through the same process of over-extension.1722 Labour law and the 
associated rights are simply not designed to control public power.1723 In the absence of 
the tension associated with normative pluralism,1724 the law-ousting-law argument rests 
on a “disjunctive interpretation of ss 23 and 33”.1725 The idea “that the existence of one 
right negates the other is not consonant with the principles underlying the 
Constitution”.1726 
In summary, the words of Stacey are appropriate: 
The suggestion that rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights can be withheld 
from individuals because they have other legal options available to them is a 
jarring one when viewed in terms of the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Moreover, it seems wholly inconsistent with the principle that the Bill of 
Rights applies to all law [in terms of s 8(1) of the Constitution] as well as the 
[s 2 constitutional] principle that law or conduct inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid. As Plasket J says in POPCRU, this approach fails to 
give individuals the full measure of their fundamental rights’. He goes on to 
                                            
1722
 Hoexter Administrative Law 12 appropriately explains that “[t]he constitutional recognition of a 
profusion of fundamental rights means that there is rather less work for administrative-law review to do 
than in the past: its ‘social function’ has diminished accordingly”. Administrative law is not absolutely 
ousted and labelled as having no value in its application along with other fundamental rights; it merely 
has a lesser role in the post-constitutional public employment context. As O’Regan J so pertinently 
pointed out in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 125 (with 
reference to Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 886), both the LRA and PAJA can be described as 
“social legislation of the twentieth century” when viewed against the historic struggle of labour and 
administrative law pre-constitutionally. The public consequently has an inherent social interest in the 
protection and promotion of both ss 23 and 33, as well as the legislation giving effect thereto. If the 
current role of administrative law is ousted, it would merely create a situation of reverse-over-extension 
and “we may end up with a formalist jurisprudence ... at odds with the substantive vision of our 
Constitution”. See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 135. 
Sachs J shared this concern in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at 
paras 142 and 151. 
1723
 See Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 841 at 862. 
1724
 See Klare 2008 (1) CCR 129; Van der Walt 2008 (1) CCR 77. 
1725
 Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 841. 
1726
 Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 841. 
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note that there is ‘nothing incongruous’ about more than one fundamental 
right applying to the same act.1727 
4 JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA  
Although the LRA came into operation with predictions of simplicity, uncertainty 
surrounds the proper interpretation and application of s 157,1728 which regulates the 
jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The apparent simplicity of s 157(2) has encouraged 
public servants to read it as allowing them to approach the High Court with complaints 
about employment decisions affecting them.1729 However, recent experience has shown 
that the judiciary has struggled to come to terms with s 157 and its import for the 
interaction between labour and administrative law. In his Giyose-judgment,1730 
Froneman J went as far as to identify compartmentalisation or separation of 
administrative and labour law as the cause of the contemporary jurisdictional 
problem.1731 
                                            
1727
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 324. Footnotes omitted. Cf Booysen v SAPS 2008 (10) BLLR 928 
(LC) at par 31, where it was reasoned that the “ambit of the constitutional right to fair administrative action 
does not extend to employment decisions of a public sector employer”. 
1728
 Section 157 of the LRA reads as follows: 
“(1)  Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where this Act provides otherwise, the 
Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in 
terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court. 
(2)  The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of any alleged or 
threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, and arising from— 
(a) employment and from labour relations; 
(b) any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct, or any 
threatened executive or administrative act or conduct, by the State in its capacity as an employer; 
and  
(c) the application of any law for the administration of which the Minister is responsible.” 
1729
 Some employees relied on their right not to be unfairly dismissed and/or affected by unjust 
administrative action when calling upon the High Court to exercise its jurisdictional power. See Grogan 
2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1730
 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E). 
1731
 In light of MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) 
at par 26 it can be argued that judicial denial of the normative link between ss 23 and 33 of the 
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4 1 Concurrent versus Exclusive Jurisdiction 
In Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape,1732 the applicants 
approached the Constitutional Court with a claim based on ss 9 and 33 of the 
Constitution, based on breach of a collective agreement by the employer.1733 The 
                                                                                                                                            
Constitution, is but “a transparent attempt to exclude the jurisdiction of” either the High or Labour Courts, 
depending on the forum considering the jurisdictional scope of the other. Unfortunately, the Constitutional 
Court’s Chirwa-ruling showed signs of such a denial based on jurisdictional arguments. 
1732
 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC).  
1733
 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC). The State attempted to reduce the number of teachers in its service, by 
offering voluntary retrenchment procedure. A number of teachers applied and were granted voluntary 
retrenchment packages. The applicants applied for these packages and were refused. They alleged that 
the respondents’ conduct was in conflict with the Constitution and invalid because of an infringement of 
the Bill of Rights and approached the High Court to set aside the refusal and order the respondents to 
approve their packages. The High Court regarded it as a s 24 LRA matter concerning the interpretation of 
a collective agreement and held that its jurisdiction was ousted by the LRA as a dispute to be dealt with 
by the CCMA. The applicants approached the Constitutional Court. Prior to the Fredericks-judgment, the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 (12) BLLR 1301 
(SCA) was the focus of the jurisdictional debate. In that case, Nugent AJA held that s 157(1) does not 
grant the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction over the employment relationship in general, as the common 
law entitlements of an employee is not abrogated by the LRA. The court held the focus to fall on whether 
the employee claims his dismissal to be either unfair or unlawful. If unfairness is alleged the Labour Court 
can claim exclusive jurisdiction, but if unlawfulness is at issue then the unfairness issue is incidental and 
outside the scope of s 157(1) allowing employees to approach the High Court to claim damages in terms 
of the traditional jurisdiction of the court. It is submitted that reference to the concept of fairness as 
incidental is inaccurate. The coexistence of fairness and lawfulness considerations linked to ss 23 and 33 
allows for concurrent jurisdiction when determining the lawfulness of an administrative action with due 
regard to the effect of fairness on that evaluation. Any other reading would dictate a forced conceptual 
distinction. See the minority judgment of Froneman AJA in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 (12) 
BLLR 1301 (SCA) at paras 10 – 13. The mere fact that a claim falls outside the scope of s 157(1) does 
not imply that it falls outside the jurisdictional power of the Labour Court. It merely means that the Labour 
Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the substantive merit of the claim. The context of a 
case may necessitate considerations of fairness in evaluating lawfulness. Fairness is an essential 
consideration even if the lawfulness of the decision is challenged. See Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd 
v President of the Industrial Court 1986 (7) ILJ 152 (T) per Goldstone J. The determination of the 
presence or absence of unfair labour practices involves both issues of law, as well as value judgments. 
See NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operation Ltd 1996 (6) BLLR 697 (A) at 705 and 709 per Nienaber JA; Grogan 
2001 17(6) Employment LJ (Electronic Version); Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
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Constitutional Court had to decide whether the Labour or High Court had jurisdiction. 
Consideration was given to the terms of s 169 of the Constitution that grant the High 
Court jurisdiction in constitutional matters, and found it to be conceivable that a 
dismissal can have constitutional implications, over which the High Court has 
jurisdiction in terms of s 169.1734 It was confirmed that s 169 jurisdiction is not absolute 
as the section itself, for example, provides that the High Court has no jurisdiction where 
Parliament has assigned the determination of a constitutional matter to another court 
with similar status to the High Court (such as the Labour Court). However, s 24 of the 
LRA (which deals with disputes about the interpretation of the application of collective 
agreements) was not to be understood as excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court to 
determine constitutional matters, as the CCMA (which is given jurisdiction in terms of s 
24) is not a court and therefore not of similar status to the High Court. The 
Constitutional Court found no provision in the LRA that assigns exclusive jurisdiction to 
the Labour Court in such instances and held that the High Court erred in its finding that 
it did not have the necessary jurisdiction.1735 In terms of the Fredericks-judgment, the 
LRA does not afford the Labour Court a general all-encompassing jurisdiction in all 
employment matters. The jurisdiction of the High Court in terms of s 169 of the 
                                                                                                                                            
See also NUM v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) 1995 (12) BLLR 8 (A); Majola v D & A 
Timbers (Pty) Ltd 1996 (9) BLLR 1091 (LAC); NUM v Black Mountain Development Corporation 1997 (4) 
BLLR 685 (A); Air Products (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1998 (1) BLLR 1 (LAC) (the minority judgment of Froneman 
DJP). Cf Sibiya v Administrator, Natal 1991 (2) SA 591 (D) per Didcott J. 
1734
 If a s 33 issue therefore arises in a public employment context, the High Court cannot be denied its 
power to decide the merits of a claim based on that right. See Editor 2006 22(2) Employment LJ 
(Electronic Version). 
1735
 O’Regan J in Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC) at 
paras 38 – 39 explained: “Section 157(1) … has the effect of depriving the High Court of jurisdiction in 
matters that the Labour Court is required to decide except where the Labour Relations Act provides 
otherwise. Deciding which matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court requires an 
examination of the Labour Relations Act to see which matters fall ‘to be determined’ by the Labour Court. 
It is clear that the overall scheme of the Labour Relations Act does not confer a general jurisdiction on the 
Labour Court to deal with all disputes arising from employment. As Nugent JA held in Fedlife Assurance 
Ltd: ‘… s 157(1) does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Labour Court generally in 
relation to matters concerning the relationship between employer and employees.’ Instead the Act 
provides for a careful and complex division of responsibilities between bargaining councils, the CCMA 
and the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court.” 
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Constitution “is not ousted by section 157(1) simply because a dispute is one that falls 
within the overall sphere of employment relations”.1736 The court explained that the 
“High Court’s jurisdiction will only be ousted in respect of matters that ‘are to be 
determined’ by the Labour Court in terms of the Act”.1737 The Constitutional Court 
ultimately formulated the following understanding of ss 157(1) and (2) of the LRA in the 
public employment context: 
There is no express provision of the Act affording the Labour Court 
jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from an alleged infringement of 
constitutional rights by the State acting in its capacity as employer, other than 
section 157(2). That section provides that challenges based on constitutional 
rights arising from the State’s conduct in its capacity as employer is a matter 
that may be determined by the Labour Court, concurrently with the High 
Court. Whatever else its import, section 157(2) cannot be interpreted as 
ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court since it expressly provides for a 
concurrent jurisdiction ... Whatever the precise ambit of section 158(1)(h), it 
does not expressly confer upon the Labour Court constitutional jurisdiction to 
determine disputes arising out of alleged infringements of the Constitution by 
the State acting in its capacity as employer. Given the express conferral of 
jurisdiction in such matters by section 157(2), it would be reading the Act to 
interpret section 158(1)(h) read with section 157(1), as conferring on the 
Labour Court an exclusive jurisdiction to determine a matter that has already 
been expressly conferred as a concurrent jurisdiction by section 157(2). 
Section 158(1)(h) cannot therefore be read as conferring a jurisdiction to 
determine constitutional matters upon the Labour Court sufficient … to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court.1738 
Subsequent to this decision, the legal community was left with the impression that the 
Fredericks-judgment settled the High Court jurisdictional question in employment 
                                            
1736
 Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC) at par 40. 
1737
 Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC) at par 40. See 
Nonzamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 16. 
1738
 Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC) at paras 41 and 
43. 
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matters.1739 The clarity was short lived, as uncertainty resurfaced with the Constitutional 
Court’s own Chirwa-judgment. 
In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,1740 the Constitutional Court was again called upon to decide 
whether the High Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court.1741 Unlike the 
approach of O’Regan J in the Fredericks-judgment, the Chirwa-majority did not base 
their decision on a critical evaluation of s 157. Skewyiya and Ngcobo JJ (each with a 
majority judgment) opted to consider the policy basis of the LRA1742 and held that the 
specialised Labour Court should have jurisdiction in all labour matters.1743 Ngcobo J 
                                            
1739
 See Nonsamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 17. The case 
concerned the expulsion of members of a workers’ co-operative in alleged contravention with the (now 
repealed) Co-operatives Act 91 of 1981. 
1740
 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
1741
 The applicant approached the High Court on the basis that her dismissal violated her s 33 right and 
the provisions of PAJA. The High Court accepted jurisdiction, reviewed the dismissal and ordered 
reinstatement. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the majority held that the 
dismissal did not fall to be reviewed in terms of PAJA. The applicant approached the Constitutional Court 
and claimed that she had two causes of action, one under the LRA and one in terms of s 33 as read with 
PAJA. The applicant was of the view that this choice allowed her to approach the High Court instead of a 
labour forum based on the concurrent jurisdiction found in s 157(2) of the LRA. 
1742
 Skweyiya J, who decided the matter based on jurisdiction alone, considered the drafting history of the 
LRA and found that the High Court could not exercise jurisdiction in dismissal disputes if those disputes 
fall within the LRA, because LRA based rights are linked to specific dispute resolution procedures, which 
resulted from negotiations between relevant labour role players. Skweyiya J identified that Ms Chirwa 
expressly relied on the LRA in the formulation of her unfair dismissal claim in the court a quo. He 
accordingly reasoned that Ms Chirwa had to follow the procedures set out in the LRA, as the High Court 
did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court in unfair dismissal matters. As such, Skweyiya 
J decided that it was unnecessary to decide whether her dismissal amounted to administrative action. He 
did however note that, if such a determination was necessary, he agreed with the judgment of Ngcobo J. 
Cf Nonzamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 24. Ngcobo J in turn 
reasoned that the scheme of the LRA is all-embracing and does not allow for interference from other 
courts in the jurisdiction of specialised labour forums. Ngcobo J read s 157(2) as granting the Labour 
Court the jurisdiction to hear causes of action founded on fundamental rights other than s 23 also. 
1743
 The policy reasoning on which this finding is based, does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the 
doctrine of interdependence in public employment disputes. A finding that the Labour Court cries 
jurisdictional king in employment disputes merely grants it the extended capacity (in terms of s 157(2)) to 
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placed great reliance on the purpose underlying the LRA.1744 In the absence of 
legislative intervention, Ngcobo J argued that s 157(2)1745 within the context of the 
primary objectives of the LRA,1746 allowed for a narrow reading of s 157(2)1747 to the 
effect that concurrent jurisdiction only exists where direct reliance is placed on the Bill of 
Rights in the absence of subordinate legislation. Section 157(2) of the LRA was 
declared an unfortunate error that must be read narrowly until amended by the 
legislature.1748 The majority attempted to justify this narrow interpretation with the 
                                                                                                                                            
rely on the interdependent right to administrative justice, where such issues are raised in an unfair labour 
practice dispute. 
1744
 See part 3 2. 
1745
 It is submitted that, in pursuit of the jurisdictional solution, the judiciary tends to focus only on a 
selective part of the s 1 identified primary objectives of the LRA, namely “to give effect to and regulate the 
fundamental rights conferred by s [23] of the Constitution ... [and] ‘the effective resolution of labour 
disputes’”. See for example NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape Government 2001 (4) 
BCLR 388 (C) at 395.  
1746
 In Nonzamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 29, the High 
Court summarised the reasoning of Ngcobo J: “[I]t could not have been the intention of the Legislature to 
allow an employee to raise what was essentially a labour dispute under the LRA as a constitutional issue 
under the provisions of section 157(2). This would frustrate the primary objects of the LRA and permit an 
astute litigant to bypass the dispute-resolution process of the LRA.” With respect, the reasoning of 
Ngcobo J is questionable. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to legislate in disregard of the 
Constitution. It can also not be correct to interpret the objects of the LRA in the context of its negotiation 
only, with no regard to the current context in which the living Constitution finds application. Such an 
approach shows no regard for the fact that legislation giving effect to specific constitutional rights must, in 
the first instance, be interpreted to give effect to the spirit and purport of the Constitution. Such a narrow 
interpretation of s 157(2) does not grant proper consideration to the purpose of the Constitution as the 
supreme law, to which all other legal perspectives must yield. 
1747
 In his narrow reading of s 157(2), Ngcobo J appeared to have merely taken account of two objectives 
of the LRA: the establishment of a comprehensive labour law framework and the establishment of 
superior labour courts. In Nonzamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at 
par 28, the High Court further commented on the reasoning of Ngcobo J: “The application of the section 
157(2) had to be confined ... to those instances, if any, where a party relies on the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. He added that this was subject to the constitutional principle that where legislation is enacted to 
give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass the legislation and rely directly on the 
Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of the constitutional standard.”  
1748
 The proposed Superior Courts Bill and 14th Constitutional Amendment clearly indicate that the 
legislature is aware of and attempting to address the jurisdictional problems in the South African legal 
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argument that concurrent jurisdiction would lead to the development of conflicting 
jurisprudence with the potential to undermine the ‘one stop shop’ nature of the LRA.1749 
Grogan describes these policy-based findings as “sweeping conclusions”.1750 It 
undermines the fact that concurrent jurisdiction has a very specific legal meaning. It is 
                                                                                                                                            
system. The acceptance of any Act of this nature will render the jurisdictional debate moot, and 
eventually bring to the forefront the true basis of the relationship between labour and administrative law: 
the underlying norms and values of the Constitution, specifically lawfulness, reasonableness and 
fairness. See Editor 21(3) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1749
 See Grogan 2009 25(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). The forum-shopping-fear motivation for 
the description of the word ‘concurrent’ in s 157(2) of the LRA as unfortunate reminds of the reasoning of 
Murphy AJ in SAPU v National Commissioner of the Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 55. See 
Hoexter 2008 (1) CCR 209 at 219. Cf Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). In United 
National PSA of SA v Digomo NO 2005 (12) BLLR 1169 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal however 
raesoned that “the High Court’s jurisdiction extends to reviewing acts by the State in its capacity as 
employer”. Froneman J in Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) 
BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 30 commented on the jurisdictional fallacy embraced by the Chirwa-majority: “The 
coherence of an emerging labour and employment jurisprudence is not primarily and necessarily 
determined by its development in one exclusive forum, but rather by the degree to which it gives proper 
expression to the constitutional entitlement of everyone, in terms of section 23(1) of the Constitution, to 
fair labour practices. Approached from that perspective, the question that needs to be asked is whether 
the coherence of employment law has gained or lost from administrative law insights relating to 
employment in the public sector … developments are leading to greater coherence in employment 
jurisprudence, not to divergence and parallel systems of law. If that is the case, does it matter as a matter 
of substance rather than form where the development takes place, in the civil courts or in the labour 
court?” 
1750
 Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version) refers to examples such as PSA obo 
Haschke v MEC for Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC) and SAPU v National Commissioner of the 
Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC). In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 171 – 
179, Langa CJ also expressed concern with reliance on policy-based reasoning. Grogan therefore 
reasons that “[a]lthough it may be desirable to treat public sector ... and private sector employees 
according to the same principles, the fact remains that most of the power exercised by public sector 
employers in respect of their employees are regulated by statute or regulation, and cannot merely be 
regarded as mere contractual powers.” This emphasises the argument that although public and private 
employment relationships are substantively similar in nature and attract similar regulatory principles as, 
the context in which those similar regulatory principles find application may differ. See Chapters Four, 
Five and Six. See also United National Public Service Association of SA v Digomo NO 2005 (12) BLLR 
1169 (SCA). 
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doubtful that the legislature would have opted to include the word in an extensively 
negotiated act without having regard to the legal meaning and consequence of the word 
“concurrent” when linked to jurisdiction.  
The apparent contradiction between the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments has resulted 
in conflicting lower court rulings.1751 Regardless of the fact that the Constitutional Court 
in its Fredericks-judgment ruled that even where a dispute requires arbitration in terms 
of the LRA it does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court,1752 the argument that 
administrative law principles undermine the collective bargaining component of the 
labour system has surfaced post-Chirwa. This perspective does not afford a proper 
understanding of the purpose and underlying principles of administrative law. Properly 
perceived, nothing in administrative law undermines collective bargaining.1753 In his 
POPCRU-judgment, Plasket J was confronted with an employment dispute with a 
collective character and, with due regard to administrative law considerations, evaluated 
ss 157(1) and 157(2) of the LRA and concluded that the LRA (keeping in consideration 
s 169 of the Constitution) does “not purport to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to 
determine the constitutionality of conduct of organs of state in the field of 
employment”.1754 Plasket J interpreted s 157(2) as extending Labour Court review 
jurisdiction to employment decisions made by the State, which fall outside the scope of 
the LRA and is traditionally associated with the jurisdiction of the High Court.1755 In 
                                            
1751
 See Hoexter 2008 (1) CCR 209 at 219. 
1752
 See Editor 2008 24(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1753
 In fact, PAJA acknowledges that collective situations call for procedural fairness where the rights and 
interest of individuals (through an employer’s response to their collective participation) are adversely 
affected. See s 4 of PAJA. Note that administrative law does not undermine the fact that some rights are 
obtained through collective bargaining. Administrative law looks at the adverse effect on the rights of an 
individual, and does not dissect the legally acknowledged procedure by which rights have already been 
obtained. Labour law’s approach to strike dismissals is reconcilable with this understanding. See Chapter 
Six, part 4 2 2, for an evaluation of procedural fairness in the collective context as embraced by 
administrative and labour law. 
1754
 POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 39. 
1755
 See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 39. In Rampola v 
MEC for Education Limpopo 2006 (27) ILJ 591 (T), the High Court accepted the idea of extended 
jurisdiction, but added a further dimension. Van Rooyen AJ reasoned that the High Court’s jurisdiction 
must shrink proportionally if the Labour Court’s jurisdiction is extended. Grogan 2006 22(3) Employment 
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terms of this reading, the Labour Court can consider administrative principles as it 
relates to employment disputes before it.1756 
Although the Constitutional Court in its Chirwa-judgment preferred a more restrictive 
reading of s 157(2), the majority did not expressly overrule its earlier Fredericks-
judgment.1757 This left the Labour and High Courts confused as to which Constitutional 
Court case to follow where an employment dispute calls for consideration of both 
judgments. Consequently, Froneman J in Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, 
Eastern Cape Province1758 declared the lower courts free to follow the Fredericks-
judgment.1759 In Nonzamo Cleaning Services Co-operative v Appie,1760 the full bench of 
the Eastern Cape High Court in fact went as far as to declare the two judgments 
irreconcilable.1761 
                                                                                                                                            
LJ (Electronic Version) holds this interpretation of Van Rooyen AJ to be irreconcilable with s 157 as a 
whole. Grogan supports the interpretation of Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training Eastern Cape 
2002 (2) BLLR 119 339 
(CC) and formulates the following s 157(2) interpretation: “[I]f the LRA is properly interpreted, not only 
does the High Court have jurisdiction to review labour related matters in which the State is employer, but 
the Labour Court may adjudicate such matters on the same principles as the High Court should a litigant 
place such a matter before it.” 
1756
 This perspective aligns with that of the Constitutional Court in Fredericks v MEC for Education and 
Training Eastern Cape 2002 (2) BLLR 119 (CC). 
1757
 The Constitutional Court merely distinguished these two cases on a factual basis. 
1758
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). The case concerned a dispute regarding the alleged non-payment of a 
school principal’s salary by the Department of Education. The employee approached the High Court to 
review the employer’s conduct under PAJA. 
1759
 See Editor 2008 24(5) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). In Nonzamo Cleaning Services Co-
operative v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 31, the High Court noted that Froneman J based the 
apparent contradiction on the fact that “both Fredericks and Chirwa dealt with situations where the direct 
dispute-resolution procedures in terms of the LRA were, firstly, conciliation and, failing that, arbitration”. 
1760
 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck).  
1761
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). The High Court in Nonzamo Cleaning Services Cooperation v Appie 2008 
(9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at par 39 explained: “Where a court overrules its own earlier decision on the law, it is 
customary to do so expressly and to indicate the reasons for its findings. In the absence of express 
statement ... in Chirwa that Fredericks is overruled, one must examine those judgments and the 
circumstances in which they were delivered ... Skweyiya J distinguished the judgment in Fredericks, but 
on a basis not material to the conflict in the judgments, and Ngcobo J does not refer to Fredericks. 
  
 
322 
Logic dictates that s 157(2) of the LRA cannot be read as ousting the traditional 
jurisdiction of the High Court.1762 It can also be deduced that concurrent jurisdiction 
does not bestow on the High Court the jurisdiction to resolve LRA specific issues 
reserved for the Labour Court.1763 The logical conclusion is then that the traditional High 
Court jurisdiction is extended to the Labour Court (without taking anything away from 
the former), while also granting the Labour Court its own exclusive LRA based 
jurisdiction.1764 
It is evident that s 157(2) concurrent jurisdiction includes employment related conduct of 
the State, when it acts with public power.1765 The exercise of public power triggers the 
protection provided for individuals in s 33 of the Constitution, while s 23 is brought to the 
forefront because an employment decision infringes on an employee’s right to fair 
labour practices.1766 Therefore, the alleged jurisdictional complexity does not lie in the 
wording of the section, but in the practical effect ascribed to it by the judiciary.1767 
                                                                                                                                            
Neither Skweyiya J nor Ngcobo J refers to the judgment of the Chief Justice. Skweyiya J and Ngcobo J, 
as well as the other judges who concurred in their judgment, must however have been aware of the 
comments of the Chief Justice regarding the clear conflict between their judgments and Fredericks. They 
nevertheless proceeded to deliver their judgments. It must be accepted therefore that they intended to 
overrule Fredericks to the extent that their judgments are in conflict with that of O’Regan J. It follows that 
this Court is obliged to apply the law as stated in Chirwa.” See Editor 2008 24(5) Employment LJ 
(Electronic Version). 
1762
 See Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1763
 In his POPCRU-judgment, Plasket J implicitly rejected such an argument. Grogan 2006 22(3) 
Employment LJ (Electronic Version) notes that “[t]he LRA gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Labour Court 
to adjudicate all matters which are to be determined by the Labour Court in terms of the LRA”. 
1764
 Any other interpretation would run contrary to the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon it by s 157(1) 
of the LRA. This understanding of s 157(1) does not justify a reading of s 157(2) that restricts the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court in public employment cases. 
1765
 One can therefore assume that the legislature was open to the reality of public power being exercised 
by the State when making decisions that affect public employment relationships. 
1766
 See Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 841. 
1767
 The complexity resides in the potential polycentric nature of one adverse decision that affects more 
than one fundamental right. 
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4 2 Merit-based Jurisdictional Reasoning 
Apart from the fact that the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictional Chirwa-ruling is based 
on policy rather than legal arguments,1768 Ngcobo J also delved into the substantive 
considerations underlying the evaluation of administrative action to justify the court’s 
jurisdictional finding in favour of the Labour Court. Ngcobo J found that a decision to 
dismiss cannot constitute an administrative action and consequently ruled that the 
absence of an administrative action implied that the High Court does not have 
jurisdiction in such cases.1769 
In his minority judgment, Langa CJ considered the legal framework within which the 
relationship between labour and administrative law is evaluated. Langa CJ correctly 
emphasised “that the substantive merits of a claim”1770 should not form the basis of the 
jurisdictional determination of a court’s power to hear the review.1771 It should be 
regarded as an evaluation separate from the jurisdictional question, to safeguard the 
pursuit of justice and not lose sight of the merits in the shadow of formalities. Langa CJ 
explained that the jurisdictional debate follows two (interpretative) schools of thought: 
                                            
1768
 See the concern expressed by Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 
171 – 179 with a policy-based approach. 
1769
 Ngcobo J held that the State’s decision to dismiss amounted to the exercise of public power, but not 
administrative action. Ngcobo J found that the public power in casu lacked one of the listed administrative 
action criteria found in President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), namely the implementation of 
legislation. See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 138. Hoexter 2008 (1) CCR 209 at 
224 explains that Ngcobo J “treated a single factor as decisive in a manner arguably not contemplated by 
the Court in SARFU”. Ngcobo J however appeared to regard the real issue as the fact “that the dismissal 
was ‘more concerned with labour and employment relations’ than with administration”. As a result of this 
approach, Ngcobo J emphasised “the formal division in the Constitution between labour relations and 
administrative conduct”. 
1770
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 155. 
1771
 Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 169 explained that “[t]he 
determination of whether the dismissal does constitute administrative action is part of the merits of the 
claim, not a jurisdictional requirement”. In Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 
Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 15, Froneman J (commenting on the Chirwa-judgment) noted 
that, contrary to the two majority judgments), Langa CJ also dismissed the appeal, but did not do so on 
jurisdictional grounds. O’Regan and Mokgoro JJ agreed with the minority judgment of Langa CJ. 
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the purposive approach1772 and the literal approach.1773 Langa CJ also acknowledged 
the existence of a normative overlap between labour law (s 23) and administrative law 
(s 33)1774 as far as the principle of fairness is concerned, as it is the main normative 
basis that carries both rights. The judge held that jurisdictional questions dominating the 
jurisprudence must not be decided on the existence or not of this normative overlap.1775 
It was however noted that the acceptance of normative interdependence “may bring in 
its wake some potential procedural difficulties”.1776 The possible jurisdictional or 
logistical difficulties accompanying this substantive reality (as revealed on a case-by-
case basis) must be addressed by the legislature and should not lead to the neglect of 
                                            
1772
 In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 161, Langa CJ explained that this school of 
thought “claims to give effect to the purpose of the LRA to have labour disputes adjudicated solely within 
the structures it created”. This approach tends to blur the lines between the jurisdictional and normative 
elements of the relationship between labour and administrative law. For an example of such reasoning, 
see Mgijima v Eastern Cape Appropriate Technology Unit 2000 (2) SA 291 (Tk) at 309. See Chapter 
Nine, part 4. 
1773
 Langa CJ further explained in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 162 that the literal 
school of thought only views “those matters explicitly assigned to the Labour Court by the LRA ... [as] 
excluded from the High Court’s jurisdiction”. Accordingly the reasoning of this school of thought “relies 
primarily on what it regards to be the plain meaning of the section” without being entirely unaware of the 
substantive concerns. See for example Mbayeka v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 (4) BCLR 374 
(Tk) at par 24.   
1774
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 167. 
1775
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 167. In casu, the Constitutional Court had 
an opportunity to elaborate on the doctrine of interdependence as identified by Sachs J in Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). Regrettably, the question whether Ms 
Chirwa’s dismissal amounted to administrative action was linked to the question whether the High Court 
had jurisdiction to hear her case. In Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 
(5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 13, Froneman J noted that, “as far as the jurisdiction [debate is concerned] ... 
the recent judgment of the Constitutional Court in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd ... may have disturbed a settled 
state of affairs, but ... it did not have the effect of overruling the existing state of law” that generally 
accepts that the High Court shares jurisdiction with the Labour Court “to determine alleged fundamental 
rights disputes in relation to the conduct of the State in its capacity as an employer, and civil law disputes 
arising from the common law contract of employment”. Froneman J’s respectful hesitation to follow the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) is limited to 
jurisdictional arguments. 
1776
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 32. 
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the relevant substantive considerations applicable in the circumstances of every 
case.1777 
In conclusion, it is submitted that there is no merit in the pragmatic argument that a 
concurrent jurisdiction will create uncertainty and a dual legal system in employment 
disputes. The fact that both the High and Labour Courts can arguably claim jurisdiction 
should not be regarded as an overwhelming obstacle, as “[s]ubstantive coherence in 
employment law may thus be achieved and developed in different courts, provided that 
these courts give a broadly similar effect to the underlying constitutional right to fair 
labour practices”.1778 In his Nakin-judgment, Froneman J commented that “[i]nstitutional 
control of the process can be achieved by various means”.1779 It is however primarily 
the Constitutional Court’s task to stabilise the legal system “[i]f the coherence of 
employment law is disturbed in any way ... by giving proper direction on the substantive 
content of employment law in accordance with the Constitution”.1780 
Unfortunately, formalists are “tempted to find that questions of law are jurisdictional 
questions”.1781 In embracing (albeit unintentionally) a degree of formalistic reasoning, 
the Constitutional Court has allowed interdependent consideration of the underlying 
norms as applied to the merits of every dispute to fall prey to the jurisdictional turf-war 
between the Labour and High Courts in the application of s 157 of the LRA. The 
judiciary cannot exclude merit-based justifiable administrative law considerations based 
on the factual finding required by s 157 for the determination of scope of jurisdiction. 
                                            
1777
 Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 178 explained: “The final concern 
relates to possible incoherence in the law which may develop from having two different courts 
adjudicating the issue. I do not think this is a serious problem. Our law often develops with conflicting 
opinions from different divisions of the High Court. That has not posed any intractable problems as 
disputes may ultimately be settled on appeal.” In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 44, Navsa AJ made it clear that the only tension between the LRA and PAJA are 
time limits and jurisdiction, both which the legislature can address. 
1778
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 178. 
1779
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 37. 
1780
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 39. 
1781
 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 (51) Univ Toronto LJ 193 at 199. 
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Properly construed, s 157 does not restrict the concurrent jurisdiction of either the High 
or Labour Courts with regard to adjudication of administrative action claims.1782  
5 PARALLEL CHOICE 
5 1 Cause(s) of Action 
The exercise of public power, even in an employment context, attracts the control and 
regulation of administrative law.1783 The either/or perspective propagated by the purists 
(whether from the perspective of labour or administrative law) must be replaced by a 
not-only-but-also perspective. This shift in perspective is based on the reasoning of 
Cameron JA in Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya1784 that “particular conduct may 
not only constitute an unfair labour practice ... but may also give rise to other rights of 
action”.1785  
Reasoning of this nature gives expression to the Fedlife- and Fredericks-judgments of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court respectively recognised the 
idea that employment related decisions or conduct “may give rise to more than one 
cause of action”.1786 With this admission, the judiciary granted recognition to the fact 
that more than one area of the law can find application, and possibly overlap, in one set 
of circumstances.  
Following this approach, the Labour Court in Simelela v Member of the Executive 
Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape1787 declared that “[i]n addition to 
                                            
1782
 Grogan 2006 22(2) Employment LJ (Electronic Version) notes that the legislature must have been 
aware of cases such as Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A), Administrator, Transvaal v 
Theletsane 1991 (12) ILJ 506 (A) and Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A), in which the 
Appellate Division regarded public employment decisions as administrative action. 
1783
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 194. 
1784
 2007 (8) BLLR 693 (SCA). 
1785
 Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya 2007 (8) BLLR 693 (SCA) at par 6. Emphasis added. 
1786
 POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 63. 
1787
 2001 (9) BLLR 1085 (LC). Educators were instructed not to report for duty at their school, supplied 
with a task team report on their misconduct and transferred to another school. They approached the High 
Court in an effort to prevent the initial transfer. The respondents conceded that they lacked the authority 
to transfer the applicants. Thereafter the applicants received letters informing them that they could make 
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fair administrative action, state employees are afforded a constitutional right to fair 
labour practices”.1788 In United National PSA of SA v Digimo NO,1789 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal confirmed the possibility that “[p]articular conduct of an employer might 
constitute both an ‘unfair labour practice’ ... and it also might give rise to other rights of 
action”.1790 The POPCRU-judgment of Plasket J expanded on this possibility and 
elucidated that “[t]here is nothing incongruous about individuals having more legal 
protection rather than less, or of more than one fundamental right applying to one act, 
or more than one branch of law applying to the same set of facts”.1791 This perspective 
was endorsed by Cameron JA in Transnet Ltd v Chirwa,1792 as Ms Chirwa’s facts 
triggered two constitutional rights.1793 On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Langa CJ 
further explained that “[t]he mere fact that her claims arose from the employment 
context cannot rob them of their administrative nature”.1794 
                                                                                                                                            
representations on the subject of their proposed transfer. The applicants did not make use of this 
opportunity and were transferred. The applicants again approached the court to prevent transfer and 
requested reinstatement in their previous positions. After consideration of the facts, the court ordered 
reinstatement. 
1788
 Simelela v Minister of the Executive Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) 
BLLR 1085 (LC) at par 56. 
1789
 2005 (12) BLLR 1169 (SCA). 
1790
 United National PSA of SA v Digomo NO 2005 (12) BLLR 1169 (SCA) at par 14. The statement is 
mere bone without flesh as the judgment, although widely cited in favour of a choice of cause of action 
between labour and administrative rights, was not based on the nature of labour and administrative law. 
In United National PSA of SA v Digomo NO 2005 (12) BLLR 1169 (SCA) at par 4, the court rather chose 
to add another level to the jurisdictional façade that suppresses any true reflection of the substance of the 
relationship between labour and administrative law. In ignoring substantive normative considerations it 
was declared that the claim “to enforce the right … to fair administrative action – a right that has its 
source in the Constitution and that is protected by section 33 - … is clearly cognisable in the ordinary 
courts”. Emphasis added.  
1791
 POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 60. 
1792
 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA). 
1793
 See Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 57. 
1794
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 173. Langa CJ emphasised the equal 
constitutional importance of and access to labour and administrative rights in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 
(2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 175, as “[a] litigant is entitled to full protection of both rights, even when they 
seem to cover the same ground”. 
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The jurisprudential admission that an applicant has a choice in cause of action (in that 
the public employee can rely on either the right to fair labour practices or the right to just 
administrative action or even both if he or she so chooses) is proof of the underlying 
normative interdependence in the relationship between labour and administrative 
law.1795  
In his Chirwa-judgment, Ngcobo J (in contrast to the reasoning of Langa CJ) noted 
disagreement “with the view that a public sector employee, who challenges the manner 
in which a disciplinary hearing that resulted in his or her dismissal [was conducted], has 
two causes of action, one flowing from the LRA and another from ... PAJA”.1796 It is 
submitted that this argument restricts the protective spirit of the Constitution based on 
Ngcobo J’s perceived intention behind the enactment of the LRA.1797 
Ngcobo J did not expressly address the fact that the LRA is silent on the regulation of 
public power in public employment decisions, other than the references to public 
employment in ss 157(2) and 158(1)(h) of the Act. As such, it can hardly be said that 
the LRA comprehensively usurps the function of administrative law, thereby not 
requiring reliance on normative based interdependence and compatible aims to restrain 
the abuse of power. It is simply a matter of the presence of public power contextually 
calling for additional regulation and constraint. That employer merely happens to be an 
organ of State, which in turn attracts constitutional scrutiny in terms of the rule of law. It 
is not a case of differential treatment based on superficial ideas about status or 
                                            
1795
 See Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 
48 per Froneman J. 
1796
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 149. 
1797
 Ngcobo J articulated his perspective in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 148 
and 149 as follows: “Labour and employment rights such as the right to a fair hearing, substantive 
fairness and remedies for non-compliance are now codified in the LRA. It is no longer necessary, 
therefore, to treat public sector employees differently and subject them to the protection of administrative 
law ... The starting point under our Constitution is that all workers should be treated equally and any 
deviation from this principle should be justified. There is no reason in principle why public sector 
employees who fall within the ambit of the LRA should be treated differently from private sector 
employees and be given more rights than private sector employees.” 
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privilege.1798 Public employees are only granted rights that contextually can be justified. 
Public power – not status - is the key contextual influence determining whether the right 
to just administrative action can be relied on in addition to the right to fair labour 
practices.1799 Context influences the relevant rights and the associated concepts.  
In the Nakin-judgment, Froneman J commented that “perhaps the majority of Chirwa 
tried to tell us that the conceptual choice should be made in terms of the LRA and not 
PAJA), but conceptual choices can be manipulated in order to avoid voicing the real 
substantive reasons why one choice is made in preference to another”.1800 To avoid 
such an injustice, it must be remembered that whatever cause of action a public 
employee relies upon, the outcome of the case should be fair and just to both parties to 
the administrative/employment relationship.1801 The choice of one cause of action 
                                            
1798
 See Chapter Four. Ngcobo J appeared not to appreciate that the Constitution does not require 
employment relationships to be carbon copies of each other. Equal treatment does not require absolute 
sameness. 
1799
 For an in depth discussion of the role of public power (as a contextual consideration) in a balanced 
approach to employment decisions as administrative action, see Chapter Nine, part 2 1. At this stage of 
the study, public power is specifically not discussed in isolation (from a mere administrative law 
perspective) as a theoretical element of administrative action, as it is the aim of this study to present a 
contextual perspective of public power as part of an analytical methodology in response to the concerns 
outlined in Chapter One. It is further reasoned that only once all conceptual elements are simplistically 
viewed (absent any formalistic preconceptions) can the role of public power be considered objectively 
within the context of the debate (as to the relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action) as part of the solution and not central to the problem. 
1800
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 48. 
1801
 The normative interdependence of labour and administrative rights requires that constitutional justice 
must always prevail. It is a non-derogable judicial obligation. Fairness in relying on one cause of action 
should not hold the inherent possibility of an alternative unfair result in following another cause of action. 
The duty to uphold the objects of the Constitution is extended to all courts and not merely to selective 
forums. An interpretation of this nature is irreconcilable with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution. 
Consequently, a forced choice (by the public employee wishing to challenge an employment decision) 
supports the elitist idea that labour law can oust the protection offered by administrative rights. Such a 
perspectives cannot stand, as Plasket J emphasised in POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 
2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 60 that “the protection afforded by labour law and administrative law are 
complementary and cumulative”. 
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cannot be a means of undermining the constitutional justice that flows from the 
other.1802 
If a public employment decision can give rise to more than one infringement, an 
employee may have more than one cause of action, which can result in more than one 
remedy. These remedies, if the dispute is properly construed with due regard to the 
Constitution, will be reconcilable.1803 
5 2 Remedies 
Stacey explains that a premise has developed “that our law does not admit the 
possibility of two remedies in two separate branches of law for a single act”.1804 Some 
jurists have therefore raised the issue of remedies, specifically a difference in remedies, 
to show that administrative and labour law is irreconcilable.  
                                            
1802
 In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 176, Langa CJ made this unmistakably clear 
with his statement that the fact “that the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action may 
overlap in the case of public employees is not a reason to sacrifice one right without a clear [and 
constitutionally justifiable] legislative provision to the contrary”.  
1803
 In MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
35, Froneman J explained that, regardless of the cause of action an applicant chooses, “[t]he eventual 
outcome ... will be the same” if fairness and justice remain the judicial compass. In Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 155 fn 171, Sachs J also stated that apparently 
different choices might be virtually identical “in relation to philosophy, approach and evaluation of relevant 
material and ultimate outcome”. 
1804
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 324. See also Hoexter Administrative Law 194. In Transnet Ltd v 
Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 31, Conradie JA emphasised that “PAJA and the LRA, differ 
fundamentally in the substantive remedies they provide”. To stress a fundamental difference is perhaps 
too severe when properly considered within the context of interdependence and not merely in the historic 
context. Conradie JA did, however, draw a distinction between the usual (traditional) and the 
contemporary position: “If an application for review of administrative action succeeds, the applicant is 
usually entitled to no more than a setting aside of the impugned decision and its remittal to the decision-
maker to apply his mind afresh. Except where unreasonableness is an issue the reviewing court does not 
concern itself with the substance of the applicant’s case and only in rare cases substitutes its decision for 
that of the decision-maker.” Emphasis added. Where administrative and employment decisions coincide 
in the public employment sector with the exercise of managerial and public power by a public employer 
such an exceptional substantive unreasonable reviewable decision can present itself.  
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If it is accepted, constitutionally speaking, that labour rights cannot prevent the 
applicability of administrative rights in the absence of normative conflict, then the 
remedies associated with those rights must be open to aggrieved public servants. 
Administrative action, premised on the presence of public power determined on a case-
by-case basis, will necessarily attract a public remedy.1805 
                                            
1805
 In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) at par 29, 
Moseneke DCJ explained: “It goes without saying that every improper performance of an administrative 
function would implicate the Constitution and entitle the aggrieved party to appropriate relief. In each case 
the remedy must fit the injury. The remedy must be fair ... It must be just and equitable in the light of the 
facts, the implicated constitutional principles, if any, and the controlling law. It is nonetheless appropriate 
to note that ordinarily a breach of administrative justice attracts public law remedies and not private law 
remedies. The purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt or correct or reverse an improper 
administrative function.” Emphasis added. As the emphasised passage indicates, there is nothing in 
principle about “public” law remedies that stand in conflict with the equity based remedial approach 
adopted by the LRA in giving expression to s 23. In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern 
Cape 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) at paras 99 and 100, Sachs J stated: “Both the interim Constitution and 
the final Constitution envisage a right to just administrative action. The implication is that a 
constitutionalised form of judicial review is intended to cover the field, both in substantive and remedial 
terms. To my mind it would not only be jurisprudentially inelegant and functionally duplicatory to permit 
remedies under constitutionalised administrative law, and remedies under the common law, to function 
side by side. It would be constitutionally impermissible.” Sachs J concluded that the “existence of this 
constitutionally-based public law remedy renders it unnecessary and inappropriate to hybridise and 
stretch the common-law delict of injury beyond its traditional limits in this area”. Emphasis added. This 
comment of Sachs J on the inappropriateness of a duplication of remedies in two different branches of 
law must be understood within its proper context. He was considering remedies linked to a constitutional 
right legislatively given effect to and weighed against a common law traditional remedial approach. In the 
public employment context the scenario is different. Two constitutional rights are at play, and Sachs J has 
declared himself in support of hybridity where fundamental rights can be interdependently applied to 
maximise justice. See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). This 
constitutional/common law remedial duplication that Sachs J seeks to avoid in Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) at paras 99 and 100 must also allow for 
the fact that a remedial overlap is not always excluded, but rather dependent on the circumstances of the 
case. If the common law addresses an aspect not addressed by a fundamental right then overlap is still 
allowable and practical in the pursuit of justice. In Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 (12) BLLR 
1301 (SCA) at par 15, Nugent AJA emphasised that “there can be no suggestion that the constitutional 
dispensation deprived employees of the common-law right to enforce the terms of a fixed-term contract of 
employment”. The side-by-side remedial application of common law and constitutionally informed 
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In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape,1806 the Constitutional Court 
clearly indicated that relief must fit the claim. For example, an applicant cannot claim an 
administrative law remedy for a delictual cause of action.1807 Stacey therefore argues 
that, “[i]f any act can be shown to be a public-law wrong, then public-law remedies must 
be available to correct the consequences of the act”.1808 This understanding is 
reconcilable with the idea that more than one cause of action can flow from a single 
employment context. A proper reading of s 157 of the LRA1809 shows that the High 
Court retains its traditional jurisdiction to decide constitutional and contractual matters in 
an employment context. An applicant can therefore have two causes of action; one 
based on s 23 and another on s 33, with the option of approaching the Labour Court to 
adjudicate the former and the High Court to decide on the latter. The two causes of 
action attract the remedies appropriate to each. It will bring about an injustice to say 
that, regardless of the presence of public power that attract public law remedies, an 
applicant is not entitled to such remedies as he or she already has access to remedies 
for a s 23 LRA based infringement. It would go against the spirit of the Constitution if the 
one right (and associated cause of action and remedy) were allowed to exclude the 
applicability of another. The phantom fear of forum-shopping (as Stacey appropriately 
describes it) is in itself not enough to deny parallel causes of action and the parallel 
remedies linked thereto.1810 
                                                                                                                                            
remedies have been rejected by the Constitutional Court in so far as it undermines a uniform and singular 
legal system based on the supreme Constitution due to a difference in conceptual basis. See Stacey 
2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 325; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte 
President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 118 (CC) at par 44. 
1806
 2007 (3) BCLR 300 (CC). 
1807
 See Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 322. 
1808
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 322. 
1809
 See Chapter Nine, parts 2 1 2, 2 1 3 and 3 3. 
1810
 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 326 explains: “What these arguments fail to recognize, though, is that 
drawing away from the development of parallel streams of jurisprudence is motivated by a need to 
preserve conceptual integrity within a single branch of law – and within a single forum. The 
Pharmaceutical Manufactures approach denies the concurrent availability of common-law and 
constitutional remedies ... But the approach certainly does not go so far as to deny the concurrent 
availability of administrative-law remedies and contract-law remedies, for example. The approach is 
premised on the fact that the protections of administrative justice and fair labour practices derive from the 
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6 GENUINE INTERDEPENDENCE 
As emphasised by Froneman J the Giyose-judgment, compartmentalisation as outlined 
in the preceding discussion transgresses into an unjustified judicial denial of the 
normative link between labour and administrative law.1811 
Judicial acceptance of the doctrine of normative interdependence, reconcilable with the 
Constitution,1812 has the inherent potential to promote jurisprudential continuity in the 
pursuit of justice, due to the variable nature of concepts such as reasonableness and 
fairness.1813 The context of every case, not the sphere of law that traditionally claims 
regulative dominance, determines the meaning of those variable concepts.1814  
                                                                                                                                            
Constitution ... There is no constitutional reason to flee the phantom of forum-shopping.” Emphasis 
added. 
1811
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
26. 
1812
 See Chapter Seven. 
1813
 Within the relationship between labour and administrative rights, jurisprudence clearly identifies the 
norm of fairness as the primary (particularly relevant) hybrid concept. The concept of fairness is not only 
closely associated with the idea of constitutional justice, but also relates to considerations of 
reasonableness and lawfulness as constitutionally endorsed by the rule of law (in general) and the 
principle of legality (in particular). It is informative that Didcott J in the Sibiya-judgment based the 
evaluation of a lawful exercise of power on considerations of fairness. This illustrates the presence of 
contextual normative interdependence pre-dating the Constitution. This interdependent perspective of the 
scope and nature of the concept of lawfulness is now again emphasised by its place in the Constitution, 
as explained by Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 5.: “The right to lawful 
administrative action ... elevated to the status of a fundamental right ... [i]n many cases ... will result in a 
synthesis”. Emphasis added. See De Ville 2004 (20) SAJHR 577 at 595; Grogan 1991 (108) SALJ 599. 
Didcott J’s reasoning nevertheless indicates that even though fairness and lawfulness are not synonyms 
and one can arguably be present in the absence of the other, the one can also inform the presence of the 
other. Even though not expressly acknowledged in pre-constitutional cases such as the Zenzile- and 
Sibiya-judgments, the idea of interdependence was nevertheless present. 
1814
 Cf De Ville 2004 (20) SAJHR 577 at 595 – 596. 
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In PSA obo Williams v Department of Correctional Services,1815 Commissioner Newall 
took into consideration the objects of the LRA and the normative values of the 
Constitution in evaluating the failure by the National Commissioner of Correctional 
Services to provide reasons for a decision not to appoint the employee as assistant 
director at the prison.1816 Consideration was accordingly given to the interdependence 
of the various dimensions of procedural fairness:1817 dignity,1818 democratic 
                                            
1815
 1999 (20) ILJ 1146 (CCMA). The union referred a dispute to the CCMA alleging that the National 
Commissioner of Correctional Services’ failure to appoint Mr Williams as Assistant Police Director 
amounted to an unfair labour practice. Mr Williams was one of three short-listed candidates. The names 
were submitted for selection in terms of standard procedure. The National Commissioner did not provide 
reasons for his decision and was ordered to submit written reasons for his selection. 
1816
 In PSA obo Williams v Department of Correctional Services 1999 (20) ILJ 1146 (CCMA) at 1147, the 
oversight amounted to a failure to “meet the requirements of transparent, accountable and coherent 
government”. 
1817
 All these dimensions relate to a single normative principle, but each has its own contributory element 
developmentally rooted in another area of the law. The unification of these dimensions results in the 
protection and promotion of procedural fairness as envisaged by the spirit of the Constitution. 
1818
 Collins Justice in Dismissal 106 explains that respect for dignity through the procedural element of 
fairness calls for the observance of “the rules of natural justice or due process before any deprivation of 
liberty or property, or any denial of some important legitimate expectation, for the sake of demonstrating 
respect for the individual affected by the decision”. This dimension of procedural fairness gives 
expression to the constitutional value of dignity that underlies both the rights to fair labour practices and 
just administrative action. The dignity dimension of procedural fairness alone is not sufficient for 
comprehensive protection. If not allowed to adapt to the context of every case it “lacks the diversity and 
flexibility to provide the basis for a satisfactory interpretation of the principle” of fairness, as the idea of 
due process as traditionally developed tends to imply a degree of formality. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 
2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 42, Skweyiya J emphasised the interdependent dignity dimension by 
restating that the “LRA includes the principles of natural justice”. The judge further emphasised: “By doing 
so, the LRA guarantees that an employee will be protected by the rules of natural justice and that the 
procedural fairness requirements will satisfy the audi alteram partem principle and the rule against bias. If 
the process does not, the employee will be able to challenge her or his dismissal, and will be able to do 
so under the provisions and structures of the LRA. Similarly, an employee is protected from arbitrary and 
irrational decisions, through substantive fairness requirements and a right not to be subjected to unfair 
labour practices.” The labour law framework in the LRA therefore acknowledges normative 
interdependence with administrative law. See Chapter Six. 
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participation1819 and efficiency.1820 This inherent interdependence is necessary, as the 
procedure by which the fairness of any conduct is assessed must be viewed “as a 
series of interactive stages”.1821 
In the Simelela-judgment, the Labour Court relied on the democratic participatory 
dimension of procedural fairness in finding that “[a] decision to transfer an employee 
without prior consultation amounts to an unfair labour practice”.1822 In Transnet Ltd v 
Chirwa,1823 Conradie JA revealed that the LRA emphasises certain dimensions of 
procedural fairness (particularly participation and effectiveness), but does not 
necessarily or explicitly place the traditional natural justice dignity element (as 
developed in the pre-constitutional public employment cases) at the centre of the 
                                            
1819
 According to Collins Justice in Dismissal 108 the democratic participation dimension ensures that 
procedural fairness “maximizes the opportunity for consultation and expression of differing opinions 
before a decision is reached” to ensure that “those likely to be affected by a decision [is afforded] an 
equal chance to have their views considered”. This is the underlying rational for the principle of audi 
alteram partem as traditionally associated with administrative law. See Chapter Six. 
1820
 In upholding the idea of efficiency, Collins Justice in Dismissal 110 – 111 explains the principle of 
procedural fairness to “be designed to ensure so far as possible that the decision is based on the best 
information available at reasonable cost concerning the facts and the likely consequences”, as it calls for 
relevant factors to be considered and irrelevant factors to be ignored. Collins emphasises the presence of 
an “underlying moral principle [of general welfare], here supporting procedures required by efficiency”. 
This form of procedural fairness is generally associated with labour law. See Chapter Six. 
1821
 Collins Justice in Dismissal 104. 
1822
 Simelela v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) 
BLLR 1085 (LC) at par 57. The judge emphasised the dignity dimension of procedural fairness through 
application of the principles of natural justice generally associated with administrative law type cases. In 
casu, Francis AJ linked the democratic participation dimension to the dignity dimension, illustrating that 
various perspectives of procedural fairness can indeed be relied upon in a supplementary manner 
regardless of whether the concept (absent specific context) is recognised by various branches of law. The 
contextualised perspective of the concept in one branch of the law can be drawn into the contextual 
analysis of the concept within another branch of the law. This exercise merely renders the promotion of 
fairness more just and grants a multi-dimensional contextual meaning to the concept of fairness. See 
Simelela v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 
1085 (LC) at par 59. 
1823
 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA). 
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pursuit of justice in the workplace.1824 The Constitutional Court has at times indicated 
that a co-operative approach to and application of the dimensions of procedural fairness 
in pursuit of a comprehensive promotion of justice does not imply that the administrative 
dimension will undermine the labour dimension.1825 Jurisprudence has also revealed 
that substantive fairness in labour law and reasonableness in administrative law 
presents no logical threat of normative conflict.1826 It is also evident from the Supreme 
Court of Appeal Chirwa-judgment and Giyose-judgment of Froneman J that the first 
steps have been taken to the development of an understanding of reasonableness and 
substantive fairness with co-operative potential. Conradie JA explained that an 
evaluation of unreasonableness in an administrative law context justifies an exceptional 
(rather than traditional) review of the substance of the affected person’s case.1827 In 
similar fashion, Froneman J in the Giyose-judgment found that the decision to transfer a 
public employee called for the consideration of both procedural fairness and substantive 
rationality.1828 In the older Labour Appeal Court decision of Carephone (Pty) Ltd v 
                                            
1824
 The traditional dimension of procedural fairness is the primary focus in PAJA’s pursuit of fairness, 
which lays down the procedural elements for a lawful and fair administrative decision. See Conradie JA in 
Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 28. Section 3 of PAJA (although recognising the 
flexible nature of the norm) reminds of the traditional due process dimension of procedural fairness in that 
it lays down certain minimum core elements to be adhered to in every instance for a decision to be 
procedurally fair. 
1825
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 140, where O’Regan 
J explained that the dimension of efficiency would not be prejudiced by allowing consideration of the 
traditional dimension associated with s 33, as “no further delay will be caused by that [additional level of] 
scrutiny”. 
1826
 See Chapters Five and Nine. 
1827
 See Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 31. The Constitutional Court in the 
Chirwa-judgment, referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment of Conradie JA with approval. 
1828
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
1. From a labour law perspective, substantive rationality is linked to substantive fairness, as related to 
considerations of reasonableness. See Chapter Five for a discussion of the normative interdependence 
between substantive fairness and reasonableness. In short, it can be concluded that it is possible for 
specific substantive fairness to be evaluated with due regard to the guidelines of general reasonableness. 
In an administrative law context, a link exists between rationality and reasonableness. Section 24 of the 
interim Constitution required rationality in the administrative action, while the final Constitution in s 33 now 
replaces the term rationality with reasonableness. A legal assumption has developed that the interim 
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Marcus NO1829 it was acknowledged that the contemporary perspective of rationality 
requires a court to make a value judgment as associated with the substantive idea of 
labour fairness.1830 
In the Sidumo-judgment, Navsa AJ (writing for the majority) found decisions of the 
CCMA to qualify as administrative action.1831 The judge however reasoned that the 
administrative action in question fell outside the direct regulatory scope of PAJA. Navsa 
AJ interpreted s 33(3) of the Constitution as allowing the LRA, as specialised national 
legislation protecting and promoting the s 23 constitutional objectives, to also give effect 
to the s 33(1) right to just administrative action within the functioning of the specialised 
labour scheme and its dispute resolution mechanism.1832 The judge showed great 
insight in explaining that “[n]othing in section 33 of the Constitution precludes 
specialised legislative regulation of administrative action such as section 145 of the LRA 
                                                                                                                                            
understanding of rationality jurisprudence is subsumed in the current idea of reasonableness. This was 
explained by Chaskalson CJ in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 
108. 
1829
 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC). The case considered the impact of administrative law rationality on 
labour law reviews under the interim Constitution. A reading of Chapter Three illustrates that the 
understanding of reasonableness as found in the final Constitution attracts both considerations of 
rationality and proportionality, if contextually justified. 
1830
 Due deference is owed to the privilege of the employer to determine who works for him and her, as 
well as the disciplinary manner in which misconduct is addressed. See Chapter Five for a discussion of 
the proper understanding of deference as respect (as developed in administrative law) in the context of 
labour law after the Constitutional Court’s Sidumo-judgment. 
1831
 In POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 46, Plasket J explained 
that, as a type of public power, administrative action (whether directly regulated by PAJA or not) is 
“reviewable for compliance with the founding value of the rule of law, including the principle of legality, 
entrenched in s 1(c) of the Constitution at the very least”. Even if it can be argued that an administrative 
action is not present in a specific context that affects a public employee, the constitutional values still 
inform all rights. The umbrella principle of legality therefore informs s 23 with its underlying considerations 
in the regulation of fairness where public power (even if arguably not of an administrative nature) is 
present in an employment context. 
1832
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89. Accordingly, 
CCMA decisions, as administrative actions, must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. See Lange, 
Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 6 – 7. 
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alongside general legislation such as PAJA”.1833 As a result, it is permissible within the 
transformative milieu for the LRA to regulate “‘administrative action’ within the 
specialised labour law sphere”.1834 Such regulation must occur with due regard to the 
constitutional principles found in s 33.1835 This logical approach allows administrative 
law to contribute its constitutionally developed understanding of reasonableness to the 
labour law realm, thereby allowing judicial consideration of context-specific 
reasonableness considerations when interpreting the variable component of fair labour 
practices.1836 The Constitutional Court thus acknowledged the potential of labour law to 
                                            
1833
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 91. The LRA is 
specialised in giving effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices. In the majority judgment, 
Navsa AJ gave sufficient weight to the argument that labour law, in its regulation of public employment, 
can in part be regarded as specific administrative law, that functions in harmony with the general 
principles emanating from the s 33 right to just administrative action. Consequently, the Constitutional 
Court explained that s 145 of the LRA (in identifying the grounds for review) must be read in line with the 
Constitution and therefore interpreted to give effect to the s 33 right to just administrative action, as “any 
legislation giving effect to s 33 must comply with its prescripts”. Within the context of the case and its 
specific legal question, Navsa AJ emphasised that there are “causes of action for judicial review of 
administrative action that do not fall within the scope of PAJA”. See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 91 – 94, specifically par 92 where Navsa AJ quoted Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 25 per O’Regan J. 
Navsa AJ concluded that PAJA does not form the exclusive legislative basis for reviews. Cf Lange, 
Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 8. Navsa AJ in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 105 elucidated: “[S]ection 3 of the LRA provides, inter alia, that its 
provisions must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution. Section 145 therefore must be read to 
ensure that administrative action by the CCMA is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.” 
1834
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89. Lange, Rudolph and 
Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 8 – 9 explain that Navsa AJ’s reliance on s 145 of the LRA instead 
of PAJA does not allow litigants to circumvent legislation giving effect to the right to just administrative 
action in terms of s 33(3). The authors elaborate: “Direct reliance on section 33 of the Constitution is not 
countenanced by Navsa AJ’s approach since section 145 of the LRA is determined to be, alongside 
PAJA, national legislation that gives effect to the right to lawful, reasonableness and procedurally fair 
administrative action.” 
1835
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89. 
1836
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89 per Navsa AJ, 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 25 per 
O’Regan J 
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contextually address employment disputes through labour principles “suffused by the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness”1837 as broadly outlined in O’Regan J’s Bato 
Star-test.1838 Navsa AJ explained that the application of this reasonable equilibrium 
evaluation in such a manner “will give effect not only to the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices, but also to the right to administrative justice which is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.1839 In addition, Navsa AJ noted that the current labour 
law rationality perspective takes its cue from the Industrial Court’s administrative action 
approach.1840 In the contemporary context, the “Labour Appeal Court describes this 
approach as one of ‘substantive reality’, likening it to administrative law concepts such 
as reasonableness, rationality and proportionality”.1841 
In the same case, Sachs J insightfully commented that the norms of reasonableness 
and fairness are not easily separated, as “it is difficult to see how a reasonable 
commissioner can act unfairly, or a fair commissioner can function unreasonably”.1842 
Sachs J explained that, while “the very notion of a fair labour practice requires that 
fairness be the touchstone throughout”1843 it must be observed that “the values of fair 
dealing that underlie section 33 of the Constitution must be respected”1844 within the s 
145 LRA context of the review of procedural misconduct.1845 Consequently, as a clear 
definition of the flexible norm of fairness eludes the judiciary, it cannot unequivocally be 
declared that fairness in a labour context excludes reasonableness considerations as 
                                            
1837
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 110. 
1838
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 110. See Chapter 
Five, part 4, for a detailed discussion of the Bato Star-test. 
1839
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 110. 
1840
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 38. 
1841
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 39. Footnotes omitted. 
1842
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 146. Allan (as referred to 
by Chaskalson 1989 (5) SAJHR 293 at 297) insightfully declares: “All law must postulate some kind of 
common denominator of just instinct in the community. There is no meaning in any legal system unless 
this foundation exists. Infinite though the variations of subjective opinion may be, it needs no subtle 
dialectic to demonstrate that there is in man an elementary perception of justice as a form of right and 
good, which no law dare flagrantly transgress.” 
1843
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 at par 145. Emphasis added. 
1844
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 at par 158. 
1845
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 at par 158. 
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generally associated with the right to just administrative action.1846 The highlighted 
cases indicate that the judiciary to some degree has recognised this fact in the embrace 
of genuine interdependent reasoning at times. 
However, genuine interdependent reasoning has not yet completely infiltrated the 
judiciary’s constitutional understanding in employment disputes. Although five of the 
judges in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd1847 held that s 33 of the Constitution 
found application in the absence of PAJA, four of the judges unfortunately reasoned 
that neither s 33 nor PAJA found application in the case.1848 In his minority judgment, 
Ngcobo J held that review of labour decisions must be understood in a restrictive 
manner.1849 Ngcobo J reasoned that the focus must fall on the scope and meaning of 
gross irregularity,1850 and incorporated the concept of fairness into that meaning.1851 In 
                                            
1846
 General fairness inevitably includes considerations of reasonableness. See Chapters Two, Three and 
Five. In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 at par 172, Ngcobo J also (albeit 
unintentionally) illustrated that the pursuit of fairness has a similar dimension to its mirror image in 
administrative law, in that “fairness to both the workers and their employers means the absence of bias in 
favour of either”. The absence of bias in decisions affecting the rights and interests of individuals is a 
crucial element of the pursuit of justice and fairness in administrative law traditionally and contemporarily. 
This truth underlies both labour and administrative law. Ngcobo J however disagreed with Navsa AJ and 
argued that the CCMA performs judicial functions. See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 
(12) BCLR 1097 (CC) at par 215.  
1847
 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC). 
1848
 See Lange, Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 7. 
1849
 This perspective of Ngcobo J is unfortunate, as Brassey et al The New Labour Law 61.9 explain that 
such a restrictive interpretation does not embrace the beneficial objective of the LRA: “The proper 
approach is to seek out the ‘true intention of the legislature as expressed in the Act’. When there is doubt 
– as there often will be because of the open texture of the definition, the court should, it is submitted, 
prefer a liberal to a restrictive construction, because this is a provision with a beneficial object.” See 
Marais Onbillike Arbeidspratyke 23. 
1850
 In interpreting the meaning of the concept, Ngcobo J took into consideration the judgment of Ellis v 
Morgan 1909 TS 576 at 581 where it was stated that “an irregularity in proceedings does not mean an 
incorrect judgment; it refers not to the result, but to the methods of a trail, such as, for example, some 
high-handed or mistaken action which has prevented the aggrieved party from having his case fully and 
fairly determined”. 
1851
 Lange, Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 10. In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 at par 268, Ngcobo J explained his reasoning: “[W]here a commissioner 
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requiring a degree of fairness that is manifestly unfair to form the basis for a review, 
Ngcobo J adopted an understanding of gross irregularity that reminds of the pre-
constitutional understanding of symptomatic unreasonableness.1852 Lange, Rudolph 
and Wessels accordingly comment that Ngcobo J, although declining to view CCMA 
decisions as administrative action, nevertheless merges the framework of the 
administrative law understanding of symptomatic reasonableness with his 
understanding of fairness as the basis for the meaning of gross irregularity.1853  
The reasoning of the Constitutional Court, whether read from the majority or minority 
perspective, implies that the requirement of reasonableness (as administrative law’s 
answer to substantive fairness) to some extent supplements labour law understanding 
of fairness, because of the transformative Constitution. This is logical, as both 
reasonableness and fairness are flexible contextually informed concepts that 
incorporate “boni mores and policy considerations”1854 in the value judgment it requires 
of the courts. 
If the Constitutional Court in its Sidumo-judgment ruled that the s 33 idea of 
reasonableness can, circumstances permitting, supplement the s 23 idea of fairness 
within the context labour practices, what (if anything) does the court’s Chiwa-judgment 
contribute to the genuine promotion of this constitutionally based normative 
interdependence? 
                                                                                                                                            
fails to have regard to material facts, the arbitration proceedings cannot, in principle, be said to be fair 
because the commissioner fails to perform his or her mandate ... This constitutes a gross irregularity in 
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, as contemplated in section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA.” 
1852
 See Lange, Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 10. 
1853
 See Lange, Rudolph and Wessels 2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 11. All the judges therefore agreed 
that the decisions of the CCMA (whether administrative action or not, whether subject to PAJA or not) 
can, to some degree, be reviewed on the ground of reasonableness. See Lange, Rudolph and Wessels 
2008 (5) AJA Newsletter 1 at 7. The same argument can be carried over to situations where the State is 
party to a dispute in the capacity of employer: the decisions of an organ of state (whether administrative 
action or not, whether subject to PAJA or not) can, to some degree, be reviewed on the ground of 
reasonableness. 
1854
 NUM v Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining Co Ltd 1987 (8) ILJ 776 (IC) at 779. See also Marais 
Onbillike Arbeidspratyke 27. 
  
 
342 
In its Chirwa-judgment, the Constitutional Court, confronted with the jurisdictional 
conundrum that so frequently overshadows the constitutional interdependence that 
underscores labour and administrative law norms, was granted an opportunity to 
unequivocally state the law. Unfortunately, the court presented more questions than 
answers.1855 Skewyiya J for example reasoned that, although the judiciary should be 
careful not to limit the existing constitutional rights of a litigant, “it is unsatisfactory that 
the High Court should be approached to decide review applications in terms of PAJA 
where the LRA already regulates the same issue to be reviewed”.1856 Such reasoning 
appears to ignore the genuine interdependence logic of the Constitutional Court’s own 
earlier Sidumo-judgment.  
Even if it is accepted that the Labour Court has jurisdiction there is no constitutional 
basis for that fact to deter the Labour Court from considering the right to just 
administrative action in giving effect to the Constitution in the manner presented in the 
Sidumo-judgment. Acknowledging the normative interdependence between the rights to 
fair labour practices and just administrative action does not hinder employees from 
pursuing their cause of action “through the mechanisms established by the LRA”.1857 In 
fact, the pursuit of justice within labour law through the LRA allows for such normative 
interdependence.1858  
                                            
1855
 In his majority judgment, Skweyiya J set out the order of the court. His judgment was supported by 
seven of the judges. In agreeing with Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J identified two further issues on which 
Skweyiya J did not focus and rendered a judgment supported by 6 judges (but not by Skweyiya J). Langa 
CJ wrote a minority judgment supported by Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ. 
1856
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 40. 
1857
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 41 per Skweyiya J. 
1858
 The reasoning of Skweyiya J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 42 is 
informative: “The LRA includes the principles of natural justice. The dual fairness requirement is one 
example; a dismissal needs to be substantively and procedurally fair. By doing so, the LRA guarantees 
that an employee will be protected by the rules of natural justice and that the procedural fairness 
requirements will satisfy the audi alteram partem principle and the rule against bias. If the process does 
not, the employee will be able to challenge her of his dismissal, and will be able to do so under the 
provisions and structures of the LRA. Similarly, an employee is protected from arbitrary and irrational 
decisions, through substantive fairness requirements and a right not to be subjected to unfair labour 
practices.” 
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Developing the understanding of variable concepts such as fairness on a continual 
basis and with due regard to changing context is a judicial duty. The LRA gives 
expression to this judicial duty in declaring that the “LAC and the Labour Court ... are 
charged with the responsibility for overseeing the ongoing interpretation and application 
of the LRA and the development of labour relations policy and precedent”.1859 The 
Constitutional Court described this responsibility as “the objective to develop a coherent 
and evolving jurisprudence in labour and employment relations”.1860 The judicial 
evolution of labour jurisprudence must be coherent and compatible with the object, spirit 
and purport of the final Constitution. In developing a genuine interdependent 
understanding of substantive fairness in labour law and reasonableness in 
administrative law against the backdrop of the Constitution, it is imperative that the 
judiciary take note of the fact that the constitutional understanding of reasonableness 
attracts both rationality and proportionality considerations at varying degrees.1861 When 
the duty to develop labour law within a constitutional context is then taken into 
consideration, it becomes clear that substantive fairness and reasonableness reveal no 
logical threat of normative conflict.  
This understanding of normative interdependence must not be overshadowed by 
jurisdictional considerations.1862 In setting out the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in 
relation to the High Court, s 157(2) of the LRA indicates that the doctrine of 
interdependence is an important consideration in the adjudication of labour disputes 
                                            
1859
 NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at par 30. Emphasis added. 
1860
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 118 per Ngcobo J. 
1861
 This administrative law understanding of reasonableness as requiring both rationality and 
proportionality was not yet available to the Labour Appeal Court in their reliance on that norm in 
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 (11) BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
1862
 This was unfortunately evident from the reasoning of Ngcobo J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) 
BLLR 97 (CC) at par 80. Skweyiya J was however content with merely considering the submitted 
jurisdictional argument, Ngcobo J identified two further issues, namely the scope of s 157(1) and (2) and 
the characterisation of a dismissal as an administrative action. Ngcobo J stated that “[t]hese two issues 
have given rise to complex jurisdictional problems for both the High Court and the Labour Court”. As 
such, the majority was not dealing with the normative relationship between labour and administrative law, 
but condemning genuine interdependence by limiting the jurisdictional scope of the forums that may be 
called upon to give full expression to all relevant constitutional rights. 
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after jurisdiction has properly been established.1863 Section 157(2)(b) reveals that the 
legislator foresaw that situations may arise in the public sector where administrative 
action can manifest itself as an employment decision. Such a reality implies that 
administrative law considerations will be drawn into an employment law evaluation of 
fairness at the point of intersection between labour and administrative law.  
In summary, the principles on which labour and administrative law are respectively 
based are not in conflict.1864 The principle of fairness, as found in a labour law context, 
acknowledges that the context in which a decision is made determines the dimension of 
fairness required for a just decision.1865 In NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd,1866 the 
Labour Appeal Court explained that fairness, in a labour context, requires “a balanced 
and equitable assessment”1867 of the interests involved.1868 This indicates that 
substantive fairness in labour law is compatible with proportionality considerations. 
Such proportionality considerations are similarly found in administrative law 
reasonableness, as articulated by the Constitutional Court in the Bato Star-
judgment.1869 Fairness must be determined in the circumstances of every case, as it is 
“a combination of findings of fact and opinions”.1870 If this is contextually done, in public 
employment, the presence of public power carries the potential to draw reasonableness 
considerations into the fairness assessment as one of a range of contextual factors 
relevant to the decision.1871 If properly embraced by the judiciary, the content of 
                                            
1863
 The section unequivocally states that labour courts have the same jurisdictional power to consider the 
violations of any fundamental right (not merely the right to fair labour practices in isolation) in the context 
of labour relations. 
1864
 Fairness (whether procedural or substantively reasonable), to some degree embraced by both labour 
and administrative law, is of a contextually variable nature. Consequently, the contextual application of 
the concept of fairness inherently avoids a conflict in circumstances where both the right to fair labour 
practices and the right to administrative action are in play. 
1865
 Sossin 2002 (27) Queen’s LJ 809 at 822. 
1866
 1991 (12) ILJ 564 (LAC). 
1867
 NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1991 (12) ILJ 564 (LAC) at 589. 
1868
 See Chapter Two, parts 3 1 and 3 2. 
1869
 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). See also Chapter Five, part 4. 
1870
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BCLR 1097 (CC) at par 63. See Chapter Two. 
1871
 Cf Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 678 
(CC) at par 45 per O’Regan J. 
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reasonableness, as developed in administrative law, balances the uncertainty in 
contexts where employment decisions, clothed in administrative action, are present.1872 
The interdependent nature of rights in the Bill of Rights sees to it that fairness does not 
become just an empty word on paper.1873 A genuine constitutional interdependent 
understanding of fairness infuses the labour law protection and promotion of fair labour 
practices in specific contexts, and holds the potential to unravel the contemporary 
conundrum of the rights-relationship between labour and administrative law. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis illustrates that the judiciary’s attempt at giving practical effect to 
its constitutional duty in the public employment context has been less than successful 
when denying genuine normative interdependence. The search for simplistic legal 
certainty has in fact complicated the interdependent relationship between ss 23 and 33 
and the associated legislation. 
In seeking clarity in the confusion, Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin explain that the LRA 
(as the primary source of regulatory labour legislation) “directs fairness in the employer-
employee context”,1874 while the PAJA, in codifying jurisprudentially identified grounds 
for judicial review, “steers due process and rationality in the public service”.1875 What 
this illustrates is that the LRA and PAJA may be contextually drawn to public 
                                            
1872
 With regard to the danger of nursing uncertainty within the legal system, Lewis 2003 (120) SALJ 330 
at 345 – 346 significantly notes: “There is no necessary connection between a fairness or 
reasonableness test and uncertainty. As Jansen JA [in his dissenting judgment in Bank of Lisbon and 
South African Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A)] has pointed out, the principle of certainty is not 
absolute, but must be balanced ... Thus, perfect certainty is not only an impossible but an undesirable 
ideal. What is necessary is a sufficient degree of certainty. A fairness test does not preclude this level of 
certainty. There are a number of reasons for this: guidelines, precedent and absolute prohibitions.” 
1873
 See Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law 18–14(2). 
1874
 Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1987. Emphasis added. 
1875
 Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1987. Emphasis added. It must be kept in mind that PAJA 
was not specifically created with the aim of protecting public employees from abuse of public power. It 
has a more general aim: it seeks to protect the public in general from the abuse of public power where 
they are party to an administrative law relationship. The LRA also aims to protect against abuse of power, 
but aims that protection specifically at the parties to employment relationships. 
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employment disputes from different legal corners. When the complexity of the 
relationship between labour and administrative law is viewed from a normative angle, 
the contextual overlap becomes more simplistic. From this perspective, the debate 
regarding the relationship between labour and administrative law appears frivolous. This 
apparent theoretical clarity has generally gone unnoticed (being obscured by the 
arguments discussed in this chapter), but the following point may be made. 
Firstly, the continued legal value of the Zenzile-judgment in the current context lies in its 
understanding of public power, as well as administrative law’s role in protecting the 
individual against, and society’s interest in, the particular exercise of power. The 
underlying general principle of the judgment relating to public power remains 
authoritative. Its authoritative quality is found in the fact that it does not undermine the 
regulatory role of constitutionally entrenched labour rights,1876 while still supporting the 
underlying equity objective of the right to just administrative action in the restraint of 
public power.1877 
                                            
1876
 Consequently, the line of Labour Court judgments (such as the SAPU- and Haschke-judgments) 
unfortunately ascribed a narrow reading to the Zenzile-judgment and assumed that the judgment “has no 
principled basis but was motivated purely by expediency”. See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 59. As far as those judgments regard the right to fair labour 
practices as trumping the right to just administrative action, they ignore the value based, interdependent 
normative spirit of the Constitution. It is this misinterpretation that allowed for the development of a line of 
Labour Court cases that denied that one employment related decision or act could attract the regulation 
of both labour and administrative law, as the judges refused to recognize the presence of a normative 
overlap and interdependence. Such formalistic reasoning is irreconcilable with the purport of the 
Constitution. As Plasket J in POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 
59 and 60 correctly summarised: “It is not based on principle but rather on a view that labour law would 
be better off without any overlap with administrative law ... [and] represent a parsimonious approach to 
fundamental rights and an austere formalism.”  
1877
 This perspective is shared by Plasket J in POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) 
BLLR 385 (E) at par at 55: “I am, in any event, bound by – and, for what it is worth, agree with – the more 
general proposition for which Zenzile is authority, namely that the decision of a public authority to dismiss 
and employee is an exercise of public power.” Emphasis added. The consequence of the general 
Zenzile-principle is that any exercise of public power must be both lawful and reasonable. See POPCRU 
v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 56 and 57 where Plasket J 
emphasised that the general “principle has been applied to every type of administrative activity over the 
years, whether it involved the administration’s ‘powers of intervention, powers of compulsion, powers of 
  
 
347 
Secondly, post-constitutional jurisprudence (some unintentionally) reveals that the 
norms of labour and administrative law overlap. Section 33 by no means alters the 
normative basis of s 23 and the LRA. An interpretation to the contrary would remove its 
own normative basis. Section 33 merely reinforces and extends the s 23 protection of 
the LRA where public power is present.1878 This is in fact necessary if one considers 
that labour law, and the LRA specifically, is silent on the regulation of public power, 
although reference is made to it in s 157(2) where the focus falls on State as employer 
(albeit from a jurisdictional perspective). Section 33 of the Constitution (in indirectly 
giving effect to the general Zenzile-principle) addresses this shortcoming.1879 
Thirdly, separatism undermines the comprehensive recognition of both labour and 
administrative law’s reconcilable purposes. This denial is based on the traditional 
compartmentalisation associated with the outdated public/private divide. It undermines 
proper consideration of the normative interdependence endorsed by the Constitution. 
This unfortunate perspective has spurred on a jurisdictional debate based on the 
(mis)interpretation of s 157 of the LRA. 
Fourthly, the LRA allows for both exclusive (s 157(1)) and concurrent (s 157(2)) 
jurisdiction. In an effort to properly interpret s 157, some judges attempted to separate 
normative considerations (such as lawfulness and fairness) in an attempt to interpret 
most public employment disputes as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court. This line of thinking led to the judiciary confusing jurisdictional challenges 
with findings on the substantive merits of disputes. In its Fredericks-judgment, the 
Constitutional Court took the first step in addressing the interpretive questions 
                                                                                                                                            
inspection, powers of decision’ or any other powers and functions that the administration may exercise or 
perform”.  
1878
 See for example the High Court judgment in NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 
Government 2001 (4) BCLR 388 (C) at 395 for reasoning justifying the idea that PAJA (in giving effect to 
administrative law, and specifically s 33 of the Constitution) can be constitutionally challenged. 
1879
 This is apparent from the statement of the Labour Court in Simelela v Member of the Executive 
Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 1085 (LC) at par 39: “The 
Constitution affords everyone ‘the right to administrative action that is lawful reasonable and procedurally 
fair’. This means that every exercise of public power must, in order to be constitutional, be mandated by 
law, be performed in good faith by a decision-maker who has not misconstrued his or her powers, be 
rational, and be conducted with due regard to the rules of natural justice.” Emphasis added. 
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underlying s 157 of the LRA, by finding that the section must be read as an extension of 
the Labour Court’s jurisdiction and not as a limitation of the High Court’s traditional 
jurisdiction. The clarity of this judgment has been undermined by the Constitutional 
Court’s own Chirwa-judgment. The court reasoned that the policy underlying the history 
and structure of the LRA dictates against the High Court exercising jurisdiction in 
employment matters where specialised procedures exist. The court interpreted the 
claim in casu as LRA based, although it was not so pleaded. With this judgment, the 
Constitutional Court endorsed a narrow reading of s 157(2). It appears that the Chirwa-
majority refused to acknowledge that labour law has evolved to a relative and not an 
absolute autonomous character under the influence of the Constitution.  
Fifthly, unfortunately, those labour jurists in favour of maintaining absolute separatism 
treat administrative law as a legal leper. Yet, jurists have no problem in reading the 
Public Service Act (Proc 103 of 1994) as extending the LRA where it is silent on certain 
issues,1880 such as transfer in the public interest.1881 It is baffling that some labour 
commentators, in this constitutional era, argue for the exclusion of the normative 
considerations that underlie the administrative action evaluation. This is illogical as the 
normative considerations merely bring an extra dimension to the fairness analysis 
required by labour law generally, without taking anything away from it. The reasoning of 
Froneman J in the Giyose-judgment and Navsa AJ in the Sidumo-judgment is therefore 
inspirational, as both justices embraced the idea that general and specialised legislation 
can be interpreted and applied in an interdependent manner that gives comprehensive 
expression to contextually applicable fundamental rights. Such an approach also allows 
for the promotion of O’Regan J’s perspective that the judiciary should give proper 
consideration to the relevant concepts in the substantive context of the case, rather 
                                            
1880
 See for example the reasoning of the Labour Court in PSA of SA v Premier of Gauteng 1999 (20) ILJ 
2106 (LC) at paras 2 and 4 for a clear illustration that more than one statute can find application in one 
set of employment circumstances.  
1881
 See for example the Nxele-judgment, where the Labour Court explained that the LRA does not 
regulate the transfer of employees, except indirectly in the context of unfair labour practices (as a 
disciplinary measure short of dismissal). However, the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994 deals with 
transfers in ss 14 and 15 and allows for transfers “when in the public interest”. Legislative 
interdependence is therefore permissible and necessary in the labour sphere for pragmatic reasons.  
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than the time consuming undertaking to classify a decision as either labour or 
administrative in nature.1882 
Sixthly, arguments denying employees a choice in cause of action and remedy, fail to 
give proper effect to the comprehensive contextual recognition of all fundamental rights. 
Prior to the Chirwa-judgment, both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court gave recognition to the choice-idea in the employment context. The judiciary at 
that stage endorsed the idea of more rather than less legal protection. With the Chirwa-
ruling came a turn, when Ngcobo J in his majority judgment reasoned that public 
employees should not be granted a choice as to cause of action. Ngcobo J reasoned 
that such a choice was not justified, as public employees should not be treated 
differently than private employees. This argument is unfortunate as it ignores the fact 
that the constitutional value of equality acknowledges that a difference in treatment can 
be acceptable if contextually justifiable.1883 This denial of contextual reality also allows 
for judicial manipulation of the cause of action, to avoid substantive consideration of the 
merits of a dispute. 
Lastly, prior to the Constitutional Court’s Chirwa-ruling in which the Court undermined 
its own understanding of interdependence, the doctrine was gaining support in the lower 
courts. In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa,1884 Mthiyane JA showed interdependent insight in 
reasoning that s 23 (in elevating labour rights to fundamental rights) “imports into the 
employment contract a reciprocal duty to act fairly, [but] does not deprive the 
employment contract of its legal effect”.1885 If Mthiyane JA could accept the infusion of 
fairness, then the mere fact that the LRA now includes public sector employees cannot 
by itself counter the integration of the administrative law dimension of fairness (as 
constitutionally endorsed by s 33) into the employment relationship. 
This perspective aligns with the recent line of Supreme Court of Appeal decisions 
following the confusing two-majority Constitutional Court Chirwa-judgment. The 
Constitutional Court’s lack of uniformity in its perspective of the constitutional 
                                            
1882
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 137. 
1883
 Cf NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 126 per Sachs J. 
1884
 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA). 
1885
 Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 15. 
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relationship between administrative and labour law has caused conflicting perspectives 
emerging in the lower courts. Most of these arguments are jurisdictional in nature and 
based on unsound propositions that undermine proper considerations of the substantive 
merits of cases. In recent cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal has attempted to provide 
clarity as to the ratio of the Constitutional Court in the Chirwa-judgment. Great strides in 
judicial clarity by the Supreme Court of Appeal has unfortunately again been 
undermined by the Constitutional Court’s failure in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and 
Security1886 to properly address the complexity flowing from its own line of judgments. 
This attempt at clarity will be analysed in Chapter Nine from both the perspective of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. 
                                            
1886
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE CHIRWA V TRANSNET LTD 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd1887 can best be described as anticlimactic when viewed against 
the background of the judicial turmoil that preceded it.1888 The legal community (or at 
least administrative and labour law specialists) eagerly awaited this judgment and the 
clarity it was expected to bring to the debate about the relationship between labour and 
administrative law. If anything, the Chirwa-judgment united the champions of 
administrative and labour law, as well as the lower courts,1889 in their quest to determine 
what the Constitutional Court actually decided.1890 The aim of this chapter is to evaluate 
the  response of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court to the 
uncertainty that surrounds the Chirwa-judgment.1891 
In the absence of a clear distinction between binding dicta and obiter policy comments 
in the Chirwa-judgment, judgments of the High Court and Labour Court in the 
immediate wake of the Chirwa – judgment showed a focus on clarity  and a  search for 
                                            
1887
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) 
1888
 Chapter Eight seeks to reflect the underlying debate and related arguments at the centre of this 
jurisdictional turmoil. 
1889
 In Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 23, 
Nugent JA commented on the impact of the Chirwa-judgment (a judgment penned by the highest court on 
constitutional matters) and noted that even in the aftermath of that judgment judicial objections “have 
shown remarkable resilience”. 
1890
 See Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741, Grogan 2009 25(3) Employment LJ (Electronic Version), Ngcukaitobi 
2008 (29) ILJ 841 and Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307. 
1891
 It is submitted that a formalistic perspective of specificity (Chapter Seven, part 2 3) as the basis for 
the separation of labour and administrative law (Chapter Eight, part 3) appears to have informed the 
Chirwa-reasoning of Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ, culminating in a somewhat confusing jurisdictional finding 
based on the court’s interpretation of s 157(2) of the LRA. The majority in that case argued that the 
apparent concurrent jurisdiction provided for by s 157(2) has the potential to frustrate the objectives of the 
LRA and undermine the advancement of coherent labour jurisprudence. See the discussion in Chapter 
Eight, part 4. See also Editor 2009 Employment LJ 25(3) (Electronic Version). 
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a legal rationale in that judgment.1892 A number of these judgments have revealed that 
the Chirwa-judgment can be interpreted in more than one way. In the Nakin-judgment, 
Froneman J declared himself unable to identify the Chirwa-ratio and commented that 
the Chirwa-reasoning of Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ contrasted with that of O’Regan J in 
the Fredericks-judgment.1893 Froneman J found himself in the position of having a 
choice between two authoritative Constitutional Court judgments.1894 In cases such as 
Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality1895 and Mogothle v Premier of the North West 
                                            
1892
 Although the post-Chirwa cases differ factually from each other (as well as from the Chirwa-facts 
itself), all these cases involved disputes regarding employment decisions with two common 
denominators: firstly, an argument presented on behalf of the employer that the High Court lacked 
jurisdiction; secondly, reliance placed on the Chirwa-judgment in support of that argument. See Editor 
2009 Employment LJ 25(3) (Electronic Version). 
1893
 In the Nakin-judgment, Froneman J observed that prior to the Chirwa-judgment concurrent jurisdiction 
in employment matters (with a contractual or fundamental right dimension) was assumed and later 
confirmed by the highest courts in the Fedlife- and Fredericks-judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and Constitutional Court respectively. For a discussion of the two-majority Chirwa-perspective, see 
Chapter Eight. The Fredericks-jurisdictional perspective is outlined in Chapter Eight, part 4. 
1894
 Froneman J reasoned that it would be inappropriate for lower courts to assume that one judgment of 
the highest court overrules a previous judgment of that court, if this was not explicitly stated. The judge 
ultimately chose to follow the Fredericks-perspective of concurrent jurisdiction. He commented that the 
development of coherent labour jurisprudence would not be at risk, as the focus should not fall on the 
forum, but on the fact that all courts must give expression to fundamental rights. 
1895
 2009 (3) BLLR 272 (E). It was reasoned that the Chirwa-judgment rested on only two findings: first, 
that the dispute in that case fell within the ambit of s 157(1) of the LRA (ie within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Labour Court); secondly, that the decision to dismiss did not amount to an administrative action. 
Grogan AJ explained that it was the latter of the two findings that divided the Constitutional Court. In 
considering the exclusive jurisdiction bestowed on the Labour Court in terms of s 157(1) to decide all 
matters under the LRA as well as any matter in any other law on which it is called to decide, Grogan AJ 
noted that only the common law and the BCEA can conceivably qualify as “other law” bestowing 
exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court. However, in Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 2009 (3) BLLR 
272 (E) at 273, Grogan AJ reasoned that the BCEA empowers the Labour Court to decide any matter 
concerning a contract of employment in terms of section 77(3), which determination may include an order 
for specific performance, and award of damages and an award for compensation. According to the 
judgment in Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 2009 (3) BLLR 272 (E) at 274, the reasoning of the Chirwa-
majority “provides authority too tenuous to depart from the plain meaning of section 77(3), which gives 
the Labour Court concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts ‘to hear and determine any matter concerning 
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Province1896  the High and Labour Court respectively gave a narrow reading to the 
Chirwa-judgment, which can be described as an attempt to limit the damaging effect of 
the ambiguous Chirwa-ruling. These cases distinguished between two types of overlap 
for purposes of jurisdiction (namely contract/labour law cases and the Chirwa-type 
administrative/labour law cases) and allowed for concurrent jurisdiction where contract 
and labour legislation overlap. In contrast, the Labour Court in Mohlaka v Minister of 
Finance1897 identified a uniform approach to overlapping rights in the Chirwa-ruling 
(whatever the type of overlap) and adopted the view that concurrent jurisdiction 
threatens the development of coherent labour jurisprudence.1898 A fourth example of 
post-Chirwa jurisprudence, and perhaps the most extreme leap of Chirwa-faith, is found 
in the reasoning of the Labour Court in Booysen v SAP.1899 In that case the Labour 
Court stated that “if there is no right to fair administrative action separate from the right 
                                                                                                                                            
a contract of employment, irrespective of whether any basic condition of employment constitutes a term 
of that contract’”. 
1896
 2009 (4) BLLR 331 (LC). The court summarised its understanding of the Chirwa-judgment: “Narrowly 
construed, the judgment dealt only with whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain claims by 
dismissed public servants. At a more general level, the Chirwa judgment suggests that all employment-
related disputes involving allegations of unfair conduct by employers should be decided in the dispute 
resolution forums established under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1996 (‘the LRA’). The latter reading 
would mean that, in the light of Chirwa, any remedy established by the LRA must be pursued to the 
exclusion of any right that may previously have existed. However, although the Chirwa judgment 
constitutes an obvious endorsement of the mechanisms, institutions and remedies created by the LRA, 
the judgment did not expressly exclude the right of employees to pursue contractual claims either in the 
Labour Court by virtue of the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (‘the 
BCEA’) or in civil court with the requisite jurisdiction.” 
1897
 2009 (4) BLLR 348 (LC). 
1898
 The dispute concerned the decision of a CCMA commissioner not to condone the late dispute 
referral. The applicant partly argued that the commissioner omitted to give reasons for her decision. The 
respondent argued in limine that the applicant could have requested reasons in terms of PAJA, but in the 
absence of such a request rendered the application premature. In this judgment, Pillay J vigorously 
defended the scope of labour law and the jurisdiction of labour tribunals. Cf PSA obo Haschke v MEC for 
Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC), an earlier judgment of Pillay J characterised by separatist-type 
reasoning. See Chapter Eight, part 3. 
1899
 2008 (10) BLLR 928 (LC). 
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to fair labour practices, there can be no ‘alleged or threatened violation’ of the right to 
fair administrative action – a requisite for jurisdiction under section 157(2)”.1900  
However, the purpose of this chapter is not to debate all the arguments that have 
emerged from the judgments of the High Court and Labour Court. The chapter rather 
focuses on an evaluation of the post-Chirwa response of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court.  
The focus firstly falls on the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal (part 2), with 
specific consideration of the approach developed by Nugent JA in Makambi v MEC, 
Department of Education, Eastern Cape1901 and Makhanya v University of Zululand.1902 
In considering these judgments, the three unsound jurisdictional propositions identified 
by Nugent JA as the arguments on which the judiciary often places reliance to justify 
their various approaches to the controversial relationship between labour and 
administrative law will be outlined (part 2 1 1).1903 Following this, consideration will be 
given to the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to s 157 of the LRA, an approach 
that aligns with the idea of interdependence (parts 2 1 2 and 2 1 3). The Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s reading of the Chirwa-judgment (as mainly articulated by Nugent JA) will be 
highlighted against this background (part 2 1 4). More recent Supreme Court of Appeal 
cases, building on the approach developed by Nugent JA, will be considered in part 2 2, 
specifically Kriel v Legal Aid Board1904 and Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu 
Natal.1905 
                                            
1900
 Booysen v SAP 2008 (10) BLLR 928 (LC) at par 31. It is submitted that the Labour Court with this 
statement indirectly recognised the fact that the legislator foresaw the possibility of administrative action 
considerations being present in the context of an employment dispute where the State acts as employer. 
If this is so, then judicial attempts to interpret almost all public employment decisions as not constituting 
an administrative action amount to a manipulation of legislative intent. The reasoning of the Labour Court, 
unfortunately gives the impression that the court confused its judicial duty to determine jurisdiction with 
the duty to determine whether a claim is good or bad in law. See part 2 1 1 1 for Nugent JA’s criticism of 
this perspective. See also Grogan 2009 25(3) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
1901
 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA). 
1902
 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA). 
1903
 See also the various judicial opinions reflected in Chapter Eight. 
1904
 2009 (9) BLLR 854 (SCA). 
1905
 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA). 
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The perspective of the Supreme Court of Appeal will be weighed up against the recent 
Constitutional Court decision in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security,1906 starting 
with a brief synopsis of the Gcaba-case (part 3 1). This will be followed by an analysis 
of the Gcaba-judgment, with due regard to the constitutional and legislative context 
within which the decision was handed down (part 3 2). In light of the Gcaba-ruling, the 
importance of a proper judicial approach to the character of a claim and the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of s 157 (part 3 3) will be considered. It will be 
illustrated that the Constitutional Court appears to place reliance on one of the unsound 
jurisdictional principles identified by the Supreme Court of Appeal (part 3 4). It will 
furthermore be shown that, although the Constitutional Court proclaims support for the 
three constitutional principles identified and discussed in Chapter Seven, namely 
flexibility, interdependence, and specificity (part 3 5), the Court  appears to elevate the 
specificity principle to  an absolute formalistic (rather than relative) principle.1907 It will 
also be shown that, in its search for reasonable predictability in public employment 
dispute resolution, the Constitutional Court has now created the impression that the 
determination of the presence or otherwise of administrative action (as precondition for 
the application of administrative law) can be formulated as a general rule (part 3 6). The 
possible impact of the Gcaba-ratio on the reasoning of the lower courts will also be 
considered (part 3 7). 
In the final instance (part 4), this chapter will illustrate that the Constitutional Court has 
yet to provide a clear purposive interpretation for its perspective of the rights-based 
interaction between labour and administrative law.  
2 SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL PERSPECTIVE 
Post-Chirwa, the Supreme Court of Appeal has taken on a central role in addressing the 
uncertainty that underlies the debate about the rights-based relationship between 
administrative and labour law. The court’s attempts are reflected in the judgments in 
                                            
1906
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
1907
 It appears as if the Gcaba-judgment interprets the specificity principle as having the power to check 
or limit the considerations of flexibility and interdependence. See Chapter Seven, part 2 3.  
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Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape,1908 Makhanya v University of 
Zululand,1909 Kriel v Legal Aid Board1910 and Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu 
Natal.1911 The well-informed reasoning of Nugent JA is primarily reflected in the first two 
judgments. The reasoning of Nugent JA in turn influenced the reasoning of Mhlanthla 
JA, Leach AJA and Bosielo AJA in the latter two judgments. As such, the perspective of 
Nugent JA (as reflected in the Makambi- and Makhanya-judgments and supported in 
the Kriel- and Ntshangase-rulings) will form the central focus of the discussion of the 
endeavours of the Supreme Court of Appeal to attain clarity about the interaction 
between labour and administrative law after Chirwa.1912 
                                            
1908
 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA). The appellant was employed on a temporary contract at the Kubusie State 
School. In March 2004, she was informed of her transfer to the Tyilekanie Primary School until further 
notice. In June 2004, she was notified that the post allocation at Kubusie State had been revised. She 
was “declared as in addition” and informed that a position at Tyilekanie Primary would open in six months 
and that she would be considered for the post. Without notice payment of her emoluments and benefits 
were suspended in August 2004. At that time the principle, vice-principle and secretary of the Kubusie 
State officially requested the department to amend the nature of her appointment from temporary to 
permanent. In October 2004, the request was denied. She approached the High Court with an urgent 
application for the review of the decision to stop her salary and the declaration regarding her status as 
educator. 
1909
 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA). The university terminated Mr Makyanya’s employment contract. He 
pursued a claim for the infringement of his LRA right in the CCMA and failed. He thereafter pursued a 
claim for the enforcement of his employment contract in the High Court. This case granted Nugent JA an 
opportunity to expand on his opinion of the Constitutional Court’s confusing two-majority ruling. According 
to Nugent JA, this case was “not materially different to Chirwa”. See Makhanya v University of Zululand 
2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 5. 
1910
 2009 (9) BLLR 854 (SCA). This case concerned the dismissal of an attorney from his employment at 
the Legal Aid Board. He approached the High Court seeking review, correction and the setting aside of 
the decision to dismiss him. 
1911
 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA). The appellant was a director in the provincial Department of Education. 
He was found guilty on several charges of misconduct and received a final warning. The responsible 
Member of the Executive Council did not agree with the penalty and launched review proceedings in the 
Labour Court, but the application was dismissed. On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court replaced the final 
warning with a sanction of summary dismissal. See MEC for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal & another v Dorkin 
NO [2008] 6 BLLR 540 (LAC). The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
1912
 This will in turn inform the evaluation of the Constitutional Court’s post-Chirwa approach. 
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2 1 The Logic of Makambi and Makhanya 
In similar fashion to that of Froneman J in the Nakin-judgment, Nugent JA in the 
Makambi-ruling1913 declared that he was unable to detect a clear legal (as opposed to 
policy-based) ratio in the Constitutional Court’s Chirwa-reasoning.1914 In his Chirwa-
evaluation, Nugent JA identified that much of the controversy surrounds the judicial 
practice associated with three unsound jurisdictional propositions, as well as the 
jurisdictional finding in the Chirwa-majority. In this regard, it is helpful to evaluate 
Nugent JA’s Makambi- and Makyanya-judgments together.  
2 1 1  The Three Unsound Jurisdictional Propositions 
In search of post-Chirwa clarity, Nugent JA restated the legal fact that a jurisdictional 
challenge calls for a factual enquiry.1915 The judge identified a judicial tendency to 
answer jurisdictional issues with reference to one of three unsound propositions, 
namely: 
1. “The court has no jurisdiction because the claim is a bad claim.”1916 
2. “A high court that has jurisdiction to consider a claim for the enforcement of a 
right may thwart the assertion of that right by declining to exercise its 
jurisdiction.”1917 
3. “The claim that is before the court is not what it purports to be, but is instead a 
claim for enforcement of an LRA right.”1918 
Nugent JA’s reasoning in labelling these propositions as ‘unsound’ calls for further 
consideration. Each of the mentioned propositions will be discussed individually. 
                                            
1913
 Nugent JA concurred with the judgment of Farlam JA, but opted to set out his reasons separately to 
prevent his concurrence from being misunderstood. See Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, 
Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at paras 16, 21 and 24. 
1914
 See Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 21.  
1915
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 29. 
1916
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 51. 
1917
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 58. 
1918
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 66. 
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2 1 1 1 The First Unsound Proposition  
With regard to the first unsound proposition, Nugent JA pointed out that it requires 
similar exercise of judicial power to dismiss a claim (for reasons other than jurisdiction) 
than to uphold a claim.1919 Nugent JA accordingly stated that the first proposition 
offends the rule of logic, as “the power of a court to answer a question (the question 
whether a claim is good or bad) cannot be dependent upon the answer to the 
question”.1920 In so reasoning, Nugent JA aligned himself with the Appellate Division 
judgment in Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd.1921 
Nugent JA therefore stated that any reason that would prevent a court from exercising 
jurisdiction based on an argument that a claim is bad in law would stifle legal progress: 
[I]f courts were precluded from considering claims that are bad in law there 
would be no scope for the recognition of new rights and the development of 
the law. The very progress of the law is dependent upon courts having the 
power to consider claims that have not been encountered before. A court 
cannot shy away from exercising its power to consider a claim on account of 
the fact that it considers that the recognition of the claim might have 
undesirable consequences. Its proper course in a case like that is to exercise 
its power to consider the claim but to decline to recognise the rights that are 
asserted and to dismiss the claim as being bad in law.1922 
In considering this argument, it is important to contextualise and distinguish the practice 
of the CCMA and bargaining councils to first hear the merits of a claim to inform a 
jurisdictional decision. This approach developed for pragmatic reasons in reaction to the 
                                            
1919
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 52. 
1920
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 54. This point of logic cannot be 
over emphasised. In so reasoning, Nugent JA placed reliance on the minority judgment of Langa CJ in 
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 155, in which it was argued that the substantive 
merits of a claim cannot inform a decision as to whether a court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
1921
 [1985] 1 All SA 347 (A). In that case, the Appellate Division acknowledged that (regardless of the 
prospect of success) a plaintiff is entitled to ask a court to exercise its power to rule on the merits of the 
claim as formulated. See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 43. 
1922
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 57. Emphasis added. The 
emphasised section aligns with the policy consideration on which Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ based their 
Chirwa-reasoning. 
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“one-stop shop dispute resolution structure”.1923 As explained in the Sidumo-judgment, 
forums of this nature are not comparable to traditional styled courts. Accordingly, the 
idea that a court must first determine that it has jurisdiction before ruling on the merits 
only applies to the High Court, the Labour Court (as a court of similar status) and those 
courts superior to it in status.  
2 1 1 2 The Second Unsound Proposition  
The second unsound proposition identified by Nugent JA relates to the choice-
approach, namely that a court may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction.1924 Nugent JA 
acknowledged that it is logical to reason that an employee who has one claim must 
necessarily choose which forum to approach for its enforcement, if more than one forum 
can exercise jurisdiction.1925 However, the judge argued that the situation is somewhat 
different when an employee has more than one claim based on the same set of facts: 
Forcing a choice would undermine the general aim of the Constitution to extend 
maximum protection to its beneficiaries and deny “the holder a forum in which to assert 
[it]”.1926 In accord with the reasoning of Nugent JA, a forced choice, through a denial of 
jurisdiction, negates one right in favour of another.1927 
Consequently, the same-protection or adequate-protection argument fails when tested 
against Nugent JA’s logic, as the judiciary will act contrary to the interest of justice if it 
accepts that the assertion of one right can cause the denial of another, absent any 
normative conflict in the rights-relationship that could justify limitation. Judicial adoption 
of this understanding of Nugent JA as a legal truth will nullify the popular “law-ousting-
law” argument.1928 It is submitted, in agreement with Nugent JA, that it is not enough to 
merely hold that the right to fair labour practices present public servants with a “right 
                                            
1923
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 54 per Skweyiya J. 
1924
 See the discussion in Chapter Eight. 
1925
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 61. 
1926
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 63. See also Makhanya v 
University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 62. 
1927
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 61. 
1928
 See Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 323; Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 
(SCA) at par 65; Chapter Eight, part 3 4. 
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that is just as good”1929 as the right to just administrative action.1930 Nugent JA’s 
perspective endorses logical reasoning that, although the Chirwa-majority emphasised 
that “[o]ne of the manifest objects of the LRA is … to subject all employees, whether in 
the public sector or the private sector, to its provisions”,1931 the legislature did not make 
the inclusion of public sector employees subject to the forfeiture of their contextually 
justified constitutional right to just administrative action.1932 
2 1 1 3 The Third Unsound Proposition  
The third unsound proposition identified by Nugent JA is a “defence [that] has been 
mounted by Halton Cheadle”.1933 In his reading of the Chirwa-judgment, Cheadle 
regards the majority, among other things, as having decided “as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation to limit the scope of the right to administrative action so as 
to exclude labour practices”.1934 It is submitted that in doing so Cheadle places the 
primary focus on the policy considerations underlying the LRA and not on the 
constitutional framework to which its application must adhere.1935 In support of the 
Chirwa-majority, Cheadle finds justification for this approach in the argument that the 
conduct of Transnet did not constitute an administrative action1936 and that the 
                                            
1929
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 65. 
1930
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 65. 
1931
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 102. 
1932
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 69. 
1933
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 as referred to by Nugent JA in Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) 
BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 66. 
1934
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 at 754, as quoted by Nugent JA in Makhanya v University of Zululand 
2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 67. 
1935
 This approach mirrors that of Ngcobo J in his Chirwa-reasoning, Cf Makhanya v University of 
Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 68.  
1936
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 67. It must be kept in mind 
that the presence of administrative action should be determined on a case-by-case basis. The judicial 
development of a rule that holds that a labour practice cannot amount to an administrative action in a 
context where there is no normative conflict, reveals the (re)emergence of formalistic reasoning. 
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Constitutional Court characterised the claim of Ms Chirwa as one that should rather 
have been presented in LRA terms.1937 
In the Makhanya-judgment, Nugent JA admitted that the identification of the issue 
calling for adjudication is a necessary first step in establishing whether the court has 
jurisdiction to decide a case.1938 The judge acknowledged that to do this, the court must 
determine the nature of the asserted right in every case.1939 However, in the Makambi-
judgment, Nugent JA warned that this exercise must be approached with caution, as 
“things cannot be made to be what they are not merely by calling them something else 
and that applies as much to legal claims as to other things”.1940 Accordingly, if an 
employee for example expresses reliance on the constitutional right to just 
administrative action, Nugent JA’s reasoning logically places it within the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the high court.1941  
At no stage did Nugent JA proclaim this to be an easy legal exercise. In his Makhanya-
reasoning Nugent JA admitted that while the asserted right may be easily identifiable in 
one instance, it may in other instances have to be inferred from the facts and the relief 
claimed.1942 However, the reasoning of Nugent JA leads one to conclude that, although 
certainty is a judicial goal, simplicity in pursuit of legal certainty should not be sought at 
the cost of justice for the beneficiaries of constitutional rights. The claim presented by a 
public servant approaching the court must be approached as a matter of fact, as it is 
presented to the court.1943 Nugent JA in fact emphasised that a court is not at liberty to 
                                            
1937
 This reading of Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 at 754 is supported by Nugent JA in Makhanya v 
University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 70: “What he says, as I understand it, is that the 
majority regarded the claim that was before it as a claim for the enforcement of LRA rights (enforceable 
only in a Labour Forum) and not as a claim to enforce a constitutional right.” 
1938
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 29. 
1939
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 30. 
1940
 Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 32. See 
Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 29. 
1941
 See Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 30. 
1942
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 31. 
1943
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 71. 
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change an employee’s claim to mirror its (policy) preferences to avoid complexity or 
establish jurisdiction.1944 Language should not be abused in such a manner.1945  
However, Nugent JA pointed out that the identification of the relevant issue, and the 
underlying nature thereof is unfortunately “done under the guise of what is called 
‘characterising’ the claim”.1946 When a court properly characterises a claim, an attempt 
is made to describe the distinctive nature and character of the claim.1947 Nugent JA 
reasoned that this exercise must not be allowed to morph into a judicial attempt to 
“convert the claim into another kind”,1948 as this would amount to abuse of judicial 
discretion, and would deny a claimant the opportunity to assert his/her rights.1949 
2 1 2 Interpreting Section 157 
The wording of s 157 of the LRA has been central to the confusion that underlies the 
relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action.1950 
The nature of and relationship between the s 157(1) exclusive Labour Court jurisdiction 
and the s 157(2) concurrent High Court jurisdiction has not been consistently 
interpreted. Nugent JA described the Chirwa-ruling as questionable, due to the reliance 
placed on policy considerations to determine the legislative intent behind s 157 of the 
LRA.1951 If this approach was indeed a true reflection of the actual scope of s 157(2), 
the Constitutional Court would not have had cause to call for legislative intervention, as 
                                            
1944
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1945
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1946
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1947
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1948
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1949
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
1950
 See Chapter Eight, part 4. 
1951
 In Makambi v MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 37, 
Nugent JA explained that the Constitutional Court in the Chirwa-case held the legislative intent to be the 
limitation of employees to only pursue “complaints arising from their employment … through the 
mechanisms of the LRA”. Nugent JA explained that to obtain this objective the Constitutional Court 
“decided that the high courts must not exercise their ordinary jurisdiction in such cases”. Cf Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 40. 
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it could merely have stated that the policy perspective was a reflection of the law.1952 
Nugent JA therefore did not regard the Supreme Court of Appeal as bound to adopt the 
Chirwa-perspective in the absence of such legislative endorsement.1953 
Nugent JA further commented that Ngcobo J’s Chirwa-understanding of the inclusion of 
the word ‘concurrent’ in s 157(2) as an unfortunate legislative error was based on the 
misconception “that section 157(2) of the LRA ... [has somehow] divested the High 
Courts of their ordinary power to consider claims to enforce a constitutional right arising 
from employment”.1954 In acknowledging the fact that the inclusion of two forms of 
jurisdiction within the two subsections of s 157 was a legislative choice,1955 Nugent JA 
declared there to be “no room for ambiguity, and the word ‘concurrent’ … [not 
unfortunate but rather] superfluous”,1956 as any other reading would render the whole of 
s 157(2) superfluous.1957 Nugent JA accordingly reasoned that s 157(2) of the LRA 
merely bestows additional “jurisdiction upon the Labour Court”,1958 equivalent to that of 
the High Court as far as disputes that attract constitutional rights are concerned. 
2 1 3 The Two Truths Underlying the Correct Interpretation of Section 157 
In attempting to gain some clarity – from s 157 specifically and the LRA in general – 
Nugent JA identified two basic propositions in the Makambi- and Makhanya-judgments. 
The focus of the first proposition falls on the rights that employees can claim and 
acceptance of the fact that, although employees have LRA rights,1959 they “also have 
other rights, in common with other people generally, arising from general law”.1960 
According to Nugent JA, these other rights can be based on “the right that everyone has 
                                            
1952
 See Makambi v MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 38. In 
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 71, Skweyiya J made an appeal for legislative 
review of s 157(2). 
1953
 See Makambi v MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 39. 
1954
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 14. 
1955
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 14. 
1956
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 17. 
1957
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 17. 
1958
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 16. 
1959
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 11. 
1960
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 11. This reality allows for and 
necessitates genuine recognition of the doctrine of interdependence. See Chapter Seven, part 2 2. 
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... to insist upon performance of a contract ... [or] the right that everyone has ... to just 
administrative action”.1961 More than one claim can legitimately “arise when an 
employee’s contract is terminated”.1962 In acknowledging that employees can claim 
rights that do not amount to typical LRA rights, as claimed by Nugent JA, it is important 
to understand that both ss 23 and 33 rights emanate firstly from the Constitution and 
secondly from legislation.1963 This sensible understanding of the claim-potential of 
public employment aligns with the fact that the law is seamless and allows for 
interdependence.1964 This understanding supports Nugent JA’s second proposition, 
which, in turn, is based on three interrelated propositions, namely:  
1. LRA rights are only enforceable in labour forums (CCMA or the Labour Court) in 
terms of s 157(1) of the LRA.1965  
2. Common law contractual claims are enforceable in both the Labour Court and 
the High Court in terms of s 77 of the BCEA and s 169(b) of the Constitution 
respectively.1966  
3. Constitutional rights are similarly enforceable in both the Labour Court and the 
High Court in terms of s 157(2) of the LRA and s 169(b)(ii) of the Constitution 
respectively.1967  
                                            
1961
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 11. Although the 
interdependence debate does not only involve labour and administrative law, but also labour and 
contractual law, the latter relationship is not the focus of this study and comment on it will only be made in 
as far as it contributes to an understanding of the nature of the relationship between labour and 
administrative law. 
1962
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 12. This is not a novel idea. The 
Appellate Division in Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd [1985] 1 All SA 
347 (A) already confirmed that the same set of facts can give rise to more than on right and more than 
one claim. See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at paras 41 – 43. 
1963
 It must be kept in mind that the LRA rights are first and foremost constitutional rights and must not be 
erroneously viewed as mere legislative creations.  
1964
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 8. 
1965
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 13. 
1966
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 13. 
1967
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 13. 
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From this it may be deduced that a litigant who relies on a LRA right can approach the 
Labour Court while also relying on common law and constitutional rights claims, as the 
Labour Court has jurisdiction to enforce all three claim-types outlined in the second 
proposition (provided, of course, the Labour Court and not the CCMA or a bargaining 
council has jurisdiction to enforce the LRA right). However, if a litigant chooses not to 
rely on the LRA, but merely on common law and constitutional claims and wishes to 
approach the High Court, the judiciary should not (re)characterise the claim as LRA-
based to oust the High Court’s jurisdiction. Nugent’s second proposition emphasises 
that a litigant theoretically has the option of approaching the Labour Court with an LRA 
based-claim, while approaching the High Court for consideration of constitutional and/or 
common law based claim(s), all emanating from the same set of circumstances.1968  
In light of this understanding, it becomes clear that the jurisdictional turf-war should not 
bar litigants from approaching the Labour Court to also protect constitutional rights other 
than s 23, if threatened or infringed upon by an employment decision. The two 
propositions ultimately illustrate that the nature of the rights upon which an employee 
relies in his or her claim indicates whether a court has jurisdiction.1969 
2 1 4 Supreme Court of Appeal’s Reading of Chirwa 
Ultimately, Nugent JA concluded that the findings in the two Chirwa-majorities were 
“mutually destructive”.1970 The judge held the Chirwa-judgment to be based on “one or 
                                            
1968
 It is submitted, that this jurisdictional option, although theoretically possible, falls under the policy 
concerns the Constitutional Court relied upon in the Chirwa-judgment, as it would prevent a single court 
from logically dealing with the events and claims as appropriate in the context of every case. Although 
such a split in jurisdiction is not desirable, it is for the legislator to address. 
1969
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 21. Before setting off on his 
own evaluation based on this confusion, Nugent JA in Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 
721 (SCA) at par 18 provided a summary of his understanding of the three jurisdictional points to be 
found in the Chirwa-judgment: Firstly, “[t]he Labour Forums have exclusive power to enforce LRA rights 
(to the exclusion of the High Courts)”, secondly, “[t]he High Court and the Labour Court both have the 
power to enforce common law contractual rights”, and thirdly “[t]he High Court and the Labour Court both 
have the power to enforce constitutional rights so far as their infringement arises from employment”. See 
Chapter Eight, part 4. 
1970
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 82. 
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other of the three unsound propositions”.1971 Regardless of the fact that the 
Constitutional Court found that the dismissal in that case did not amount to 
administrative action, Nugent JA held that “Chirwa, like all the cases that preceded it, 
was not about jurisdiction at all ... [but rather] about whether there was a good cause of 
action”.1972 It is therefore submitted that the root of the post-Chirwa legal uncertainty is 
in fact the judicial trend to confuse jurisdictional challenges with the substantive 
arguments that underlie a fair labour practice/administrative action evaluation.1973  
2 2 The Evolving Perspective in Kriel and Ntshangase 
In the recent Kriel-judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal differentiated between the 
consideration of jurisdiction and the evaluation of a cause of action.1974 This judgment 
represents a step in the right direction, as Mhlanthla JA and Leach AJA looked past the 
superficial jurisdictional debate.1975 It was emphasised that the question of jurisdiction is 
a separate consideration not to be simultaneously evaluated with the substantive merits 
of the cause of action.1976 It was reasoned that once a court has found that it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a matter, that ought to be “the end of the matter … [as] by its own 
finding on that issue it … [lacks the] power to rule on the merits”.1977 The judges 
declared that the issue in casu was not one of jurisdiction, but called on the court to 
                                            
1971
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 90. 
1972
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 93. 
1973
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 93. 
1974
 In its Kriel-judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal only considered the presence or absence of PAJA 
defined administrative action, as that is how the appellant pleaded it. The court set out to consider the 
nature of the decision within these parameters. Mhlanthla JA and Leach AJA found that the decision of an 
organ of state to dismiss a public servant did not constitute an administrative act due to the presence of 
contractual power. See Kriel v Legal Aid Board 2009 (9) BLLR 854 (SCA) at par 2. 
1975
 See Chapter Eight, part 4. 
1976
 Following the Makhanya-reasoning, the court did not regard the jurisdictional finding in the Chirwa-
judgment to be the ratio in that case and concluded that the High Court had jurisdiction to consider the 
Kriel-claim. 
1977
 Kriel v Legal Aid Board 2009 (9) BLLR 854 (SCA) at par 9.  
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consider “whether the dismissal of the appellant constituted ‘administrative action’ as 
envisaged by PAJA”.1978 
Although there is no clear recipe for action of an administrative nature, indicators can be 
found in the meaning attributed to the s 33 constitutional understanding of an 
administrative action, as it is the point of origin for PAJA.1979 In terms of the s 33 
approach adopted by the higher courts, it must be identified on a case-by-case basis 
whether the exercise of public power can be described as having an administrative 
nature.1980 
                                            
1978
 Kriel v Legal Aid Board 2009 (9) BLLR 854 (SCA) at par 2. Apart from the jurisdictional clarification, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reading in Kriel v Legal Aid Board [2009] 4 All SA 314 (SCA) at par 8 of 
the Sidumo-judgment, as a finding “that the CCMA arbitration proceedings did not constitute 
administrative action”, is unfortunate. In his minority judgment in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 162, Ngcobo J specifically explained that Navsa AJ held that “that the 
conduct of Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) arbitration proceedings 
constitutes administrative action within the meaning of section 33 of the Constitution.” Ngcobo J also 
noted that Navsa AJ found that PAJA “does not apply to reviews under section 145(2) of the LRA ... [as] 
the ambit of the grounds of review under section 145(2) … must be informed by section 33”, suffusing s 
145(2) of the LRA with “the constitutional standard of reasonableness which is implicit in the requirement 
of reasonable administrative action in section 33.” Emphasis added. Although the Constitutional Court in 
the Sidumo-case declared that PAJA did not find direct application, Navsa AJ relied on the Bato Star-
judgment of O’Regan J to interpret reasonableness in the LRA review context. The latter case however 
considered the PAJA approach to s 33 of the Constitution in formulating the general contextually 
adaptable guidelines of a reasonableness evaluation. Navsa AJ therefore allowed indirect reliance of 
PAJA in the interpretation of s 33, so as to use that section (as PAJA interpreted) to interpret the LRA and 
its promotion of the s 23 right to fair labour practices. This perspective gives recognition to the LRA as 
specialised legislation to be given preference when functioning in a context that also attracts general 
legislation, such as PAJA. There is therefore a difference in finding that an administrative action is absent 
and declaring that PAJA does not directly regulate an administrative action because of it being displaced 
(in the absence of normative conflict) by specialised legislation, such as the LRA. In the latter instance s 
33 considerations (as expressed in PAJA) informs the context-specific interpretation and application of 
the LRA in its regulation of an administrative-action-cum-labour-practice. 
1979
 See Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA) at par 
22. 
1980
 It must be kept in mind that an administrative action is merely a specific form or type of public power. 
See Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA) at par 24. A 
series of considerations was identified by the full court in President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 
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The case-by-case approach to the determination of the presence or otherwise of 
administrative action endorsed by the Constitutional Court is not reconcilable with the 
development of a blanket rule that regards an employment decision as never amounting 
to an administrative action. Such a conflicting perspective denies the proper contextual 
evaluation of the nature and subject of (public) power in every individual case.1981 The 
judiciary should, for example, not assume that the presence of contractual 
considerations exclude the possibility of public power considerations infiltrating the 
                                                                                                                                            
(CC) at par 143 to determine under which public form the nature of a power falls: “The source of the 
power, though not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So, too, is the nature of the power, its 
subject-matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it is related on the one 
hand to policy matters, which are not administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, 
which is.” In his minority judgment in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 186, Langa CJ 
identified the following supplementary factors: “(a) the relationship of coercion or power that the actor has 
in its capacity as a public institution; (b) the impact of the decision on the public; (c) the source of the 
power; and (d) whether there is a need for the decision to be exercised in the public interest.” In 
identifying the SARFU-considerations, the Constitutional Court declared that the focus of the evaluation 
should fall on the function, not the functionary. Public function considerations are “important 
consideration[s] in the determination of exactly what public law regulation applies”, seeing that state 
action undeniably carries a public character. Keeping in mind that constitutional law is part of public law, it 
is logical to deduce that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights (including the right to fair labour 
practices) carry a public law character. This perspective aligns with the Constitutional Court declaration in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: Ex Parte Application of the President of the RSA 
2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 30 that there is only one legal system, with the Constitution as the 
supreme source. See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 167; Mittalsteel South Africa Ltd v 
Hlatshwayo [2007] 1 All SA 1 (SCA). South African courts unfortunately appear to still presume and 
assume a lot and investigate very little when it comes to identifying the type of public power in terms of 
the function performed in a specific public employment context. 
1981
 Any general perspective developed by the judiciary should not be read as an absolute formalistic rule. 
However, there can be an assumption that employment decisions generally do not amount to 
administrative action, with the possibility of exceptions being identified on a case-by-case basis. Cf Craig 
in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 28. It is submitted, that the formalistic type of judicial 
reasoning that should be ignored is best illustrated by the judgment in SAPU v National Commissioner of 
the South African Police 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) paras 51 – 53. See also the opposite approach in 
POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at paras 53 – 54 (with reference to 
Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg 1958 (3) SA 343 (A). Cf Craig in Corder and Maluwa 
Administrative Justice 27; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA). 
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traditional private law realm in a public employment context. Although the State’s 
capacity to enter into contractually based relationships is primarily drawn from 
legislation,1982 its power to act with such legal personality is sourced in and underpinned 
by the Constitution itself.1983 This understanding underlies the High Court’s judgment in 
Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape,1984 where it was explained 
that the “State and its organs have no power outside that granted to it by the 
Constitution or by legislation complying with the Constitution”.1985 The public power 
element can therefore not be ignored simply because a decision is being taken in an 
employment context. 
Furthermore, it must be said that it is logically unsound for the judiciary to reason that 
the public power that was granted to appoint a public employee does not carry over to 
the decision to terminate employment. Even if one attempts to find the source of State 
power to act in legislation, that power ought to not necessarily be drawn directly from a 
                                            
1982
 See Quinot (LLD US 2007) 69. 
1983
 See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 73 – 74; Quinot (LLD US 2007) 103 – 104. See also 
Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA) at par 20. 
1984
 2005 (1) SA 141 (E). 
1985
 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141 (E) at par 21. See Quinot 
(LLD US 2007) 104 fn 159. Quinot (LLD US 2007) 110 points out that, although the Constitution as 
source mandates the functions of the State, these functions are wide in ambit, leaving it open to the State 
to determine the method or specific action by which the functions are to be executed. Although Quinot 
draws this conclusion in reviewing the commercial capacity of the State to enter into tender agreements, 
it is submitted that the same basic reasoning holds true for the general array of State functions 
constitutionally ordained, as the source of the State’s capacity to play its role in a democratic society is 
“ultimately found in the Constitution”. The Constitutional Court in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender 
Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) at paras 20 – 21 embraced a similar perspective: “[W]hen a 
tender board procures goods and services on behalf of government it wields power derived first from the 
Constitution itself and next from legislation in pursuit of constitutional goal ... when a tender board 
evaluates and awards a tender, it acts within the domain of administrative law. Its decision in awarding or 
refusing a tender constitutes administrative action ... because the decision is taken by an organ of State 
which wields public power or performs a public function in terms of the Constitution or legislation and the 
decision materially and directly affects the legal interests or rights of tenderers concerned”. Emphasis 
added.  
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statute. It can flow indirectly from a statute, as pointed out by Schreiner JA in his 
minority judgment in Mustapha v Receiver, Lichtenburgh.1986 
It appears that the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: 
KwaZulu Natal,1987 attempted to address the issue of the presence or otherwise of 
administrative action in that case with reasoning in line with the Mustapha-judgment. In 
this case, which concerned an attempt by a State department to review its own 
disciplinary process, the Supreme Court of Appeal started with an analysis of the status 
of the employer in the sector-specific context of the case. It found the employer to be an 
organ of state as defined in s 239 of the Constitution. The court also stated that the 
employer, as an organ of state, exercised “public power in terms of the public interest in 
terms of legislation”.1988   
It is interesting to note that Bosielo AJA, by contextualising the evaluation of the 
employment decision, justified the consideration and use of administrative law concepts 
on the basis that the applicable collective agreement was not comparable to a contract 
                                            
1986
 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) at 347 and 350. Quinot (LLD US 2007) 154 – 155 in commenting on the 
judgment explains: “[W]here an agreement is made in terms of statutory powers, any ‘further powers’ 
exercised in implementation (including termination) of the contract are also subject to statutory regulation. 
The important point ... is that the original source of the power to enter into the contract also has a 
determinative impact on any further powers flowing from or created by an exercise of that original power. 
Simply put, this means that, once the origin of a contract can be traced to a statutory source, action taken 
in terms of that contract cannot be divorced from the statutory source and will, like the conclusion of an 
agreement, be subject to public law regulation due to the public source of the power thus exercised.” 
Alder 1993 (13) Legal Studies 183 at 188 also reasons that “[a]ll legal power ultimately derives from 
‘public law’ sources, so that, for example the enforcement of a contract by an individual could be 
regarded as an exercise of power delegated by the state”. See also Quinot (LLD US 2007) 169 fn 200. 
1987
 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA). 
1988
 See Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 12. On the 
facts of the case, the court deduced: “Undoubtedly, when the second respondent appointed Dorkin [as 
chairperson] to preside over the appellant’s disciplinary hearing, it did so in its capacity as the State. It 
follows, in my view, that Dorkin’s action complained of herein which essentially is that of the second 
respondent qualifies as administrative action. That being so, such action has to be lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair as contemplated by s 33(1) of the Constitution.” 
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but rather constituted “a piece of subordinate, domestic legislation”.1989 As the 
chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry was appointed in terms of the PSCBC Resolution 
2 of 1999 (regulating discipline in the public sector), it was concluded that the 
disciplinary hearing qualified “as public power or public function performed in terms of 
[the] Resolution”.1990 The logic of the court’s reasoning is reconcilable with that found in 
the now approved minority of Schreiner JA in the Mustapha-judgment.1991 
In its Ntshangase-judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal then moved on to decide 
whether the review should fall under PAJA or s 158(1)(h) of the LRA.1992 Bosielo AJA 
found himself in agreement with the reasoning of the Labour Appeal Court, that “if the 
conduct of compulsory arbitrations relating to dismissal disputes under the Act 
constitutes administrative action [as was found in the Sidumo-judgment], then the 
conduct of disciplinary hearings in the workplace where the employer is the State 
constitutes, without any doubt, administrative action … [which] is required to be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.”1993 If then shown to be unreasonable, the action of 
the State would be reviewable in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA.1994 
                                            
1989
 S v Prefabricated Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 535 (A) at 540 as quoted in Ntshangase 
v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 13. 
1990
 Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 14. 
1991
 In Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA), Cameron JA referred to the 
minority Mustapha-judgment of Schreiner JA with approval. It is submitted, that the reasoning could have 
been simplified to reflect that found in the Kate-judgment. 
1992
 See Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 14. Section 
158(1)(h) determines that the Labour Court may “review any decision taken or any act performed by the 
State in its capacity as employer, on such grounds as are permissible in law”. 
1993
 Zondo JP’s Labour Appeal Court judgment from which Mr Ntshangase appealed, as quoted in 
Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 16.  
1994
 See Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at par 16. Bosielo 
AJA continued with consideration of the issue of locus standi in Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: KwaZulu 
Natal 2009 (12) BLLR 1170 (SCA) at paras 17 – 18: “Undoubtedly the second respondent has an interest 
in ensuring that fair labour practices are upheld in its employment relationships. The same holds true for 
its employees. All actions and/or decisions taken pursuant to the employment relationship between the 
second respondent and its employees must be fair and must account for all the relevant facts put before 
the presiding officer. Where such an act or decision fails to take account of all relevant facts and is 
manifestly unfair to the employer, he/she is entitled to take such decision on review. Moreover, the 
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The Ntshangase-judgment shows signs of a Supreme Court of Appeal movement 
towards an interdependent approach to the administrative/labour law relationship: 
acknowledging the presence of an administrative decision, as well as the relevance of s 
33 constitutional considerations relating to just administrative action, within the context 
of an employment relationship that justifies a review in terms of s 158(1)(h) of the LRA 
before in a specialised labour forum. It is submitted that the court in the Ntshangase-
judgment gave practical recognition to the Makambi- and Makhanya-reasoning of 
Nugent JA, by embracing the understanding that “the law is a seamless web of rights 
and obligations that impact upon one another across those fields.1995 In part 3 below, 
this understanding of the Supreme Court of Appeal is contrasted with the recent Gcaba-
judgment1996 of the Constitutional Court. 
3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S ATTEMPT AT REDEMPTION 
In the Gcaba-ruling, the Constitutional Court attempted to address the “complexity and 
confusion”1997 that resulted from the judiciary’s struggle to reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments.1998  
The Gcaba-case concerned a grievance lodged by a station commissioner of the SAPS 
against a decision not to appoint him (although short-listed) when his position was 
                                                                                                                                            
second respondent has a duty to ensure an accountable Public Administration in accordance with ss 195 
and 197 of the Constitution. I therefore find that the second respondent had the necessary locus standi to 
take Dorkin's action on review to the Labour Court.” 
1995
 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 8. 
1996
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
1997
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 2. 
1998
 The court in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 2 chose to 
place the blame at the door of the “legislature, courts, legal representatives and academics” for 
repressing the “clarity and guidance” of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. A reading of the case 
however creates the impression that the Constitutional Court in casu downplayed its role in the creation 
of the complexity, and rather saw the lower courts as the judicial culprits. In Gcaba v Minister for Safety 
and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 42, the differing opinions found in the reasoning of the 
‘other’ courts attempting to discern “whether Chirwa ‘overruled’ Fredericks” were illustrated with reference 
to the Makambi-attempt “to formulate the precise circumstances under which each precedent is to be 
followed”. In the Gcaba-judgment, the court also described the POPCRU-perspective (of constitutional 
rights as complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature) as robust. 
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upgraded. The applicant chose to phrase his claim with specific reference to the right to 
just administrative action. The applicant claimed that that right had been infringed upon 
due to the procedural unfairness (as he was not given the opportunity to state his case) 
and unreasonableness (as no reasons were proffered and the decision was irrational) of 
the decision not to appoint him.1999 The claim of the applicant presented the court with 
an opportunity to provide “a definitive pronouncement”2000 on the post-Chirwa issues 
that tormented the lower courts. 
In the Gcaba-judgment, the Constitutional Court readily acknowledged that it was called 
upon to decide a constitutional matter that concerned the interplay between 
administrative and labour law principles and by implication the LRA and PAJA. Although 
the dispute between the parties was moot when it reached the court, the Constitutional 
Court decided, in the interests of justice, to consider the associated jurisdictional issues. 
It is unfortunate that our highest court downplayed the relationship between labour and 
administrative law to a mere jurisdictional question.2001 The Constitutional Court’s 
approach to the relationship between labour and administrative law in the Gcaba-
judgment will be outlined and evaluated in the discussion to follow.2002 
3 1 Brief Synopsis of Gcaba 
The Constitutional Court held that it was called upon to decide two issues: 
(1) whether the decision not to promote the applicant constituted an administrative 
action; and 
(2) whether the High Court was correct in holding that it lacked the jurisdiction to 
decide the matter. 
In attempting to address these issues, the court (through Van der Westhuizen J) 
acknowledged that conflicting schools of thought emerged after the Fredericks- and 
Chirwa-judgments, with some courts allowing concurrent jurisdiction between the 
                                            
1999
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 45. 
2000
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 18. 
2001
 See Chapter Eight, part 4. 
2002
 As the judgment itself is confusing, and contains ambiguous statements, the development of 
contradictory post-Gcaba interpretations in the lower courts remain a possibility. 
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Labour and High Courts where labour disputes are concerned, while others concluded 
that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all labour matters emanating from 
public employment relationships. In addressing this conflict, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised that one set of facts can give rise to more than one cause of action and 
that human rights are interdependent and indivisible in nature. The court also 
acknowledged a need for specificity and specialisation in the provision of legislative 
rules emanating from specific rights,2003 and also emphasised the importance of 
adherence to the doctrine of precedent. With all these underlying principles in mind, the 
court declared that the Gcaba-case aligned with the Chirwa-case as both applicants’ 
complaints could be considered typical labour matters concerning the right to fair labour 
practices. The court concluded that Mr Gcaba would have failed with his application in 
the High Court, especially as it held that labour related decisions in the public 
employment context generally do not amount to administrative action. 
In the Gcaba-judgment, the court furthermore aligned itself with the reasoning of 
Skweyiya and Ngcobo JJ in the Chirwa-case, by emphasising that the LRA created a 
specific adjudicatory structure for labour issues and by accepting a broad reading of s 
157(1) of the LRA (on which s 157(2) must not be allowed to encroach). In conclusion, 
the court declared that, as far as conflict continues to exist between its previous 
judgments (i.e. between the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments), the most recent (i.e. 
Gcaba-judgment) must be regarded as the relevant authority. 
3 2 The Constitutional and Legislative Framework 
The interpretative explanation provided by the court for its understanding of the 
Constitution and applicable legislative instruments is not immediately clear. As point of 
departure and by attempting to address the constitutional matter before the court, the 
court re-emphasised that the Constitution, as the supreme law, protects the basic rights 
of individuals.2004 With this, the court created the expectation that the pursuant 
                                            
2003
 See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the doctrine of interdependence and the idea of specificity. 
2004
 The court stated that the interplay between administrative and labour law in the public employment 
context qualifies as a constitutional matter, seeing as the constitutional roots of the LRA and PAJA, 
namely ss 23 and 33, influence the interpretation of these two instruments. See Gcaba v Minister for 
Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at paras 1 and 17. 
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evaluation would involve a genuine consideration of the interdependent spirit, object 
and purport of the Constitution.2005 Unfortunately, the reasoning of the court only hints 
at it. The court merely acknowledged that the entrenchment of s 23 in the Bill of Rights, 
along with the promulgation of its effecting LRA, was primarily an attempt to pursue the 
constitutional protection of the right to fair labour practices,2006 while s 33 was primarily 
aimed at the protection of everyone’s right to just administrative action given effect to by 
PAJA as the national legislation called for in s 33(3).2007  
In considering the s 33(3) constitutional obligation to enact legislation that gives effect to 
the right to just administrative action, the Constitutional Court  did not expressly 
distance itself from the majority Sidumo-perspective that s 33 does not preclude the 
regulation of administrative action by means of specialised legislation, such as the 
LRA.2008 Although the reasoning of the court (absent any apparent conflict) must be 
read along with this Sidumo-understanding, the court unfortunately did not make explicit 
mention of the Sidumo-perspective, leaving the specialised-general functioning 
relationship between the LRA and PAJA in place.2009 With this superficial overview of 
the constitutional-legislative basis of the relationship between labour and administrative 
law, the Constitutional Court in the Gcaba-case simply added to (instead of eliminated) 
the post-Chirwa complexity. If the court took the time to expand on its understanding of 
the relationship between the specialised LRA and general PAJA (building on the 
Sidumo-groundwork), it could have eliminated a lot of the legal uncertainty, thereby 
preventing possible post-Gcaba interpretative manipulation of that judgment.2010  
                                            
2005
 The Constitutional Court has previously endorsed this approach. See Chapter Seven. 
2006
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 10. 
2007
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 11. 
2008
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 91 – 92. The 
reasoning of the court, so reflected, implies that the existence of administrative action in an employment 
context is not impossible. Cf part 3 7. 
2009
 See part 3 6 4 for a discussion of the doctrine of precedent.  
2010
 In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 37, Van der 
Westhuizen J did however make reference to the Chirwa-perspective of Ngcobo J, namely that 
specialised legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right cannot be bypassed with direct 
reliance on that right, without challenging the constitutionality of the legislation. This principle, in the 
absence of a statement to the contrary, must be understood against the Sidumo-perspective that general 
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3 3 The Character of the Claim and the Section 157 Confusion2011 
To interpret the scope of s 157 of the LRA, Van der Westhuizen J delved into the 
opposing perspectives of the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments and the manner in 
which the character of the claims in those cases were interpreted.  
As is evident from the Fredericks/Chirwa-confusion, the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence is not clear on what the scope of an employment issue or dispute is for 
purposes of determination of the exclusive/concurrent jurisdictions provided for by s 
157. This confusion infiltrated the Gcaba-judgment in the court’s attempt to distinguish 
between the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments without expressly overruling either one. 
Van der Westhuizen J reasoned (with reliance on Skweyiya J’s understanding in the 
Chirwa-case), that “Fredericks was never a labour case or a case where direct reliance 
was placed on the LRA”.2012 The Fredericks-judgment was explained to be a case that 
“turned on the proper interpretation of section 157 of the LRA and section 169 of the 
Constitution”.2013 Nevertheless, the “non”-labour nature of the Fredericks-case 
(confirmed in the Gcaba-judgment to have been concerned with the interpretation of the 
LRA, the statutory core of labour law) was declared to have moved the claim in that 
case out of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court “and placed it within the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the High Court”.2014 The Gcaba-
                                                                                                                                            
legislation (and the right to which it gives effect) can be used as an interpretative source for specialised 
legislation (and the right that it seeks to promote). See also the holistic interpretative approach endorsed 
by the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
2011
 See Chapter Eight, part 4 for a discussion of the jurisdictional-argument in the administrative-labour 
law relationship debate. 
2012
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 28. Emphasis added. 
2013
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 23. The judge explained 
that, as the claim in the Fredericks-case was formulated as a constitutional matter relating to the 
infringement of ss 9 and 33 of the Constitution, the High Court was found to have jurisdiction, based on s 
169 of the Constitution. In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 28, 
it was held that “Fredericks was never a labour case or a case where direct reliance was placed on the 
LRA” so the court “left open the question whether a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application 
of a collective agreement can also give rise to a constitutional complaint as envisaged in section 157(2) of 
the LRA”. See also Chapter Eight, part 4; Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 
(CC) at paras 23 and 24. 
2014
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 30. 
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interpretation of the Fredericks-judgment leaves one somewhat perplexed as to the 
logic behind this contradiction: a non-labour-case with a non-LRA-based-claim, dealing 
with s 157 LRA interpretation, with the court ultimately ruling that the non-labour-case 
fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and Labour Court (with the latter 
being a court statutorily designed to only deal with labour cases).2015 
The next step for the court in the Gcaba-case was to declare (drawing on the merit-
based jurisdictional approach of Skweyiya J in his Chirwa-judgment) that the choice of 
“the applicants in Fredericks not to rely on the provisions of the LRA removed their 
claim from the purview of labour law”,2016 while the applicant in the Chirwa-case framed 
her claim “in terms that sought to impugn a failure to properly apply sections of the 
LRA”.2017 The Chirwa-claim, so understood, allowed Skweyiya J (in his Chirwa-majority) 
to distinguish it from the Constitutional Court’s Fredericks-reasoning. Accordingly, the 
Chirwa-claim was construed as based on an employment contract (a labour matter), 
and not approached as worded by the applicant.2018 In Gcaba, Van der Westhuizen J 
                                            
2015
 It is still possible to reason that the Fredericks-judgment did not concern an LRA-based claim, but it 
appears a bit of a stretch to argue (in the employment context of that dispute) that it was not at some 
level describable as a labour case. 
2016
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 30. 
2017
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 31. With regard to Chirwa-
judgment, Van der Westhuizen J in Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) 
at par 26 stated that it was a case where the applicant “claimed that she had two causes of action 
available to her, one under the LRA and the other flowing from the Bill of Rights and PAJA”. 
2018
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at paras 28 and 31. 
According to Ngcobo J in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 124, the Constitutional 
Courts was allowed to (re)characterised Ms Chirwa’s claim, based on the fact that “[w]hat is, in essence, 
a labour dispute as envisaged in the LRA should not be labelled a violation of a constitutional right in the 
Bill of Rights simply because the issue raised could also support a conclusion that the conduct of the 
employer amounts to a violation of a right entrenched in the Constitution”. Yet the legislature allows for 
such a possibility in the scope of the concurrent jurisdiction found in s 157(2) of the LRA. It appears as if 
Ngcobo J in his majority Chirwa-judgment recognised that other rights could be violated by a public sector 
employer’s conduct, but reasoned that it should rather be viewed as a labour dispute if the essence of the 
conduct so allows. If mere preference, then why acknowledge the Labour Court’s extended jurisdiction 
over matters that implicate constitutional rights (s 157(2)), if only LRA matters and rights should in 
essence be addressed. The LRA aims to give effect to s 23. The s 157(1) exclusive jurisdiction can cover 
the Labour Court demanded protection, as s 23 is the reason for the LRA’s existence. If all s 23 issues 
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did not express any concern with this (re)characterisation of Ms Chirwa’s claim. This 
silent acceptance in Gcaba of the majority’s ‘identification’ of Ms Chirwa’s claim is 
confusing, especially because the court in Gcaba  also aligned itself with the minority 
reasoning of Langa CJ in Chirwa,- which criticised the judicial trend to (re)characterise 
claims and held that a litigant’s claim should be approached as it is pleaded.2019 The 
apparent acceptance in the Gcaba-judgment of two mutually destructive approaches in 
the Chirwa-case does not assist in providing legal clarity. In the absence of proper 
explanation, the Gcaba-judgment creates the impression that “divergent schools of 
jurisprudence”2020 developed because the Fredericks–claim was adjudicated as it was 
pleaded, while the Chirwa–claim was adjudicated as it was (re)characterised. This 
leaves the Constitutional Court’s Gcaba-judgment open to criticism when viewed 
against the third unsound proposition identified by Nugent JA (in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal),2021 as it is not the task of the judiciary to tell the applicant what he or she ought 
to have claimed, in the absence of ambiguity. 
The Gcaba-judgment further expanded on Ngcobo J’s finding in the Chirwa-judgment 
that s 157(2) of the LRA should be narrowly interpreted, as the LRA is aimed at 
addressing problems associated with “multiplicity of laws, as well as overlapping 
jurisdictions”.2022 The court accordingly reasoned that the “application of section 157(2) 
must be confined to those instances, if any, where a party relies directly on the 
                                                                                                                                            
lead to the Labour Court for consideration (as it cannot be bypassed according to the Constitutional Court 
in SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 (9) BLLR 785 (CC)), then the s 157(2) constitutional rights 
reference must allow for consideration of other constitutional rights, in addition to s 23 which is already 
covered by the LRA matters.  
2019
 In his minority judgment in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 157 – 159, Langa 
CJ emphasised that Ms Chirwa’s case had to be evaluated as it was pleaded, as a claim based on the 
right to just administrative action as given effect to by PAJA. Langa CJ did not regard it as appropriate to 
(re)characterised Ms Chirwa’s claim in the same manner as the majority.  
2020
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 39. 
2021
 See part 2 1 3. 
2022
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 35. The court did not give 
any express consideration to the Sidumo-finding that the LRA as specialised legislation displaces the 
general PAJA approach in regulating administrative action in an employment context. This understanding 
cancels out the “multiplicity of laws” problem. 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights”.2023 Van der Westhuizen J thus read Ngcobo J’s Chirwa-
judgment in a manner that interpreted s 157(2) of the LRA into a no-meaning zone for 
normal labour disputes,2024 regardless of the fact that the Fredericks-judgment 
confirmed that the Labour Court does not hold the monopoly on all employment 
disputes.2025 Van der Westhuizen J did not comment on the express choice of the 
legislature to use the word ‘concurrent’, or the legislative choice to omit any reference to 
the direct application, qualification or limitation mentioned in the Gcaba-judgment. Van 
der Westhuizen J merely endorsed the Chirwa-majority’s understanding of exclusive 
jurisdiction that “[l]abour issues are to be dealt with in specialised fora ... [as it is the] 
purpose of the LRA ... to create a system under which all labour disputes can be 
resolved”.2026 The apparent support in the Gcaba-case for the policy-laden reasoning of 
the Chirwa-majority, leaves one somewhat perplexed, considering that Van der 
Westhuizen J in his Gcaba-ruling emphasised “that labour disputes that raise a 
constitutional issue are justifiable in the High Court”.2027 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of s 157(2) of the LRA in Gcaba 
amounted to nothing more than a mere restatement of the words of that section in the 
                                            
2023
  Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 36. Emphasis added. 
2024
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 32. It appears that 
Ngcobo J’s Chirwa-efforts at reconciliation came down to giving a s 157(1) LRA policy meaning to the 
reading of s 157(2). The idea of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction is irreconcilable in character, the 
jurisdictional equivalent of oil and water. The purpose behind exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction cannot 
be harmonised without forfeiting the essence of the one in exchange for the other. The legislative 
reference to the concurrent dimension of jurisdiction is not unfortunate, as the Makhanya-reasoning of 
Nugent JA confirmed, but rather a legislative choice that must be properly interpreted and not 
manipulated under the pretext of purposive interpretation. 
2025
 The Constitutional Court has already proclaimed that direct reliance on a provision in the Bill of Rights 
is not allowed where legislation is in place to regulate that provision, except when a provision is relied 
upon to hold the legislation (or a section thereof) unconstitutional. 
2026
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 28. Footnotes omitted. 
The s 191 LRA regulation of unfair dismissals was held to qualify as a matter for which the Labour Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction. See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 
29. However, even if the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction in, for example, s 191 LRA matters, the 
exclusivity associated with it cannot oust the other legitimate rights that flow from the same set of 
employment facts. 
2027
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 33. 
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LRA, without any clarity-promoting conclusion. In doing so, the court conceded that 
concurrent jurisdiction is reserved for “any dispute over the constitutionality of any 
exercise or administrative act or conduct by the state in its capacity as employer”.2028 It 
is submitted, that an administrative act can only be present if public power is exercised 
by the State while acting as employer. If an administrative act can be exercised by the 
State in its capacity as employer (as implied by the wording of s 157(2)) that in turn 
indicates that the State in its capacity as employer acts with public power. It appears 
that the Constitutional Court must, at some level, have been open to this possibility, as 
it stated that s 157(2) of the LRA is not aimed at restricting the High Court’s already 
existing jurisdiction.2029 Therefore, the LRA must not be read as intending “to destroy 
causes of action or remedies”.2030   
In the court’s interpretative endeavours, it appears that Van der Westhuizen J 
attempted to emphasise two points. Firstly, Labour Courts can address constitutional 
issues that arise from an employment context.2031 Secondly, these issues include 
“disputes concerning the alleged violation of any rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights 
which arise from employment and labour relations”.2032 However, in admitting that any 
right in the Bill of Rights can potentially find application in a public sector employment 
context, the court perhaps unwittingly acknowledged that the right to just administrative 
action (as a right entrenched in the Bill of Rights) also carries such a potential.  
Ultimately, the Gcaba-judgment reverted back to old habit in relying on substantive 
reasoning to form the basis for a case-specific jurisdictional finding by the ruling that the 
“applicant’s complaint was essentially rooted in the LRA, as it was based on conduct of 
an employer towards an employee which may have violated the right to fair labour 
practices ... was not based on administrative action ... [and] should have been 
adjudicated by the Labour Court”.2033 
                                            
2028
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 71. Emphasis added. 
2029
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 73. 
2030
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 73. 
2031
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 71. 
2032
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 71. Emphasis added. 
2033
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 76. 
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3 4 Apparent Reversion to the First Unsound Jurisdictional Principle2034  
In interpreting s 157 of the LRA, Van der Westhuizen J looked to the Skweyiya J 
Chirwa-finding that “addressed the question whether public sector employment 
contracts are subject to administrative law, on a jurisdictional basis”,2035 and 
emphasised that labour issues should be resolved in  specialised fora in light of the 
purpose of the LRA. 
However, in the Makhanya-case, Nugent JA explained that it is unsound (as a principle 
of logic) for a court to base the presence or absence of its jurisdictional power on a 
finding as to the presence or absence of an administrative action.2036 In the Gcaba-
judgment, Van der Westhuizen J nevertheless found that the claim presented to the 
court by Mr Gcaba was bad in law and held that to indicate that the High Court lacked 
jurisdiction.2037 In other words, the court evaluated the presence or absence of an 
administrative action, and used that decision (which concerns the merits of the case) to 
inform the decision as to which lower court should have jurisdiction.2038 This goes 
against a recognised (and Constitutional Court approved) principle of logic, as Van der 
Westhuizen J (in dealing with the merits of the case, before addressing the issue of 
jurisdiction) created the impression that the court again based a jurisdictional finding on 
a finding as to the presence or absence of an administrative action. 
                                            
2034
 See part 2 1 1 1. 
2035
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 28. Consequently, the 
Skweyiya J Chirwa-majority must not be read as a finding on the merits of that case. 
2036
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 51. See also Fraser v ABSA 
Bank 2007 (3) BCLR 219 (CC) at par 40; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 155 per 
Langa CJ. 
2037
 With his claim of procedural unfairness, the applicant placed primary reliance on the right to just 
administrative action and secondary reliance on the right to fair labour practices. See Gcaba v Minister for 
Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 75. 
2038
 The administrative action evaluation was therefore undertaken, before a finding was made as to 
whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction. In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) 
BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 69, the court went as far as to declare its support for the Chirwa-perspective, in 
stating that the “consequence of the finding that the conduct … is not administrative action will 
substantively reduce the problems associated with parallel systems of law, duplicate jurisdiction and 
forum shopping”. 
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Clarity and certainty for the practice in lower courts could easily have resulted from the 
Gcaba-judgment, had the Constitutional Court followed a similar approach as that 
expected of the lower courts.2039 In doing so, the court could have led by example and 
limited the possible misinterpretation by lower courts looking for a way around the 
Gcaba-finding. 
3 5 The General Principles underlying the Constitutional Court’s Complexity 
In attempting to present the legal community with some clarity, the Constitutional Court 
in the Gcaba-case outlined four principles identified from previous decisions, which 
principles ostensibly informed and directed its reasoning.  
3 5 1 The First Principle: Condemning Formalism2040 
The first principle rejects formalism in calling on the judiciary to avoid rigid 
compartmentalisation.2041 In the Gcaba-judgment, Van der Westhuizen J admitted that 
although one decision may potentially violate more than one constitutional right (which 
would give rise to more than one cause of action that each could be pursued in different 
fora),2042  it is also true that “[a]reas of law are labelled or named [only] for purposes of 
systematic understanding and not necessarily on the basis of fundamental reasons for a 
separation”.2043  
3 5 2 The Second Principle: Endorsing Interdependence2044 
Complementary to the first, the second principle embraces the “intrinsically 
interdependent, indivisible and inseparable”2045 character of human rights. The court 
                                            
2039
 An evaluation of the substantive merits of a dispute can only be made on a case-by-case basis 
(generalisation is therefore dangerous). See President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 
143. The required evaluation on the merits can only take place once a court has ruled on jurisdiction. The 
lower courts (whether the High or Labour Court) will in every case first have to evaluate the jurisdictional 
fact. 
2040
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 1. 
2041
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 53. 
2042
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 53. 
2043
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 53. 
2044
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 2. 
2045
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 54. 
  
 
383 
found this principle to be supported by the “constitutional and legal order … [as] one 
coherent system for the protection of rights and the resolution of disputes”.2046 Related 
to this, is the understanding “that legislation must not be interpreted to exclude or 
unduly limit remedies for the enforcement of constitutional rights”.2047 With this 
endorsement of the doctrine of interdependence, the court appeared to have accepted 
the perspective that beneficiaries of constitutional rights are entitled to comprehensive 
protection without undue limitation. 
3 5 3 The Third Principle: Reverting to Specificity2048 
The third principle unfortunately appears to contradict the first and the second principle, 
by reverting to traditional formalistic reasoning.2049 The third principle acknowledges the 
idea of separatism as a necessity in giving effect to the rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights. The court declared “that the Constitution recognises the need for specificity and 
specialisation in a modern and complex society under the rule of law”.2050 Van der 
Westhuizen J justified the endorsement of separatism by stating that the Constitution 
itself mandates the enactment of regulatory legislation.2051 
Rules and structures can however not be allowed to ignore the variable character of 
norms and function in isolation with a disregard for genuine interdependence (in the 
absence of normative conflict), otherwise specificity takes on a formalistic character 
                                            
2046
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 54. This argument aligns 
with that of Sachs J in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 50. 
2047
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 55. 
2048
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 3. 
2049
 It is noteworthy that the Constitutional Court declared this to be a “principle or policy consideration”, 
reminding of the much criticised Chirwa-policy-approach. See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 
2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56. Emphasis added. 
2050
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56. 
2051
 In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56, Van der 
Westhuizen J reasoned: “The legislature is sometimes specifically mandated to create detailed legislation 
for a particular area, like equality [PEPUDA], just administrative action (PAJA) and labour relations (LRA). 
Once a set of carefully-crafted rules and structures has been created for the effective and speedy 
resolution of disputes and protection of rights in a particular area of law, it is preferable to use that 
particular system.” Emphasis added. The Constitutional Court recognised the fact that preference (in 
theory) plays a role, but in practice appears to interpret this as a directive and not a choice. 
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irreconcilable with the spirit of the Constitution.2052 The Constitutional Court did not 
expressly declare which form of separatism (absolute or relative) it was endorsing as 
the third principle. It is an intrinsic contradiction to acknowledge that fundamental rights 
are inseparable, while allowing the constitutionally mandated legislation that gives effect 
to those rights to function in a divisible manner. As a result, absent clarification in the 
Gcaba-judgment, the support for specificity proffered as justification for the court’s 
Chirwa- and Gcaba-findings, gives the impression that absolute formalism is 
acceptable.2053 Absent an express declaration in favour of a relative approach to 
specificity, the Gcaba-ruling creates the opportunity for lower courts to favour extreme 
specificity that would see the third principle suppress the first and second.2054 
The Constitutional Court did however note that its support for specificity (as the third 
principle) is based on the desire to avoid the development of “a dual system of law”.2055 
It is submitted that if genuine consideration is given to the second principle (if all rights 
and effecting legislation are interpreted and applied with due regard to the 
interdependent nature of the Constitution) and if specificity is not allowed to suppress 
the variable value system of the Constitution, then the development of a dual system of 
law can be averted. After all, the idea of interdependence is aimed at evading the 
development of a dual system of law, by embracing the Constitution as the supreme 
law.2056 A dual system of law will only be problematic if compartmentalised 
interpretation and application of fundamental rights (and associated legislation) is 
endorsed by allowing absolute formalistic (instead of relative) specificity. As the 
Constitutional Court declared itself against formalistic separatism, in the same manner it 
rejected the formalistic influence by accepting the first two principles, the logical 
                                            
2052
 See Chapter Seven, part 2 3. 
2053
 See the discussion of the idea of specificity in Chapter Seven, part 2 3. 
2054
 Such an understanding renders the Constitution a mere pipe dream and empowers legislation to 
undermine the Constitution in the name of the false ‘constitutional’ principle of specificity. 
2055
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 56. 
2056
 For comment on the single system brought about by the Constitution see Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC). 
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deduction would be that the third principle was formulated in support of relative 
constitutional specificity.2057 
3 5 4 The Fourth Principle: Doctrine of Precedent  
The Constitutional Court also relied on the doctrine of precedent to attempt to reconcile 
its reasoning in the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments. The court considered the 
meaning of the Latin maxim, stare decisis et non quieta movere:2058 “[I]t means that in 
the interests of certainty, equality before the law and the satisfaction of legitimate 
expectations, a court is bound by the previous decisions of a higher court and by its 
own previous decisions in similar matters”.2059 The court made reference to Robin 
Consolidated Industries Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue2060 and Certification of 
the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19962061 where  
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court respectively  acknowledged 
that a deviation from previous decisions will only be justifiable if the court clearly erred 
in its previous judgment, “or where the point was not argued or where the issue is in 
                                            
2057
 Furthermore, while recognising the Constitutional Court’s argument in Gcaba v Minister for Safety 
and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 57 (that “forum shopping is not desirable”), it is submitted 
that litigants will not be forced to revert to forum shopping for the full protection of all their rights if the 
judiciary cultivates a culture of genuine interdependent protection of human rights. Even if the different 
forums adjudicated claims based on the same set of facts, the reasoning of the High and the Labour 
Courts should be reconcilable, regardless of which forum is approached to adjudicate the matter. This 
would allow (in fact demand) specialised labour fora to have due regard to all relevant rights in giving full 
circumstantial effect to the right to fair labour practices. This altered judicial culture can also infiltrate the 
context specific discretion of the labour fora when identifying an appropriate remedy. Forcing a litigant to 
base a cause of action on a specific right uninformed and detached from its constitutional support system, 
will bring about a mistrust in the applicable court’s capacity to see to it that justice is done to the full 
extent of the law. 
2058
 This phrase translate as, “to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters”. See Gcaba v 
Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 58. 
2059
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 58. The emphasised 
section highlights the three components by which previous judgments retain their authoritative status. 
2060
 1997 (3) SA 654 (SCA) at 666. 
2061
 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 8. 
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some legitimate manner distinguishable”.2062 The Constitutional Court did not venture 
into a discussion of post-Chirwa judgments to evaluate the influence of the 
Constitutional Court’s two majorities in Chirwa in view of this understanding of the 
doctrine of precedent. Van der Westhuizen J merely set out the Constitutional Court’s 
own reasoning, creating the impression of an unbalanced, incomplete evaluation. The 
Constitutional Court chose to not expressly give full consideration to the arguments and 
criticism lodged in the lower courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal against its 
apparently conflicting judgments in Fredericks and Chirwa. Although constitutional 
justice may have been done, the court’s silence undermines the appearance of 
constitutional justice being done.2063 
Furthermore, sight must not be lost of the fact that certainty is but one element of the 
Latin maxim that underlies the fourth principle. The Constitutional Court cannot be 
faulted for theoretically acknowledging the other three constitutional principles in an 
attempt to provide clarity post-Chirwa in support of the legal ideal of reasonable 
predictability (which amounts to the rationale for judicial reliance on the doctrine of 
precedent). However, no court must lose sight of the fact that it has to abide with mere 
reasonableness and not precise predictability. The carefully crafted general rules that 
the court desires through specificity and predictability cannot be viewed as cast in 
stone, due to the variable nature of the norms that underlie the rules of justice. The 
variable normative system within which the Constitution, its ensuing rights and effecting 
legislation function, demand proper consideration of fair and equal treatment as 
required by the rule of law. This demands more than mere formalistic sameness. The 
constitutionally recognised value of equality (as associated with the variable concept of 
fairness) requires its scope to be contextually determined through case-by-case 
consideration. 
It is therefore, in the absence of further explanation, a paradox that the Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that interference in set precedent is justified “when this Court’s 
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 Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) at par 95 per Moseneke J. See also Van der Walt v 
Metcash 2002 (5) BCLR 454 (CC) at par 39; Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 
1145 (CC) at paras 59 – 61. 
2063
 Jurisprudential silence as to the court’s underlying reasoning allows for formalistic interpretation to 
undermine the truth underlying a just decision. 
  
 
387 
earlier decisions have given rise to controversy or uncertainty, leading to conflicting 
decisions in the lower courts”,2064 when in fact it is the controversy and uncertainty 
underlying its previous Chirwa-judgment (reflected in the post-Chirwa rulings of the 
lower courts) that brought the Gcaba–case to the court. If fairness and optimal (equal 
access) protection of fundamental rights do not qualify as a “coherent and compelling 
reason”2065 for deviation from a controversial Constitutional Court ruling, then it is 
difficult to discern what does. 
3 6 General Presumption of the Absence of Administrative Action 
The attempt at the promotion of legal certainty in the Gcaba-judgment did not end with 
the Constitutional Court’s paradoxical approach to its quest for certainty through the 
identification of the four general constitutional principles discussed above. The 
Constitutional Court also addressed the presence or absence of administrative action 
on the facts of the case in an attempt to answer the jurisdictional question.2066 In the 
absence of an in-depth analysis of recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgments,2067 the 
Constitutional Court stated:2068 
Generally, employment and labour relationship issues do not amount to 
administrative action within the meaning of PAJA ... When a grievance is 
raised by an employee relating to the conduct of the state as employer and it 
has few or no direct implications or consequences for other citizens, it does 
not constitute administrative action. In this regard the reasoning of Murphy 
AJ in SAPU is persuasive ... [T]he Constitution regulates, the employment 
relationship expressly in section 23 …2069 
                                            
2064
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 62. 
2065
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 62. 
2066
 See part 3 4. 
2067
 See the preceding discussion in section 2 of this chapter. 
2068
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at paras 72 – 76. Cf the 
Makambi and Makhanya-judgments in part 2 1 1; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 
155 per Langa CJ. 
2069
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at paras 64 – 65. Emphasis 
added. Footnotes omitted. For criticism on the reasoning of Murphy AJ in SAPU v National Commissioner 
of the Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) see Chapter Eight, part 3. 
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With this statement, the Constitutional Court formulated a general presumption that 
employment decisions cannot constitute administrative action. However, in the absence 
of an express acknowledgment that this general assumption allows of case specific 
exceptions, the court created the opportunity for formalistic reasoning to once again 
infiltrate the rights-relationship between labour and administrative law in the public 
employment context. In fact, the Constitutional Court has on numerous occasions 
emphasised that the presence or absence of an administrative action must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, as the concept of public power is as elusive as a 
precise content description of the fairness component of fair labour practices. The 
Constitutional Court, for some reason, omitted to expressly factor this legal reality into 
its general presumption.  
For some inexplicable reason the Constitutional Court also chose to place reliance on a 
controversial case (the SAPU-judgment) to justify the formulation of this general 
presumption. In an attempt to bolster the authority of Murphy AJ’s SAPU-reasoning, the 
Constitutional Court commented that the distinction between the applicability of ss 23 
and 33 of the Constitution “does not mean that employees have no protection”.2070 
However, as Nugent JA so adequately explained in the Makhanya-judgment, the 
constitutional argument must not merely focus on the provision of some protection, but 
on comprehensive protection to which all beneficiaries of rights contained within the Bill 
of Rights are fundamentally contextually entitled.2071 The Constitutional Court  did not 
give express or comprehensive consideration to this argument of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (as articulated by Nugent JA). In failing to do so, the court appears to have lost 
sight of the fact that SAPU-type cases based their formalistic  distinction between 
labour and administrative law on the contractual element of the employment relationship 
(as regulated by s 23) in an attempt to justify the presence of private power (or, 
conversely, the absence of public power). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
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 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 65. 
2071
 See Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 69. This sentiment was also 
emphasised in the judgment of POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Service 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at 
paras 58 – 61, a case that the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in the Chirwa-saga 
regarded as the opposing view to that of Murphy AJ in the SAPU-judgment. See also Van der Walt 2008 
(1) CCR 77 at 111. 
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contradicted the rationale underlying the ‘authoritative’ SAPU-case, by admitting that 
“[s]ection 23 is an express constitutional recognition of the special status of employment 
relationships and the need for legal regulation outside of the law of contract”.2072  
In an apparent last effort to eliminate any applicability of administrative law, the court in 
the Gcaba-judgment elaborated on its opinion that the conduct of the State as employer 
has “no direct implication or consequence for other citizens”,2073 while only in passing 
admitting that “[t]he situation might be different where, for example, the appointment or 
dismissal of the National Commissioner of the SAPS is at stake”.2074 At the same time, 
however, this exception was linked to the fact that that “decision [is] taken by the 
President as the head of the executive”,2075 which Van der Westhuizen J recognised as 
“of huge public import”.2076  
It is submitted, that this argument cannot stand. The exception is far too narrow. In the 
same way that the demographics and size of the population that the public service 
serves “impacts on the beliefs and attitudes”2077 of public employees, the beliefs and 
attitudes of  public servants impact on the population they serve in the exercise of their 
functions.2078 This belief-system is now encapsulated in the Batho Pele Principles that 
reveal the public service’s vision as “we belong, we care, we serve”. The Batho Pele 
Principles act as the guideline for all public servants in the performance of their 
duties.2079 One of the transformative priorities associated with the Batho Pele Principles, 
in support of better service to the public, is the renewed focus on the employment 
conditions and labour relations of employees in the public sector.2080 Emery and 
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 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 65. Emphasis added. 
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 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 64. 
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 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 64 fn. 
2075
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 64 fn. 
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 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 64 fn. 
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 Glor 2001 (67) Int Rev Admin Sc 525 at 527. 
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 See Glor 2001 (67) Int Rev Admin Sc 525 at 527. 
2079
 In a sense, it can be reasoned that the Batho Pele Principles are part and parcel of the terms and 
conditions of public employee’s employment agreements.  
2080
 Batho Pele: People First http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/bathopele.htm (2009/10/08). NEHAWU has 
also put forward the argument that there is a link between poor public service delivery and public service 
wage disputes. See http://www.nehawu.org.za (2009/10/08). Cf the Conflict in Interest and Post-
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Giauque also emphasise that the importance of the public service’s impact on society 
must not be underestimated, as it works both ways:2081 What affects the public servant 
affects the public and vice versa. The ethos or spirit of the public service clearly 
contradicts the Constitutional Court’s opinion that the conduct of the State as employer 
has no general direct impact on the citizens that the public service is called upon to 
serve.2082 
[C]ivil service employees are quicker to defend the general interest and 
service to the community. Moreover, the public interest, the general interest, 
form part of the values with which employees in the civil service readily 
identify ... The public ethos is therefore not merely rhetoric used deliberately 
by civil servants to protect themselves against attacks on their conditions of 
employment and their jobs. On the contrary, it would seem that these values 
form the heart of the professional identity of a majority of them.2083 
A causal link is clearly identifiable. If the State as employer makes an employment 
decision that adversely affects public servants, it inevitably impacts on the quality of 
service offered to the citizens. The causal link that informs the required general direct 
impact is all the more relevant in the case of front-line public servants that deal directly 
with the public on a day-to-day basis. The stronger the causal link the weaker the 
Constitutional Court’s generalisation becomes. In the Chirwa-judgment, the link can be 
described as a weak one, because Ms Chirwa was an administrative officer that did not 
deal directly with the public on a day-to-day basis.2084 In contrast, the public servant that 
approached the Constitutional Court in the Gcaba-case, Mr Gcaba, came to the court 
as a prospective station commissioner in the SAPS. A person in this position undeniably 
deals with the public as a front-line public servant. The capacity of such an official to 
fulfil his public service obligation to the community is important. If a decision of the State 
                                                                                                                                            
employment Code for the Canadian Public Service that echo the spirit of Batho Pele in the South African 
public service. See Glor 2001 (67) Int Rev Admin Sc 525 at 536. 
2081
 See Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 650. 
2082
 See Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 650. 
2083
 Emery and Giauque 2005 (71) Int Rev Admin Sc 639 at 651. Emphasis added. 
2084
 Her work could not be said to impact on the public directly, but rather on her fellow public servants in 
her role as a human resources manager. 
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as employer affects the fulfilment of that obligation, the employment decision can be 
said to directly impact on the citizens. The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is 
that the presence or absence of a direct impact on the citizens cannot be generalised 
into one standard formalistic answer, but depends on the circumstances of every case. 
3 7 The Gcaba-ratio: In Theory and Practice 
With the Gcaba-judgment the Constitutional Court did accept that s 157 of the LRA 
must not be interpreted to imply that “only the Labour Court should deal with disputes 
arising out of employment relations”, where other remedies exist. At the same time, it 
seems clear from the judgment that an employee like Mr Gcaba could be denied the 
opportunity to pursue his expressly pleaded administrative law cause of action in the 
High Court, even though the Constitutional Court also accepted that the substantive 
merits of a case should not determine jurisdiction.2085 
From these apparent contradictions, it is difficult to distinguish a jurisdictional ratio from 
the judgment.2086 In theory, nothing is taken away from the High Court’s traditional 
jurisdiction. The Labour Court’s jurisdiction is merely extended with the 157(2) LRA 
concurrent jurisdiction. Although an employee is forced to pursue LRA based claims in 
labour fora, it is open to an employee to pursue an employment context claim informed 
by a constitutional right, such as the right to just administrative action, in either the High 
Court or the Labour Court, in situations where the State acts as employer. This, 
according to the Constitutional Court, is the theory that gives expression to the intention 
of the legislature and the LRA. In practice, the court illustrated that if an employee 
brings a claim based on the right to just administrative action, as indeed Mr Gcaba did, 
it will be ‘properly’ interpreted by the court to be a claim to assert a LRA right. 
Consequently, regardless of what an employee claims, the court will indicate to the 
employee that he or she in fact (albeit unknowingly) intended to claim a LRA right for 
which only the Labour Court has jurisdiction. Smit comments that this specific 
component of the Gcaba-judgment not only “is a perfect example of how imperfect 
contextual and purposive reasoning may be where there is more than one plausible and 
                                            
2085
 See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 75. 
2086
 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC). 
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compelling interpretation”,2087 but also that the Constitutional Court is unwilling to look 
past its previous questionable judgments, specifically the ghost of Chirwa. 
Generalisations, as found in the Gcaba-judgment, come dangerously close to 
(re)embracing formalistic reasoning. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Court’s “clarity and guidance” and value of  its Gcaba-judgment as 
precedent leaves one in agreement with the colloquial description of De Vos2088 , that 
the judgment cannot be described as anything but paradoxically “weird”.2089 This is 
apparent from the Constitutional Court’s own concluding remarks:  
As stated earlier, this Court’s decision in Chirwa has been interpreted to have 
‘overruled’ its previous decision in Fredericks, but also as not to have done 
so. This term was not used in Chirwa, however. The distinction between the 
two cases was pointed out, as indicated earlier. In this judgment the relevant 
factual and procedural similarities and differences between Fredericks, 
Chirwa and Gcaba are highlighted. To the extent that this judgment may be 
interpreted to differ from Fredericks or Chirwa, it is the most recent 
authority.2090 
It remains to be seen whether this intrinsically confusing attempt at clarification by the 
Constitutional Court once again leaves the lower courts perplexed as to the actual 
binding ratio to be discerned from the Gcaba-judgment.  
4 1 Piercing the Purposive Interpretation Veil 
What has become evident from an evaluation of the Constitutional Court’s recent labour 
law judgments is that the court does not expressly deny the idea of interdependence it 
has previously endorsed. However, the Constitutional Court relies on purposive 
                                            
2087
 Smit 2010 (1) TSAR 1 at 35. 
2088
 See De Vos Constitutional Court tries to fix its own balls-up http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/   
(20/10/2009). 
2089
 See De Vos Constitutional Court tries to fix its own balls-up. 
2090
 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 77.  
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interpretation to justify compartmentalisation of the ss 23 and 33 constitutional 
considerations and undermines the genuine normative interdependence of these rights. 
Unfortunately, what the court declares to be purposive interpretation is a half-truth, with 
the other half being the reversion to formalistic tendencies with no true consideration of 
the perspective recently reflected in the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal. As 
a result, reliance on purposive interpretation has become a tool for the judicial 
avoidance of investigative legal evaluation, rather than a method of interpretative 
enlightenment. 
In Attorney-General Canada v Hallett & Carey Ltd,2091 it was appropriately noted that 
“there is no better way of approaching the interpretation of … [an] Act than to 
endeavour to appreciate the general object that it serves and to give its words their 
natural meaning in light of that object”.2092 If purposive interpretation is properly applied, 
the objective can be properly realised.2093 Purposive interpretation plays an important 
role in determining the meaning behind the words of an Act in light of its object.2094 As 
an interpreter, a judge must discover why an Act was passed before even looking at the 
words.2095 
As explained, the LRA was passed to give effect to constitutionally recognised labour 
rights, with the constitutional element as the central consideration. The labour rights 
found therein are to be interpreted to fit into their constitutional milieu, which results in 
an obligation to read the object of the LRA (in giving effect to the labour rights) within 
that constitutional milieu. This is the true intent, meaning and spirit of the LRA. 
Consequently, purposive interpretation, if properly approached, focuses on the truth and 
                                            
2091
 [1952] AC 427. 
2092
 Attorney-General Canada v Hallett & Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427 at 440. 
2093
 Ironically, it is the objective of both the LRA and PAJA to give effect to the Constitution, yet the 
interpretation of these instruments are continually manipulated to subvert the interdependent sprit of the 
Constitution.  
2094
 See Graham Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice 22. 
2095
 See Graham Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice 22. 
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not on easily manipulated isolated policies as has been the recent trend (one example 
of which is the Chirwa-judgment of Ngcobo J).2096 
Within the search for the realizable goal, it is necessary to consider the proper 
relationship “we create between the intention of the text’s author and the ‘intention’ of 
the legal system”.2097 Barak explains that purposive consideration can only carry proper 
interpretative value if constitutional principles (“democracy, separation of powers, rule of 
law, and the role of a judge in a democracy”)2098 are kept in mind.2099 The relevance of 
constitutional considerations in the proper exercise of purposive interpretation indicates 
that mere consideration of the policy issues identified by the LRA-negotiators in 
isolation does not qualify as an acceptable purposive interpretation.2100 When judges 
declare that they rely on purposive interpretation to justify their reliance on policy 
considerations without proper consideration of all constitutional influences, their 
interpretation cannot withstand legal scrutiny. It merely amounts to a judge presenting 
his or her own opinion of what the intention, meaning and spirit of an Act should be, in 
contrast to what it is in reality or what it is constitutionally required to be. 
If a judge applies his or her mind, proper purposive interpretative consideration of “the 
purpose at the core of the text”2101 requires constitutionally informed consideration of 
“the values, goals, interests, policies, and aims”2102 of the text from the perspective of 
                                            
2096
 It is submitted, that Ngcobo J in his Chirwa-majority lost sight of the fact that the core of an 
interpretative study is answering the ultimate question: What is the constitutional goal? Cf Barak 
Purposive Interpretation in the Law 88. 
2097
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 88. 
2098
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 88. 
2099
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 88 adds that “[p]urposive interpretation uses this set of 
considerations – which shapes a legal text’s purpose – to solve the fundamental problems of legal 
interpretation”. 
2100
 As the constitutional considerations are informed by the normative value system that underlies it, the 
purpose of the text amounts to contextual normative conceptualisation. See Barak Purposive 
Interpretation in the Law 89. 
2101
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 106. 
2102
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 106.  
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the author of the Act and the interpreter of the Act in the proper contemporary 
context.2103  
While the author formulates the text, the interpreter formulates the purpose.2104 In 
considering genuine purposive interpretation, Barak explains that the purpose of a norm 
(as an abstract concept) has both a subjective and objective purpose: 
The subjective purpose constitutes the values, goals, interests, policies, 
aims, and function that the text’s author sought to actualize ... It is the 
subjective intent of the author, operating at different levels of abstraction. An 
interpreter learns the intent through the language of the text as a whole and 
the circumstances external to it, like the history of its creation ... The 
objective purpose constitutes the values, goals, interests, policies, aims, and 
function that the text should actualize in a democracy.2105 
Barak notes that the objective purpose operates on four levels: 
1. Lower level: “what the specific author would have wanted to carry out had he or 
she thought about it”.2106 
2. Intermediate level: “what the reasonable author would have wanted to carry 
out”.2107 
3. High level: “depends on the type of legal arrangement in question and its 
characteristics”.2108  
4. Supreme level: “actualizes the fundamental values of the legal system”.2109 
With regard to the subjective/objective distinction, Barak also states that the subjective 
element reflects “the intention of the text’s author”2110 and the “historical-subjective 
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 See Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 106. 
2104
 See Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
2105
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
2106
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 90. 
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intention”2111 as “a fact established in the past”.2112 On the other hand, the objective 
element represents “the intention of a reasonable author [otherwise known as the 
presiding judge] and the fundamental values of the legal system [found in the 
Constitution as the supreme law]”,2113 while also reflecting “a social-objective 
intention”2114 and constituting “a legal norm that reflects the present.”2115 
The interpreter’s present day reflection of the legal norms must not stagnate at the 
determination of the author’s intention, but must objectively evaluate the current day 
“‘intention’ or the will of the system”.2116 The current day intention of the system is found 
in the normatively informed constitutional system. This must form the basis of the 
interpreting judge’s objective purposive analyses. 
It is submitted, that a proper interpretative approach was lacking in the Constitutional 
Court’s recent labour/administrative law judgments. It is therefore predicted that the 
Gcaba-judgment will see jurists finding creative means around the Constitutional 
Court’s forced reasoning and rather echo the Makambi-sentiment of Nugent JA that, 
“[n]otwithstanding close and repeated study of the ... judgment ... I regret that I have not 
been able to discover a legal basis for the finding that the high court has no jurisdiction 
over a claim of that kind”.2117 
This unfortunate state of affairs emphasises that the judiciary has not heeded Sachs J’s 
call for the development of “an appropriate analytical methodology”2118 to value-based 
interdependence of fundamental rights in the public employment context. In conclusion 
to this thesis, Chapter Ten will illustrate, against the background of  preceding chapters, 
that the development of a constitutionally endorsed analytical approach to the 
                                            
2111
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91. 
2113
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91. 
2114
 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91. 
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 Barak Purposive Interpretation in the Law 91.   
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 Makambi v MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 34. 
Although this sentiment was based on an evaluation of the two-majority Chirwa-judgment, the same holds 
true of the Gcaba-judgment in that the Constitutional Court did not expressly distance itself from the 
forced ‘purpose’ interpretation (based primarily on isolated policy considerations) in the Chirwa-judgment. 
2118
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151. 
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relationship between labour and administrative law is not complicated (merely 
multidimensional), but requires the judiciary to remain true to the duties imposed on 
them by the Constitution.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION: AN APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY2119 TO THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOUR AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
An overlap between administrative and labour law considerations is evident in public 
employment cases. The fact that the judiciary has been unable to develop a unified 
approach to this overlap (as reflected in Chapters Eight and Nine) already illustrates 
that the rights-based relationship between labour and administrative law is complex and 
multi-dimensional. In an attempt to simplify the understanding of and approach to the 
relationship in question, this study has presented the various dimensions of this overlap 
in three stages.  
Firstly, the character of labour law (Chapter Two), administrative law (Chapter Three) 
and the public service (Chapter Four) were considered and explained. What is clear 
from this discussion is that the normative framework that developed to support both 
labour and administrative law share characteristics and rely strongly on flexible equity-
based principles. As reflected in Chapter Four, the fact that the relationship between the 
State and its employees is of both an administrative and employment nature does not 
bestow on public employees a status different to their private sector counterparts.2120 
There exists no difference between public and private sector employees fundamental 
                                            
2119
 This title is inspired by the call of Sachs J in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) 
BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151 for the development of “an appropriate analytical methodology” for the 
recognition of the interdependence of fundamental rights and the values that inform these rights. 
2120
 The reason for this being that labour law focuses on the restraint of managerial power abuse, while 
administrative law looks to restrain the abuse of public power. It is not the status of the employee, but 
rather the status of the State as regulator obligated to carry out its responsibilities with due regard to the 
public interest that brings to the scene the public power element. The subtle differentiation between the 
public and private employees, due to the presence of public power, does not justify the superficial idea 
that private and public employment should formally be kept separate. See Seidman-Makgetla 2000 (17) 
Indicator SA 18 at 22. See also Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 24. 
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enough to justify separate regulation of public servants.2121 Neither the status of public 
sector employees, nor the actual relationship between State and public servant justifies 
a difference in approach.2122 The extension of the principle of fair labour practices to 
everyone allows for equal access to the right to fair labour practices as entrenched by 
the Constitution and endorsed by the LRA; but that equal idea of fairness does not 
necessarily imply sameness of treatment. 
Secondly, at a deeper level, the study explored the interaction between the 
characteristics identified in the first stage of the study, by juxtaposing the values 
underlying labour and administrative law. For the reasons expressed in those chapters, 
this was done by analysing the substantive (Chapter Five) and procedural (Chapter Six) 
dimensions of fairness. The following broad principles were identified: 
1. The context of every case informs the content of the shared variable principles 
associated with labour and administrative law, which are reasonableness (as it 
relates to substantive fairness) and procedural fairness. 
2. The overlap between labour and administrative law shows a shared duty to act 
fairly. 
3. Although the equity guidelines associated with labour law, in contrast to 
administrative law, is more defined and specialised, general reasonableness 
guidelines originating in administrative law can contextually inform the labour law 
understanding of specific substantive fairness. 
4. A shared procedural fairness rationale supports the relationship between labour 
and administrative law, as both spheres of law developed the audi alteram 
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 See Seidman-Makgetla 2000 (17) Indicator SA 18 – 21. See also Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination 
and Unfair Labour Practices 24. Within the realm of labour law, the interests of employees in the public 
sector are of equal status to that of private sector employees. The presence of public power merely 
incorporates the fact that an organ of state must always take into account the public interest when 
exercising public power in taking of decisions, even if that decision is employment related. 
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 The public employment relationship is akin to that of a private employment relationship. Although 
these two spheres are not precise mirror images of one another, the basic features that labour legislation 
regulates are in essence the same. Labour law is based on the idea of contextual flexibility. No two 
private sector employers’ relationships are ever the same, as people (each with their unique set of 
circumstances) are the variables in the employment relationship. 
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partem rule to embrace ideas of transparency and dialogue, with due regard to 
the flexible constitutional perspective of fairness. 
Thirdly, the constitutional principles that support and impact on the rights-based 
relationship were identified (Chapter Seven) and evaluated against the arguments that 
underlie the judicial debate about the proper constitutional understanding of the 
relationship between ss 23 and 33 of the Constitution (Chapters Eight and Nine).  
The challenge that remains is to merge these three stages in a synthesised manner that 
reveals an appropriate way forward, which, at a minimum, embraces the interdependent 
character of the Constitution. 
As point of departure, and in realising that constitutional justice in pursuit of fairness is 
adaptable to the variable elements of every case, it becomes apparent that mutual 
support by no means requires administrative law to undermine labour law.2123 The 
Constitution blurred, if not obliterated, the dividing line between public and private law in 
the employment context.2124 The values shared by all fundamental rights fuse ss 23 and 
33 and give effect to the transformative objective of the Constitution. This is no cause 
for legal caution:2125 
Seepage should be understood not as a form of analytical blurring to be 
avoided, but rather as a desirable mechanism for ensuring that constitutional 
interests, in appropriate cases, are properly protected, and constitutional 
justice fully achieved. And hybridity should be recognised for what it is, the 
co-existence and interpenetration of more than one guaranteed right in a 
particular factual and legal situation. Instead of seeking to put asunder what 
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 Rawls 1985 (14) Phil & Publ Aff 223 at 246 – 247 supports the idea that overlapping normative 
considerations underlying constitutional rights. See also Stacey 2007 (22) SAPL 79 at 84; Currie 1999 
(15) SAJHR 138 at 145. It was, for example, noted in PSA obo Botes v Department of Justice 2000 (21) 
ILJ 690 (CCMA) at 649 and 698, that unlawful administrative action cannot be linked to unfair labour 
practices is a myth, as “the duty to act fairly is superimposed on the duty to act lawfully”. See also Hlope v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (3) BLLR 287 (LC) at par 11 with reference to Simelela v Member of 
the Executive Council for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 1085 (LC). See also 
Chapters Five and Six. 
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 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151 per Sachs J. 
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human affairs naturally and inevitably join together, we should, in these 
circumstances, develop an appropriate analytical methodology that eschews 
formal pigeon-holing and relies more on integrated reasoning.2126 
As mentioned, the research in the preceding chapters serves as the basis for the 
search for an appropriate methodology, and firstly illustrates (in part 2 1) that a 
formalistic judicial denial of the contextual presence of public power in the form of 
administrative action is not the solution. Furthermore, this denial is at the root of the 
judicial failure to give contextual expression to the spirit and purport of the Constitution 
in public employment disputes (this is discussed in part 2 2). Finally, it shall be argued 
that a constitutionally inspired shift in judicial attitude is required for interdependence to 
be properly recognised in the relationship between the rights to fair labour practices and 
just administrative action, to avoid undue confusion and complexity (this issue is raised 
and discussed part 2 3). 
2 AN APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY2127 
2 1 Employment Decisions as Administrative Action2128 
An approach that disregards administrative law in the public employment context 
disregards the proper consideration of important values brought to the fore through the 
identification of administrative action. As far as administrative law is concerned, the 
approach of the judiciary is that PAJA is the primary pathway for the review of 
administrative action.2129 However, a proper understanding of s 33 of the Constitution 
and the relationship between general and specific administrative law2130 reveals that 
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 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151. Emphasis added. 
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 As already mentioned, Sachs J in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 
(CC) at par 151 expressed the need for the development of an analytical methodology.  
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 See Chapters Two and Three for a discussion of the elements that underlie the power relationship of 
both an employment and administrative law relationship. 
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 See Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 308. 
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 The Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at 
par 91 per Navsa AJ (with reference to Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 
par 95) was open to the fact that s 33(3) merely calls for national legislation (not necessarily just PAJA) to 
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decisions of an administrative nature can affect “[m]any different types of interests”.2131 
Some of these interests are covered by the protective scope of specialised legislation, 
such as the LRA. Although the Constitutional Court in the Chirwa- and Gcaba-
judgments attempted to indentify and isolate the impact of administrative law on the 
public employment relationship,2132 Head observes that no formalistic answer can be 
penned that will dictate the role of administrative law in every instance.2133 
To be able to determine the presence or absence of an administrative action, a proper 
understanding of how s 33 of the Constitution approaches the concept is required.2134 
Any finding about the presence or absence of administrative action must be preceded 
by a consideration of the presence or absence of public power. An administrative action 
is a form of public power.2135  
                                                                                                                                            
regulate the right to just administrative action. The court appears to have been open to the reality that 
different dimensions of administrative law (general and specific) exist in practice. 
2131
 Head Administrative Law: Context and Critique 14. 
2132
 See Chapter Eight, part 3 and Chapter Nine, part 3. 
2133
 See Head Administrative Law: Context and Critique 14. The weight ascribed to political, economic 
and social considerations differ from case to case. 
2134
 See Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 306 – 307; Van Zyl v NNP 2003 (19) BCLR 1167 (C) at par 
88. This knowledge must go deeper than the mere general wording of the definition found in PAJA, which 
is often quoted in labour cases as singular justification for the absence of administrative law 
considerations in public employment disputes. 
2135
 Public power has a broader scope and should not be regarded as dependent on administrative 
action. As such, the definition of administrative action requires the presence of public power. It is 
important to note that, even if action taken by an organ of state does not qualify as an administrative 
action, the Constitution still requires public power to conform to the principle of legality. The decisions of 
public bodies are therefore always subject to the values of the Constitution associated with administrative 
law. See Burns and Beukes Administrative Law 138 – 139; Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2007 (12) BLLR 1096 (CC) at paras 137 – 138. Consider also the Constitutional Court’s reliance on the 
principle of legality in Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC) and President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), but specifically Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 
241 (CC) at paras 19, 33 and 41. See also Hoexter 2006 Acta Juridica 303 at 305 – 306; Fetsha v 
Member of the Executive Council responsible for Education (Eastern Cape) [2006] 3 All SA 542 (Ck). See 
also De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 173. 
  
 
403 
2 1 1  Public Power Dimension 
In SARFU v President of the RSA,2136 the Constitutional Court, in discussing the 
distinction between different forms of public power, identified various factors to be 
considered in identifying those different forms of public power.2137 When determining 
whether a specific exercise of public power qualifies as administrative action on a case-
by-case basis, “the subject matter of a power is … relevant to determine whether the 
exercise of the power constitutes administrative action for the purposes of section 
33”.2138 The Constitutional Court however emphasised that while different forms of 
public power exist,2139 a definition of public power and function remains elusive.2140  
When approached from a broader constitutional perspective, the point of departure is 
that “[t]he individual as the possessor of natural rights … exercises his free will to create 
the state to which he delegates the overall responsibility of ensuring the survival and 
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 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
2137
 In President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143, the Constitutional Court clearly 
emphasised power as a crucial element in the character of administrative action. 
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 President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143. Footnotes omitted. The court 
emphasised that this exercise calls on the judiciary to draw difficult boundaries.  
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 A public power/function has two components: public and power or function. It is the former of the two 
components that appear to be the trickiest, as it is usually linked to public interest. In President of the 
President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 175, in considering s 1 of the Commissions Act 
8 of 1947, the Constitutional Court regarded “the term ‘public’ as qualifying ‘public concern’”. Malherbe 
2001 (1) TSAR 1 at 8 comments: “[P]ower refers to the capacity to act coercively or to enforce rules of 
law; and a function is an act performed in the exercise of a power.” See also Spigelman Foundations of 
Administrative Law Paper delivered at the 1998 SPANN Oration (with reference to Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] All ER 953) 
2140
 The Constitution itself grants no clarity as to the meaning. See Ka Mdumbe 2005 (20) SAPL 1 at 17; 
Stacey 2007 (22) SAPL 79; s (1)(c) of the Constitution; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: 
In Re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 20; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) 
BLLR 97 (CC) at par 186 per Langa CJ. See also Chapter Nine, part 2 2. 
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goodwill of all who enter the free community”.2141 This is the natural function of the 
State, as created by the people for the people to exercise public power.2142  
The Constitution holds the exercise of power and the performance of functions by 
organs of state (as defined in s 239) subject “to standards such as accountability, 
transparency, the Bill of Rights and values governing the public administration”2143 
found in s 195.2144 The concepts of public power and public function must be 
determined within this framework,2145 as “the exercise of all public power must be 
consistent with the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law”.2146 
Craig explains that the question as to the meaning of public power continues to exist, as 
the pattern of South Africa’s government changes within the State and “our perspective 
of the dividing line between public and private law”2147 shifts. Within this changing 
reality, two approaches have developed to the existence of public power as prerequisite 
for the existence of administrative action: the institutional approach and the functional 
approach.2148 The relationship between these two approaches has been labelled the 
source/function divide due to the close link it reveals to the orthodox public/private 
divide.2149 
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 Ncube in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 78. See the theories of Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau in this regard. Cf Van Eck and Jordaan-Parkin 2006 (27) ILJ 1997. 
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 Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 82 explain that organs of state “are 
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 See Ka Mdumbe 2005 (20) SAPL 1 at 17. 
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that “the answer to that question, like most solutions to the public/private dilemma, is a fudge.” 
2148
 See Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 25. 
2149
 See English 1999 (62) MLR 474. 
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2 1 1 1 Source of the Power 
When going in search of the source of power (as an indication that the power is public), 
the judiciary must properly consider its impact.2150 However, no matter how one aims to 
portray the capacity of the State, logic and reality dictates that it cannot be depicted as 
“analogous or sufficiently similar to a natural person”,2151 as “even the most banal 
activities of government [contextually] differ fundamentally from those of private 
individuals”.2152 
Apart from the State’s persona partly being ascribed to the presence of public interest in 
its actions, it is also based on the Constitution.2153 The judiciary should be open to the 
fact that the maturity of administrative law under the influence of the Constitution has 
                                            
2150
 Courts should not be sidetracked by the existence of an employment contract in its evaluation of the 
source of the action or decision by the State. Under the influence of orthodox idea of a private/public 
divide, the presence of public power is traditionally identified primarily with reference to the public source. 
Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 25 – 27 notes that the traditional approach places its 
focus on categories of institutions that are presumed to exercise public power by placing the emphasis on 
“the source of the authority’s power”. Cf Bamforth 1999 (62) MLR 476 at 479. In Mbayeka v MEC for 
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 (4) BCLR 374 (Tk) at par 29, the High Court was requested to declare a 
suspension from duty without emoluments unjust. It found that the MEC’s failure to adhere to the audi 
alteram partem rule prior to suspension to constitute an unconstitutional administrative action. The reason 
being that the power exercised was public as it was obtained from the Public Service Act 103(P) of 1994. 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 
(SCA) at paras 11 and 13 per Cameron JA (distinguishing Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection 
Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (10) BCLR 1026 (SCA)) held that the statutory source and the 
exercise of public power should be linked through the element “of superiority or authority by virtue of its 
being a public authority”.  
2151
 Harris 1992 (108) LQR 626 at 635 – 636. See Quinot (LLD US 2007) 103. 
2152
 Breitenbach 1994 (5) Stell LR 276 at 282. See Chapter Four; Baxter Administrative Law 396; Quinot 
(LLD US 2007) 103. 
2153
 See Chapter Nine, part 2 2; Mustapha v Receiver, Lichtenburgh 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) at 347 and 350 
per Schreiner JA; Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141 (E) at par 
21; Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA) at par 20; 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) at paras 20 – 21; Alder 
1993 (13) Legal Studies 183 at 188; Quinot (LLD US 2007) 69, 103, 104, 105, 110, 154 and 155. 
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led to a level of generality in the determination of the source of the power.2154 In Masetla 
v President of the RSA,2155 the High Court specifically stated that “the power to appoint 
will, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, include the power to 
dismiss”.2156 The judiciary should not give in to the temptation to manipulate the source 
requirement to justify the outcome it desires in a specific case.2157 The desire to protect 
the jurisdictional sanctity of the Labour Court must not promote the detrimental 
manipulation of the substantive legal arguments and rights of employees.2158  
For that reason, identification of the formalistic source-based trap (albeit in the 
public/private power debate) is important.2159 The current perspective is that the source 
of the power is not necessarily central to determining whether power is public. The 
focus has moved to the nature of the function, rather than the functionary.2160  
2 1 1 2 Function Not Functionary 
With reference to the English case of R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte 
Datafin,2161 Craig states that “[t]he difficulties of a formalistic test have inclined the 
                                            
2154
 See Quinot (LLD US 2007) 166 – 170. This is evident in the reasoning of judges in an array of recent 
judgments, namely Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC v Cape Metropolitan Council 1999 (4) 
SA 1184 (C) at 1195, IMATU v MEC: Environmental Affairs, Developmental Social Welfare and Health, 
Northern Cape Province 1999 (4) SA 267 (NC) at 286 and Masetla v President of the RSA 2007 JOL 
19069 (T). 
2155
 2007 JOL 19069 (T). 
2156
 Masetla v President of the RSA 2007 JOL 19069 (T). See also Quinot (LLD US 2007) 167 fn 195. Cf 
Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA) at par 52 per Cameron JA. 
2157
 Examples of such manipulation (or misunderstanding) is evident in the reasoning in SAPU v National 
Commissioner of the Police Service 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) per Murphy AJ, Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 
(1) BLLR 10 (SCA) per Mthiyana JA and Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) per Ngcobo J. 
See also Quinot (LLD US 2007) at 168. 
2158
 See Pretorius 2002 (119) SALJ 374 at 385. Cf Quinot (LLD US 2007) 169. 
2159
 The public source of the power is not a conclusive factor, but merely a factor. See R v Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 at 838 (per Donaldson MR), 847 – 848 (per 
Lloyd LJ), 849 (per Nicholls LJ); President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143. 
2160
 See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 150. 
2161
 [1987] QB 815. 
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courts towards a more open-textured criterion which requires them to consider the 
nature of the power wielded by the particular body”.2162  
Jurisprudence appears to reflect acceptance of a shift in perspective from a source-
based to performance-based approach to determination of the existence of public 
power.2163 Pretorius reasons that "[i]f the objective is to protect the individual against the 
unfair exercise of governmental power, it should not matter whether the power is 
derived from statute or contract”.2164 In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa,2165 Mthiyana JA, in 
finding the function performed by Transnet (as an organ of state) to fall outside the 
direct scope of PAJA,2166 emphasised the approach laid down in the SARFU-judgment 
                                            
2162
 Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 28. Emphasis added. Cf Wade and Forsyth 
Administrative Law 480. Lord Lloyd in R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 
815 at 846 – 869 further explained with reference to the reasoning of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935: “If the source of power is a statute, or 
subordinate legislation under a statute, then clearly the body in question will be subject to judicial review. 
If, at the other end of the scale, the source of power is contractual, as in the case of private arbitration, 
then clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial review … But in between these extremes there is an 
area in which it is helpful to look not just at the source of the power but at the nature of the power.”  
2163
 See Ka Mdumbe 2005 (20) SAPL 1 at 13. The judicial perspective shifted with judgments such as 
Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 34 – 36, where Hoexter JA regarded the 
regulation of the power by the source of the power as of lesser importance in comparison to the factors 
such as the “essential nature” of the power exercised. See also Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 158 – 159. In 
Langeni v Minister of Health and Welfare 1988 (9) ILJ 389 (W) and Mokoena v Administrator, Transvaal 
1988 (4) SA 912 (W), Goldstone J considered the impact of the action (with due regard to the specific 
right) to be a relevant consideration in the determination of the presence of public power in the form of 
administrative action, in contrast to the broader perspective embraced by Hoexter JA in Administrator, 
Transvaal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A). See Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 227 – 228. Within the context of 
disciplinary action taken against public employees the impact focus has generally fallen on the punitive 
character of the action taken. See for example Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 
30 and 35; Monckton v British South Africa Co 1920 AD 324 at 330. See also Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 229. 
The impact consideration is also evident in the understanding of the action component of administrative 
action expressed by Nugent JA in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (10) 
BCLR 931 (SCA) at paras 23 – 24. 
2164
 Pretorius 2002 (119) SALJ 374 at 384 fn 57. 
2165
 2007 (1) BLLR 10 (SCA). 
2166
 See Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 165. Consider the description of organ of state in s 239 of the 
Constitution.  
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of the Constitutional Court, namely that the focus should fall on the function, not the 
functionary.2167 Phrased differently, it is character of the power exercised, not the 
character of the authority, that matters.2168  
The existence of a link between power and function/character forms an important 
component in the identification of administrative action. As a definition of public power 
or public function is elusive, and jurisprudence mainly identifies what does not qualify as 
administrative action in contrast to what does, one must consider the proximity between 
the nature of the action and the public purpose thereof.2169 
2 1 1 3 Public Interest 
According to Devenish, Govender and Hulme, “the purpose behind administrative action 
… is the public interest”,2170 as general public functions are regarded “as those 
functions aimed at the public interest”.2171 The duty to act in the public interest rests on 
the State in the exercise of its functions, “or at the very least that the purpose of all 
administrative action is in general the advancement of public interests”.2172  
                                            
2167
 See President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at paras 141 and 143. See also Transnet Ltd 
v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) BCLR 176 (SCA); Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 213. 
2168
 See Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 480. See also Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 39; 
Govender in Corder and Van der Vijver Realising Administrative Justice 55. 
2169
 The indirect or direct, or internal or external purpose of the State action therefore begs consideration 
in the determination of public power as administrative action. The shift of focus to function is not unique to 
South African jurisprudence, as America, New Zealand, India and the United Kingdom have accepted this 
approach. However, these countries embrace different perspectives of this approach. American 
jurisprudence construes the concept of public function restrictively, while the other countries interpret it 
generously. See Ka Mdumbe 2005 (20) SAPL 1 at 17; Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 221. Due to its English 
roots, South African jurisprudence is more inclined to embrace a generous interpretation. Cf De Smith, 
Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 168 – 169. 
2170
 Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 10. 
2171
 Quinot (LLD US 2007) 207. See also Baxter Administrative Law 90; Burns and Beukes Administrative 
Law 191; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and Justice 74 fn 64. Quinot (LLD 2007 
US) 203 observes that South African academic commentators appear to be in consensus as to the duty 
to act in the public interests. 
2172
 Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 203. See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) 
at par 53 per Plasket J. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 191, Langa CJ 
commented that the facts in the POPCRU-case pointed to the “‘pre-eminence of the public interest’ in the 
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As illustrated by the minority Chirwa-judgment of Langa CJ, there should be an 
evaluation of the weight ascribed to the public interest in any given situation. The facts 
of every case must be scrutinised for the presence or absence of strengthening 
factors.2173 Such factors are “intimately linked to the impact a decision has on the 
public”.2174 Public power is therefore at play where the public interest is of paramount 
importance.2175  
However, logic dictates that “it is arguable that the state must always act in the public 
interest”.2176 In fact, authors such as Baxter point out that there is a duty on public 
authorities to act in the public interest in all instances.2177  
2 1 2 Broad Perspective 
It is clear that South African jurists do not embrace a uniform approach to the 
determination of the presence of public power (as prerequisite to a possible finding that 
                                                                                                                                            
proper administration of prisons”. See also Bullock NO v Provincial Govt, North West Province [2004] 2 
All SA 249 (SCA).  
2173
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 191. 
2174
 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 193 – 194. Because the absence of such 
strengthening factors cannot be guaranteed in public employment labour disputes, Langa CJ emphasised 
that his “reasoning does not entail that dismissals of public employees will never constitute ‘administrative 
action’ under PAJA”. Cf Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at fn 107 per 
Van der Westhuizen J. The Gcaba-judgment leaves open the possibility of formalism seeping through the 
judicial cracks. See Chapter Nine, part 3 6. 
2175
 See Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v JSE 1983 (3) SA 344 (W). 
2176
 Quinot (LLD US 2007) 203. Emphasis added. In dealing with a labour dispute involving correctional 
officers, Plasket J in POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E) at par 53 
attempted to link the “elusive concept of public power” not to the public interest in general, but to specific 
situations where only two or so members of the public stands to be affected by the exercise of public 
power. See also Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at fn 107. 
2177
 See Baxter Administrative Law 100. See also Boulle, Harris and Hoexter Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 300; Quinot (LLD US 2007) 203. In light of this, the judgment of Murphy AJ in SAPU v 
National Commissioner of the South African Police 2006 (1) BLLR 42 (LC) at par 52 comes across as 
questionable in placing reliance on the absence of public interest to find that there was no exercise of 
public power to inform distinction between tenders and employment as explanation. See Chapter Eight, 
part 3. Cf Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Department of Correctional Services 
2006 (10) BLLR 960 (LC) at par 59; Mbayeka v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 (4) BCLR 374 (Tk); 
Hlope v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (3) BLLR 297 (LC). 
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there exists administrative action).2178 The Constitutional Court has declared its focus to 
fall on the nature of the function,2179 a visible shift from formalism to flexibility within the 
institutional approach.2180 However, labels given to different approaches are merely 
informative.2181 Labels are descriptive conclusions about the content of the power and 
“cannot guide our reasoning in advance”.2182 Contextual factors should influence the 
reasoning.2183 According to Craig, the functional approach complements the institutional 
approach in that it requires scrutiny of the effect of attributing the labels ‘public’ or 
‘private’ to a power.2184 
This perspective is not a novel one. In R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte 
Datafin,2185 it was noted that the only essential element of public power can be 
described as the public element and this can take on various forms.2186 Although some 
factors have been identified in jurisprudence, these factors have crystallised within 
specific contexts. The presence of all the identified factors cannot be required in every 
set of facts.2187 As a result, one factor cannot carry the potential to exclude another.2188 
Context remains determinative. This amounts to a broad-based functional approach2189 
to the determination of public power, to which courts revert when they acknowledge that 
“it is not always clear what criteria are relevant”.2190 
The identification of a causal link between the nature of the action and the public power 
exercised can be of assistance in determining the presence or absence of 
                                            
2178
 See Hoexter Administrative Law 194. 
2179
 See President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143. 
2180
 See Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 27 – 28. 
2181
 See Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 28. 
2182
 Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 28. 
2183
 See Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 28. 
2184
 See Bamforth 1999 (62) MLR 476 at 480; Craig in Corder and Maluwa Administrative Justice 32. 
2185
 [1987] 1 QB 815. 
2186
 See R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB 815 at 838. 
2187
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 169. 
2188
 See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 169. 
2189
 As termed by De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review 169.  
2190
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB 815 at 838. This is reflected in the 
minority judgment of Langa in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd  2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 186. 
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administrative action. As explained by Woolf CJ in Poplar Housing and Regeneration 
Community Association Ltd v Donoghue,2191 one can find different meanings for the 
concept public power in different contexts.2192 As “the decision is very much one of fact 
and degree”,2193 this approach assists with the testing of factors relied upon to 
determine the type of public power to be regulated.2194 The more public power factors 
are present within the context of an administrative objective, the more likely the public 
power is to be identified as administrative action.2195 This flexible approach to the 
determination of the type of public power also addresses the warning articulated by 
O’Regan J the Sidumo-judgment,2196 namely that an attempt to draw the line between 
                                            
2191
 [2001] 4 All ER 604. 
2192
 See Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] 4 All ER 604 
par 68. 
2193
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] 4 All ER 604 par 
66. Quinot (LLD 2007 US) 221 explains that the importance of this causal link is not yet widely 
acknowledged in South African law. An adaptation of Woolf LCJ’s approach can however be detected in 
the sine quo non test formulated by Pretorius 2002 (119) SALJ 347 at 396 for the determination whether 
public power is present in action taken by the State. Arguably, such a determination is unnecessary, as 
the State cannot act in the absence of public power. See part 3 1 1 3. What is possible is that the type of 
public power exercised may differ from case to case. Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 47 similarly states 
that the action of an “employee of a government department at any level, no matter how significant in its 
impact” is public. The question is not whether the action is of a public nature, but whether the public 
action is of an administrative nature. For administrative action to be present, the administrative nature of 
the action must accordingly be incidental to the public power exercised, through the culmination of the 
objective sought, the exercise of statutory power, the advancement of the public interest etc. In similar 
fashion, Corder 1998 (14) SAJHR 38 at 47 argues that the focus of administrative action in the 
constitutional context falls “on such action which is ‘admittedly public’, such as that of an employee of 
government department”. It requires collaboration between labour and administrative law to protect the 
rights and interest of public employees comprehensively when such action is directed at them. 
2194
In President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143, the court alluded to some form of 
causal consideration by considering “how closely it is related on the one hand to policy matters, which are 
not administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, which is”. Emphasis added. 
2195
 See the factors identified in President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at par 143. Within the 
context in which PAJA refers to the presence of public power, the questions does not fall on the presence 
or absence of public power in action taken by the State, but on the presence or absence of the species of 
public power, termed administrative action. 
2196
 2007 (12) BLLR 1096 (CC). 
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administrative action and other forms of decisions will “lead us directly to the arid 
classification of our old administrative law ... [with the result that we should] prefer an 
approach to the question based on a substantive understanding of section 33 ... [as that 
section] should be understood as one of the key constitutional provisions giving life to 
the constitutional values ... found in section 1 of our Constitution”.2197 
2 2 Transforming the Judicial Approach to the Operational Dimension2198 
The debate concerning the relationship between labour and administrative law has 
predominantly focussed on the jurisdiction of the Labour and High Courts. The debate 
has revealed itself as a turf-war rather than a proper consideration of the substantive 
arguments. It is possible to avoid the associated controversy if the judiciary approaches 
the jurisdictional problem that prevents proper recognition of the normative 
interdependence with the proper constitutional attitude. Regrettably, a formalistic 
approach to adjudication sees the judiciary exercising their power in a formal, technical 
or mechanistic manner that undermines substantive reasoning.2199 The three-stage 
discussion in preceding chapters revealed the need for a change in judicial attitude, 
specifically with regard to jurisdiction, cause of action and interdependence (as it relates 
to equity-based principles). From this realisation, it is clear that the appropriate 
analytical methodology is rooted in a Sidumo-inspired operational solution. 
2 2 1 The Required Judicial Attitude 
If practical effect is to be given to the doctrine of interdependence, the judiciary must 
embrace a deliberative duty as a constitutional imperative. A transformative 
understanding of administrative justice calls on the judiciary to discard all narrow 
restrictions.2200 
                                            
2197
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1096 (CC) at paras 137 – 138. 
2198
 See Chapters Eight and Nine. 
2199
 See Hoexter 2008 (24) SAJHR 281 at 287. 
2200
 The Chirwa- and Gcaba-judgments (and alike cases), when narrowly construed to isolate labour 
rights from constitutionalised administrative law considerations, gravely reduce the constitutionally 
required accountability for the exercise of public power. Cf Head Administrative Law: Context and Critique 
27 – 30; Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 at paras 99 – 100 per Kirby J (dissenting 
judgment). 
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In his philosophy of the law, Rawls views courts as deliberative and exemplary 
institutions.2201 Aristotle’s reasoning also reveals that the aim of deliberation 
emphasises the necessity of critical evaluation and susceptibility to change in goals and 
preferences.2202 Sadurski takes the deliberative component of the judiciary’s primary 
task a step further in reasoning that deliberation “entails being open to reasons – that is, 
being willing to alter your preferences, beliefs or actions if convincing reasons are 
offered to do so – and being willing to base attempts to persuade others on giving 
reasons rather than threatening coercion or duplicity”.2203  
In embracing this deliberative element the judiciary must have due regard to what 
Webber describes as “the importance of dialogue over rights”.2204 Webber emphasises 
three specific approaches to rights-protection, namely by implication, limitation or 
statute.2205 The implied approach is present in court rulings that hold one constitutional 
provision to be implicitly guaranteed by the judicial recognition of another provision.2206 
In contrast, the limitation approach sees “the entrenchment of a bill of rights in the 
constitution, backed by judicial review, but subject to express derogation by legislative 
action”.2207 As there is no conflicting normative element in the relationship between the 
rights to fair labour practices and just administrative action,2208 the one cannot be a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of the other in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.2209 
                                            
2201
 See Rawls Political Liberalism, as referred to by Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 22. 
2202
 See Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 23. 
2203
 Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 23. See Chapter Nine, part 3 6 4; Scott 1999 (1) ESR 
Review 4 at 6. 
2204
 Webber as quoted in Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 62. 
2205
 Only the first two forms are relevant for the present discussion. Rights-protection by statute does not 
find application in the South African context, but is better suited to the English system that has a Human 
Rights Act in the absence of a Constitution. 
2206
 See Webber in Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 62. 
2207
 Webber in Sadurski Constitutional Justice, East and West 62. Footnotes omitted.  
2208
 See Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
2209
 The judiciary, in interpreting the Constitution and the legislation that gives effect thereto, is tasked 
with balancing and resolving conflicts between competing rights. As the discussion in Chapters Two, 
Three, Five and Six illustrates, there is no clash between the norms and social goals of the specific right 
to fair labour practices and the general right to just administrative action. Limitation is only required when 
rights are regarded as competing. The absence of conflict renders the limitation consideration 
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The implied approach is to be favoured, firstly because the spirit of the Constitution 
lends itself to permeability and, secondly, because general administrative law allows for 
the functioning of specific areas, such as labour law, within its ambit of application. 
Such an approach also gives expression to the fact that judges are duty-bound to 
promote and protect the values and rights of the Constitution.2210 Klare accordingly 
argues for a judicial mind-shift away from formalistic reasoning in favour of deliberative 
substantive reflection.2211 
2 2 2 Jurisdiction, Cause of Action and Interdependence 
The judiciary must tread carefully when interpreting the cause of action with which a 
litigant approaches the court. While judges should not attempt to (re)characterise the 
claim of a litigant to read as they would have preferred, they must also not 
underestimate their role in the identification of the issue that underlies the cause of 
action as presented by the parties to the employment dispute.2212 A proper balance is 
                                                                                                                                            
unnecessary in within scope of this study. See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–16 and 11–33 (1st ed). Cf S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at paras 10 and 95 per Chaskalson P; Holomisa v Argus 
Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at 607. 
2210
 See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–16 (1st ed). Emphasis added. Moseneke 2002 (18) SAJHR 309 at 314 
accordingly explains that judges are tasked with transformative adjudication, which renders them 
obligated to uphold and advance the transformative design of the Constitution. Hoexter 2008 (24) SAJHR 
281 at 286 explains that transformative adjudication is “a natural adjunct to transformative 
constitutionalism: it is what judges must do in order to achieve the aims of transformative 
constitutionalism”. Emphasis added. This obligation can only be met if the judiciary embraces a 
deliberative approach and actively engages with the text and spirit of the Constitution. Only when the 
judiciary embraces this approach will proper recognition be given to the central features of transformative 
constitutionalism as identified by Liebenberg 2005 (20) SAPL 155 at 161, namely substantive equality, 
social justice, a human rights conscious private law sphere in promotion of a culture of justification 
through association with the public law sphere. See Hoexter 2008 (24) SAJHR 281 at 286 – 287. A 
deliberative approach to transformative adjudication therefore calls for “substantive adjudication”, 
endorsed by Langa 2006 (17) Stell LR 351 at 357, as “a commitment to … examining the underlying 
principles that inform laws themselves and judicial reaction to those laws.” 
2211
 See Klare 1998 (14) SAJHR 146 at 156. 
2212
 See Chapter Nine, part 2 1 1 3. 
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crucial, as “the court’s view as to what is fair in the circumstances is the essential 
determinant in deciding the ultimate question”.2213 
One solution is to follow an approach analogous to the international law, rule of 
connexity. The international law rule of connexity, the jurisdictional alter ego of the 
doctrine of interdependence,2214 allows for two causes of action, which on the surface 
appear to be different in form but in reality are similar in substance, to be judicially 
deliberated under the procedural ambit of one of the two potentially relevant 
instruments.2215 The rule of connexity gives expression to the essential elements of any 
legal system, namely stability and justice, as these two elements propagate against 
piece-meal litigation.2216 
International law, in dealing with the competing jurisdictions of international courts has 
seen the pragmatic development of the rule of connexity “which authorizes a court to 
join related claims to one set of proceedings”.2217 The rule of connexity has also been 
                                            
2213
 Media Workers Association of South Africa v Press Corporation of South Africa Ltd (“Perskor”) 1992 
(13) ILJ 1391 (A) at 1400. See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at 
par 63; Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 72. 
2214
 As the doctrine of interdependence was first developed and adopted in human rights jurisprudence 
through the perspective of the international law relationship between the provisions of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, operational guidance can be found in that legal realm. Scott and Alston 2000 (16) SAJHR 206 
at 212 emphasise the informative potential of international law, as endorsed by the Constitution, 
specifically in ss 39 and 233. See Chapter Seven, part 2 2. 
2215
 Jurists must keep in mind that reliance on procedure must reflect the substantive aspects of the law 
and not vice versa. Cf Biehler Procedures in International Law 7. It must be noted that international law 
refers to conventions and covenants as instruments. While these can be described as akin to statutes as, 
this difference in terminology exists because, in the absence of a central legislative body, international 
law cannot be regarded as generating legislative but merely consensus based documents. 
2216
 See Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 27. In Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxuza 2001 (10) BCLR 1039 
(A) at par 22, it was explained (with reference Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Willcox Bros (Pty) Ltd [1962] 
4 All SA 295 (A) at 301 per Steyn CJ) that “the common law doctrine of cohesion of a cause of action 
(contentia causae)” propagates “that where one court has jurisdiction over a part of a cause, 
considerations of convenience, justice and good sense justify its exercising jurisdiction over the whole 
cause”. The doctrine of cohesion is arguably the common law alter ego of the rule of connexity. 
2217
 Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 26. Footnotes omitted. 
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referred to as the ‘same issues’ test.2218 If two claims or causes of action can be 
regarded as based on the same issues, the test allows it to be addressed within the 
context of one instrument and one jurisdictional context. ‘Same issues’ will be present if 
a similar object and similar ground can be identified within the two causes of action.2219 
Shany comments that “[p]erhaps a clearer description is that the ‘same issues’ test is 
met if the competing claims address the same fact pattern ... and the same legal 
claims”.2220 Due to the fact that the values and norms that underlie human rights are 
flexible in nature, international courts and tribunals have illustrated a similar degree of 
flexibility in the application of the ‘same issues’ test in requiring that the claims be 
essentially (and not necessarily precisely) the same.2221 In the absence of a “material 
difference in the substantive scope”2222 of the norms and rights underlying the two 
mechanisms giving expression thereto, essential and sufficient similarity can be said to 
be present. In the presence of substantive similarity, claims cannot properly be 
regarded as competing.2223 
In the same manner as “the right to fair labour practices is not the only constitutional 
right protected by the implied term of trust and confidence”,2224 it is also not the only 
right protected by the implied duty to act fairly.2225 While the rights to dignity and 
freedom and security of person also embrace the idea of trust and confidence, the right 
to administrative justice similarly incorporates the duty to act fairly.2226 It is only when 
these rights and their overlapping norms are interpreted in a manner that undermines 
the constitutionally endorsed doctrine of interdependence that we run the risk of 
creating “a confused ‘patchwork’ jurisprudence”2227 by ignoring that there is “only one 
                                            
2218
 See Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 26. 
2219
 See Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 25. 
2220
 Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 26. 
2221
 See Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 26. 
2222
 Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 27. 
2223
 See Shany The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 27. 
2224
 Bosch 2006 (27) ILJ 28 at 31. 
2225
 See Chapter Six, part 2. 
2226
 Cf Bosch 2006 (27) ILJ 28 at 31. 
2227
 Bosch 2006 (27) ILJ 28. 
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system of law grounded in the Constitution”.2228 The grundnorm of both South African 
administrative and labour law is now rooted in the supreme values and rights of the 
Constitution.2229 An essential and sufficient similarity is undeniably present in the 
relationship between labour and administrative law. 
As to the choice of the legal instrument, logic dictates that the more specific or 
applicable of the two instruments in the context of the dispute will be the more relevant 
and appropriate to give expression to interdependent fundamental rights. This in turn 
allows for legal certainty, as the procedures will be clear and unambiguous.2230 Such 
clarity allows judicial consideration of substantive aspects once jurisdiction is 
established.2231  
What the rule of connexity (as analogous to the doctrine of interdependence) also 
shows is that the judiciary must be open to the fact that the manner in which the 
employment dispute is pleaded and contextually supported merely influences the point 
of intersection between the Constitution and the LRA.2232 For the judiciary to give effect 
to the aims of the Constitution and the labour rights enshrined therein, sight must not be 
lost of the fact that “labour rights fall under the broad family of socio-economic 
rights”.2233 This allows different situations to arise where more than one right can be 
relevant in one set of facts. The Constitutional Court has on numerous occasions 
acknowledged the interrelated relationship between the substantive socio-economic 
rights and the right to administrative justice that assists in giving practical effect thereto. 
This constitutional reality calls for a mind shift in labour law dispute resolution. The 
                                            
2228
 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) 
at par 22 per O’Regan J. See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte 
application of the President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 30. 
2229
 Cf Du Toit 2008 (125) SALJ 95 at 124. 
2230
 Cf Biehler Procedures in International Law 7. 
2231
 Cf Biehler Procedures in International Law 7. Biehler Procedures in International Law 9 explains that 
procedural rules “provide a limiting framework for the [judiciary’s] application of all substantive law” as far 
as it relates to the remedies and powers of the courts. See Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 at 394. 
2232
 Cf Jonker v Okhajlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at paras 23 – 27. See Chapter Eight, 
part 4 and Chapter Nine, parts 2 1 and 3 4. 
2233
 Jonker v Okhajlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 27. 
  
 
418 
judiciary, although “straight-jacketed into responding to disputes”2234 as pleaded, can 
give practical effect to the aims of the Constitution by acknowledging that labour law 
calls for a polycentric approach (in this way also giving  expression to the analogous 
idea of connexity).2235 Linear, one-dimensional reasoning can no longer be sustained in 
the transformative exercise that is constitutionalised labour law.2236 A proper 
understanding of the analogous idea of connexity provides clarity about the necessity 
and proper functioning of the concurrent jurisdiction provided for in s 157(2) of the LRA, 
in situations where the doctrine of interdependence finds application. 
2 2 3 Jurisdiction and Fairness 
Equity principles (such as reasonableness and fairness) are part of the principles of 
substantive justice. Thus viewed, there is no place for formalism to create an 
operational problem between labour and administrative law.2237 Justice as fairness, as 
understood by Rawls,2238 Bentham2239 and Hart,2240 sees the substantive principles as 
not directly relating to the rules by which they are manifested.2241 Put differently, rules 
relating to jurisdiction and specific courts (as found in s 157 of the LRA) should not 
direct the relevance of substantive equitable principles. 
Equity forms the essence of the power entrusted to the Labour Court.2242 Equitable 
principles in turn require the Labour Court to have “regard to all the exigencies of the 
                                            
2234
 Jonker v Okhajlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 27. 
2235
 Cf Jonker v Okhajlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 27. 
2236
 Cf Jonker v Okhajlamba Municipality 2005 (6) BLLR 564 (LC) at par 27. 
2237
 Macdonald 1980 (25) McGill LJ 520 at 521 – 522 explains that it is imperative that fairness be 
understood as a concept “independent of any classification of function exercise”. Recognition of 
constitutional fairness as the equity link in the right to just administrative action and fair labour practices 
requires “a fundamental reorientation in the law”. Mullan 1975 (25) Univ Toronto LJ 281 at 315 
accordingly explains that a fundamental reorientation of the judiciary’s perspective requires 
acknowledgment of the fact that, if fairness is properly developed, it will lead to a simplification of the law. 
2238
 A Theory of Justice 13. 
2239
 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 34. 
2240
 The Concept of Law 156. 
2241
 See Macdonald 1980 (25) McGill LJ 520 at 538. 
2242
 Equity jurisdiction is characterised by equity considerations, which calls on the Labour Court to apply 
equitable principles. 
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case”2243 in their application.2244 The application of equitable principles through equity 
jurisdiction “leaves great discretion to the judges”.2245 It would be unjust for the Labour 
Court to deny parties over which it has jurisdiction in personam the full equity to which 
they are entitled. This is especially true if such denial is based merely on the reason 
that another branch of the law may find application to the merits of a case, “as equity is 
understood as an overriding set of judicial principles ... which should be always applied 
by the court”.2246 It is inequitable to read s 157(2) of the LRA in any manner that limits 
the full protection of the law as endorsed by the Constitution.2247 In fact, the mitigation of 
the severity of the law is the primary task of equity considerations.2248 If the focus is 
placed on the judiciary’s shared equity task instead of its pursuit of jurisdictional 
exclusivity, then it is “easy to see them as intertwined whenever jurisdiction is exercised 
by a court whose laws, lex fori ... [reflects] equitable principles”.2249  
2 2 4 A Sidumo-Inspired Operational Solution 
In the Sidumo-judgment, the Constitutional Court implicitly embraced the judiciary’s 
deliberative duty through reasoning that reminds of the logic that underlies the doctrine 
of interdependence (and the rule of connexity), in a manner that gives expression to the 
equitable principles endorsed by the Constitution. Unfortunately, the Sidumo-logic is 
                                            
2243
 Biehler Procedures in International Law 19. Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted. 
2244
 Although stated in a contract law and fiduciary obligation context, the argument of Mason P in 
Kavalee v Burbridge [1998] NSWSC 111 nevertheless holds true when considering the equitable 
functional basis of the Labour Court: “Anyone cognisant with the history of equity in our legal system 
would see no difficulty with such a concept in principle.” See Biehler Procedures in International Law 18. 
Cf Baschet v London Illustrated Standard Co [1900] 1 Ch 73; Lett v Lett [1906] 1 IR 618 (CA); Warner 
Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209; Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356. 
2245
 Biehler Procedures in International Law 19. Footnotes omitted. 
2246
 Biehler Procedures in International Law 19. Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted. 
2247
 Ngcobo J’s Chirwa-opinion may therefore be good policy from a legislative perspective, but amounts 
to bad law from a constitutional equity perspective. 
2248
 See Biehler Procedures in International Law 17. 
2249
 Biehler Procedures in International Law 17. Footnotes omitted. 
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undermined by the confusion that surrounds the Chirwa-judgment.2250 This confusion 
has obtained a new dimension with the recent Constitutional Court Gcaba-decision.2251 
2 2 4 1 Interpretative Context 
The character of the Constitution and the type of value-based interpretation that it 
attracts inform the context in which fundamental rights function, as well as the scope the 
judiciary owes such rights in the promotion and protection thereof.2252 The judiciary is 
required to have regard not only to the domain of the right at issue (for example 
employment or administrative), but also to the ambit of the right (for example specific or 
general).2253 The interpretation of one right to the exclusion of another in the absence of 
                                            
2250
 See Chapters Eights and Nine. The academic impact of the Constitutional Court’s confusing stance is 
illustrated in the recent academic contributions of Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741, Ngcukaitobi 2008 (29) ILJ 
841 and Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307. The post-Chirwa jurisprudence indicates that the Constitutional 
Court has not contributed to the ideal of legal certainty, but did unify the judiciary in its quest to find 
meaning in that uncertainty. See for example Nakin v MEC, Department of Education Cape Province 
2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck), Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 
(SCA), Booysen v SAP 2008 (10) BLLR 928 (LC), Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 2009 (3) BLLR 272 
(E), Mohlaka v Minister of Finance 2009 (4) BLLR 348 (LC) and Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 
(8) BLLR 721 (SCA). See also Grogan 2009 25(3) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
2251
 See Chapter Nine. In the Sidumo-judgment, the majority propagated the interdependence of 
fundamental rights in line with the courts earlier judgments. See the discussion in Chapter Seven. In the 
Chirwa-case, the Constitutional Court attempted to provide clarity on the relationship between labour and 
administrative law at the expense of its own precedent (without express rejection thereof), as it endorsed 
“strict compartmentalisation of fundamental rights and … the pre-eminence of one right to the exclusion 
of the other”. As indicated by the tone of this statement, Langa CJ in his minority Chirwa-judgment did not 
share this perspective. See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 167 and 176. See 
also Hoexter 2008 (1) CCR 209 at 210 and 228. In the Gcaba-case, the Constitutional Court professed 
itself in support of the doctrine of interdependence and stressed that “rigid compartmentalisation should 
be avoided”. Unfortunately, the Gcaba-finding on the facts of the case did not reflect a genuine 
application of the doctrine of interdependence. See Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) 
BLLR 1145 (CC) at paras 53 – 56. When considering the proper constitutional approach to the 
relationship between labour and administrative law the reasoning that mirrors that of the Constitutional 
Court in the Sidumo-judgment is to be preferred.  
2252
 See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–23 (1st ed); S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at par 303. 
2253
 Section 39 of the Constitution directs all courts to have regard to the spirit, purport and object of the 
Bill of Rights when interpreting the law. See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–9 and 11–32 (1st ed); S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (5) BCLR 665 (CC) at par 325. 
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normative conflict is suspicious, because the normative value system of the Constitution 
dictates against such an approach and “the rights enshrined in ... [the Bill of Rights] give 
expression to the most profound commitments of our society”.2254 It is undeniable that 
the right to fair labour practices is a beacon for vulnerable employees.2255 In giving 
effect to this right, the LRA affords protection to vulnerable employees.2256 Labour 
legislation, such as the LRA, should be interpreted to grant protection to the 
contextually identified vulnerable employees.2257  
The judiciary’s favourite catchphrase in this respect is ‘purposive interpretation’.2258 
However, it is unacceptable to tag interpretation as purposive in order to justify policy 
findings, as purposive interpretation has its own rules and presumptions that cannot be 
set aside for reasons of personal preference.2259 Even if an applicant does not 
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 Woolman et al CLOSA 11–32 (1st ed). See the preferred interpretative approach of Navsa AJ in 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89. Cf Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 
2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 139 per Ngcobo J. 
2255
 See Partington and Van der Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 218. 
2256
 The Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at 
par 72 elaborated that “[t]heir vulnerability flows from the inequality that characterises employment in 
modern developing economies”. 
2257
 The vulnerability of every employee in a specific employment relationship involved in a specific 
dispute must be determined within the job or sector-specific context of that specific relationship and 
dispute. See Chapter Four, part 3. 
2258
 The Constitutional Court embraced the purposive approach, properly understood, in the judgment of 
S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at par 15. Scott and Alston 2000 (16) SAJHR 206 at 218 indicate that 
the philosophy that underlies purposive interpretation is the effective protection of fundamental rights. As 
such, purposive interpretation calls into play certain presumptions: “Notable are the presumptions that 
interpretations should be: ‘generous’ rather than ‘legalistic’; aimed not just at being consistent with the 
purpose of the right in question but at ‘fulfilling’ that purpose; and directed at ‘securing … the full benefit’ 
of the Bill of Rights’ protection”. Emphasis added. The majority of the Constitutional Court in Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at paras 41, 47, 104 and 112 did not give express recognition to the 
technique and considerations that underlies a true purposive approach. In the absence thereof, one is left 
with the impression that reliance was placed on apparent purposive interpretation to justify the limitation 
and separation of fundamental rights from a policy perspective. See Chapter Nine, part 4. 
2259
 See the discussion in Chapter Nine, part 4. With regard to criticism on the reliance of policy-
considerations for the interpretation of statutory provisions, see the minority judgment of Langa CJ in 
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 174. See also Makambi v MEC, Department of 
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specifically place reliance on a fundamental right (for example s 33), s 39(3) of the 
Constitution entails that the underlying values and principles can still have important 
adjudicatory implications.2260 This is in line with the reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court in S v Zuma,2261 namely that the Bill of Rights must be interpreted in a manner 
“suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
referred to”.2262 What the ‘full measure’ amounts to must be contextually determined on 
a case-by-case basis.2263 In attempting to do so, constitutional jurisprudence has 
acknowledged the likeness between the value-based approach and purposive 
interpretation.2264 
When interpreting the purpose of the protection afforded by the right to fair labour 
practices, the judiciary must not overshoot this purpose to such an extent that it isolates 
the right and the individuals that stand to benefit, from the full protective spirit of the Bill 
of Rights.2265 Unfortunately, it appears as if the judiciary is losing sight of the true 
purposive focus, as the policy-laden approach identifiable in the apparently purposive 
interpretation of Ngcobo J’s Chirwa-judgment comes dangerously close to confusing 
general policies with constitutional values.2266 In striving for harmonious interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                            
Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at paras 37 – 39; Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 
2009 (3) BLLR 272 (E) at par 53; Modutle v Municipal Manager: Sol Plaatjie Municipality [2009] ZANCHC 
6 at par 38. 
2260
 See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–9 (1st ed). 
2261
 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
2262
 S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at par 14 quoting Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 
at 328. Emphasis added. See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–10 (1st ed). See also Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fisher [1980] AC 319, cited with approval in the Zuma-judgment. 
2263
 See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–12 (1st ed). 
2264
 See Scott and Alston 2000 (16) SAJHR 206 at 218; Woolman et al CLOSA 11–25 (1st ed); R v Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321.  
2265
 The Constitutional Court in S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at paras 17 and 18 explained that the 
judiciary must be cautious not to get caught up in deviation, but limit itself to mere interpretation. See the 
discussion pertaining to purposive interpretation in Chapter Nine, part 4. 
2266
 In Makambi v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 2008 (8) BLLR 711 (SCA) at par 37, 
Nugent JA (after consideration of the Fredericks- and Chirwa-judgments) observed that “a fair reading of 
the two judgments makes it clear that the majority was of the view that the objective of the Act was both 
to encompass employees in the public service and also to be exhaustive of their rights arising from their 
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s 23 and the LRA, judicial interpretation of the LRA remains conditional on the proper 
purposive understanding of the constitutional values.2267 
2 2 4 2 Relevant Rights 
When considering the applicability of fundamental rights, it must be kept in mind that 
“[a] first and quite distinctive structural feature of South Africa’s Bill of Rights is the non-
hierarchical approach it takes to received categories of human rights”.2268 
The Sidumo-judgment recognised that “[e]mployees are entitled to assert their 
rights”.2269 It was held to be a general misconception that ss 23 and 33 of the 
Constitution are “exclusive and have to be dealt with in sealed compartments”.2270 The 
Constitutional Court revealed itself open to the idea that “these rights in part overlap 
and are interconnected”.2271 This understanding of fundamental rights can be linked to 
the Constitutional Court’s understanding in S v Makwanyane,2272 that an associated 
right can be relied upon to grant meaning to a particular right.2273 
In so far as the Chirwa-majorities can be read as sanctioning compartmentalisation of 
the rights to fair labour practices (s 23) and just administrative action (s 33), it stands in 
                                                                                                                                            
employment, notwithstanding that the Legislature had expressed itself to the contrary in section 157(2)”. 
Emphasis added. 
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 See Woolman et al CLOSA 11–31 (1st ed); Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) BCLR 658 (CC) at par 75 
per Mohamed J. Cf Partington and Van der Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 229. 
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 Scott and Alston 2000 (16) SAJHR 206 at 214. 
2269
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 77 per Navsa AJ. Not 
merely one right, but all relevant rights. 
2270
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 112 per Navsa AJ. In 
Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 8, Nugent JA explained that law in 
general should not be compartmentalised. 
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 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 112 per Navsa AJ. See 
also the judgments of O’Regan and Sachs JJ in that case. In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 89, the majority illustrated a willingness to rely on s 33 of the 
Constitution for the interpretation of s 145 of the LRA, thereby indicating the practical application of the 
theoretical doctrine of interdependence. This stands in contrast to the Chirwa-reasoning of Ngcobo J. 
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 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
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 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at paras 10 and 95; Woolman et al CLOSA 11–33 (1st 
ed). A similar sentiment is revealed in the judgment of Nugent JA in Makhanya v University of Zululand 
2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 46. 
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contrast to the often repeated perspective of constitutional interdependence propagated 
by the Constitutional Court.2274 The inherent danger of such an approach is explained 
by the comment of Scott and Alston on the proper application of purposive 
interpretation: 
Whereas an each-provision-in-isolation approach can easily result in rights 
(and thus people) falling through the constitutional cracks in an unprincipled 
way, a holistic approach to contextual interpretation is more likely to take 
seriously the interpretative presumptions associated … with the purposive 
approach.2275 
The interdependence between ss 23 and 33 was emphasised in the Sidumo-case, 
specifically in the judgments of O’Regan and Sachs JJ. In the Chirwa-case, the 
Constitutional Court did not explicitly reject its previous understanding of the holistic and 
interdependent interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.2276 It is respectfully 
submitted that jurists and academics, such as Cheadle, do not embrace genuine 
interdependence and purposive interpretation, when adopting the Chirwa-perspective 
that “the Constitution must be interpreted to draw a distinction between the 
constitutional rights to fair administrative action and to fair labour practices and between 
the laws giving effect to each”.2277 Cheadle concludes that, “as a matter of constitutional 
scope, the right to fair administrative action in s 33 of the Constitution does not apply to 
administrative decisions concerning employment and labour relations because those 
relations are comprehensively dealt with under s 23”.2278 An evaluation of the rights 
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 Stacey 2008 (125) SALJ 307 at 330 comments that the absurdity of the two-majority Chirwa-
perspective “will continue to stymie lower courts and perpetuate confusion until the impossible situation 
that the majority … decision has created is acknowledged and corrected”. This was not done by the 
Constitutional Court in the recent Gcaba-judgment. The court merely attempted to interpret its way 
around the Chirwa-confusion, without overruling the two-majority Chirwa-judgment.  
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 Scott and Alston 2000 (16) SAJHR 206 at 218. See Chapter Nine, part 4.  
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 See Chapter Seven. 
2277
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741. 
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 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741. Emphasis added. Cheadle’s understanding of the constitutional approach 
to the determination of “the constitutional scope” is unfortunate as he chooses to disregard the 
predominant constitutional jurisprudence prior to the Chirwa-judgment and seeks to determine the 
interpretative intention of the Constitution as it relates to the Bill of Rights in isolation. Cheadle 2009 (30) 
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enshrined in the Constitution in such a manner leads to the resurrection of conceptual 
formalism that undermines the spirit and purport of the Constitution. 
It is unfortunate that the High Court in De Villiers v Minister of Education, Western Cape 
Province2279 opted to build on the restrictive approach embraced by Cheadle. With 
reference to the author, the court held that “[w]here rights share the same values as 
fairness does in the right of equality, a right to fair labour practices and fair 
administrative action, the courts have to locate the primary constitutional breach in the 
more specific right as was the case in the majority judgment in Chirwa”.2280 
This point of view is salvageable from an organic interdependence perspective if one 
accepts that the (primary) right to fair labour practices can be informed, contextually and 
interpretively, by another (secondary) constitutional right, such as the right to just 
administrative action. Furthermore, although it is possible, and from an operational 
perspective desirable, to accept that PAJA should not be regarded as the primary 
regulatory mechanism where employment disputes arise in the public sector, the 
Sidumo-judgment illustrated that it is possible for s 33 constitutional concepts, such as 
reasonableness, to find application and influence the fairness requirement that qualifies 
labour practices.2281 It is possible for the LRA to regulate employment disputes in the 
                                                                                                                                            
ILJ 741 at 747 merely focuses on one Constitutional Court judgment – Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 
2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) – to argue that it is justifiable to reason that fundamental rights are separable. 
This argument is furthermore based on the court’s mere mention that primary rights were contextually 
identifiable. However, the Constitutional Court also acknowledged that the secondary right (such as the 
right to dignity) could inform the existence of a specific or contextually primary right due to shared 
foundational values. Cf the Constitutional Courts’ acceptance of context and value based 
interdependence in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BLLR 1181 (CC) at paras 135 – 140. 
2279
 2009 (2) SA 619 (C). 
2280
 De Villiers v Minister of Education, Western Cape Province 2009 (2) SA 619 (C) at par 16. As far as 
this judgment can be read as forcing a protection-choice between rights respectively associated with 
primary and secondary constitutional breaches, it is questionable. 
2281
 Hoexter 2008 (1) CCR 209 at 213 correctly explains that the reasoning of the majority in the Sidumo-
case is an improvement on the inconclusive approach to the administrative action issue in Minister of 
Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), but views it also as “evidence of the intrinsic 
difficulty of deciding what is and what is not administrative action”. Hoexter notes that the difficulty of 
evaluating the presence or absence of administrative action on a case-by-case basis “exists even when, 
as here, the Court is relying on the general conception of administrative action developed judicially under 
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public sector if it is contextually interpreted to allow s 33 developed influences in the 
interpretation of fair labour practices (as protected by s 23), as the LRA was not 
specifically designed to regulate public power infused employment relationships. 
Froneman J emphasised the value of this perspective in the Nakin-judgment,2282 by 
stating that “the substantive coherence and development of employment law can only 
gain from insights derived initially from administrative law concerns”.2283 
In addition, Cheadle himself admits that the Constitutional Court’s Chirwa-judgment 
results from “the manner in which the constitutional issues are identified in the 
judgment”.2284 With regard to the possible permeable interpretation of rights, one is 
faced with a controversial judgment on the one hand and a range of unambiguous and 
reconcilable judgments on the other.2285 Legal logic dictates that a range of coherent 
judgments concerning the normative value-based understanding of fundamental rights 
is to be preferred to one apparently rogue reading of a contentious perspective, all from 
the same court.  
The idea that two different constitutional rights may form the basis of the same issues is 
not unknown to labour law, as the Labour Court has noted that even where the same 
cause of action may be found in a discrimination dispute and an unfair dismissal 
dispute, the applicable remedies are still found in separate pieces of legislation.2286 Any 
other understanding would prevent the judiciary from considering “all relevant aspects 
                                                                                                                                            
section 33 rather than the more nit-picking definition in the PAJA”. Even though this exercise is no easy 
task, Hoexter proclaims that the Constitutional Court got it right in the Sidumo-judgment. 
2282
 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck). 
2283
 Nakin v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (5) BLLR 489 (Ck) at par 39. 
Emphasis added. 
2284
 Cheadle 2009 (30) ILJ 741 at 742. 
2285
 The Constitutional Court’s position is clearly illustrated in Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), 
Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC), NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 
(CC), Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of SA 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC), Government of 
the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 
BCLR 569 (CC) and Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). See Chapter 
Seven. 
2286
 See Ditsamai v Gauteng Shared Services Centre 2009 (5) BLLR 456 (LC), as referred to in Grogan 
2009 25(3) Employment LJ (Electronic Version). 
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of the particular”2287 dispute. The implication of this statement in the context of the 
Ditsamai-case is that the right to fair labour practices and the right to equality can give 
rise to the same cause of action. As is the case with the LRA and PAJA, the LRA and 
the EEA provide different remedies. With regard to the legislative relationship between 
the LRA and PAJA, the Constitutional Court can at least be said to exude a clear 
perspective that the specialised LRA is to remain the regulatory force, even if the State 
acts as employer.2288 
2 2 4 3 Relevant Legislation and Forum 
The approach that underlies the relationship between the relevant rights influences the 
identification of the relevant legislation and the forum in which an infringement of the 
relevant rights can be adjudicated. 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA,2289 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal reasoned, contrary to the rules of interpretation and logic, as embraced 
by the Constitution Court’s Sidumo–judgment, that the general regulations of PAJA 
supersede the specific provisions of the LRA. Although the Constitutional Court has 
admitted that PAJA was enacted in response to the constitutional obligation for 
legislation to “cover the field”2290 of administrative action, this provision must be 
regarded in the proper holistic context of the Constitution and the relationship between 
general and specific administrative law. 
In the Sidumo-judgment, the Constitutional Court properly considered the different 
general and specific dimensions of administrative law. The court concluded that, 
although PAJA codifies the common law elements of administrative law, it could not be 
regarded as the exclusive legislative basis for the regulation of s 33 of the Constitution. 
                                            
2287
 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 47. See also the minority judgment 
(which concurred with the majority on the jurisdictional issue) in Department of Justice v CCMA 2004 (25) 
ILJ 248 (LAC). 
2288
 See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BCLR 97 (CC) at paras 102 and 175. See also Nonzamo 
Cleaning Services Cooperative v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 901 (Ck) at paras 18 – 29. 
2289
 2006 (11) BLLR 1021 (SCA). 
2290
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 43. See also Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC). 
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It was confirmed that this function could contextually be performed by specialised 
national legislation like the LRA.2291 
Consequently, the argument that an employee must base his claim on PAJA if a court 
finds that the disciplinary action of the employer constitutes an administrative action 
cannot hold legal ground.2292 Using s 33 as an interpretative tool and supplementary 
right in the application of specific s 23 provisions found in the LRA still allows public 
employees the opportunity to ensure the protection of their right to just administrative 
action through its co-operation with their right to fair labour practices. 
In the Sidumo-case, Navsa AJ identified three areas of conflict between the LRA and 
PAJA, namely time-scale issues in relation to reviews, jurisdiction (with specific 
consideration of s 157 of the LRA) and the available remedies. Nothing in the legislative 
conflict affects the substance of the right to just administrative action as enshrined in the 
Constitution. The reasoning that PAJA need not find direct application for the protection 
of s 33 (if specific legislation can perform the same function) eliminates all superficial 
conflict and allows substantive considerations to remain relevant. There is no legal (as 
opposed to policy) reason why the jurisdictional reasoning, as found in the Chirwa-case, 
cannot fit within the Sidumo-understanding of the LRA, as specialised legislation that 
                                            
2291
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 91 and 92. 
Section 210 of the LRA (which stipulates that “[i]f any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, 
arises between this Act and the provisions of any other law, save the Constitution or any Act expressly 
amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail”) carries the interpretative potential to give 
expression to this perspective. See Nonzamo Cleaning Services Coorperative v Appie 2008 (9) BLLR 
901 (Ck) at par 23. The general ambit of PAJA should therefore not be read as ousting the specialised 
functioning of the LRA. (In the absence of specialised legislation, PAJA would be the obvious first port of 
call.) Reasoning of this nature is in line with the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 678 (CC) at par 25, where it was held that the 
“cause of action for the judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA”. The 
court regarded PAJA as the ordinary route but not the exclusive one as it declared that it was not in the 
necessary in the Bato Star-case “to consider ... causes of action for judicial review of administrative 
action that do not fall within the scope of the PAJA”. Emphasis added. Cf Van Eck 2008 Obiter 339 at 
347. 
2292
 Cf Vettori 2008 (71) THRHR 240 at 252. 
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“gives effect to the right to fair labour practices”2293 and that must be read in a manner 
that complies with the prescripts of s 33 of the Constitution.2294  
A logical approach of this nature is possible, as s 157(2) of the LRA allows 
administrative action based employment decision affecting public employees to be 
considered within the realm of the Labour Court, without taking anything away from the 
traditional protection of the High Court. The Labour Court is in essence an equity court 
that must consider all relevant contextual considerations in pursuit of fair labour 
practices.2295 The Labour Court cannot ignore the right to just administrative action and 
the jurisdictional power that it brings in the form of s 157(2), merely because it feels 
more comfortable with the familiar application of the LRA provisions exclusively 
associated with s 23 of the Constitution. The extension of the High Court’s constitutional 
jurisdiction to the Labour Court by means of s 157(2) of the LRA in fact endorses the 
interdependence of s 23 with other constitutional rights in scenarios where the State as 
employer exercises public power.2296 
3 SUMMARY 
It is not denied that both labour and administrative law demand recognition of their 
autonomy. The bases of their autonomy or traditional sui generis nature now reside in 
constitutional rights.2297 The character of the associated autonomy has changed from 
                                            
2293
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 94. 
2294
 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 89 and 91. See 
also De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council (Umhlatuzana Civic 
Association Intervening) 2001 (11) BCLR 1109 (CC) at par 24 per Yacoob J. Cf Partington and Van der 
Walt 2008 Obiter 209 at 231. 
2295
 See also Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 (8) BLLR 721 (SCA) at par 46. 
2296
 In terms the concurrent jurisdiction s 157(2) of the LRA therefore bestows on the Labour Court 
jurisdiction to comprehensively deal with such cases, while taking nothing away from the High Court in 
the exercise of its power in such circumstances. The Constitutional Court admitted as much in Gcaba v 
Minister for Safety and Security 2009 (12) BLLR 1145 (CC) at par 24. The constitutional jurisdiction 
bestowed on the High Court also in turn calls on that court to recognise the interdependence between ss 
23 and 33 in scenarios where the State as employer exercises its public power and adversely affects the 
rights and interests of public employees, if such an employee chooses to approach the High Court. 
2297
 In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 150, Sachs J 
elucidated: “The Bill of Rights does specifically identify a number of rights for special constitutional 
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absolute to relative.2298 Section 33 of the Constitution provides a contextual boundary 
for labour law, while s 23 in turn acts as the contextual boundary for administrative law, 
as the relative autonomy of both cannot be allowed to undermine the interests of the 
parties to the public sector administrative-employment relationship, which the 
Constitution is called upon to protect.2299 The constitutional protection found in ss 23 
and 33 must be conceived as a means of structuring the relationship between these two 
rights.2300 
The doctrine of interdependence allows constitutional rights to merge in cases where 
there is no normative conflict. The normative interdependence between labour and 
administrative law pre-dates the Constitution, although courts tend to ignore that fact in 
                                                                                                                                            
protection. Each is independently delineated, reflecting historical experience pointing to the need to be on 
guard in areas of special potential vulnerability and abuse. Each has produced an outgrowth of specialist 
legal learning. Yet enumerating themes for dedicated attention does not presuppose or permit detaching 
the listed rights from the foundational values that nurture them. Nor does it justify severing the listed 
rights from the foundational values that nurture them. Nor does it justify severing the rights from the 
underlying values that give substance and texture to the Constitution as a whole. On the contrary, in a 
value-based constitutional democracy with a normative structure that is seamless, organic and ever-
evolving, the manner in which claims to constitutional justice are typified and dealt with should always be 
integrated with the context of the setting, interests and values involved.” One should here again be aware 
of the fact that constitutional justice is flexible in that it is the heart of the living instrument that we call the 
Constitution. Constitutional justice therefore calls for judicial consideration of contexts, interests and 
values. 
2298
 As Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 7 rightly explains, “[r]ights define boundaries ... and it 
is those boundaries, enforced by the law, that ensure individual freedom and autonomy”. 
2299
 As Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 13 appropriately elucidates, “rights are not primarily 
about things, but about people’s relation to each other”. A rights-based approach, underlying the 
Constitution, acknowledges this traditional protective function of rights. Furthermore, the idea of 
‘relationship’ works against the abstract idea of rights in their functioning, as “there is no free standing 
human nature comprehensible in abstraction from all relationship from which one could derive a theory of 
rights”. See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 18 fn 20. 
2300
 Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 8 argues that rights should be conceived as 
relationships.  
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an attempt to compartmentalise the rights to fair labour practices and just administrative 
action.2301 
The idea that two different areas of law can come together in one set of circumstances 
is not a new one. In his minority Mustapha-judgment, Schreiner JA recognised that 
contractual stipulations (traditionally regarded as private law regulated) could be 
exercised by a state official with public power.2302 The consequence of this is that 
contractual aspects were not disregarded, but supplemented by public law regulation of 
public power (in the interest of justice) to prevent any arbitrary action that could 
otherwise be taken in the context of the contract. The same argument applies to current 
law when evaluating the relationship between labour and administrative law. The 
common conceptual trilogy of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness 
allows for interdependence. That interdependence, in turn, allows labour and 
administrative law to supplement one another where the singular application of either 
undermines certain aspects of the pursuit of constitutional justice.2303 
                                            
2301
 Pre-constitutional interdependence is evident in the Zenzile-judgment, where it was emphasised that 
the principles of natural justice collectively form a golden thread that runs through the law in pursuit of 
fairness. See Chapter Eight, parts 2 2 and 3 1; Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law and 
Justice 23. Although read as attempts to circumvent the exclusion of public employees from the 
framework of labour law out of necessity, pre-constitutional judgments are camouflaged examples of 
hybridity. In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (12) BLLR 1181 (CC) at par 140, Sachs J 
expressed the view that different formal articulations may be based on the same basic constitutional 
rationale. Southwood J expressed a similar view within a public employment context in Nell v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development 2006 (7) BLLR 716 (T) at par 19 in declaring that “it is wrong to 
characterise a matter as a labour dispute or as an administrative law dispute and then decide that the 
dispute must be decided in accordance with the relevant body of law”. 
2302
 The minority judgment of Schreiner JA is post-constitutionally regarded as the correct approach. The 
majority judgment in Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue in Lichtenburg 1958 (3) SA 343 (A) was overruled 
in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA), where the court held the minority 
judgment to be the correct one. See POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E). 
2303
 Also important is the fact that the broad content of constitutional justice itself requires consideration of 
three elements: context, interests and values. See the judgment of Sachs J in Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at paras 150 and 151. The presence of more than one 
right calling for protection and promotion in a specific set of circumstances does not create tension. In 
NCGLE v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at par 114, Sachs J declared that “a single 
situation can give rise to multiple, overlapping and mutually reinforcing violations of constitutional rights”. 
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The recognition of normative interdependence between labour and administrative rights 
in theory counters this archaic problem. In practice, the judiciary must now determine 
how to apply this theoretical cure to the formalistic problem. As explained by Froneman 
J in the Giyose-judgment, the judiciary must clarify the issues in every case, without 
undermining the character of the issues with impressive (although logically flawed) 
interpretative footwork.2304 This will require the judiciary to step out of their formalistic 
comfort-zone and give genuine expression to their constitutional duty to protect and 
promote the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. If the true (not (re)characterised) issue 
relates to the exercise of both managerial and public power in a public employment 
context, both labour and administrative law will require judicial consideration.2305 Such a 
judicial mind-shift will result in the avoidance of the “parsimonious approach of austere 
formalism that is at odds with a proper approach to fundamental rights”.2306 
                                                                                                                                            
This realisation holds true as the impact of a public employment decision on public employees as a group 
“is of such a nature that a number of different protected rights are simultaneously infringed”. Sachs J 
further emphasised that, in such circumstances, “it would be as artificial in law as it would be in life to 
treat the categories [of rights] as alternative rather than interactive”. The focus should fall on the fact that 
all rights must be read in conformity with the supreme Constitution. The judicial tendency to read-in 
superficial tension in the public employment relationship, by reverting to archaic formalistic perspectives, 
is not in accord with the spirit of the Constitution to which courts are duty-bound to give expression, 
directly or indirectly, in every case. 
2304
 See MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
19. 
2305
 In MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 
19, Froneman J summarised the possible situations: “[I]f the real dispute transcends or goes beyond 
mere employment issues, the applicant of the right to just administrative action might come to the fore; if 
the dispute does not reach that far, the focus on just administrative action becomes unnecessary without 
detracting in any way from its full application and importance as a fundamental right.” Yet it is not for the 
courts to deny an applicant the opportunity to justify the applicability of the right to just administrative 
action if he or she so pleads it. 
2306
 MEC, Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape v Giyose 2008 (5) BLLR 472 (E) at par 19, 
with reference to POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) BLLR 385 (E). A jurisdictional 
perspective aimed at isolating certain legal considerations, attempts to reserve labour evaluation that 
attracts s 23 constitutional considerations to the Labour Court, and bans the High Court’s jurisdiction and 
the s 33 associated administrative law considerations. This results in a denial of the “mutability of basic 
values”, such as fairness, based on jurisdictional arguments and ultimately amounts to a constitutional 
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Illustration 4: The Constitutional Dimensions 
Specialised 
legislation 
(LRA) giving 
effect to s 23 
It is crucial that both labour and administrative law academics and practitioners 
recognise that the relationship between labour and administrative law, with its fairness 
roots, is but two sides of the same coin2307 – the coin being the Constitution. 
Constitutional fairness informs the standard of fairness required by both ss 23 and 
33.2308 The broad concept of constitutional fairness encompasses reflection of both a 
substantive and procedural nature, as well as considerations of lawfulness and 
reasonableness.  
The outcome generated by the relationship of the rights to fair labour practices and just 
administrative action must be consistent with the values of the Constitution.2309 Just as 
rights form the boundary for contextually overlapping areas of law, the Constitution 
forms the boundary for the overlapping rights. In view of that, the Constitution must 
structure the reality of the relationship between rights.2310 When specialised legislation 
is viewed against general legislation, and both are informed by the supreme 
Constitution, conflict fades away as perspective shifts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
injustice. If such jurisdictional reasoning is allowed to continue, legal substance will once again be 
suppressed by form. See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 4. Botha 2003 (1) TSAR 20 at 21 
rightly notes that “[t]he Constitution … represents a fundamental break with the assumption that it is … 
acceptable to erect legal walls of separation to prevent challenges”. 
2307
 Consequently, regardless of whether jurists call it labour fairness or administrative fairness, it remains 
in essence a consideration of fairness. 
2308
 Consequently, the LRA and PAJA pursue rights-based constitutional fairness. 
2309
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 9. 
2310
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 14. 
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If genuine sector-specific contextual consideration is given to the normative 
interdependence of ss 23 and 33, the fact that both the Labour Court and the High 
Court can arguably (in terms of s 157(2) of the LRA) concurrently protect the rights of a 
public sector employee (if justified on the facts) will prevent the development of a dual 
system of law. The court must accept that there is only one system of law based on the 
Constitution and that the jurisdictional functioning of the courts must reveal a spirit of 
co-operation. Any minor inconsistency in the Labour Court and the High Court’s 
respective approaches is comparable to, for example, the judgments of the Western 
Cape High Court and the Eastern Cape High Court with similar facts but different 
opinions as to the merits of the case. A difference of opinion is inevitably present in the 
judgments of the various divisions of the High Court.2311 The argument that the 
concurrent jurisdiction between the Labour Court and High Court will lead to the 
development of such a dual legal system is illogical. As long as the judiciary exercises 
their duties with proper regard to the spirit and purport of the Constitution, any errors in 
legal reasoning can be addressed by an appeal court higher up in the hierarchy, as 
normally happens in any legal system. No dual system of law will develop if courts 
respect the interdependence of the rights in the Bill of Rights, acknowledge that no set 
rules for the variable norms of fairness and reasonableness can be pre-determined and 
take on a collaborative deliberative attitude instead of a defensive jurisdictional one. 
This is possible, because the judiciary, first of all, agree that s 23 protections of both 
private and public sector employees are enforced through the provisions of the LRA. 
The judiciary also agree that employees are obliged to approach the Labour Court for 
LRA based claims.2312 All that remains is for the judiciary (including the Constitutional 
Court itself) to give proper recognition to the interdependent spirit of the Constitution, as 
recognised in the Sidumo-judgment when considering the scope of the concurrent 
jurisdiction endorsed by s 157(2) of LRA. 
Consequently, the legal reality should echo the constitutional Sidumo-reasoning of 
Sachs J, that the “relationship between the separately protected rights should ... be 
                                            
2311
 This reality was emphasised by Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC) at par 
178. 
2312
 See s 157(1) of the LRA. 
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regarded as osmotic rather than hermetic.”2313 When the focus shifts to a rights-
relationship, based on constitutional justice, then the attention automatically turns to 
contextual considerations2314 in which the variable nature of the administrative law 
trilogy obtains appropriate recognition without causing uncertainty due to unrestrained 
flexibility. In conclusion, a rights-relationship calls for consideration of constitutional 
values, which in turn calls for the acknowledgment “that how we articulate and foster 
those values varies tremendously over time and place”.2315 
                                            
2313
 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC) at par 151. 
2314
 See Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 9. 
2315
 Nedelsky 1993 (1) Rev of Const Studies 1 at 10. See Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (12) 
BLLR 1181 (CC) at par 140 per Sachs J. 
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